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A hctrart 
This thesis fills a significant gap in current secondary literature on post-war British 
defence and internal security policy. Hitherto, post-war British defence policy in Kenya 
has only been considered in passing, in relation to the larger question of Middle East 
strategy. Very little attention has been paid to Kenya's particular importance in the 
post-1956 `east of Suez' role. Current works on British internal security policy in 
Kenya concentrate either on post-war policing in general or, more specifically, on the 
British counter-insurgency campaign during the Mau Mau revolt (1952-6). 
In examining post-war British defence and internal security policy and practice 
in Kenya until 1965, this thesis demonstrates the essential continuity in British strategic 
priorities in the area. Far from having to `scram from Africa', Britain adapted its 
defence requirements to an acceptable minimum, thereby ameliorating the more 
`extreme' face of African nationalism, and denying it political capital with which to 
apply pressure to Britain's `moderate' collaborators. The success of this flexible 
approach to defensive requirements is clear because, in losing its politically 
unacceptable army base, Britain gained a great deal in terms of retention of 
communications, leave camp, overflying, staging and training rights and facilities, in 
exchange for arming and training the Kenyan military and assisting in the maintenance 
of post-independence internal security. Such arrangements continued well beyond the 
apparent demise of the `east of Suez role'. 
This thesis sets British internal security policy in Kenya in its broad Cold War 
context (1945-65). Even after apparent military victory in 1956, Britain remained 
fearful of a recurrence of Mau Mau, and the possible failure of attempts to fudge a 
`political solution' in Kenya. Britain also had to ensure that its `moderate' successors 
would be safe from the more radical elements in Kenya African politics, especially 
given the earlier contradictions inherent in the divisive political and socio-economic 
reforms which had been designed to foster economic and political stability. 
Quite simply, therefore, this study demonstrates that British defence and 
internal security interests in Kenya were far more important, and far more intricately 
connected with the transfer of political power, than has hitherto been acknowledged. 
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'The greatest problem of all was Kenya. 1 inherited from lain Macleod a strong 
emotional involvement in this country, which was, and I think still remains, the 
outstanding example of British influence in Africa. ' 
Reginald Maudling, Memoirs (1978). 
`We should seek to achieve the orderly transfer of power to an African-dominated 
Government commanding the widest possible support in the country and having as its 
objective the development of Kenya as a modern democratic state; our tactics 
... 
should be directed towards this end and we should take every opportunity to bring 
about any new political alignment which offers a sound prospect of our attaining our 
ultimate objective. ' 
Reginald Maudling, `Kenya Constitutional Conference', 30 January 1962. 
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Introduction 
Aims and focus 
This thesis has two main aims. First, it seeks to bridge a significant gap in the current 
literature on post-war British defence and internal security policy in Kenya. The 
research that underpins this study was motivated by the key question: why does 
existing scholarship fail to consider in detail Kenya's place in British overseas defence 
policy, and is this neglect justified? The same can be asked of the relative lack of 
attention paid to internal security in Kenya prior to the declaration of the State of 
Emergency in October 1952 and, equally, following Britain's apparent military victory 
over Mau Mau in late 1956. ' In surveying the defence and internal security aspects of 
British colonial policy in Kenya in the broad context of the 1945-65 period, the 
narrative account therefore attempts not only to fill a gap in the current historiography, 
but also provides the basis for considering whether or not the subject in fact warrants 
this earlier neglect. 
In addressing this first aim, the thesis also demonstrates that political 
decolonisation in Kenya and British defence priorities and internal security policy were 
far more intricately connected than previous studies suggest, and were not confined 
simply to the Emergency years (1952-60). This study therefore provides a hitherto 
largely neglected, but important, backdrop to British political decision-making on 
' The only exceptions are my `British Counter-Insurgency in Kenya. 1952-56: Extension of Internal 
Security Policy or Prelude to Decolonisation? ', Small 11 ars and Insurgencies, 9/3 (Winter 1998). pp. 
46-101, derived largely from Chapter II of this thesis and the earlier 'The British Campaign in Kenya. 
1952-1956: The Development of Counter-Insurgency Policy. MA dissertation. University of 
Lancaster. 1996. and internal Security and Decolonization in Kenya, 1956-63". Journal of Imperial 
and Comm nonwealth Hi. stc», º, 29/1 (Jan. 2001). pp. 92-116. derived from Chapters V and VI. 
Kenya during the post-war period, and in doing so contributes to a more complete 
understanding of British decolonisation. 
The decision was taken to examine the evolution of defence and internal 
security policy between 1945 and 1965 in order to assess the various political 
developments in Kenya and responses to them in their post-war, thus Cold War, 
context. In taking this broad chronological approach, this study argues that British 
decolonisation in Kenya did not follow a pre-planned pattern; nor did it amount to a 
radical and rapid policy reversal, as such. Rather, when viewed from the defence and 
internal security perspectives, it can be seen that in responding to nationalist pressures 
and fears of a post-Mau Mau Kenyan civil war, and ultimately transferring power to an 
African majority government, Britain reacted in a calculated and pragmatic manner. 
The former suzerain was thereby able to enjoy a large degree of continuity in its aims 
and `vital' interests even beyond Kenya's independence. 
Historiography 
Given that a principle aim of this study is to consider a hitherto largely neglected 
aspect of British decolonisation, it is pointless to simply catalogue all of the current 
works which might conceivably include more detail on post-war British defence and 
colonial internal security in Kenya. Suffice it to say that previous studies comprise of 
several categories which, for simplicity, will be surveyed selectively, implying neither 
any ranking nor any relative importance of each particular genre. 
Understandably, Autobiographies (or memoirs) and Biographies of British 
decision-makers and key participants, that cover varying careers which spanned many 
years, tend to focus on `public' political events rather than the necessarily covert 
2 
defence and internal security deliberations which frequently underpinned them. Of 
course, the contentious issue of `national security' (or `public interest') dictates that 
some degree of government censorship is often imposed on such publications. 2 
Nevertheless, autobiographies tend to be less informative than they could be and, for 
the most part, those consulted for this study provided few, if any, clues as to what 
might be gleaned about British defence and internal security policy in Kenya beyond 
the confines of 1952-6.3 The same can be said of the handful of auto/biographies 
by/about key African nationalists. ' In both cases, where accounts by participants or 
biographies have a bearing on this thesis, relevant citations can be found in the main 
text. For the purposes of this study, however, it should be stressed from the outset that 
most autobiographies and biographies of key participants tend to concentrate on the 
Mau Mau Emergency and surrounding political developments, if at all. ' 
For example, Lord Butler, the former Foreign Secretary (Oct. 1963-64), refers 
in his memoirs to his erstwhile Colonial Office colleagues Oliver Lyttelton and 
Reginald Maudling (although not Alan Lennox-Boyd) in the British political context, 
2 For example, see the cabinet discussion on the publication of Lord Hankey's memoirs in: CAB 
128/34, CC (60) 64th Meeting, Item 10, 'Lord Hankey's Memoirs', 15 Dec. 1960. More recently. of 
course, there was the farcical episode of the Thatcher government's banning the publication of the 
autobiography of the former Assistant Director of MI5, Peter Wright, which then became wider 
available after publication in Australia: Peter Wright, Spy Catcher: The Candid. Autobiographv of a 
Senior Intelligence Officer (Richmond, Victoria: William Heinemann Australia. 1987). See also: John 
D. Baxter, State Security, Privacy and Information (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 1990), 
pp. 17,29,36,57,58,74.82,85-91,145, Laurence Lustgarten and Ian Leigh, In from the Cold: 
: \rational Security and Parliamentary Democracy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 237.258-9, 
279-85. 
3 Two exceptions. which allude to the importance of defence and internal security issues to Lennox- 
Boyyd's decision to hold the January 1959 Chequers conference on future policy in East Africa. are: Sir 
Michael Blundell. So Rough a Jl end: The Kenya . Memoirs of Sir 
. 
1Iichael Blundell (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964), pp. 261-2: Charles Douglas-Home, Evelyn Baring: The Last 
Proconsul (London: Collins. 1978), pp. 282-4. 
4 J. M. Kariuki, Ilau alau Detainee (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964 [19631)-, Malcolm MacDonald. 
Titans and Others (London: Collins. 1972). pp. 239-80. Tom Mbova, Freedom and. 1fter (London: 
Andre Deutsch. 1963): Jeremy Murray-Brown. Kenyatta (London: Fontana. 1974 [19721); Oginga 
Odinga. Not Yet Uhuru: an 
. 
4utobiographv (London: Heinemann. 1969 11967]). 
5 Martin Gilbert. '. Vei er Despair': ülnston S. Churchill 194 
-1965 (London. Heinemann. 1988). pp. 
803-4. 
yet provides not even a mention of Kenya. 6 Maudling himself, while giving a fair 
indication of the political tensions in Kenya during his time in office, suggests in a 
rather self-laudatory manner that a great deal more was achieved in the February 1962 
constitutional conference than detailed consideration of subsequent events and British 
concerns suggests. ' 
Studies of Imperialism and Decolonisation suffer even more than 
autobiographies and biographies from the necessity to convey information in as 
accessible and concise a manner as possible, and focus on political events and their 
socio-economic background. ' Again, references to Mau Mau excepted, defence and 
internal security is largely ignored. 9 This is especially the case with introductory 
surveys. 10 The same is true of the multitude of specialist studies of Mau Mau and 
Political Development in Kenya which again, where relevant, are cited in the main 
thesis text. " 
6 Lord Butler, The 
. 
art of the Possible: the Memoirs of Lord Butler (London: Hamish Hamilton. 
1971). pp. 125,127,135,140,143,145,148,156,159,160,223,233,236,239,240.241.246,248, 
249. 
'Reginald Maudling, Memoirs (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1978), pp. 90,92-6. 
8 See, for example: John Hatch, A History of Postwar Africa (New York: Praeger, 1970 [19651), 
passim.: Denis Judd, Empire: The British Imperial Experience from 1765 to the Present (London: 
Harper Collins, 1996), passim.; and Bernard Porter, The Lion 's Share: 
.4 Short Histoiy of British 
Imperialism, 1850-1970 (London, New York: Longman, 1975), passim. 
9 Again, see, for example: A. N. Porter and A. J. Stockwell (eds. ), British Imperial Policy and 
Decolonization, 1938-64 Two Volumes (London: Macmillan, 1989,1987), passim. 
10 For example, see: Franz Ansprenger. The Dissolution of the Colonial Empires (London. New York: 
Routledge. 1989), pp. 69,135.173,177.197-201,204; Raymond F. Betts. Decolonization (London: 
Routledge. 1998), pp. 2,3,8,32,33-5,44,49,50.56,59. David Birmingham, The Decolonization of 
. 
-1 frica (London: UCL Press, 1995). pp. 5.6,21,39,43-6.47.50.52.55.79,95: J. D. Hargreaves, 
Decolonization in Africa (London, New York: Longman. 1988), pp. 10,18.22.38,51.53,62.71.74. 
89.129-30,160.163,164-5.167.186,193-6,210, R. F. Holland, European Decolonization 1918- 
1981: an Introductory Survey (London: Macmillan. 1985). pp. 144-9.237-9.240-8; Miles Kahler. 
Decolonization in Britain and France: the Domestic Consequences of International Relations 
(Guildford: Princeton University Press. 1984), pp. 4.144-5,246.256.298-9,303-5,313,345-7.353. 
359. 
" For example: Wunyabari 0. Maloba. 
.I lau .t Iau and Kenva:. 4 n Analysis of a 
Peasant Revolt 
(London: James Currey. 1998 [1993]). passim. 
4 
The few exceptions to this rule, including studies of British Defence Policy 
which refer to Kenya's strategic significance only in passing, rely almost exclusively 
upon Phillip Darby's pioneering, if largely non-primary source-based, study of Britain's 
`east of Suez role' (1947-68). 12 Even the most recent primary source-based study of 
the transfer of power in Kenya largely dismisses strategic issues. '3 This general failure 
to take seriously Kenya's strategic significance becomes all the more apparent upon 
reading Clayton's essay on British military relations with the African members of the 
post-independence Commonwealth. 14 
Naturally, previous studies of British defence policy, if they consider Kenya at 
all, do so in the broader context of post-war Middle East Strategy, but only in passing, 
and only until 1956.15 These important works do, however, provide invaluable 
background as well as a clear indication as to the early stage at which British defence 
planners began to think of Kenya in post-war geo-strategic terms. Kent's impressive 
12 Michael Carver, Tightrope Walking: British Defence Policy since 1945 (London: Hutchinson, 
1992) pp. 54.55,66; Phillip Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez 1947-1968 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1973). pp. 10.14,21,27.36-8,49.51,84-5,124.133,146,175,185-6.203-8,238. 
279-80: John Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation: the Retreat from Empire in the Post-IT ar World 
(London: Macmillan, 1988), pp. 184-5 n. 35,262 n. 114, Robert Holland. The Pursuit of Greatness: 
Britain and the Il orld Role, 1900-1970 (London: Fontana, 1991), p. 293 n. 33; Jeffrey Pickering, 
Britain's 1r 'ithdrawal from East of Suez: the Politics of Retrenchment (London: Macmillan, 1998). pp. 
4.68,117 nn. 108-9,121 n. 6,122. 
13 Keith Kyle. The Politics of the Independence of Kenya (London: Macmillan, 1999), pp. 122-3,183- 
4. 
14 Anthony Clayton, The Military, Relations between Great Britain and Commonwealth Countries. 
i0th particular reference to the African Commonwealth Nations'. in W. H. Morris-Jones and Georges 
Fischer (eds. ), Decolonisation and: 4fter: The British and French Experience (London: Frank Cass, 
1980). pp. 196,201.204-5.207. See also: Chester A. Crocker- `Military Dependence: the Colonial 
Legacy in Africa', Journal of. \lodern African Studies, 12/2 (1974), pp. 265-86. 
'" David R. Devercux, `The Middle East and Africa in British Global Strategy. 1952-56'. in Richard 
J. Aldrich and Michael F. Hopkins (eds. ), Intelligence, Defence and Diplomacy: British Policy in the 
Post-War World (Ilford: Frank Cass. 1994). p. 173, The Formulation of British Defence Polich 
Towards the 
.1 fiddle East, 19-18-56 (New York: St. Martin's Press. 1990), pp. 18-9.22.25.28.42.81- 
7,94,98.100,190, John Kent (ed. ), Egypt and the Defence of the. 1-Iiddle East Three Volumes 
(London: The Stationary Office. 1998). passim., British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the ('old 
11ar 1944-49 (Leicester, London. New York: Leicester University Press. 1993), pp. 98,100f. 129f, 
148f. 205. 'Bevin's Imperialism and the Idea of Euro-Africa. 1945-49'. in Michael Dockrill and John 
W. Young (eds. ). British Foreign Policy. 1945-56 (London: Macmillan. 1989). pp. 531 f. 61f: Ritchie 
Ovendale (cd. ). British Defence Policy 
. 
since 1945 (Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1994). 
pp. 7.111 
-1. 
i 
documentary reader is particularly useful in this regard, as are the extensive collections 
edited by Goldsworthy and Hyam, respectively, under the auspices of the British 
Documents on the End of Empire project (BDEEP). 16 Yet, all such studies still fail to 
consider the effects of broader British defence priorities in Kenya, and largely ignore 
events from 1957 onwards. 
Military and Regimental Histories, by definition, also concentrate on the 
operational phase of the Mau Mau Emergency, while the dozen-plus so-called Mau 
Mau Memoirs, again by definition, tell us little about British defence and internal 
security beyond the confines of 1952-6.17 
With regard to Kenya, current studies of British Intelligence and Covert 
Operations, and those which deal with what might arguably be called Internal Security, 
including studies of Policing, tend either to be far too generalised, or to share the 
general fascination with the Mau Mau Emergency and subsequent political 
developments. '8 As a result, such studies can be loosely defined under the rubric of 
16 David Goldsworthy (ed. ), The Conservative Government and the End of Empire 1951-1957 Three 
Volumes (London: HMSO, 1994), passim.; Ronald Hvam (ed. ), The Labour Government and the End 
of Empire 1945-1951 Four Volumes (London: HMSO, 1992)_ passim. 
" For an overview of the `military history' of the Mau Mau Emergency. which is superfluous to the 
current remit, see: David Percox, `Kenya: Mau Mau Revolt, 1952-1960', in Charles Messenger (ed. ), 
Reader's Guide to Alilitarv History (Chicago, London: Fitzroy Dearborn, 2001), pp. 289-91. The 
British military units involved against Mau Mau can be traced in: Gregory Blaxland, The Regiments 
Depart: A History of the British 
.. 
-1 rmy, 1945-1970 (London: William Kimber, 1971). Each unit's 
regimental history can then be found listed in: Ian S. Hallows. Regiments and Corps of the British 
. 
lr»rv (London: Cassell, 1994 [1991]). Mau Mau memoirs are analysed in: Marshall S. Clough- 
.1 fall 
. 
I1au. 11enroirs: History 
-Memory and Politics (Boulder, CO, London: Lynne Rienner. 1998). 
18 Anthony Clayton. Counter-Insurgency in Kenva:. 4 Study of Llfilitarv Operations. 4gainst 
_Uau klau (Nairobi: Transafrica. 1976); Anthony Clayton and David Killingray. Khaki and Blue: klilitary and 
Police in British Colonial. 
-1 frica (Athens. Ohio: Ohio University Centre for International Studies. 
1989). W. Robert Foran, The Kenya Police, 1887-1960 (London: Robert Hale. 1962): William F. 
Gutteridge, 'Military and Police Forces in Colonial Africa'. in L. H. Gann and P. Duignan (eds. ). 
Colonialism in : Ifirica, 1870-1960, Vol. 2: The History and Politics of Colonialism, 1914-1960 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 286-319: Jock Haswell. British : %Iilitarv 
Intelligence (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1973), pp. 2234. Heather. R. W.. 'Counterinsurgency 
and intelligence in Kenya: 1952-6'. PhD thesis. University of Cambridge. 1994. 'Intelligence and 
Counter-Insurgency in Kenya_ 1952-56'. Intelligence and 
. 
\'ational Security. 513 (July 1990). pp. 
_57- 
83): Keith Jeffery. 'Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency Operations: Some Reflections on the British 
Experience'. Intelligence and 
. 
Vational. ý'ecuritl. 2/1 (1987). pp. 125.128-9.140: David Killingray. 
I he Maintenance of Law and Order in British Colonial Africa 
. 
African 
.1 ffairs. 85 (1986). pp. 411- 
6 
British Counter-Insurgency, and also demonstrate the common misconception that, 
following military victory over Mau Mau, the transfer of power in Kenya amounted 
simply to a more or less complicated series of administrative and constitutional 
negotiations. Newsinger and Paget go slightly further than most in revealing that after 
the Mau Mau Emergency Kikuyu militants continued to stockpile weapons and gather 
in the forests, and that the threat of further violence strengthened the nationalists' 
hands. '9 References to post-Mau Mau subversive movements, particularly Kiama Kia 
Muingi (KKM) and the Kenya Land Freedom Army (KLFA), but not much, if any, 
detail on the response to either, can be found in Füredi, Kanogo, and Rosberg and 
Nottingham 
. 
20 
Three important works on British intelligence, by Aldrich, Bloch and 
Fitzgerald, and Heather, respectively, share many of the above failings with regard to 
Kenya. 21 In four pages devoted to British Cold War intelligence operations in Africa, 
Aldrich's impressive study makes no mention of Kenya, except to tell us that ex-Kenya 
37: Frank Kitson. Bunch of Five (London: Faber & Faber. 1977), pp. 3-65, Low Intensity Operations: 
Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping (London: Faber & Faber, 1971), pp. 31,33,42,100.123. 
135-6, Gangs and Counter-Gangs (London: Barrie & Rockliff, 1960); Thomas R. Mockaitis, British 
Counterinsurgency, 1919-1960 (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 5,9.25.36,38,44-51.124.125-32, 
135-8,142,148,156,167-71.188-9; Hamish Morrison, "`Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? " The 
Problems of Policing in Anglophone Africa during the Transfer of Power', PhD thesis. University of 
Aberdeen, 1995, pp. 8-12; John S. Pustav, Counter-Insurgency Warfare (New York: Free Press. 
1965), pp. 78.108,114,122-3, David Throup, `Crime, politics and the police in colonial Kenya. 
1939-63 '. in David M. Anderson and David Killingray (eds. ). Policing and Decolonisation: 
Nationalism, Politics and the Police, 1917-65 (Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1992). pp. 
127-57; Charles Townshend, Britain 's Civil [tars: Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth Century 
(London: Faber. 1986), pp. 198-207. 
19 John Newsinger, `Revolt and Repression in Kenya: The Mau Mau Rebellion, 1952-1960. Science 
and Society. 45/2 (Summer 1981), p. 184. Julian Paget, Counter-Insurgency Operations: Techniques 
oj'Guerrilla 11 arfare (New York: Walker & Co.. 1967). p. 103. 
," Frank Füredi, The 
. 
\Iau Illau [far in Perspective (London: James Currey. 1989), pp. 161.175-7. 
179-80.185-93,203-4. Tabitha Kanogo, Squatters and the Roots of. 1lau . 11au 1905-63 (London: 
James Currey, 1987). pp. 6.148-9,165-9.171-3.174.176, Carl G. Rosberg. and John Nottingham. 
The. 1 hvth of ". lau 
. 
flau ":. \'ationalism in Kenya (New York: Praeger. 1966). pp. 306-7. 
Richard J. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence (London: 
John Murray. 2001). Jonathan Bloch and Patrick Fitzgerald, British Intelligence and Covert Action: 
. 
-lfrica, 
.1 
fiddle East and Europe since 1945 (Dingle. London: Brandon. Junction. 198)); Heather. 
'Counterinsurgency and intelligence'. 
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Special Branch head, John Prendergast, moved on to Cyprus, Hong Kong, and Aden. `2 
As with most studies of British counter-insurgency and intelligence in Kenya, 
Heather's thesis lacks any detailed consideration beyond 1956. While Bloch and 
Fitzgerald's study goes much further than most in outlining the span of British covert 
operations in Kenya from 1945 to beyond independence, and provides potentially 
useful background information, it lacks reference to primary sources other than 
newspapers and confidential interviews, and is written in `journalese', perhaps 
explaining its absence from the bibliographies of many works on related subjects. 
Sources 
As well as referring to current secondary literature and several unpublished scholarly 
works, this study has relied mainly on British government documents in the Public 
Record Office, Kew (PRO). The perspective gained from the PRO documents has been 
supplemented by the private papers of participants `on the ground' held at Rhodes 
House Library, Oxford (RHL), particularly the Oxford Development Records Project 
(ODRP) collection. Some of the papers of General Sir George Erskine (GOC, EAC, 
June 1953-May 1955), in the Imperial War Museum, London, were also useful. 
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of the Lord Harding of Petherton (CIGS, Nov. 
1952-Sept. 1955) and Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer (CIGS, Sept. 1955-Sept. 
1958) papers in the National Army Museum, London, because they relate mainly to 
personal or regimental matters and the experience of each in Cyprus and Malaya, 
respectively. 
-- Aldrich. The Hidden Hand, pp. 578.600-4. Prof. Aldrich disclosed to this author that he had 
considered extending his study to include Kenya, but felt that Heathers coverage was definitive: 
personal communication. Universit of Nottingham. 1I Sept. 2001. 
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While all of the key military and political figures for the bulk of the period 
under investigation have long since passed away, it had been hoped that useful 
information could have been gleaned from interviews with surviving ex-Colonial 
Servants. 23 However, undertakings provided by two such individuals, who both had 
involvement in the intelligence side of the work of the Kenya administration during the 
latter stages of decolonisation, were never honoured, in one case because of ill 
health. 24 Subsequent enquiries, including an attempt to cast the net more widely among 
the Corona Club, received no reply. Given this reticence, anonymity must be respected. 
With regard to the PRO, it hardly needs reiterating that time restrictions and 
the shear volume of potentially useful material available precluded consultation of all 
such documents in their entirety. Rather, a selective process was necessary, and 
involved mainly examination of documents relating to defence and internal security in 
Kenya which had clearly been ignored by previous studies, as well as revisiting 
`political' documents consulted by others in order to assess the relative importance of 
defence and security issues during everyday political discourse. For example, the 
extensive Cabinet (CAB) and Prime Minister's Office (PREM) papers provide a 
general overview of policy-making in a particular subject area, thus useful pointers for 
detailed scrutiny of specialised departmental files, and reveal far more about the 
defence and security aspects of decolonisation in Kenya than previous studies suggest. 
It must be stated, however, that the obvious choice for consultation, the records of the 
Colonial Office Intelligence and Security Department (CO 1035), are not only still 
,; For this purpose I attended the 'Administering Empire' conference. held jointly by the University of 
London and the Corona Club. Senate House. University of London. 27-8 May 1999. 
2' An approach was considered to the former head of Kenva's Special Branch. special security adviser 
to Rhodesian Prime Minister. Ian Smith. and head of security for the King of Bahrain. Ian Henderson. 
HoiN ever. the idea was abandoned when it became clear that he was already involved. with Dr Randall 
Heather. in drafting his as yet unpublished (auto) biography 
. 
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closed to the public and scholars alike, but at the last time of inspection appeared to 
have had all trace of their existence removed from the PRO. This suggests that some of 
the evidence for Britain's often pragmatic, and occasionally cynical, approach to its 
colonies with regard to defence and security matters in this thesis cuts closer to the 
bone of the projected image of a magnanimously decolonising, nation-building former 
suzerain than some in Whitehall might care to admit. Equally, this could also 
demonstrate that some British colonial security decisions taken and implemented 
between the 1940s and 1960s, which would be open to inspection ordinarily, might still 
have a bearing on current policy in the `post-imperial age'. It is hard to believe, 
however, that either current national security, or the unlikely survival of the majority of 
Britain's colonial intelligence and security officials from the 1940s onwards, warrants 
this continued closure. 
Naturally, this study has benefited from the voluminous records of the Colonial 
Office East Africa Department (CO 822), as well as those of the Colonial Office 
Defence Department (CO 968), the Ministry of Defence (DEFE), and the War Office 
(WO). Given the inexorable link between government policy and finances, it remains a 
surprise that current historical scholarship still largely ignores the records of the 
Treasury. During the course of research for this thesis, at least one document (in T 
225/2211), while unavailable elsewhere, was located in this way. One notable omission 
from this thesis is any reference to the records of the Colonial Office Police 
Department (CO 1037). Perusal of this series revealed quickly that, for the purposes of 
this study, little of substance could be gleaned that was not already in the East Africa 
Department files (CO 822) related to internal security matters. Besides. post-, vti ar 
colonial policing in Anglophone Africa generally has already been the subject of 
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detailed scholarly analysis, 25 and policing in Kenya still warrants a comprehensive 
primary resource-based study in its own right. 26 
Lastly, except for the occasional pertinent reference, government publications, 
such as Command Papers, have been largely ignored. This decision was taken, quite 
deliberately, because such publications tend, by there very nature, to perform as much 
a multi-faceted propaganda and public relations function as fulfilling any quasi-legal 
requirements. Clearly, given the nature of this study, what is of most interest is the 
secretive decision-making process, rather than what is presented for public 
consumption. Besides, any such documents, like defence white papers, for example, 
are more than adequately discussed in the existing secondary literature, and cited in the 
thesis as necessary. 
Structure 
In order to illustrate the post-war evolution of British defence and internal security 
policy in Kenya in relation to changing economic and political circumstances in Africa 
and elsewhere, this thesis is presented in a straightforward narrative form. The study 
makes no pretence of detailed analysis of economic and political issues, which are 
extensively surveyed by existing scholarship. Rather, it relates British defence and 
internal security planning and practice to key stages in, and concerns over, Kenya's 
rapidly changing socio-economic and political circumstances, and the developments 
intended to address them, or the lack thereof 
IMorrison. 
"'Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? '*'. passim. 
26 At the time of writing. I understand that comparative doctoral research into policing in Kenya and 
Uganda is being undertaken under the supervision of Dr Philip Murphy in the Universit of Reading. 
Chapter I ('Defence and Internal Security, 1945-52') places British defence and 
internal security planning in Kenya in its immediate post-war context. As was the case 
elsewhere in the Empire, between 1945 and 1950, Britain steadily altered its defensive 
focus in East Africa from a war footing towards contingency plans to cater for the 
escalating Cold War. While Kenya's strategic significance could be said to have been 
minimal, it was by no means non-existent. Given the apparent potential for East 
Africa's natural and manpower resources to be employed in aid of the severely 
hamstrung post-war British economy, Britain's main concern during this period was to 
maintain the region's internal security, and to ensure that communism did not take 
root. In addition to their internal security role, locally-recruited African troops 
constituted a potential reserve for Egypt in the event of global war. While financial 
stringency ensured that socio-economic and political advances in Kenya were never 
quite adequate to keep abreast of nationalist aspirations and generally held African 
grievances, the largely unrepresentative colonial government also found it increasingly 
difficult to deal with the consequent widespread increases in crime and anti-colonial 
militancy. It is telling that, from late 1949 onwards, the Kenya government redoubled 
its efforts to plan for a possible State of Emergency. 
Given the extensive literature on the military and so-called `hearts and minds' 
aspects of the Mau Mau Emergency, Chapter II ('British Counter-Insurgency in 
Kenya, 1952-6') provides neither an encyclopaedic nor an exhaustive account. Rather, 
it seeks to demonstrate the reactionary nature of British Counter-Insurgency as 
opposed to the common, and erroneous, view that the campaign constituted a 
progressive precursor to eventual decolonisation. Clearly, British efforts to repress 
Mau Mau were aimed at retaining, rather than relinquishing control. 
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Chapter III (`East Africa, East of Suez: I, 1956-7') confirms that, in planning 
to station elements of the UK Strategic Reserve `permanently' in Kenya, Britain was 
less concerned with African political sensibilities than with addressing broader overseas 
interests following the evacuation from Suez in late 1956. With militant anti-colonial 
nationalism apparently brought to heel by superior firepower, force of numbers, and 
ever-sophisticated tactics, Kenya's enhanced strategic significance ensured that Britain 
had no intention of abandoning the colony. Political concessions to African nationalism 
during this period were presented as demonstrating Britain's commitment to 
developing Kenya in an orderly and rational manner. The aim, however, was to delay 
rather than to accelerate the transfer of power. 
The intricate connection between Britain's fitful approach to political 
development and its strategic interests is considered in Chapter IV ('East Africa, East 
of Suez: II, 1957-9'). Clearly, defence interests, and the administrative and financial 
minutiae involved in their realisation, had a considerable bearing on Britain's decision 
to avoid making any meaningful statements about Kenya's ultimate future. Indeed, the 
presence of a permanent garrison of British troops, it was thought, would in itself act 
as a `stabilising influence in the background to the colony's political life'. In this light, 
all of the political concessions made to African nationalism until 1959, if not later, can 
be seen as a holding operation, intended to demonstrate the spirit, if not the substance, 
of British bonafides. 
However, in restricting concessions to African nationalism to a slow, if 
reasonably steady trickle, in the hope of maintaining control under the guise of 
progress, Britain's position in Kenya became increasingly precarious. Chapter V 
('Internal Security and Decolonisation: I, 1956-9') assesses the apparent return to 
l) 
`normality' following the military defeat of Mau Mau and the albeit temporary 
withdrawal of most British troops. Far from enjoying the new-found stability 
theoretically engendered by the apparently successful counter-insurgency campaign, 
Britain now had to deal with the contradictions inherent in its divisive and piecemeal 
political and socio-economic reforms. While a return to the scale of violence 
encompassed by Mau Mau was always thought to be unlikely, the resurgence of 
subversive activity, combined with nationalist agitation and threats of, if not actual, 
civil disobedience and constant industrial disputes, to stretch colonial Kenya's 
chronically undermanned security forces to the limit. Only when the veil of 
constitutional progress was shredded by the Africans' boycott of Legislative Council 
from November 1958, were the colonial authorities compelled to accede to African 
demands for a constitutional conference. Yet, the ethnically, and to some extent 
ideologically, fragmented nature of African politics in Kenya, which at one time must 
certainly have suited the British, now threatened to undermine the general policy of 
promoting the stable and `moderate' polity deemed so essential to Britain's `vital 
interests'. Britain therefore had no choice other than to tighten its control over 
Kenya's security forces while at the same time performing a slight of hand to ensure 
that adequate security legislation existed to effect maximum control after the 
withdrawal of Emergency Regulations. Indeed, the ultimate ending of the State of 
Emergency, in January 1960, depended as much on the completion of this replacement 
legislation as it did on meeting the timetable for the first (Kenya) Lancaster House 
conference. 
Chapter VI ('Internal Security and Decolonisation: II, 1959-65') shows how 
increasingly desperate the British became as they tried to guide the pace and nature of 
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political developments in Kenya towards a moderate, pro-Western outcome. As ethnic, 
socio-economic, and personal political rivalries, and continued subversion threatened 
increasingly to draw Kenya into a civil war, Britain juggled with political compromise 
after political compromise, and hoped that there would be no recourse to the use of the 
troops that were frequently placed on standby to deal with such an eventuality. When, 
at last, the British felt assured that in Jomo Kenyatta's Kenya African National Union 
(KANU) they had finally found a `moderate' and benevolently neutral successor 
government, they pulled out all of the stops to bolster Kenya's internal security and 
secure that regime in power. As ever, Britain's magnanimity came at a price. 
In Chapter VII ('Defence and Decolonisation, 1959-65') it is shown how, 
when the political and security situation in Kenya dictated that the best means of 
safeguarding `vital interests' were, in the end, to grant independence, Britain ensured 
that in exchange for its assistance in maintaining the rehabilitated Kenyatta in office, it 
would continue to enjoy albeit minimal, if by no means insignificant, defence facilities. 
More importantly, the chapter demonstrates that achieving these ends was as much a 
priority as acquiescing to nationalist demands in order to bring about the kind of 
moderate government upon which Britain's strategic requirements depended. Indeed, 
Britain even tailored these requirements so that they would be politically acceptable to 
African ministers, thus less likely to jeopardise Kenyatta's position and, especially 
important from the British perspective, more likely to prolong the longevity of the 
post-independence defence agreement. With overflying and staging rights, and access 
to army training and recreation and naval dockyard facilities secured, the Wilson 
administration continued its predecessor's policy. Plans existed to intervene militarily 
to maintain Kenyatta in office, if necessary, while Britain trained his bodyguard, and 
15 
maintained significant influence by training and equipping the Kenya armed forces. 
This continuity in policy persisted up to and beyond the date at which this study closes, 
in 1965, before the onset of the financial crises which bought about Britain's 
withdrawal from east of Suez. Nevertheless, as a result of this shrewd approach to 
post-independence defence and internal security policy, Britain retained some military 
presence in Kenya until at least 1976, some ten years after ejection from Aden and four 
to five years after the large scale, if by no means complete, withdrawal from the Middle 
and Far East. 
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Chapter I 
Defence and Internal Security, 1945-52 
Introduction 
The so-called `scramble for Africa' (c. 1879-1914) was essentially a function of 
competition between European states, if not necessarily always based upon any 
tangible future economic gains. For example, while the `Belgian Congo' was in fact 
rich in natural resources, as was southern Africa,. Britain's annexation of a large area of 
eastern Africa was motivated by a desire to secure pre-existing economic and strategic 
advantages elsewhere, particularly in Egypt, India, and the Far East. ' In a sense, 
therefore, colonial state formation was about survival in the wider world; where 
practicable, decolonisation was too. 
While any state may or may not adapt by becoming more `inclusive', it must 
nevertheless protect itself and its citizens or subjects. Essentially, the state relies upon 
its monopoly of the use of force, underpinned by its legal and legislative processes, and 
in many cases legitimised by the democratic process, to plan for and to act against the 
threat of external attack, and to be able to act as freely as possible to secure its 
interests in the international arena. 2 It hardly needs to be reiterated that the state's 
potential for the use of force also underpins the legal process which validates it. 
M. E. Chamberlain. The Scramble for Africa (London: Longman. 1980 [1974]), p. 52: Darwin. 
Britain and Decolonisation, p. 126: J. M. MacKenzie. The Partition of. lfrica 1880-1900 (London. 
New York: Methuen. 1983): H. L. Wesseling (Arnold J. Pomerans: trans. ). Divide and Rule: The 
Partition of Africa, 1880-1914 (Westport, CT, Praeger. 1996), pt. I. chs. 3-6. pts. II-III. passim.: 
Richard C. Whitting. The Suez Canal and the British Economy 1918-1960'. in Keith M. Wilson 
(ed. ). Imperialism and Nationalism in the 
.1 fiddle East: The .4 nglo-k( % ptian Experience (London: Mansell. 198.0. p. 77: Keith M. Wilson. 'Introduction'. in idem.. Imperialism and Vationali. s-m. pp. 
For an overview of theories regarding the use of force by the state. and the development of colonial 
policing, see: Morrison. "'Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? 
. 
pp. 13-64. 
17 
Clearly, force applied within a legal framework, prescribed by democratically elected 
legislators under the guise of popular consent, is in most cases more palatable than 
indiscriminate state brutality. 
Of course, the state also needs to employ both legal and forcible means to 
protect itself from disaffected and/or destabilising elements from within, whether 
wholly domestic in origin, or stimulated in some way by a hostile international power 
or powers. " For every example of a nascent or emergent modern state, there can be 
found examples of attempts to undermine or overthrow it. 4 Given the size of the 
British Empire at its peak, and the disparity between political and socio-economic 
development in Britain and its far-flung colonies, it is as no surprise that many such 
territories provided a breeding ground for widespread subversion and armed 
insurgency. ' 
It is therefore axiomatic that `arms' (police and military forces) and `the state' 
(democratic or authoritarian government) are synonymous. 6 However, while the 
For the relationship between British democracy and legal means of ensuring state, internal. or 
'public' security, developments in said legal devices, and the `repressive' civil means at the state's 
disposal to enforce law and `public' order, see, for example: Baxter, State Security, Privacy and 
Information. passim.; Tony Bunyan, The Histon' and Practice of the Political Police in Britain 
(London: Quartet, 1978 [1976]), passim.; Lustgarten and Leigh, In from the Cold, passim.; Bernard 
Porter, Plots and Paranoia: 
_A History of Political Espionage in Britain 1790-1988 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), passim.; Richard Thurlow, The Secret State: British Internal Security in the Tw-entieth 
Centur%" (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). passim.; Charles Townshend, 
-Making the Peace: Public Order 
and Public Security in Modern Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), passim. 
`' Janet Coleman. 
-lgainst the State: Studies in Sedition and Rebellion (London: Penguin/BBC, 1990), 
passim. 
For a broad overview and analyses of imperial insurgencies and efforts to repress them, see: 
Anderson and Killingray (eds. ), Policing and Decolonisation, passim.: Blaxland, The Regiments 
Depart, passim.; Michael Carver, It ar since 1945 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1980). passim.; 
Mockaitis. British Counterinsurgency, passim.: Paget. Counter-Insurgency Operations, passim.; 
Townshend, Britain 's Civil Wars, passim. 
6 This assertion is supported by, numerous cases throughout history. With respect to Africa. see: 
Gutteridge. 'Military and Police Forces in Colonial Africa'. pp. 286-319: and Killingray. 'The 
Maintenance of Law and Order in British Colonial Africa'. pp. 411- 37. For Kenya, see: David M. 
Anderson. 'Policing, prosecution and the law in colonial Kenya. c. 1905-39'. in David M. Anderson 
and David Killingray (eds. ), Policing the Empire: Government, Authority and Control, 1830-1940 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), pp. 183-200. For the parallel rise of modern police 
forces and the 'dynamic development of the European state system' over a 150 year period see: Hsi- 
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history of the conquest and formation of the British state arguably stretches back over 
the last thousand years, and the development of modern legal, military, police, and 
political structures can be traced back over the last two or three centuries or so, the 
formation and development of the colonial state and its attendant paraphernalia is a 
relatively recent phenomenon, as is decolonisation. 
The history of the British colonial state in Kenya is certainly no exception. 
Military conquest and formal annexation began in 1895. Colonisation of the territory 
by white and Indian immigrants was encouraged shortly afterwards. Significant 
numbers of the early European settlers originated from the military and `officer class', 
especially after the First World War, reflecting the essentially defensive nature of the 
colonisation.? The British East Africa Police had been established in 1887, as the 
Imperial British East Africa Company fell into decline. The British East Africa 
Protectorate was not proclaimed until 1895.8 This pattern was repeated some twenty 
years later. The Kenya Police was formed in 1918, two years before Britain declared 
the Protectorate to be `Kenya Colony'. As with most of Britain's colonial territories, 
responsibility for external defence and internal security beyond the capacity of the 
police was vested largely in local levies, commanded by European officers. The King's 
African Rifles (KAR) was established from the remnants of earlier units, such as the 
East African Rifles, in January 1902, as the initial conquest of Kenya drew to an end. 9 
Huev Liang, The Rise of 
_1, lodern Police and the European State Svstein f to; n Aletter eich to the 
Second il orld 11 ar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1992). passim. 
John Lonsdale, 'The Conquest State of Kenya 1895-1905'. in Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale. 
Unhappy I allev. Conflict in Kenia and Africa, Book One: State and Class (London: James Currey. 
1992). pp. 13-44, C. J. Duder, "'Men of the Officer Class": The Participants in the 1919 Soldier 
Settlement Scheme in Kenya'. African Affairs, 92/366 (Jan. 1993). pp. 69-87. 
Foran. The Ken%'a Police, pp. 3-10, Robert B. Edgerton. AIau 
. 
llau: An 
.1 
frican Crucible (London: 
I. B. Taucis. 1990). pp. 1-32. Anne Thurston. Guide to Archives and 
. 
Manuscripts Relating to Kenia 
and East Africa in the United Kingdom (London: Hans Zell. 1991). p. xiii. 
9 Clayton and Killingrav. Khaki and Blue. p. 200. Malcolm Page. KIR:. 4 Histori of the King's 
i Ji"ican Rif es (London: Leo Cooper, 1998). p. 1. 
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From almost the outset of the occupation, exclusion by European settlers of 
many Kikuyu from their homeland, a rich agricultural area which came to be known as 
the `White Highlands', and their concentration in set-aside reserves, considerably 
restricted their socio-economic life. 10 This, combined with the imposition of a state- 
sponsored system of native administration by British-appointed chiefs and headmen, 
and settler domination of state politics, also severely limited the channels for the 
expression of any grievance, if they were not effectively closed. " Those Kikuyu who 
did not eke out a living in the reserves were compelled to seek either wage labour in 
the urban areas or, for the most part, lived as `squatters' on European farms in the 
Highlands, working for so many days per year in exchange for the usufruct of as much 
land as they could cultivate. Meanwhile, mission-educated young Kikuyu proto- 
politicians vied unsuccessfully for their share of state patronage. 
This fragile political and socio-economic situation continued for several years 
and was alleviated, albeit temporarily, by the contraction of settler agriculture during 
the 1930s Depression, then by the boom brought about by the Second World War, 
both of which served as motors for Kikuyu agriculture. 12 By the end of the 1930s and 
after the war, however, the economic and political resurgence of the settlers, along 
with conservation-driven agricultural reforms and the abuse of office by many in the 
`native' authorities, began to drive an ever-increasing wedge between not only the 
Europeans and the Africans, but the Kikuyu `haves' and `have Hots'. 1 , The very nature 
10 Kanogo. Squatters and the Roots of*alau klau. passim.; David W. Throup, Economic and Social 
Origins ofAlau . llau, 1945-1953 (London: James Currey 
. 
1987). passim., The Origins of Mau Mau'. 
., 
l Jrican Affhirs. 84/336 (July 1985). pp. 399-433. 
Berman and Lonsdale. Unhappy I alley. pp. 2.13-74 Füredi. 
_llau Hau liar. pp. 9-12.22. 
John Lonsdale. The Depression and the Second World War in the Transformation of Kenya*. in 
David Killingrav and Richard Rathbone (eds. ). Africa and the Second If orld iVar (New York: St. 
Martin's Press. 1986. pp. 97-142. 
13 For the wartime assimilation of the European settlers by the colonial state, see: George Bennett. 
kenva:. 1 Political History: The Colonial Period (London: Oxford University Press. 1963). pp. 89-98. 
20 
of the political system in Kenya dictated that the moderate would-be political 
spokesmen of the Kikuyu would be at best ineffective. As matters became increasingly 
untenable, with rising urban and rural unemployment, homelessness, and ever-stringent 
demands on the squatters from the European farmers, an apparent lack of concern, let 
alone action by the Kenya government led to the gradual onset of the militant action 
which culminated in the so-called `Mau Mau revolt'. ' 4 
By 1945, as the `second colonial occupation' began, Kenya already had a well 
established system of `native administration' running in parallel with the European 
settler-dominated central government. 15 Europeans also formed the mainstay of the 
territorial Kenya Regiment, founded in 1937 to defend against possible Italian 
aggression, and reconstituted in 1950 for mainly internal security purposes. 16 While 
`ill-equipped and poorly trained Tribal Police' operated in the African `reserves', the 
regular police Special Branch intelligence structure in Kenya was apparently `as good a 
system, if not better, than [in] most colonial territories'. 17 The British imperial state in 
Kenya seemed to many to be secure, at least until 7 October 1952, when this 
perception changed dramatically with the assassination of Senior Chief Waruhiu. This 
was `an important blow against the colonial regime' and, according to one 
interpretation, `provided the pretext for a new offensive' against such expressions of 
'a Keesing 's Contemporary Archives. Vol. 9 (1952), p. 12478: House of Commons Debates (HCD). 
vol. 505, col. 389, `Kenya (Mau Mau Activities)'. 16 Oct. 1952. Füredi, . flau. \lau It ar. passim.: 
Throup, Origins of, llau, 11au. passim. 
I' D. A. Low and J. M. Lonsdale, 'Introduction: Towards the New Order 1945-1963'. in D. A. Low and 
Alison Smith (eds. ), Historr%' of East. 1fi"ica, Vol. III (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1976), pp. 12-6. also 
reproduced inD. A. Loww. Eclipse (? f Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1991). pp. 173 - 
6. Throup. Origins qf. 11au 
-I lau. p. 25. 16 Guy Campbell, The Charging Buffalo:. 4 History of the Kenya Regiment 1937-1963 (London: Leo 
Cooper/Secker & Warburg. 1986). pp. 15-7,29. 
" Throup. 'Crime. politics and the police'. p. 129: Cmnd. 1030, Historical Survey of the Origins and 
Grovth of_llau 
.1 
lau. (London: HMSO. 1960). p. 36 (hereafter. Corfield Report). 
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African grievances. '8 Before decolonisation, would come a `second conquest' or third 
`colonial occupation' of Kenya. 
The `Mau Mau revolution' of the 1950s had a profound, if by no means 
immediate, impact upon British plans for the transfer of power in Kenya. 19 The State of 
Emergency, imposed in October 1952, legalised the repression of the Mau Mau 
guerrillas and their supporters. Politically, the Emergency facilitated the gradual 
implementation of socio-economic and constitutional reforms designed to alleviate, 
again only temporarily, the grievances of those Africans who had not yet chosen to 
resort to violence, and to stem support for those who had. 
However, the major political advances which arguably anticipated 
`decolonisation' (the `Macleod plan' for a majority of seats in the Legislative Council 
to be elected on an `open' rather than `communal' franchise, for example), were not 
set in train until April 1959, when the British Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs, 
18 Füredi, liars Mau if ar, p. 116; Bruce Berman, `Bureaucracy and Incumbent Violence: Colonial 
Administration and the Origins of the "Mau Mau ' Emergency, in Berman and Lonsdale, Unhappy 
Fallen, Book Two: Violence and Ethnicity. p. 252. 
19 The Kenya government uncovered the 'Mau Mau movement' on white settler farms in 1948, but the 
origins of the term 'Mau Mau' remain unclear. The forest fighters had few. if any, connections with 
the pre-emergency `Mau Mau' leadership, and did not consider themselves to be 'members. as such. 
Instead, many called their `movement' Ithaka na ii'aithi (land and moral responsibility. or freedom 
through land), taking on many guises during and after the official State of Emergency (1952-60). 
Given that at one stage there were up to eight `Mau Mau annies' from geographically diverse origins, 
operating in the Aberdares region alone, it seems that the 'Mau Mau' label was a catch-all imposed bN 
the authorities upon all forms of anti-colonial resistance, serving to tar such dissent with the 'atavistic 
return to savagery' brush, thereby justifying whatever repressive measures were employed. See: Bruce 
Berman. Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenna: The Dialectic of Domination (London. James Currey. 
1990), p. 349: Robert Buijtenhuijs, Essays on . flau _llau: Contributions to, 11au Hau Historiographv 
(Leiden. African Studies Centre, 1982), p. 51: Susan L. Carruthers. If inning Hearts and. 1linds: 
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Alan Lennox-Boyd, announced a future constitutional conference. 20 Lennox-Boyd 
made his rapid policy reversal in response to pleas from the Governor of Kenya, Sir 
Evelyn Baring, following the African members' January boycott of the legislature. This 
breakdown in the political process occurred weeks, if not days, after Lennox-Boyd and 
the East African governors had `pencilled in' the date for Kenya's independence as 
1975. Significantly, Lennox-Boyd's change of heart came some two years after the 
apparent defeat of the Mau Mau forest fighters, and in itself raises doubts over the 
connection between constitutional reform and British count er-insurgenc_y. 21 
In the light of the above, Britain's use of massive force, combined with the 
introduction of piecemeal political and selective socio-economic reforms during the 
Emergency can be seen, not as a direct response to Mau Mau, as such, but as a form of 
continuity. British policy towards Kenya following the Mau Mau Emergency, and in 
the run up to, and immediately following independence, can only be fully understood in 
a broader context. Moreover, Britain's efforts to stabilise internal security in Kenya 
during the 1950s and 1960s clearly represented attempts to rectify the mistakes made 
before October 1952, and to consolidate economic and strategic interests beyond 
Kenya's independence in December 1963. It is therefore necessary to consider the 
British transfer of power in Kenya not simply in the strict chronological sense 
suggested by the Emergency and its aftermath, but in the broader context of the Cold 
War and the so-called `era of decolonisation'. In other words, what did the British 
," Robert Shepherd Lain Alacleod: A Biography (London: Hutchinson, 1994). p. 182, Kyle. Politics of 
Indep, ndence, p. 104, Philip Murphy. Alan Lennox-Bond: A Biography (London: I. B. Taucis. 1999). 
pp. 22? 
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Public Record Office. Kew (PRO). CO 822/1819. `Future Policy in East Africa. memo. by Lennox- 
Boyd (Secretary- of State. Colonial Office). n. d. (c. Jan. 1959). Unless other; ise stated. all documents 
were consulted at the PRO. See also: Blundell. So Rough a Ii end. pp. 262-2. The tenuous link 
attributed to constitutional reform and counter-insurgency in Kenya is explored further in: Percox. 
'British Counter-Insurgency', passim. 
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government hope to achieve by arming the Kenya state to varying degrees, at certain 
times over a twenty year period, in combination with the gradual implementation of 
constitutional and socio-economic reforms? 22 
Before any attempt can be made to answer this question, it is necessary to 
consider post-war British defence planning and internal security policy in relation to 
Kenya. Only then will it be possible to understand the British response to Mau Mau 
and the various, if intermittent, developments in its aftermath. This chapter therefore 
examines Britain's defence and security priorities in Kenya during the post-war, pre- 
Emergency period, as the Cold War apparently threatened to spread throughout the 
British Empire and beyond. 
Cold War: Kenya as adjunct to British Middle East strategy, 1945-50 
Kenya was annexed by Britain mainly to head off competition from other European 
powers, and largely for economic and strategic purposes based primarily on the 
exclusion of those powers. Strategically, it seems that Kenya had very little intrinsic 
value, except as a land bridge from the Indian Ocean to the source of the Nile, the 
great lakes in Uganda. It was consistent with Kenya's status as a British colonial 
possession, if somewhat ironic, that before independence the territory's transient 
11 Consideration of the obvious extension of this question, whether ends justified means. would 
depend largely upon ideological perspectives and subjective value judgements of British imperialism 
per 
. 
se and what might be called the 'Cold War scholarly divide'. Given that satisfactory analysis of 
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interpretations and resulting conclusions must be left to the reader. A Neo-Marxist interpretation of 
the aims and outcome of British policy in Kenya up to and beyond independence can be found in: 
Colin Le-*vs. (nderdev, elopinent in Keni"a: The Political Economy of 
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involvement in international affairs came about as a result of the two world wars 
which, excepting Japanese aggression in the Pacific and Southeast Asian regions, had 
originated largely from continued and irreconcilable conflict between European states. 
In both the Great War and the Second World War, East Africa contributed 
greatly to the British and Allied campaigns. During the 1914-18 war, the KAR was 
eventually increased from three battalions (the perceived internal security requirement), 
to the 22 battalions (over 30,000 troops) which took part in the German East Africa 
campaign. Between the wars, the KAR in Kenya was frequently engaged in internal 
security operations in the largely ethnic Somali Northern Frontier District (NFD), and 
border defence following the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. The KAR also 
occasionally broke cover from its discreet position in the background of the colony's 
life to repress strikes during the mid-late 1930s. During the Second World War, KAR 
battalions from Kenya fought in Italian East Africa, Madagascar and, by 1944, had 
been posted as far afield as Southeast Asia. ' 
In Kenya itself, African and European commercial farmers and African peasant 
cultivators and black market traders benefited from the wartime agricultural boom. 
Growing land poverty, the corrupt practices of native officials, and consequent 
disaffection and dispossession only added to population pressures and rising crime, 
however, as the unemployed and homeless flocked to Nairobi. 24 In January 1945, 
23 Page. KTIR. pp. 28,49,50-1. For details of the establishment of the KAR its involvement in the 
'Mad Mullah' Campaign (1900-20) in the Horn of Africa. the 1914-18 war, and the inter-war years. 
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concern over the prevalence of street gangs and rising crime in Nairobi led to an 
emergency debate in the Legislative Council. Two members representing, African 
interests, Eliud Mathu (who had only been appointed in 1944,13 years after African 
representation was first recommended) and Archdeacon Beecher (who, among others, 
had pressed for such an appointment), stressed that the crime wave had social and 
economic causes. However, in what was to become a familiar pattern, the majority of 
the settlers were more concerned that police manpower and criminal sentences should 
be increased. 25 While political and socio-economic development in Kenya during the 
war had been complicated and to some extent held in check by Britain's need to 
maintain stability and maximise the colony's contribution to the war effort, very little 
would change following victory. 26 
If anything, the problem posed by the closing stages and end of the Second 
World War was that the very exigencies of the war in itself (the build up and 
employment of massive levels of financial, industrial, manpower, and military 
resources), geared towards victory, actually led to stalemate in Europe. The onset of 
the Cold War and the consequent potential for renewed global warfare, while not 
necessarily on the scale seen between 1939 and 1945, was certainly unprecedented in 
terms of its complexity, duration and inclusivity. Following any brief overview of the 
1939-45 conflict and a passing understanding of the alliances and issues at stake, and 
given a cursory glance at global political developments in the post-war period, one 
could be forgiven for questioning the point of it all. Surely, following any global 
conflict fought ostensibly against `oppression' and `tyranny' (thus, for `freedom'), it 
would not be unreasonable to expect to perceive such an outcome. Yet, the onset of 
I' Throup. Origins of. lau Alau. pp. 177-8. Bennett, Kenya: 
.I Political Historl-. pp. 
96-8. 
,o Harold Macmillan. Tides o/'Fortune, 1945--i5 'London: Macmillan. 1969). p. 276. 
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the Cold War, whatever the reasons for it, could hardly be said to have reflected this, 
despite the ostensible freedoms gained in Asia through independence in the immediate 
post-war years. 
As for Britain's post-war strategic `grand design', Kenya Colony was never far 
from British defence planners' thinking, if only ever in a necessarily peripheral sense. 
Towards the end of the war, the British Resident Minister in the Middle East, Sir 
Edward Grigg, prepared a memorandum for the soon to be dissolved War Cabinet, in 
which he outlined `the nature of British interests and aims in the Middle East'. 27 While 
the document was primarily a `political memorandum', Grigg explained that, in line 
with its title, it also contained `some tentative ideas upon' the military `dispositions 
which seem best suited to maintain security within the political and financial conditions 
which are likely to govern us'. As is well known, the Middle East was a `region of life- 
and-death consequences for Britain and the British Empire in four ways': as `an 
indispensable channel of communications'; a `strategic centre'; `the Empire's main 
reservoir of mineral oil'; and `as a region in which British political method must make 
good, if the British way of life is to survive'. 
Much of Grigg's overview necessarily considered the Middle East states 
themselves, focusing particularly on Egypt and the problem of integrating Palestine 
into British strategy given plans for its possible partition. In these early stages of post- 
war planning, however, little had been done regarding detailed financial and military 
provisioning, which was being undertaken by various redeployment committees. Kenya 
and Rhodesia, significantly given their white minority governments, began to be drawn 
into British strategy in so far as the development of RAF bases in those countries was 
- 
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considered to be `desirable'. Grigg also perceptively presented this concept in terms 
not only of imperial defence and overseas strategy generally, but also with regard to 
colonial internal security: `Military expenditure is most economically incurred where, 
so far as possible, it will serve a double purpose and pay two separate dividends. The 
use of Kenya and Rhodesia as rear bases and of Cyprus as an advanced base would 
conform to this principle. '28 
By March 1946, with the war over, and ongoing wrangling over revision of the 
Anglo-Egyptian Treaty (1936), the case for Kenya becoming the location for major 
British military installations had progressed little further than Grigg's paper 
recommendations of the previous year. The British Chiefs of Staff, contrary to the 
thinking of the Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, had insisted upon the retention of a 
peace-time garrison in Egypt. The Foreign Office supported the service chiefs' view on 
the grounds that the Egyptians could not be `trusted to maintain unaided (or, let us say 
it frankly, unprompted) the military framework which must exist in peace-time if the 
area is to be properly defended in war'. 29 However, difficulties in negotiating with the 
Egyptians prompted Britain to consider in detail the idea of an East African base. 
The decision pivoted as much on whether an `East African bastion' was a 
military possibility, as it did on the likelihood of being able to remain in Egypt. 
According to the Foreign Office, withdrawal from Egypt could not be countenanced 
`unless the over-a11 defence of the British Empire can be assured by substituting for the 
Egypt-Palestine-Transjordan-Irak [sic] bastion the East African bastion plus through 
communications with West Africa'. 3° Significantly, the option of a base in East Africa 
Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
29 FO 37I/ß 3286. no. 942. minute by P. S. Scrivener. 2 March 1946. cited in: ibid.. pp. 75-7. doc. 27. 
30 Ibid. 
28 
apparently held financial as well as political merits, especially when compared with `the 
present edifice, whose foundation is the shifting sand of Arab-and Jewish-politics'. The 
Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, for one, considered it preferable to defend the Middle 
East from `British or British-controlled territories and not from foreign territories the 
governments of which were reluctant to have British forces quartered on their soil. 
Thus, a large and perhaps the main British base would be at Mombasa and other bases 
would be in Iraq and Transjordan if, as was probable, the Governments of those 
territories agreed. '3' 
Before any reports on East Africa's suitability as a location for a major base 
were forthcoming, the Chiefs of Staff had dismissed the idea. If the defence of the 
Middle East on a regional basis were to become `a reality' the `main headquarters' 
simply could not be located elsewhere. 32 The only other alternative (at the time) was to 
base the HQ in Palestine, with store holding facilities in Mombasa and Aden, but with 
the internal security situation in the former likely to be as precarious as that in Egypt, 
British policy tended more towards the `better the devil you know' approach. " Yet, 
Bevin remained unconvinced that the Middle East HQ could not be located in Kenya, 
or even the Sudan. Immediate commencement of withdrawal from Egypt would not 
only create goodwill, but also show that Britain's dependence upon the Cairo HQ and 
the Suez base was far less than the Egyptians had perceived, and could only enhance 
I' FO 371/5' 288, no. 1151. TO note of a meeting in Mr Bevin's room on 11 March 1946'. cited in: 
ibid.. p. 82. doc. 30. See also: P. S. Gupta, 
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Britain's negotiating position. '` Again, the Chiefs of Staff countered, this time because 
Turkey and the Arab states would not be convinced of Britain's commitment to the 
defence of the Middle East with troops stationed in East Africa. 35 
With the issue of British policy in the Middle East delicately poised, it seems 
that Britain's `left hand' (represented by Bevin) was not so much unaware of what its 
`right hand' (the service chiefs) was doing, nor the means or lack of means at its 
disposal, rather than somewhat schizophrenic regarding the ultimate ends of policy 
generally. As Kent has demonstrated, British defence policy in the Middle East was 
complicated to some extent by Bevin's vision of wide-ranging economic, strategic and 
technical co-operation in Africa between Britain and the other European colonial 
powers. 36 With this in mind, in the Autumn of 1946, Bevin had laid the groundwork 
for Britain's evacuation from Egypt to be completed by 1 September 1949, with some 
flexibility to take account of possible future international hostilities. The Foreign 
Secretary was also encouraged by the `progress made in examining the potentialities of 
East Africa as a base' 
. 
37 Potential was one thing, however, and reality was quite 
different. The problem from Kenya's perspective, so to speak, was that broad strategic 
decisions taken in Whitehall often impacted on parochial security issues. Whatever 
London decided to do with its military forces after the war, Nairobi still had to ensure 
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that in its corner of the British Empire it remained `business as usual'. As we will see, 
this turned out to be the greater problem. 
Towards the end of the Second World War, in response to the burgeoning 
crime wave, the Kenya Police had begun to take tentative steps towards improving its 
coverage of the African reserves, establishing `regulars' in Kiambu, Nandi and Narok, 
then Kericho and Kisii, respectively. By 1949, however, large areas of Kenya, 
including the Rift Valley Province, still lacked a regular police presence. 38 Despite the 
ongoing increases in manpower, wider dispersal, and measures taken to improve the 
command structure, the police found it difficult to adapt to its increased responsibilities 
in both rural and urban areas, as levels of unemployment, housing shortages, and the 
cost of living spiralled upwards, contributing inevitably to rising levels of crime, 
particularly minor offences. 39 As crime levels increased, the settler-dominated local 
governments enacted more and more legislation designed to regulate African activities. 
`Poorer Africans, especially Kikuyu, who flocked to the burgeoning shanty-towns 
around the capital as they were dispossessed by European and African commercial 
farmers, were common offenders against local ordinances. '40 
In the early post-war period the colonial state was not preoccupied only with 
the threat to internal security and economic progress and stability posed by crime. As 
the Cold War took hold, Kenya's strategic significance was again, if briefly, elevated. 
By August 1947, given Britain's planned withdrawal from India and Palestine, and 
continued difficulties in negotiating the future of the vast military complex in Egypt, 
Kenya Colony now seemed destined to become the principal military stores holding 
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area for the Middle East. 41 Certainly, the military commanders in the Middle East itself 
had arrived at this, albeit hasty, conclusion. As an enclosure in a despatch from the 
Chief of Staff, Middle East Headquarters (COS, GHQ, MELF), General Pyman, to the 
local military commander, General Dimoline, made clear: 
If political decisions take a certain turn it may even be that directing headquarters and 
even theatre reserves of British fighting units will have to be stationed in peacetime in 
EAST AFRICA [sic]. [... ] Therefore military activity is certainly going to increase IN 
PEACETIME in EAST AFRICA to some and possibly to a very large degree. That 
EAST AFRICA will be an important military base in any future WAR is almost 
without question. -2 
This would add to the `security problem' in Kenya, because of the need to 
import skilled labourers for the construction of the Mackinnon Road depot ('Operation 
Satire IF, later renamed `Leader'): `careful screening would be necessary '. ` `' Kenya's 
security planners' minds had already been focused by the Mombasa dock strike in 
January 1947, the Murang'a peasants' revolt later that year, and pro-secessionist 
agitation by the Somali Youth League in the NFD, as well as the latter's supposed 
`link up' with the political voice of African nationalism in the colony, the Kenya 
African Union (KAU). 44 Moreover, before the end of the war, Officials in Whitehall 
had begun to express concerns, which on one view were groundless, about the 
potential threat posed to the internal security of Britain's African colonies by returning 
demobilised African soldiers. 45 Also, as pressure began to mount for aborting the 
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evacuation from Egypt, because security of tenure in Cyrenaica (yet another possible 
Middle East HQ) could not be assured, it seemed feasible to station British troops in 
Kenya for reinforcement of the Persian Gulf. 46 It followed, according to somewhat 
circular logic after Grigg's earlier recommendations, that the more secure Kenya was 
as a colony, the more viable it would be as a British base, and the more secure, and so 
on. 
In September 1950, as the result of Britain's eventual decision to stay on in 
Egypt, the MacKinnon Road project was finally abandoned. 4' Kenya was just too far 
away from the Middle East to serve as a main base. 48 Despite measures taken to 
expand and improve the police, the Kenya government's ability to make contingency 
plans to deal with internal civil disorder had also been weakened by other decisions 
taken in Whitehall. With the closure of Mackinnon Road, so dwindled any immediate 
prospect of significant numbers of British troops being stationed in Kenya. While fairly 
comprehensive plans existed for internal security reinforcement by air, these decisions 
served effectively to limit the numbers of local military personnel on the ground 
. 
49 
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In late 1946, wartime debts and the consequent requirement to economise 
prompted awareness in Britain that post-war demobilisation would steadily deplete the 
numbers of locally recruited troops stationed in the colonies when there was a `grave 
shortage of white man-power'. This led Attlee to suggest that `a review be carried out 
in order to make the maximum possible use of Colonial man-power, both from the 
military and industrial points of view'. 50 Thus began the review of `the role of the 
colonies in war' 
. 
51 
Although presented with reference to efficiency and battle-readiness, with 
particular attention paid to the colonies' defence schemes, the review amounted to a 
cost-cutting exercise aimed at reducing, where practicable, the levels of manpower in 
colonial armed forces. The British Chiefs of Staff were in favour of maintaining `an 
internal security force re-organised from the present demobilised East and West 
African forces, and of maintaining a small armed nucleus capable of expansion in 
war'. 52 They would not, however, approve the funding of colonial forces in East and 
West Africa from the service votes, `which would have to be devoted to raising the 
British Services to the highest possible standard. Money spent from the votes of the 
Service Department on African forces could only be at the expense of the British 
Services. 
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Following Attlee's suggestion, the review of colonial forces included an 
assessment of wartime accomplishments. According to one such evaluation, East 
African troops had performed creditably in Africa and the Middle East, and achieved 
their `main' success in the Far East with an advance down the Kabaw Valley in Burma 
during the 1944 monsoon. `In the campaign in Burma, however, reports from Force 
Commanders show that the East Africans did not reach the standard of other troops 
engaged, and in fact were somewhat disappointing. When outside the fighting zone, 
their discipline also caused difficulty at times. '54 Perhaps there were grounds for 
Britain's fears of the risk to internal security posed by demobilised African soldiers 
after all? 
One of East Africa's roles in any future war would be to provide a military 
force to be expanded initially to one division `for use outside East Africa'. It was 
decided, however, that until `further experience indicates whether the defects noted 
... 
can be overcome, it appears wise not to plan for its use outside Africa'. 55 Apart from 
projected future manpower requirements for pioneer and labour units, mainly for 
essential industries, this left local troops with responsibility for internal security duties 
and the `Army share of defences for Imperial naval and air bases in East Africa'. 56 
With this renewed emphasis placed on the internal security role of local military 
forces, and given that it was `common ground' that financial responsibility therefore 
`fell on the Colonies concerned', an effective limit on the numbers of troops in Kenya 
was inevitable. s' This materialised in the form of a recommendation from the War 
' CAB 134/153 1, ODC (46) 11, The Role of the Colonies in War'. 6 Dec. 1946. f. 7. For a full 
account of KAR activities in Burma. see: Page. KJR. pp. 13,3-75. On KAR discipline in Burma and 
generally, see: Clayton and Killingrav. Khaki and Blue, pp. 23 7-444.254 
" CAB 134/53 1, ODC (46) 11. 'The Role of the Colonies in War', f. 9. 
Ibid. 
CAB 13 1/ I. DO (46) 24th, 5.7 Aug. 1946. f. 8. 
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Office for a reduction in East African forces to a ceiling of 5,000.5% The `Expansion for 
war provision' was to be a `long term contribution to the war effort which need not 
[sic] affect the peace time planning'. 59 In an effort to minimise the impact of the 
manpower ceiling, Dimoline proposed that the size of KAR battalions be reduced, 
rather than their number. Despite objections from Dimoline's successor, General Sir 
Arthur Dowler, this change was made in early 1949, reducing a four company KAR 
battalion from 728 African ranks to 656.60 The inter-war objection to such reductions, 
that the flexibility required of African troops in an `imperial role' would thereby be 
impaired, had again been superseded by financial constraint S. 61 
The East African governors had pressed throughout for the War Office to 
assume sole responsibility for direct command and control, and financing of local 
military forces. 62 The War Office, however, found this to be conveniently inconsistent 
with their status as `His Majesty's representatives and therefore His Majesty's heads of 
the Army forces in their territories'. 63 The governors were therefore left to haggle with 
London over the relative proportions which Britain and the colonial governments 
should pay towards the cost of maintaining the local forces. This question pivoted on 
the difference between what the War Office was prepared to pay for the forces' 
58 WO 276/75, 'Notes on Tour of GOC to Uganda: Discussion between HE The Governor, C-in-C 
MELF and GOC. 20 February 1948'. f. 2. para. 9. 
59 Ibid.. COS/42, `Aide Memoire for GOC's Address to East Africa High Commission Defence 
Session 21st September 1948'. 
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external `Commonwealth Defence element' and the amount the territories could afford 
to pay towards their internal security, as well as the extent to which the shortfall could 
be met by the Colonial Office. 64 Events elsewhere, particularly the June 1948 `Berlin 
crisis', compounded the problem by complicating and prolonging the colonial defence 
review. 65 Despite numerous committee meetings in London and East Afi ica, several 
conferences, and reams of correspondence, `the special EA problem could not be 
settled until decisions had been reached on the larger question' of `Colonial forces 
everywhere, and the methods of paying for them. In the meantime, all planning in East 
Africa had to be on suppositions. '66 
Among the possible solutions suggested to the actual and, perhaps more 
important, the potential shortfall in military personnel, were that the Kenya government 
could either introduce a form of national service, or raise territorial units on the UK 
model, or both. Since the end of the war, Governor Sir Philip Mitchell had consistently 
asked Dimoline why (white) `Kenya youths' were not being conscripted like their 
British counterparts, who were sent out to serve in Africa. 67 The answer came in 
August 1947, when the then Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs, Arthur Creech 
Jones, informed Mitchell that the question of conscription would have to be deferred 
until completion of the review of colonial forces. He did however agree in principle to 
64 WO 276/76.141. top secret telegram. Wallace (War Office") to Dimoline (GOC. EAC). 4 March 
1949. 
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the reconstitution of the mainly European Kenya Regiment, which had been disbanded 
at the end of the war. 68 
Although the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Field-Marshal Lord 
Montgomery, had enthusiastically praised the potentially vast reserves of African 
manpower as a means of dealing with `crises' throughout the Empire, no `African' 
solutions to Europe's overseas defence problems were in fact forthcoming. 69 Britain's 
reversal on Middle East defence policy led, as we have seen, to a proportionate 
downgrading in Kenya's strategic importance. In the end, the governors themselves 
rejected the idea of (white) national service in East Africa, not least because of the 
cost. Besides, such `reinforcements' would be either too young, and lacking in the 
quality of leadership needed to serve in East African units or, as with British conscripts 
generally, their service would be too short-term, `so that by the time they had become 
useful in their units they were due to be released'. 70 
As for addressing manpower shortages with part-time reservists, Dimoline was 
not in favour of re-starting an African territorial unit on the lines of the old 7 KAR. He 
came to this negative conclusion after the Mombasa dock strike, when Ugandan troops 
68 WO 276/10, GC (47) 16, `National Service in East Africa'. memo. for East African Governors' 
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aided the police in restoring order. 71 The problem was addressed again the following 
year. 
At the meeting of the [East Africa] High Commission held in February, 1948, the High Commission came to the preliminary conclusion that the highly complicated nature of 
modern military training made it unlikely that Territorial Forces embodying Africans 
would be practicable. The General Officer Commanding subsequently endorsed this 
view. 
72 
British opinion apparently distinguished between the `more educated and 
sophisticated West African, and the greater number of large towns where a territorial 
unit might be located, and the East African'. Dimoline did not believe that `the East 
African' was `yet ready for Territorial service' and considered that `any money so 
spent would be entirely wasted'. 73 That some 225,000 East Africans, including over 20 
KAR battalions, had served the British Empire during the war, and largely successfully, 
did not figure in these calculations. 74 Perhaps demobilised African soldiers did not need 
refresher courses in marksmanship? The revival of rifle clubs for `Indians and 
Europeans', on the other hand, did not seem to pose a security problem. 75 
Unsurprisingly, the same can be said for the reconstitution of the Kenya 
Regiment, which was finally approved in early 1949 and implemented in 1950. This 
provided the means by which Europeans would continue to receive military training 
without the Kenya government resorting to conscription. 76 With limits on the numbers 
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of troops available in the colony, however, and the laboured improvements to the 
police, some means were still needed to enable the security forces to be brought up to 
strength in `emergency conditions'. The Kenya Police Reserve (KPR), which was 
`open to all races', was therefore established to take over in `undisturbed areas' while 
the regular police dealt with `disturbed areas'. " Another solution to manpower 
shortages in the event of an emergency, which would have far-reaching implications 
beyond Kenya's independence, was `a strong striking force of police available to deal 
at the earliest possible moment with any outbreak'. 78 In late 1947, in parallel with a 
similar initiative in the Gold Coast (Ghana), so came about the formation of the Kenya 
Police `Emergency Company', predecessor of the General Service Unit (GSU). 79 It 
seems that on this occasion the lead was taken in the colonies, with Creech Jones not 
advocating the widespread adoption of colonial mobile gendarmeries until the end of 
1948.80 Meanwhile, in the political and socio-economic spheres, Creech Jones seemed 
more concerned with developments in `local' rather than `self-' government, although 
he did make the concession, unpopular with most white settlers, whereby Kenya's 
Kenya on 2nd March 1949', `Third Meeting of the East Africa High Commission held in Nairobi on 
Tuesday and Wednesday 8th and 9th March, 1949' (`Defence Session', 9 March 1949). f. 6: 
Campbell, p. 29. 
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Legislative Council would receive four appointed (not elected) African members. 
Meanwhile, the socially disastrous agricultural terracing campaign continued. 8' 
While Britain's post-war review of colonial defence was undertaken primarily 
to ensure military effectiveness against external attack, unrest in the Gold Coast 
highlighted a serious deficiency in colonial internal security capabilities which had 
implications elsewhere in the Empire. The Accra riots of February 1948, although 
foreseen by the local military commander, had utterly surprised the Police 
Commissioner. This focused the minds of the colonial governments on `the need for 
establishing or strengthening intelligence services and special branches', especially 
given the circular they had received that month demanding ` political intelligence on the 
threat posed by subversive movements'. 82 
Prompted also by `crises' in Europe, the Malayan Emergency of June that year, 
and unrest elsewhere in the Empire, a colonial police adviser, W. C. Johnson, was 
eventually appointed at the behest of the Minister of Defence, Lord Alexander, in 
November 1948.83 The importance of broadcasting and `propaganda warfare' was also 
brought home by the 1948 `panic', with the Colonial Office information service taking 
over the management of the British Council in April. In May 1948, Bevin had asked 
the Colonial Office to initiate the practice of preparing regular reports on communist 
activities in the Empire. 84 At around the same time, Bevin recommended that Attlee 
add a Colonial Office representative to the Joint Intelligence Committee, so as `to 
x' Kyle. Politics of Independence. pp. 41,43, Throup, Origins ofJlau . 1Iau. pp. 4-5.6-7,66.79-81. 
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ensure that we have the best possible intelligence about Communist activities in the 
Colonies, so that we may not be taken unawares'. 85 
Indeed, in early 1948, fear of widespread communist and/or nationalist 
subversion throughout the Empire, led to a thorough reorganisation at the Colonial 
Office. Geographical departments were tasked with preparing fortnightly intelligence 
summaries, collated from the information that they received from the colonies. These 
summaries were then submitted to the newly-established Colonial Office Defence 
Department, for inclusion in its monthly reports. 86 No sooner had these arrangements 
been put in place, however, and the colonial governments' contributions been found to 
be wanting, than the Malayan State of Emergency was proclaimed. 87 
The East African governors had long been aware that African nationalism was 
likely to arise and would threaten peace and stability in the post-war period. In June 
1945, at a conference to assess the problem, they had agreed that `an efficient political 
internal security organisation should be established in East Africa and that each 
territory should take steps to ensure that its own organisation was adequate'. The 
subsequent enquiry reported that Kenya's political intelligence structure `cannot be 
regarded as satisfactory-. 88 By 1947, little had improved, and the authorities were 
again reminded of the `lack of an adequate Intelligence organisation for the Civil 
Police' 
. 
8o As General Dimoline noted: 
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I informed HE [Mitchell] that I was apprehensive that the Police Security Int[elligence] 
in the territory was almost non-existent and that this was amply born [sic] out in the Mombasa strike. Moreover, in view of our new visitors [Kenyatta et al? ], this fact had 
even greater significance. I further consider that the Special Branch of the Police was 
not doing its job, although the Chief of the Special Branch, Capt Sandwith, seemed to know his job, but was not allowed to dolt. 90 
Reflecting what would become a recurring theme regarding political 
intelligence-gathering in Kenya, if not elsewhere, it seemed that a lack of civil-military- 
police co-operation, exacerbated by what might be called the `bailiwick mentality', was 
at the root of the problem. 9' For example, the then Provincial Commissioner for 
Central Province, Percy Wyn Harris (later appointed Chief Native Commissioner), 
while agreeing that there `might' be a problem in the towns, `felt that, from the Native 
Reserves of his Province, he was getting a reasonable amount of information'. 92 
Nevertheless, Mitchell agreed with Dimoline, `that there was a grave weakness 
in our Police Int[elligence] and promised to give it immediate attention'. 9' This 
culminated in a `Security Conference' attended by the Director-General of the Security 
Service (M15), Sir Percy Sillitoe, in late August 1947.94 The conference made several 
recommendations. Autonomous Special Branches should be established within each 
territory's police force. All police recruits from Britain should be trained there prior to 
departure, with Special Branch recruits taking short M15 and Special Branch courses 
in either London or the provinces. Ultimately, `Central Training Schools' should be 
established locally. Perhaps most important: `All information on security matters, from 
9" Ibid.. 'Notes on Conference with HE the Governor of Kenya. on Friday, 21st Februar- 119471'. 
91 Ibid.. 'Conference in GOC-in-C's Office 
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whatever source, should be made immediately available to the Commissioners of 
Police. ' The resulting report would then be passed to the Security Liaison Officer 
(SLO), representing M15, who would collate this with `information reaching him from 
other sources', and advise the relevant authorities. 95 
These recommendations were all well and good, but their implementation and 
subsequent effectiveness were another matter. Despite its separate establishment and 
firmly laid guidelines for the dissemination of political intelligence, Special Branch 
continued to suffer from manpower shortages, preventing it from developing a 
`provincial network for intelligence-gathering'. In June 1948, while communist `crises' 
seemingly rampaged throughout the Empire, East Africa Command reported gloomily 
that `the "security situation" had "deteriorated considerably in the post war period)! " 
. 
96 
In 1950, the problem was compounded, ironically, by the formation of the Kenya 
Police Criminal Investigation Department (CID). Although this released more officers 
for `regular' police work, the new department also tended to monopolise the 
enthusiastic attention of the then Police Commissioner, Michael O'Rorke. While 
O'Rorke's main concern was the Nairobi `crime wave', he paid scant attention to the 
steady flow of Special Branch reports on trade union and `radical' activity. Thus little 
effort was made to bring such reports to the attention of the administration or the 
Attorney-General and Member for Law and Order, John Whyatt. The situation was 
exacerbated by the promotions of several middle-ranking Special Branch officers to 
other colonies. If that were not enough, in 1950 the Director of Intelligence and 
Security (DIS) himself, Cecil Penfold, was promoted elsewhere. Penfold's successor 
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lacked his intricate local knowledge, and seemed unable to utilise the information 
available to him. 97 
Given Britain's post-war financial stringency, the Kenya government was 
poised dangerously between two stools. On the one hand, a more or less generally 
perceived lack of any desirability or necessity to concede major political advance to 
Africans served only to frustrate the efforts of the moderate would-be collaborators in 
the KAU to gain incorporation into the colonial state. The situation was complicated, 
of course, by the relatively early independence of India and Burma, juxtaposed by 
Colonial Office pronouncements on political reform. As a somewhat irritated Mitchell 
put it to Creech Jones in September 1948: 
At a time when there are frequent declarations of policy to the effect that it is the 
object of His Majesty's Government to bring Colonial Dependencies to the point of 
self-government at the earliest possible moment, it is not surprising that ignorant and 
excitable populations of this kind should suppose that means within [the] next year or 
two, and accordingly the subversive elements who organize movements of this kind 
derive a great deal of strength from official statements of policy made at Ministerial 
level 
... 
these statements of policy have, if I may be frank, been overdone in the recent 
98 past. 
In this context, the increasingly intolerable socio-economic circumstances of the great 
majority of Kenyan Africans merely provided the colony's aspirant nationalist 
politicians with broad-based support. On the other hand, while resources in Kenya 
Colony were insufficient to make a substantive improvement to many Africans' 
situation, and what development programmes existed were tarnished by corruption, 
even the state's emphasis on maintaining internal security was undermined by the very 
financial hardship which made it necessary in the first place. 
Q- Throup. 'Crime. politics and the police. pp. 135.137-9. 
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`Splendid isolation? ': strategies to maintain stability, 1950-2 
Despite financial and manpower constraints, the Kenya government had taken real 
steps to strengthen its security forces and to repair deficiencies in its intelligence 
structures, and was clearly `obsessed with the question of security'. 99 An overview of 
two aspects of the internal security planning process confirms this. The comprehensive 
`Internal Security Scheme (Nairobi/Mombasa)', for instance, detailed the army's 
`duties in aid of the civil power' and its precise role in `emergency conditions. 100 The 
scheme was reviewed almost monthly, and updated in accordance with relative 
manpower levels and the latest intelligence summaries. It recognised `five possible 
causes of unrest': racial and inter-racial disputes; economic; religious; subversive 
influence; and inter-tribal disputes. The `seven possible types of unrest' included, for 
example: `inter-tribal fighting (African)' and `attacks by Africans on Europeans and/or 
European property'. Educated Africans, disaffected African ex-soldiers, and African 
trade unionists were identified, correctly as we now know, as among those persons 
most likely to cause or lead unrest. '°' (Again, British fears of the threat posed by 
demobilised African soldiers, it seems, were not necessarily groundless. ) As well as 
covering the major municipalities, the plan catered for the army being called out to 
`deal with civil disturbances' in the African reserves. All this planning, however, did 
not guarantee effective practice. Following a rehearsal in September 1949, and 
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undoubtedly reflecting some of the difficulties outlined above, the army reported that 
the police `were not able to participate in the scheme'. 102 
By March 1950, an `Emergency Scheme for Kenya Colony' had been drawn up 
to address many such shortcomings. Taking account of probable manpower shortages 
and in expectation that outbreaks of unrest might well be widespread and occur 
simultaneously in rural and urban areas, the scheme specified a rigid and clearly defined 
command structure, with `emergency committees' at the colony, provincial, and 
district levels. These would assist in the co-ordination of the exchange of intelligence, 
so that the security forces could be deployed when and where they were most urgently 
needed. 103 `Internal Security' would come `under the direction of the Commissioner of 
Police, with the assistance of Headquarters, East Africa Command' which would, if 
requested, `supply a Military Liaison Officer to be stationed at Kenya Police 
Headquarters'. The Police Commissioner would also submit situation reports twice 
daily. 104 
In May 1950, the Nairobi general strike provided the opportunity for the 
Emergency Scheme's first real test and, more importantly, proved its success. 
Armoured cars were seen on Nairobi's streets, and teargas was used to disperse 
restless crowds in some of the African locations, both for the first time. "'s Significantly, 
although the Army's rules of engagement made allowances for `singling out' the 
`ringleaders' of angry mobs or riots (a `shoot to kill' policy), firearms were not used. 1 ' 
"', Percox. 'British Counter-Insurgence', pp. 533-4. 
l o. 1 Ibid.. pp. 54-5. Dimoline had 'disagreed' with provisions in the earlier internal security schemes 
for Kenya and Uganda, which entailed deploying troops, rather than the police. to guard vulnerable 
points' (VPs). WO 276/76. 'Note of Meeting with the Governor of Kenya - Ist Feb. 1949'. 'GOC/HE 
Governor. Uganda Conference Draft Notes'. n. d. (c. 27 Jan. 1949). 
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Order was restored within two weeks, the strike broken. " Shortly afterwards, Kenya's 
Chief Secretary, John Rankine, wrote to General Dowler, thanking him for the 
considerable assistance 
... 
given during the recent strike in Nairobi. [... ] The loan of gas 
grenades and of jeeps was much appreciated. "" Ironically, their defeat led Bildad 
Kaggia and Fred Kubai, the strike organisers, to decide that more militant action was 
necessary, including infiltration of KAU, and a general oathing campaign directed from 
Nairobi. '09 
While urban unrest, by definition, was concentrated, thus comparatively 
straightforward to repress, rural subversion was more fragmented and widespread. Of 
course, as the colonial authorities in London and Nairobi feared, and were later to 
experience, simultaneous rural and urban civil disturbances were a different matter 
altogether. The Kenya government had learned of the existence of Mau Mau in 1948, 
when Kikuyu labourers on settler farms began to agitate against their conditions. "' In 
early 1950, Special Branch first reported the existence of the Mau Mau `secret society' 
and its oathing campaign, which was promptly made a criminal offence. In April, the 
police began to make arrests for `administering an unlawful oath'. By the end of 1950, 
there had been 120 convictions. '" 
With emergency schemes and intelligence systems for gathering and collating 
information in place, the principal task remaining for directors of internal security is 
threat analysis, or `targeting'. In August 1950, the decision was taken to establish an 
Internal Security Working Committee (ISWC) to this end: tasked to `assess the 
internal security risk in Kenya in the light of present conditions and trends' and to 
10 Throup, loc. cit. 
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`review broadly the scope and nature of existing schemes with a view to assessing 
generally their adequacy or otherwise to meet the risk' 
. 
112 
The ISWC's first report, submitted in November 1951, covered many of the 
`causes' and `types of unrest' mentioned above. In an appreciation of `General 
Factors', which reflected the distinct lack of racial harmony in the colony at the time, 
the ISWC Report began thus: `The factors which may affect the internal security 
situation in Kenya can best be considered separately in relation to the three 
communities. '' 13 (This aspect of the report was omitted from Corfield's summary. ) 
Referring to `Asian factors', in so far as they might have posed a security problem, the 
ISWC summarised that these `lie mainly in the possibility of communal strife arising 
from events in their own countries, and in the chance that as the tool of Indian 
politicians, the African might be incited to excesses which he would not otherwise 
contemplate'. The ISWC also predicted that in the probable event of natural 
population growth, consequent increases in Asian unemployment might well push 
some towards communist leanings. On the whole, however, Asians were not 
considered to be a security risk. ' 14 
Taking a broad view, the ISWC also reported that `Europeans may affect 
internal security in three ways: (a) by acting as an abrasive to other communities (b) by propagating well meaning but impracticable or misguided advice to Africans; (c') by 
unlawful actions against the Government or other communities. ' Although the decision 
to form the ISWC had been taken two days before Mau Mau was proscribed, on 12 
August 1950, it paid little attention to this apparently unspectacular secret society. In 
Percox, 'British Counter-Insurgency'. pp. 55-8. 
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this same first report the ISWC thought the threat to internal security represented by 
Mau Mau was negligible. It was responsible for little more than encouraging a `'. ego 
slow" policy' and `minor acts of sabotage on farms' 
. 
"5 
Significantly, under the various headings relating to the `African factors' which 
might lead or contribute to unrest, the ISWC noted: `an increasing intolerance of 
interference in the conduct of their affairs by Europeans'; "`corner boys"... [who] have 
little to lose by the disruption of the society they exist in, and provide a permanent 
nucleus of thieves and malcontents in all the larger towns and in the African land units 
which have contact with them'. Despite its apparent lack of activity, Mau Mau could 
still be `a possible instrument for mischief in the hands of agitators, though one of 
which the potentialities appear to be waning'. Most significant of all, it remained `a 
fact that the main focus of discontent is at present amongst the Kikuyu'. "' 
As one might expect, the ISWC also assessed the influence of communism as 
an internal security risk, and considered it unlikely to present a major problem in 
relation to the numerically inferior Asian and European communities. `Although 
Communism [sic] has not necessarily any racial limitation, and indeed its known 
followers in Kenya number only a few Indians and a couple of European fellow 
travellers, it is suitable, for the purposes of this paper, to consider it as a matter 
concerning Africans[! ]' While the ISWC recognised that there were in fact very few 
communists in Kenya `and no known party influence now actually at work', the 
reasoning behind this distinction was clear: 
Kenya is, however, a country where there exist great disparities of wealth between the 
African peasants on the one hand, and the European and Asian planters and traders on 
the other. This class cleavage is accentuated by the coincidence [sic] of a colour 
cleavage, and inevitably gives rise to feelings of envy and animosity on the part of the 
1 1' Ibid. 
116 Ibid. (Emphasis added. ) 
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"have nots". No society in which such disparities obtain can be regarded as healthy, 
and here economic conditions provide a suitable environment for the propagation of Communism. 117 
When read in conjunction with the ISWC's findings on `Land Hunger', on the one 
hand the threat of communism is brought into sharp focus. On the other hand, 
especially given the apparently low risk, or effective non-existence, of Soviet influence 
in the colony at the time, communism pales into insignificance: 
The land available to certain tribes in Kenya is generally insufficient to support them, 
as at present utilised, at a reasonable standard of living. The population is increasing 
very rapidly, and it is doubtful whether improved methods of agriculture, and 
employment in secondary industries, will be able to offset the natural increase. [... ] 
Africans turn hungry eyes on the [White] Highlands, and many undoubtedly believe 
that the simple and natural solution of their problem would be to spill over from the 
Reserves [sic] on to the European farms. To the Kikuyu, in particular, this simple 
solution appears to be the more appropriate, as they have convinced themselves that in 
adopting it they would merely be repossessing lands taken from them by the white 
settlers. It is probable that the spectacle of the large areas of the Highlands (much of 
them admittedly undeveloped), compared with the congested picture of many of the 
Reserves, constitutes, at the moment, the most potent cause of hostility against 
Europeans. "' 
The ISWC was also aware that vernacular newspapers in India, West Africa, 
and in British colonies elsewhere, had been a `potent source of trouble'. In Kenya, the 
mainly Kikuyu vernacular press, which was `deliberately and mischievously disparaging 
of Government and of Europeans', was a factor, `if not yet a very considerable one, in 
fomenting unrest and anti-European feeling'. "9 Matters were not helped, either, by 
earlier developments elsewhere in the Empire: 
The rapid constitutional advance made in other countries and the flattery of some 
visitors from England inevitably suggest that quicker progress towards "self- 
government" should be made in Kenya. The fact that progress has been quicker in the 
"black countries" focuses still more favourable attention on European settlement in 
Kenya. It would be difficult, too, for the East African agitator to fail to appreciate that 
every concession extracted from the British Government, whether in Ireland, Palestine, 
'' Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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India, or indeed to an extent on the West Coast, has seemingly been extracted only by 
violence. 120 
Given the ongoing restrictions on the political means of expression of African 
grievances, evidenced by the eventual increase to four Africans appointed to the 
Legislative Council in 1947,121 the ISWC's assessment of African political factors as 
risks to internal security is instructive: 
It is inevitable that the more intelligent and ambitious Africans should seek 
opportunities to make their mark in politics. [... ] Some of the politicians are 
undoubtedly actuated by a more or less honest desire to promote the interests of their 
people; others are simply anxious to get rich quick. The disparity of wealth, the 
shortage of land, and general social grievances furnish the politicians and agitators with 
potent medicine; the susceptibility of Africans to oratory, and the ignorance of the 
masses, make them easy game. 122 
As the principal `official' political voice for Africans, the KAU naturally came 
under ISWC scrutiny. KAU was considered to be mostly `moderate and constitutional 
in method', as evidenced by contacts between some of its members and the African 
members of the Legislative Council. By contrast, alleged contacts between some 
members of KAU and the organisers of Mau Mau and various religious sects gave rise 
to considerable uncertainty within the ISWC. As a factor in internal security risk 
assessment, however, one thing was certain: `The Kenya African Union would at 
present undoubtedly play the major role in any wide scale political agitation, though 
the personal rivalries of its leading officials make it not improbable that there may be a 
"hiving off' into other unions or congresses, perhaps based tribally or territorially' 123 
Ironically, this latter prediction would not be fully realised until Kenya moved closer to 
independence following the lifting of the State of Emergency (1952-60) and 
subsequent Lancaster House Conference. As will be seen in the next chapter, the 
Il" WO 276/5 19. ISWC Report. 
121 Kyle. Politics of Independence. p. 43. 
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Kenya government's approach to those members of the KAU leadership suspected of 
complicity in Mau Mau, while apparently somewhat belated, would reflect the fears 
expressed above. Whether these fears were justified is another matter entirely. 
Certainly, Kenya's Attorney-General seemed to have a clear understanding of the 
gravity of the situation, which is difficult to contradict following even a cursory glance 
of the ISWC Report. 
Reflecting his liberalism, possibly some naivete, and perhaps the relative lack of 
information that he received on Kikuyu subversive activities, Whyatt nevertheless drew 
a prescient conclusion. In his covering letter to the ISWC Report, he emphasised that 
the major problem in Kenya and East Africa generally is social and agrarian and not 
nationalistic. Moreover, we are at present at a stage when improvement in social 
conditions and such land reform as is practicable could bring about a marked 
betterment in the attitude to Government and it is for that reason that we can regard 
such improvement and reform as major security measures. 124 
Crucially, alarm bells should have been ringing in the Colonial Office for at least a year 
before the declaration of Kenya's State of Emergency. However, as Füredi has 
perceptively argued, it was common throughout the British Empire for warnings such 
as those contained within the ISWC Report to be ignored until it was too late. `When 
disorder broke out, sociological explanations lost ground to those of law and order. '125 
Certainly, the Cold War paranoia of 1948 had superseded earlier, more 
moderate approaches to those `who actively oppose colonial rule'. 126 It seems that 
Britain could not afford, in terms of financial and other resources, to distinguish 
between communists and nationalists. While the British were aware that many forms of 
anti-colonial agitation in the Empire were justified by socio-economic conditions, 
124 Ibid. 
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dissent, rather than quiet acquiescence, was qualification enough for incurring the 
state's wrath. Britain simply had too much to lose by caving in to nationalist demands 
everywhere, and Kenya was far too important from both the economic and, albeit 
transient, strategic perspectives. 
Nonetheless, the Kenya government, at least in part, was acutely aware of 
Kikuyu grievances and the potential threat to security that they posed, if not the full 
extent of the threat. As for `existing security arrangements', the ISWC concluded that 
these were `generally adequate to meet the scale of risk which can immediately be 
foreseen, and that the real issues of policy are rather those preceding the violent state; 
they are those of ensuring that the elements which lead to violence and the means of 
achieving any serious disorder are denied'. The report also stressed that the emergency 
schemes `should, of course, be reviewed from time to time'. 127 
The ISWC also made several recommendations. These included `the restriction 
of local agitators who overstep the mark', `appropriate control over publications 
whether local or imported', and `the strengthening of existing legislation relating to 
arms and explosives'. 128 Documents relating to the Singapore Riots Inquiry would also 
be circulated among the military and police, so that lessons could be learned. '29 By the 
time that the ISWC Report had been submitted, `the strengthening of the legislation 
relating to arms and explosives' was already `in train'. Mitchell had even prepared a 
request for a Royal Commission on land use. Unfortunately, because of changes in 
personnel, the ISWC did not meet as scheduled, in May 1952, so its second review of 
I- WO 276/519. ISWC Report. 
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internal security risks and contingency plans did not take place. 13" By the time of the 
next review, due in November 1952, Kenya was already in a State of Emergency. 
In the absence of meaningful political and socio-economic development, it 
follows that pre-emptive action to `nip' a security problem `in the bud' should be 
preferable to a delayed, and often heavy-handed response. The Kenya government was 
certainly alive to this proposition, as evidenced by its extensive planning, although its 
approach to dealing with threats to internal security could hardly be said to have been 
subtle. The problem was related as much to the dissemination and interpretation of 
intelligence as to its availability and, as Corfield concedes, Mau Mau was a secret 
society, bound by an oath. 13' It should also be stressed that the Mau Mau guerrillas 
were arguably as much a product of state repression as they were its target. (This will 
be discussed further in Chapter II. ) That the first detailed intelligence report on Mau 
Mau, completed in April 1952, took nearly four months to arrive at Government 
House only made matters worse. ", 
This gives some credence to Lyttelton's tenuous retrospective view that if the 
Colonial Office had been better informed, and earlier, as might have been possible, 
`many security and remedial measures could have been taken earlier', saving many 
lives and, of course, money and other resources. 133 It is hard to believe that the 
Colonial Office was unaware of the ISWC Report. Nevertheless, while `remedial 
measures' were thin on the ground before October 1952, and fitfully applied thereafter, 
`security' measures were certainly `taken earlier', although the application of such 
measures could not have been further removed from Whyatt's interpretation. 
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In early 1952, well before the declaration of the State of Emergency, the Kenya 
Police began to implement the government's security crackdown, and arrested several 
key figureheads from the Fort Hall branch of "U. 134 By May, the police had begun 
an extensive campaign against Mau Mau in the Rift Valley, in which 150 Kikuyu 
squatters were detained, and 10 others arrested. The District Commissioners (DCs) of 
Fort Hall, Kiambu, Laikipia, Meru, Naivasha, Nakuru, Nanyuki, and Nyeri were also 
given `the equivalent of Supreme Court powers of punishment for certain offences 
which are commonly committed by members of the Mau Mau Society'. ''S In July 
1952, a `Special Bureau' was set up to `combat' Mau Mau. It `collected and collated 
all Mau Mau information and organised action against Mau Mau'. '36 In August, the 
Bureau began to collect evidence against suspected Mau Mau leaders, many of whom 
were prominent KAU personalities, in readiness for a future arrest sweep. ' 7 Kenyatta, 
the nominal head of KAU, was of course on the list. 
Following his return to Kenya in 1946, he had been closely monitored by the 
field administration, the regular police, and Special Branch. Despite the lack of any real 
evidence against him, visits to Moscow in 1932 and 1933, respectively, placed 
Kenyatta, in the eyes of the Colonial Office, and certainly in the settlers' perception, 
firmly in the Marxist nationalist camp. '3' His equivocal speeches to KAU mass rallies 
and failure to condemn Mau Mau did not help his case either, although the 
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circumstances surrounding Kenyatta's trial ensured that he would be convicted, 
regardless of the facts. 3ý 
Since early 1952, the settlers had pressed for `firm action' against Mau Mau. 140 
In August that year, this culminated in an attempt to intimidate the new Chief 
Secretary and acting Governor, Henry Potter, when two settler delegations demanded 
that the government take emergency powers to deal with Mau Mau. Potter rejected 
these demands, but was sufficiently impressed to warn the Colonial Office of an 
`imminent revolution'. Mitchell's tendency to understate matters towards the end of his 
governorship, and the apparent lack of urgency regarding intelligence reports about 
Mau Mau, led to confusion and disagreement in Whitehall. Some officials dismissed 
the settlers' views as unnecessarily alarmist. Moreover, Whyatt was not alone in 
thinking `fresh and positive measures to remove or alleviate underlying causes of 
discontent' to be preferable to `repressive legislation alone'. 141 
Besides, the Kenya government's campaign against Mau Mau was far from 
lacklustre. By September 1952,412 persons had been imprisoned for membership of 
Mau Mau. '42 A further `mass campaign of arrests' initiated by the police in September 
landed 547 Kikuyu in `preventive detention' in the first week. 14; That same month, the 
Kenya government convened an emergency session of the Legislative Council to 
`consider special measures designed to check unrest'. These included legislation which 
would deny defence counsel the right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses, 
introduced corporal punishment for forcibly administering an oath, and gave the Kenya 
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government `complete control of all printing by presses' 
. 
14 ` The state was certainly 
armed, and using all the repressive means at its disposal to check unrest and to remove 
its instigators and perpetrators from circulation. So why, in the end, did the Kenya 
government (with London's approval) resort to the declaration of a State of 
Emergency? 
Conclusion 
Towards the end of the Second World War, as preparations began for the mass 
demobilisation of African soldiers, British officials in East Africa began to assess the 
adequacy of intelligence and policing arrangements to cope with an expected upsurge 
in anti-colonial nationalism. Within a year or two, their woeful findings had been 
exacerbated by the onset of the Cold War and the related complications of uncertainty 
in London over the precise nature of future defence policy in the Middle East, and the 
broad question of colonial defence and security throughout the British Empire. 
Overarching these difficulties were the financial and material strains of the war 
itself, which underlined the necessity to maximise the use of colonial resources in aid of 
the dollar-starved British economy, while ensuring that what remained of the Empire 
would have to be run on `a shoestring'. 14' This impaired the ability of the Kenya 
government to balance its expenditure on the `welfare programmes' designed to 
stimulate the local economy and to alleviate African socio-economic grievances with 
the costs of projected internal security requirements. 
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Nevertheless, considerable progress was made in planning for the possibility of 
a serious breakdown in `public security' and, despite retrospective protestations to the 
contrary, '46 the Kenya Police did all in its power to avert a potential security crisis. 
While there may not have been enough police in Kenya, irrespective of their quality, 
there were certainly enough pre-emptive arrests, if far too many for Kikuyu 
sensibilities. Ironically, the almost total failure in London and Nairobi to appreciate 
that, in the absence of meaningful or sufficient political and socio-economic 
improvements, repression alone could never win the day, forced Britain to `fight fire 
with fire. While Kenya might not in fact have been in the throes of armed insurrection, 
the declaration of the State of Emergency and allied repressive measures would soon 
ensure that a `terrible beauty' was born. 
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Chapter II 
British Counter-Insurgency in Kenya, 1952-56 
Introduction 
It is a commonly held fallacy that in response to numerous challenges to colonial rule 
throughout the Empire, Britain conceded varying measures of constitutional advance, 
the precursor to decolonisation, as part of a broad strategy of counter-insurgency. 
Indeed, the fact that Britain made such concessions so readily has been attributed to 
vast experience in combating insurgency, and has also been interpreted as contributing 
greatly to Britain's arguable success in the field. ' It would clearly be unreasonable, and 
misinformed, to suggest that political reform did not in any way help to avoid or bring 
about the end of many insurgencies in the British Empire, as most clearly, if tragically 
demonstrated by Britain's withdrawal from India. 2 However, given the relative lack of 
detailed scholarship focusing on internal security in a pre- or post-emergency context, 
it is fair to say that too much emphasis has been placed on political reform, with 
insufficient attention paid to the timing of such reform in relation to broader issues. 
This has been detrimental to our understanding of the precise function of political 
reform on a territory by territory basis, and has ignored the strong element of 
continuity in post-war British colonial policy, especially regarding matters of overseas 
defence. 
It is unnecessary to provide an encyclopaedic or exhaustive account of the 
military aspects of the so-called `Mau Mau revolt'. ' By considering the military and 
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policing aspects of the Emergency in relation to the nature and timing of political and 
socio-economic reforms, this chapter will demonstrate that British counter-insurgency 
in Kenya amounted to a comprehensive strategy for regaining control, rather than an 
attempt to devise a satisfactory formula for the transfer of power. 
`Phoney War': Kenya's `imminent revolution', October 1952-May 1953 
With the arrival of the new governor, Sir Evelyn Baring, on 30 September 1952, so 
began the next, and apparently decisive phase in Britain's efforts to regain control of 
Kenya Colony. Draft legislation to strengthen the government's `hands in maintaining 
law and order' had been completed, and the Royal Commission on land use would 
soon be established. Despite criticism over the delay in the new governor's departure, 
Lyttelton had told Churchill that it would have been a mistake to send him to Kenya 
beforehand. 4 Clearly, the Colonial Office wanted to ensure that he had all the legal and 
political tools perceived necessary at the time to restore order to the colony. Baring 
had not arrived in Kenya with the intention of declaring a State of Emergency, 
however, and immediately began a tour of the African reserves, leaving instructions for 
Kenyatta to be invited to meet him for talks. ' This all changed following the 
assassination of Senior Chief Waruhiu on 7 October. 
Baring contacted Lyttelton on 9 October, and explained that it was in fact 
necessary to declare a State of Emergency. Kenya was `facing a planned revolutionary 
movement' which, if left unchecked, would give rise to `an administrative breakdown, 
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followed by bloodshed amounting to civil war'. ' The Colonial Office advised that 
although the Secretary of State `was absent at the time of despatch, would wish to 
consult his colleagues and there might be a delay before his decision would be 
communicated, 
... 
planning should proceed'. ' Baring wasted little time, and 
immediately began to make military arrangements. He also extended the police curfew 
to the entire Kikuyu Reserve. ' 
By 14 October, Lyttelton had been persuaded that a State of Emergency was 
`drastic but necessary to prevent deterioration' of the situation. ' The Secretary of State 
also agreed that because those arrested for `connection with subversive activities' 
would include `certain respected public figures', the operation (Jock Scott') might 
give rise to widespread Kikuyu violence. He therefore abandoned the earlier Colonial 
Office reluctance to despatch a British battalion from the Middle East as a pre-emptive 
measure. " Baring and the local military commander, General Sir Alexander Cameron, 
considered a British battalion to be necessary on two grounds. At best, the 
psychological effect of the arrival of British troops might prevent `riots and 
bloodshed'. At worst, there would be a `general uprising' of the whole Kikuyu tribe 
`half a million strong'. They also thought it to be `only a question of time before 
unauthorised European retaliation' began, as a result of the `wanton' Mau Mau 
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attacks. " A second battalion was already `being ear marked and prepared' in case 
further reinforcements should be required. " 
When viewed from the `government side' (administration, loyalists, security 
forces, settlers), the first five months of the Emergency (the `phoney war' phase), was 
somewhat short of results. "' Between 20 and 21 October, the Kenya Police, supported 
by the army, arrested 89 of the 139 targeted suspects. 14 This was about as late in the 
day as a pre-emptive strike could get. Given the delay in Lyttelton's response to 
Baring, the earlier reluctance in the Colonial Office, as well as in the Kenya 
government to declare a State of Emergency, and Baring's initial opinion that `the 
emergency was unlikely to last more than a few weeks', ' S Füredi's assertion that 
emergencies `were as much pre-planned attempts at the political management of anti- 
colonial forces as belated responses to an unexpected challenge to the imperial order' 
is, in this case, questionable. 16 So too is his suggestion that declarations of states of 
emergency allowed Britain to maintain `the pretence of normal civil rule'. " This is 
especially so if Füredi's earlier remark, that the response to Mau Mau was `poorly 
thought-out and panicky' is taken into account. 18 
Clearly, Füredi has a point, given that states of emergency, as a concept, did 
indeed allow for the introduction of political and socio-economic reforms, viz the 
`political management of anti-colonial forces'. However, it is equally, if not more clear 
" WO 216/810. loc. cit., Lonsdale, `Mau Maus of the Mind'. p. 408. 
WO 216/810, GHQ, MELF to War Office, 11 Oct. 1952. 
Berman. Control and Crisis, p. 348. 
14 CO 822/444. `Top Secret and Personal Telegram 627. and `Immediate. Top Secret and Personal 
Telegram 630'. Baring to LvItelton. 17 Oct. 1952, C0822/438. Post Office telegram, 21 Oct. 1952, 
Heather, 'Counterinsurgency and Intelligence', pp. 30-4. It has also been suggested that initially 83 
out of 154 suspects were arrested. KNA, GO 3/2/73, `Corfield - Confidential, ch. 17. fos. 5.6. 
' Douglas-Home. EvelVn Baring. p. 230. 
16 Frank Füredi. 'Creating a Breathing Space: The Political Management of Colonial Emergencies. 
Journal o/ Imperial and Commonwealth History. 21/3 (Sept. 1993), p. 90. 
Füredi. Colonial 11 ars. p. 1. 
Füredi, 'Kenna: Decolonization through counter-insurgence', p. 147. 
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that in practice, during a state of emergency, such arguably `progressive' reforms 
could only ever be introduced as a subordinate aspect of the resource-intensive and 
`repressive' military and policing measures, or first `prong' in any counter-insurgency 
campaign. If for no other reason, logic dictates that given a situation of ongoing and 
widespread anarchy, often incorporating violence, the introduction of reforms might 
well be impracticable. Besides, by the time that such `Emergency' reform becomes 
necessary, it would surely amount to too little, too late, and `terrorism' cannot be seen 
to have gained concessions from the body politic. As will be seen below, this view 
seems in accordance with practice during the Kenya Emergency. 
Within a week of Baring's request, London had agreed to the declaration of an 
Emergency, and plans were put into effect to airlift one battalion of British troops into 
Kenya to support the police during the `Jock Scott' arrests, due to coincide with the 
Emergency declaration at midnight, 20 October. '9 It cannot be overstated that recourse 
to legal means of repression, and the monopoly of such, is a significant weapon in any 
state's armoury. By resorting to the device of a State of Emergency, however, the 
British and Kenya governments were not simply exercising this monopoly in order to 
brand the nationalist politicians as lawbreakers, as Füredi has suggested. 20 
The legal mechanisms defining and underpinning a `technical' state of 
emergency, the Emergency Powers Order in Council (1939) were derived essentially 
from the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act (1939), which had been introduced as a 
precaution against invasion before the outbreak of the Second World. 2' Although in 
19 Percox. 'British Counter-Insurgency, pp. 60-2. 
," Füredi. Colonial Wars. pp. 1.192. 
11 
- 
CAB 134/1202. CA (56) 21. 'Powers of Colonial Governors to Preserve Order', memo. by Lennox- 
Bovd, 
_, 
1 May 1956. Clive Emslev. The English Police: 
.4 Political and Social Histort- (Hemel 
Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 1991). p. 158: Füredi. Colonial Wars. pp. I-')-. Keith Jeffen and 
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Britain there were protests concerning certain provisions of the Act, notably detention 
without trial of potential subversives, and despite Füredi's contention that emergencies 
were declared throughout the British Empire as pre-emptive catch-alls to help in 
combating anti-colonial resistance, there is evidence to suggest that the device was not 
used indiscriminately. 
Certainly, when it came to the Special Branch arrest lists of the alleged `Mau 
Mau managers', Baring had removed the names of those against whom there was no 
evidence of association with Mau Mau. Rather, the British authorities had to keep one 
eye on international opinion and the growing body of international law, and could only 
take militarily supported action against suspected subversion if a state of emergency 
were deemed to exist. By taking action under Emergency Regulations in this context, 
Britain could avoid contravening the European Convention on Human Rights. 22 It 
should be stressed that Baring had hoped initially that the Emergency would last until 
the end of the year, at worst; a position supported by Lyttelton, who hoped that it 
would end quickly enough to save him embarrassment at Westminster. Surely, if 
Britain had intended to curtail all nationalist tendencies in Kenya under the guise of an 
Emergency, this would have been planned from the outset, and concerns to end it as 
quickly as possible would be absent from the documentary record; this is not the case. 
Besides, it could be argued that indiscriminate tactics had already been employed by 
the Kenya Police up to two years before the State of Emergency. 
Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1983), pp. 143-4. Thurlow. The Secret State, pp. 217,220-1. Townshend. 
Britain's Civil 1l'ars, p. 23, Making the Peace. ch. 6, esp. pp. 112-5,131. 
The declaration of a State of Emergency was also desired by administrative field officers in the 
Central and Rift Valley Provinces. who had long believed that action should be taken against the 
African politicians who were, they thought. actively fomenting armed rebellion. Apparently. these 
field officers considered it unwise to act alone against this supposed 'conspiracy' for fear that they 
might be charged with exceeding their authority. See: Berman. 'Bureaucracy and Incumbent 
Violence'. p. 
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Moreover, the `Jock Scott' arrests did not bring about the expected widespread 
disturbances which had apparently necessitated the arrival of British military forces in 
23 the first place. However, Mau Mau activities were not curtailed by the arrests of their 
alleged leadership, with seven `loyalist' Kikuyu and a European being murdered within 
a week of the declaration of the Emergency; `oath-taking ceremonies were being held 
and an unknown number of young Kikuyu had taken to the hills and forests'. 24 
On the day of the declaration of the Emergency, Lyttelton explained to the 
Commons that the situation in Kenya had `become progressively worse', that troops 
had been deployed `as a reserve', and that `all action now being taken is by the Police'. 
He added, `I am leaving for Kenya next week, not to discuss the present measures 
- 
which 
... 
have my full support, but to see for myself what is happening and to consider, 
with the Governor, plans for the future development of the Colony'., 5 
Following Lyttelton's arrival in Kenya on 28 October, Baring outlined his 
government's plans to combat Mau Mau. 26 The Kenya government's priorities were to 
obtain evidence for the prosecution of the `Class A' prisoners and to re-establish its 
authority in Kikuyuland. 2' The Kenya Police would be further expanded in the African 
reserves, and a Kikuyu Home Guard would be established. 28 What better test of 
`loyalism' was there than to allow the Kikuyu to combat Mau Mau themselves? Baring 
thought that if `20 or so leaders could be put out of the way for a long time, Mau Mau 
23 Percox, 'British Counter-Insurgency, pp. 62-3. 
'Government House Meeting to Discuss Jock Scott Operation, 6: 30 pm. 29/10/52'. notes of 
minutes, seen by courtesy of David Throup (hereafter, `Meeting, 29/10/52'). Those present included: 
Lvttelton, Potter. Whv att, Davies (CNC). Cameron (GOC, East Africa Command), O'Rorke. and Hall 
(Principal, East Africa Section. Colonial Office). 
25 HCD, 505, col. 865, 'Kenva (Mau Mau Activities)'. 21 Oct. 1952. 
26 Keesing'. s. p. 12571. 'Meeting, 29/10/52'. 
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would die, but it was vain to hope for quick success'. Far from having the `breathing 
space' of an Emergency in Kenya to enable the `political management of anti-colonial 
forces', Lyttelton was more concerned that it should be over quickly, in order that he 
could avoid the embarrassment of Opposition questions in Westminster. 29 
On 11 November, Baring increased the powers of local officials in 11 Kikuyu 
areas to punish Mau Mau supporters, or anyone who failed to `make a "reasonable 
effort" to help the Security Forces' 
. 
30 Resident Magistrates were given further 
enhanced powers, while many sentences for crimes associated with Mau Mau were 
increased. New regulations were introduced, enabling the authorities to confiscate 
cattle and other possessions, to introduce communal fines, and to forcibly remove 
resident labourers from settled areas and send them back to the reserves. 3' 
The police and the military had already begun `extensive sweeps' of the Kikuyu 
Reserve. By 12 November, around 2,000 suspects had been arrested, while 3,775 
cattle, and 6,095 sheep and goats had been seized in a `punitive action' for non-co- 
operation with investigations into the murder of yet another Kikuyu, Senior Chief 
Nderi. 32 On 14 November, Baring announced that Kikuyu Independent Schools 
Association (KISA) and the Kikuyu Karinga Education Association (KKEA) `had been 
dissolved on the ground that they were "societies dangerous to the good government 
of the Colony". 
33 Towards the end of November, in response to the murder of another 
European, Meiklejohn. a further 2,200 Kikuyu men, women, and children, along with 
19 
'Mccting, 29/10/52'. 
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their livestock and household possessions, were removed from their homes in the 
Thomson's Falls area, and placed in detention behind barbed wire. " In December, a 
special `punitive' tax (also designed to help pay for the Emergency), and compulsory 
registration were imposed upon the Kikuyu. 35 Again, such measures could hardly be 
called pre-emptive, their very reactionary nature serving to demonstrate just how little 
control the colonial authorities in fact, or at least perceived, they had. 
Despite several protests about the repressive nature of government measures, 
including Lyttelton's doubts about the likely effectiveness of communal punishment, 
Baring's proposals remained largely intact. This reflected not only the large degree of 
authority vested in Britain's colonial governors, but also the over-riding desire in 
Whitehall to see a rapid conclusion of the Emergency. 36 The `lessons of Malaya' 
concerning the counter-productive nature of blanket repression clearly did not apply in 
Kenya. This suggests that the panic brought about by the earlier failure to avert an 
insurgency held sway over any pre-planned attempt at political control of the situation. 
Between 20 October and 15 November, Mau Mau had allegedly murdered 
seven Africans and a European settler. 37 In response, the security forces had arrested 
;' Keesing's, p. 13068, Füredi, 
,, 
\Iau flau ü'ar, p. 119. This appears to have been an action subsequent 
to the wider sweeps that took place between 20 Oct. and 7 Nov. 
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8,500 suspected Mau Mau supporters (most of whom remained in detention), and had 
`screened' a further 31,450.38 In addition, Kikuyu squatters were expelled en masse 
from settlers' farms, and endured `[b]eatings, forced confessions and summary 
executions' at the hands of some settlers. 39 Far from intervening on behalf of the 
Kikuyu, the Kenya government was more concerned that such incidents should be 
`hushed up' 
. 
40 
In the government's eagerness to suppress Mau Mau, dare one say pre-empt an 
insurgency, by arresting oath-takers and administrators, and punishing thousands of 
Kikuyu for the crimes of a few, it actually accelerated the onset of the armed conflict 
which it sought to avoid. 41 Many Kikuyu who had not originally supported Mau Mau 
felt angrily compelled to join, in response, it should be stressed, to the security forces' 
and the settlers' repressive measures: `If one were treated as Mau Mau by police, it 
looks as if it seemed prudent to become one'. 42 Many others joined the guerrillas in the 
forests because they believed, ironically, that if Kenyatta was indeed the leader, as the 
Kenya government argued, then Mau Mau was probably not such a bad thing after 
all. " 
Neither the Kenya government, nor the security forces were aware of the 
extent of the inadvertent mobilisation of Mau Mau forces. On 5 November 1952, 
Cameron reported that `most of the young [Kikuyu] men have disappeared from their 
256,2 5 Nov. 1952. As the perpetrators were never knowingly caught, unfortunately. this can never 
be ascertained. 
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villages. There have been stories of them assembling in force in the forest areas of the 
Aberdares and Mount Kenya, but there is little evidence to substantiate this and it 
seems more probable that they are lying up in the woods and valleys within the 
reserve. ' The GOC had hoped that the guerrillas would assemble `in force 
... 
in only 
one place' so that the security forces `could have hit them'. " Cameron realised that 
Mau Mau was `far more deep-seated' than was previously known, and according to 
`the Government experts', the movement would take `at least nine months to 
eradicate'. General Robertson, overall commander in the Middle East, went as far as to 
suggest that he `should not be surprised if it took longer'. 45 With Mau Mau 
successfully evading the security forces in the forests, the government's priorities were 
to obtain the convictions of the detained Mau Mau leadership, and to discourage 
further action in support of, or by Mau Mau. " 
By the end of November 1952, apparently to `save numbers of innocent 
persons being caught up in the net', `large-scale sweeps by troops and police' were 
abandoned `save in exceptional circumstances', and would be confined to the areas 
where `disturbances' had occurred, as in Thomson's Falls, following the Meiklejohn 
murder. ' The contradiction of targeting those Kikuyu who failed to take `reasonable 
steps to prevent crime committed in their locality', when this could only be, and was 
measured after the event, is obvious. " Even localised sweeps, which also involved the 
innocent, were to prove counter-productive. At the time, however, avoiding the 
alienation of the innocent took second place to putting down `as ruthlessly as is 
-'a W0216/811/3, CIC 87696, Cameron to Redman (War Office. VCIGS). 5 Nov. 1952. 
W0216/811/4. Robertson. (GHQ. MELF) to Redman. 5 Nov. 1952. 
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a, 00822/439, 'Statement by the Secretary of State'. drafted by P. Rogers (Colonial Office). 25 Nov. 
1952, cited in Heather. 'Counterinsurgency and Intelligence', p. 40. n. 25: HCD. 508. cols. 255-5g. 
25 Nov. 1952. 
Heather. loc. cit. (emphasis added). 
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necessary, and no more ruthlessly than is necessary, crimes against law and order'. " 
On 15 December, it became official policy to evict Kikuyu from areas where alleged 
Mau Mau crimes had occurred. 5° 
The policy of punitive sweeps and mass evictions of Kikuyu from Mau Mau 
crime areas continued unabated into 1953. By the end of February 1953,58,864 
`Africans' had been screened. Although 39,000 were subsequently released, 2,249 
were held on remand while 17,613 were sent for trial. 5' From November 1952 to April 
1953, between 70,000 and 100,000 Kikuyu were either forcibly evicted, or departed 
voluntarily from the Rift Valley and Central Provinces, mostly ending up in the already 
overcrowded Kikuyu Reserve. 52 The evictions only added to the desperation of many 
young Kikuyu males who, with few prospects in the reserve, began to drift to the 
relative security of the forests in early 1953.53 If African political and socio-economic 
grievances and the consequent crime and unrest, combined with state repression, had 
not in fact brought about Kenya's State of Emergency, the measures taken from 20 
October onwards certainly did. 54 
Nevertheless, as early as 28 October, despite official insistence that Mau Mau 
had no economic causes, Baring had announced development plans for Kenya, which 
he later called his `second prong' in the campaign. 55 Indeed, the State of Emergency, 
while enabling Britain to adopt wide-ranging coercive powers, also facilitated the 
implementation of reforms which, if undertaken earlier, might well have averted the 
'9 Ibid. 
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crisis preceding the Emergency. 56 As for `progressive measures', although the 
Emergency had prompted Baring's announcement of some £7 million for development 
and reconstruction, this would include only £328 thousand (less than five per cent of 
the whole) to `continue general agricultural betterment' 
The greater part of the development funds would be allocated to road-building 
and water projects, for the building of community centres, hospitals, schools, urban 
housing, village halls, and a new airport for Nairobi. In addition it was possible that an 
oil refinery would be constructed at Mombasa, while `the Government was 
... 
carrying 
on negotiations about the granting of oil exploration licences "over a considerable area 
of the Colony"'. 58 Despite Baring's retrospective remark that `we thought 
... 
if you 
have a policy in which you are repressing a terrorist movement, you must try and do 
something that will try and make life tolerable when the thing's over', 59 the intention at 
the time was that the Emergency should end before development plans could be 
undertaken. Baring made it clear that the development plans `could not be carried out 
"in an atmosphere of unrest and anxiety"; and said that it was hoped to carry out the 
... 
development schemes in the next 12 months'. 60 Of course, Baring hoped at the time 
that the Emergency would be well over by then. 
By proposing the introduction of agricultural reforms it was hoped not only to 
win the `hearts and minds' of the Kikuyu, but to provide an incentive to prevent other 
56 John W. Harbeson, `Land Reforms and Politics in Kenya, 1954-70', Journal ofAlodern African 
Studies. 9/2 (1971), p. 234: RHL, MSS Afr s 1574. 'Lord Howick (Evelyn Baring), Interview with 
Dame Margery Perham, 19 Nov. 1969'. fos. 24-5; Keesing's. p. 12573; Anne Thurston, Smallholder 
Aizricullure in Kenia: The (9jjicial. llind and the Swvnnerton Plan (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 1987), p. 72. 
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African ethnic groups from participating in Mau Mau. However, the Kenya 
government did not start to negotiate the funding for the programme until August 
1953.61 By then, there were already three British battalions stationed in Kenya, in 
addition to the 5,000-strong local military contingent, about 12,000 police, and several 
thousand Kikuyu Guards. 62 While Britain eventually granted £5 million for agricultural 
reform, which Baring restricted to Kikuyuland despite it being designated for the 
whole of Kenya, this apparently progressive measure was a one-off payment, and 
amounted to less than ten per cent of Emergency expenditure. 63 The plan itself was not 
published until February 1954.64 Moreover, the Colonial Office firmly rejected Finance 
Minister Vasey's additional request for a grant to expand African education. 65 
Educated Africans had already proved to be far too much of a problem. Surely, if such 
reforms represented a facet of the `managed' gradual relinquishment of political power, 
as Füredi and others would contend, the money would have been better spent sooner, 
as Whyatt had suggested in 1951.66 Given the emphasis on restoring order, and the 
cost of the military and policing aspects of the Emergency, as opposed to ameliorative 
measures, it is clear that defeating Mau Mau was not just a priority, but an end in itself 
Repression first was certainly the order of the day. 
From the outset of the Emergency, Whyatt was put in charge of co-ordinating 
security forces' measures against Mau Mau, reflecting the emphasis on the restoration 
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of law and order. Information was collated, and decisions made by a `Sitrep' (Situation 
Report) Committee, chaired by the Governor, and attended by Whyatt and other 
leading officials `closely concerned with the campaign). 6' However, the Sitrep 
Committee had `no official status', as such, was not `part of any overall chain of 
command and it lacked a staff to ensure that its decisions were carried out in the field'. 
Thus, it was `not of sufficient authority or efficiency to fight a campaign'. 68 Ironically. 
until many Kikuyu were pushed into active participation in Mau Mau by the very 
nature of government repression, which in turn had added to the unfavourable 
intelligence situation, there was no campaign to fight. Moreover, this was compounded 
by the relative lack of an early offensive role for the army, which acted mainly in 
support of the under-manned police, or was widely scattered on defensive duties. 69 
Although Whyatt had supplanted the Police Commissioner as nominal head of 
internal security measures, `the responsibility for making policy rested with' the 
governor. 70 Upon his arrival, Baring had requested an expert adviser on intelligence- 
gathering, to review the situation. In late November 1952, Sir Percy Sillitoe was again 
despatched to Kenya, and soon recommended a thorough restructuring of the 
intelligence organisation. " It would be quite some time before the recommendations 
could be implemented, let alone show results. ' Meanwhile, Baring hoped to make 
other improvements. 
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On 24 November 1952, he requested the appointment of a Director of 
Operations, in the rank of at least Major-General, similar to that which existed in 
Malaya. 73 The British service chiefs, endorsed by Lyttelton, refused, claiming that the 
problem in Kenya was not `parallel' to that in Malaya. Baring would have to be 
contented with the appointment of Colonel G. A. Rimbault as `Personal Staff Officer to 
the Governor' 
. 
74 Rimbault lacked authority, seniority and staff, and therefore found it 
difficult to co-ordinate operations. 75 The `bailiwick mentality' continued to prevail, as 
evidenced by the relative autonomy of the District Administration and the police. 76 
Ironically, on the one hand government repression was leading to the insurgency that it 
was intended to prevent. On the other hand, the effective conduct of counter- 
insurgency was hindered by London's insistence that Mau Mau was a police problem 
rather than a military one. 
By the end of 1952, the Kenya Police had found the bodies of 121 `loyal' 
Africans, including some who had given evidence against suspected Mau Mau 
members. " Mau Mau had also murdered three European settlers and one Asian 
woman. " Following a frustrated Baring's appeal direct to Churchill, and the 
intervention of General Robertson, Lyttelton finally approved the appointment of 
Major-General W. R. N. Hinde as `Chief Staff Officer to His Excellency the Governor' 
on 16 January 1953. By then, two more settlers had been killed. Baring announced 
Hinde's appointment on 26 January, the same day as 1,500 settlers marched on 
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'a Heather, `Counterinsurgency and Intelligence'. p. 49. 
Ibid.. p. 50. 
76 Ibid.. pp. 57-8. 
Throup. 'Crime. politics and the police'. p. 140. 
Keesin 's. pp. 12569.13065. 
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Government House to protest over the inadequacy of government counter-measures, 
following the murders of a further three Europeans two days earlier. 79 
The Kenya government had not been complacent, however. By the time Hinde 
took up his appointment on 1 February 1953, Whyatt had been made to relinquish his 
responsibility for the conduct of the campaign to Potter. " Magistrates were given 
greater powers, and the first Provincial and District Security Committees were 
established. " In January, the security forces even began offensive sweeps of the forest 
fringes adjacent to the Kikuyu Reserve. " 
Despite his rank, Hinde had little more authority than his predecessor, 
however, and was not in a position to take overall command of the campaign. The 
emphasis of the campaign was to remain on policing, with the military in support, and 
the policies of food denial and the `protection' of the Kikuyu settled areas were to be 
rigorously adhered to. In line with the other `doves', he also recommended `social 
measures for the betterment of the inhabitants' to go `hand in hand with military and 
police measures for the restoration of law and order', and a scheme of rewards to 
encourage active participation against Mau Mau and the provision of information. If 
re-absorption of the displaced Kikuyu should prove impracticable, `uncontrolled 
movement' would be `reduced to manageable proportions' by increasing the number of 
`reception areas and camps'. 
Hinde was also aware that the security forces were `not yet built up to their full 
strength', and that the army should be released from static defensive duties as soon as 
79 Carver. 11 ar since 19-15. p. 34.: Douglas-Home. Evelyn Baring, p. 236. Heather. 
'Counterinsurgency and Intelligence, pp. 56-9: Paget. Counter-Insurgency Operations, pp. 92-3. 
RHL. MSS Afr s 1580. 'Brief for C-in-C'. loc. cit. 
Heather, 'Counterinsurgency and Intelligence, pp. 50.56-7,59. It is noteworthy that the March 
1950 'Colony Emergency Scheme' had provided for local emergency organisations if circumstances 
dictated. This had become the case after less than three months. 
`2 Heather. 'Counterinsurgency and Intelligence'. p. 57. 
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was practicable. If offensive action by air should be required `the soundest plan will be 
to ask for an RAF squadron'. Significantly. he was also aware that the financial `shoe- 
was `beginning to pinch'. 83 More troops would cost more money, but both 
propositions did not accord with some views in Whitehall. 84 Nevertheless, as the 
insurgency dragged on some further measures would be required to bring it to a rapid 
and successful conclusion. 
Following a visit to Kenya in February 1953, General Sir John Harding (CIGS) 
recommended the despatch of two additional battalions and a further brigade 
headquarters to cater for the wider dispersal of troops. 85 Hinde would also be given 
executive authority over the `small emergency committee' that Baring had 
recommended should be established to direct the campaign. 86 Harding was concerned 
that unless measures were taken quickly the `disease' would spread. He did not want 
to see `a growing and costly commitment, as happened in Malaya'. ' Two British 
battalions were therefore despatched to Kenya in April 1953, arriving shortly after four 
Harvard aircraft from Rhodesia, which were to be used for strafing and bombing Mau 
Mau hideouts in the forests. 88 
As if to confirm fears in both London and Nairobi, and to pre-empt the arrival 
of 39 Brigade, Mau Mau carried out its first major offensive on the night of 26 March 
83 RHL. MSS Afr s 1580, 'Appreciation of the Situation by Major-General W. R. N. Hinde'. 5 March 
195 3: Heather. 'Counterinsurgency and Intelligence', p. 62. 
Ra T 225/771, Treasury minute, Bancroft/Johnston, 2/3 March 1953. `The Treasury do not consider 
that the United Kingdom Defence Budget should bear the cost, as it does for the Malayan operations. 
because the operations in Kenya are quite different from the campaign in Malaya (ww hich is in essence 
one facet of the world-wide anti-communist struggle). [... ] Moreover, the Mau Mau troubles are an 
internal security problem and quite unlike the Communist rebellion in Malaya. ' 
PREM 11/472. COS (53) 13 4. Chiefs of Staff Committee. 'Appendix Report by the Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff on his Visit to Kenya. 19th-24th February, 195Y. 
"' Ibid. 
[bid.. Alexander (MoD), to Churchill. 5 March 1953). 
Blaxland, The Regiments Depart. pp. 272-3: Philip Towle. Pilots and Rebels: The Use of. Aircra/i 
in L'iicon ventional II arfare 191S-1ON, s' (London: Brassev*s. 1989) p. 101. 
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1953. More than 300 men, divided into smaller groups, hacked and burnt to death 97 
men, women, and children, and wounded 29, in the Lan area of Kiambu District. 
Simultaneously, a Mau Mau gang of about 80 attacked a police station in Naivasha, 
killing two African policemen and a KPR officer,, released 173 prisoners, and raided 
the armoury. 89 The Mau Mau forest fighters had, in what was to prove a rare large- 
scale offensive action, at long last demonstrated their credentials as a guerrilla force to 
be reckoned with. 
The panic instilled by the Lari massacre and the raid at Naivasha led to a 
reappraisal of the operational command structure. On 11 April, in a bid to step up the 
campaign against Mau Mau, Hinde's appointment was at last upgraded to Director of 
Operations. 9° Hinde was still subject to Baring's authority, and despite his nominal 
promotion exercised command over military forces only. Although military incursions 
into the forests began in May, they achieved little success until early June. 91 The 
settlers nevertheless continued to express their dissatisfaction with `the way in which 
matters are progressing out here' and with Hinde. Two consequent reports from the 
GOC, General Cameron, and the overall commander in the Middle East, General 
Nicholson, respectively, brought about an apparently dramatic change. At the end of 
May, the War Office announced that East Africa Command would be established in its 
89 Blaxland. The Regiments Depart, p. 273, Füredi, Mau Mau War, p. 122, Heather, 
'Counterinsurgency and Intelligence', pp. 69-73. It is now the consensus that the Lari massacre was 
not a Mau Mau attack at all, but the result of a `long-simmering land dispute' between specific 
parties. See: David M. Anderson, The Lan Massacre'. Seminar Paper, University of Cambridge. 
Centre for African Studies, 31 Oct. 1995, Berman, Control and Crisis. p. 349. However. given that 
man, Kikuyu grievances were in one way or another based upon the land issue, it could be suggested 
that the distinction is largely irrelevant. 
90 RHL. MSS Afr s 1580, 'Brief for C-in-C', 6 June 1953, Paget. Counter-Insurgency Operations, p. 
91). 
91 W. J. P. Aggett. The Bloodv Eleventh: History of the Devonshire Regiment. 1'1.3: 1915-1969 
(Exeter: Devonshire & Dorset Regiment. 1995). p. 555, Blaxiand. The Regiments Depart, pp. 274-6: 
and idem. The Fareicc'll Years: The Final Historical Records of the Buff c. Royal East Kent Regiment, 
19-1S-1967 (Canterbury: Queen's Own Buffs Office. 1967). p. 70, Heather. 'Counterinsurgency and 
Intelligence. pp. 81-8,95. 
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own right, and General Sir George Erskine, an experienced counter-insurgency 
campaigner, was appointed with full operational control of `all Colonial, Auxiliary, 
Police and Security Forces'. 92 Ironically, Erskine was among the first in Kenya to 
suggest the importance of political solutions to the 'KIKUYU [sic] problem' 
. 
93 
Unfortunately for Kenyatta, although the Colonial Office had by then almost 
determined that neither he nor Mau Mau had any association with communism, 
reaching this conclusion in July 1953, the imperatives of government propaganda, as 
the campaign against Mau Mau was once again reinvigorated, ensured that no 
mitigation would be forthcoming, at least in public. 94 The Lan massacre had ensured 
equally that the colonial authorities would give no quarter to even a nominal nationalist 
figurehead. While one of the settlers, Ewart `Grogs' Grogan, had suggested in 1953 
that only Kenyatta had sufficient authority to bring an end to Kikuyu violence, and 
canvassed opinion with a view to his early release, the rest considered this to be a 
`crazy idea' 
. 
95 Indeed, it was Kenyatta's very significance to the Kikuyu, if not Kenyan 
African nationalism as a whole, that ensured he would remain under some form of 
detention for the next eight years. There would be only one victor in the forthcoming 
military conflict, irrespective of how hollow that victory may have appeared to some. 
As the following overview of the British military campaign will demonstrate, neither 
92 WO 216/851, Blundell to Harding, 18 April 1953, Cameron to Redman (VCIGS). 30 April 1953: 
WO 216/852. 'Report on the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Land Forces. Visit to Kenya. 11-16 
May 19-531'. PREM 11/472. Lvttelton to Churchill. 27 May 1953 : Imperial War Museum. London 
(IWM). 75/134/1. Erskine papers, `Top Secret Directive to C-in-C East Africa', 3 June 1953: Clayton. 
Counter-Insurgencv. p. 6, Füredi. 'Kenya: Decolonization through counter-insurgency'. p. 150. 
Heather, 'Counterinsurgency and Intelligence'. p. 91. 
9' WO 216/863. (file heading: 'Appreciation of the Situation in Kenya and Proposals by General 
Erskine'). Erskine to Harding, paras. 2.3.27 Jan. 1954 (hereafter. `Anvil proposals'). 
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African nationalism nor African grievances would gain meaningful redress until the 
`shooting war' was over. 
`Limited War': the Colonial State `hits them hard', June 1953-November 1956 
In terms of `arming the state' and thus bringing the military campaign against Mau 
Mau to an early and apparently successful conclusion, it was not simply Erskine's 
appointment, but clarification of the powers of the office of the military commander in 
itself which proved to be decisive. It is unnecessary to provide an encyclopaedic 
overview of the details of the military phase of the Mau Mau revolution from the 
British perspective. It should be stressed, however, that Erskine was in a much 
stronger position than his predecessors had been, as evidenced by his immediate 
redeployment of the army on offensive, rather than `guard' duties, and his later 
insistence on the formation of the four-man War Council at the apex of the command 
structure. Erskine was still hindered by the relatively slow expansion of the police, and 
did not hesitate to call for more military reinforcements for large-scale ` sweeps' in the 
reserves and operations against Mau Mau in the forests. RAF heavy bombers were also 
deployed at Erskine's request. Erskine can also be credited with the apparent `turning 
point' in the campaign, `Operation Anvil' (24 April-9 May 1954), a cordon and search 
of Nairobi involving four battalions of troops, during which some 19,000 adult males 
were detained. 96 Nevertheless, Erskine's request that a permanent garrison of British 
troops should be established in Kenya, which received considerable support from 
British politicians following Britain's July 1954 agreement to withdraw gradually from 
96 Pcrcox. 'British Counter-Insurgence'. pp. 75-82. 
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Egypt, fell on deaf ears. 97 Besides, such considerations were academic given the 
numbers of British military personnel already stationed in Kenya at the time. 
The very success of Erskine's offensive against Mau Mau had brought its own 
problems. As Erskine reported: `The trouble with NAIROBI [sic] is that a great many 
"displaced" KIKUYU who were turned out of the RIFT VALLEY or who have 
deserted from the forest have found their way into NAIROBI. There is no livelihood 
for them in the Reserve and so the problem is social and economic as well as police. '9R 
The problem was even more serious from the military perspective: 
There is evidence that for some time the central direction of Mau Mau came from the 
City [sic], and though this is probably no longer the case, Nairobi remains an important 
source of funds, firearms, supplies and recruits for the gangs. As a result, although 
petty crime is (because of greater police activity) less than for many years, there has 
been a serious increase of armed robberies and political assassinations, the suppression 
of which present a problem quite different to that facing the security forces elsewhere. 
The situation is aggravated by the influx of many thousands of Kikuyu whose removal 
is essential and re-settlement is being studied. 99 
Operations in Nairobi between October 1953 and January 1954, had only 
temporarily disrupted Mau Mau. Within weeks of the arrests of various leading 
members of the organisation, others had moved in to replace them. Daylight attacks by 
Mau Mau in Nairobi became increasingly frequent. "' The plans for `Anvil' had also 
suffered a setback because of abortive mass surrender negotiations which had been 
initiated earlier in the year. Ironically, Erskine could not spare troops for `Anvil' until 
they had completed the process of receiving the surrender of a possible 2,000 
97 For the detailed deliberations on Erskine's proposals. see: CO 968/462. See also: PREM 11/58 1. 
C. J. M. Alport to Churchill, 29 Jule 1954 cited in: Goldsworthy (ed. ). The Conservative Government 
and the End of E npiie Part 1: International Relations. doc. 70. pp. 202-3. 
`'`s WO 216/860. 'Situation Report as at the end of September 195's'. by Erskine. 29 Sept. 1953). 
99 WO 216/861. 'The Situation in Kenya. report by Erskine- I Oct. 1953. 
""' Heather. `CountcrinsurgencY and Intelligence, pp. 129-32. 
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insurgents. 101 Following the collapse of the negotiations in the second week of April, 
Erskine immediately launched `Operation Overdraft' which, capitalising upon the 
intelligence gained during the surrender negotiations, resulted in the capture of about 
1,000 Mau Mau supporters in the reserves. With the security of the reserves 
sufficiently ensured, Erskine could release troops for the Nairobi operation. " 
With Mau Mau at last isolated in the forests, the District Administration 
proceeded with renewed vigour to step up the hitherto fitfully applied policy of 
'villagisation'. Large-scale military operations continued. Erskine had hoped that these 
operations would place the `government side' in a strong enough position to enable 
him to make yet another surrender offer towards the end of March 1955.103 Although 
there had been encouraging reports in December 1954 of a willingness on the part of 
the guerrilla leadership to discuss peace, this was not Erskine's principal motive. "' 
Throughout 1954, allegations of brutality and the practice of `summary justice' against 
the Kikuyu Guard had increased. It was feared that some members might even defect 
to Mau Mau, rather than face judicial proceedings by their own side. "' The situation 
had been exacerbated by charges of perjury against some law enforcement officers, and 
interference by the District Administration with criminal investigations into brutality. 
This led to a `breach' between the police and some officials, and was the main reason 
for Police Commissioner Sir Arthur Young's early relinquishment of his post. "' 
10' WO 236/18. The Kenya Emergency. June 1953 
- 
May 1955: Report by General Erskine'. para. 48: 
G. W. Croker. 'Mau Mau', Journal of the Royal L sited Services Institute, 100 (Feb. -Nov. 1955), p. 
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1Ibid., para. 105. 
Ibid.: RHL, MSS Aft s 1694, Whvatt papers. Hill (District Officer, Mathira Division) to District 
Commissioner. Ny cri, 4 Dec. 1954. D. MacPherson (Assistant Commissioner of Police. CID) to 
Colonel A. E. Young (Commissioner of Police), 23 Dec. 1954. 
106 Ibid.. Acting Director of Public Prosecutions to Whyatt. 16 Dec. 1954: WO 216/879. Erskine to 
Harding. 20 Dec. 1954. Erskine to Redman, 29 Dec. 1954: RHL. MSS Brit Emp s 486. Sir A. E. 
Young papers. MacPherson to Young. 10 Dec. 1954_ Young to Baring. 14 Dec. 1954. Young. had 
82 
In September 1954, the War Council decided to reorganise the Kikuyu Guard, 
then numbering some 25,000, into a reduced but paid professional force, to be 
effective from 1 January 1955. This would also enable the government to issue a 
`strong and unequivocal warning 
... 
to the loyalist tribesmen making it clear that the 
Government would not tolerate unlawful practices'. 107 In order to prevent Kikuyu 
Guard defections based upon this instruction, an amnesty was declared for all offences 
committed before that date. This left the way clear for the death sentence to be lifted 
for Mau Mau offences committed before the date of the new surrender offer, thereby 
removing the main obstruction to mass surrenders. 1°8 The amnesty and the surrender 
terms were therefore announced simultaneously on 18 January. '09 
The planning and execution of `Operation Anvil' were not only significant in 
terms of the immediate effect on Mau Mau recruitment and organisational capacity, 
and the longer-term impact of the formation of the War Council. Many of Erskine's 
proposals for `Anvil' and the outcome of the operation were to prove important to the 
arguably non-military aspects of the counter-insurgency campaign. They are 
particularly significant when considering measures taken to `improve the lot of the 
African' and the broader debate over decolonisation. 'lo The expression `winning hearts 
experience of Palestine and Malaya, and «-as seconded from the City- of London Police at Baring's 
request, CO 822/692, Baring to Lyttelton, 29 Oct. 1953. Despite Baring's expressed hope for a police 
force 'strong in quality as well as in quantity'. Young became increasingly frustrated by an apparent 
lack of government measures to increase efficiency. and the tendency to release recent police recruits 
into the field' before they had completed their training, CO 822/692. Baring to Lyttelton. 17 July 
19 5, 
`"' WO 236/18. The Kenya Emergency. June 1953 
- 
May 1955', paras. 106,107. 
108 Ibid., para. 107. 
109 Ibid., para. 108, WO 216/876. Erskine to Redman. 20 Jan. 1955. 
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laid down in Whitehall. 
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and minds' was in many ways a euphemism. What mattered most was wh fining; 110t 
`hearts and minds'. 
In August 1953, when the Colonial Office granted £5 million for agricultural 
reform, and at the same time rejected the Kenya government's request for money for 
the expansion of African education, Lyttelton clarified exactly what the intention of 
reform was. It was important to `win the people over' by securing their protection and 
introducing development schemes, in order to avoid a protracted struggle like that in 
Malaya. "' Unlike the public pronouncements of October 1952, there was no mention 
of development for its own sake, nor of improving conditions for the African per se. 
This ambiguity again reflected the anxiety in Whitehall that the Emergency should be 
brought to a rapid conclusion. While reform nevertheless pressed ahead, if fitfully at 
first, the characteristic carrot and stick approach was explained by Erskine: `Because 
other tribes are closely watching to see if the Kikuyu will derive any benefits from Mau 
Mau 
... 
schemes so far put forward by the Committee on African Advancement have 
been confined to tribes other than the Kikuyu. [... ] Stress in propaganda is laid on the 
progress achieved by Africans in the untroubled areas of Kenya. ' 112 
While Mau Mau remained undefeated it was important, at least so far as the 
Army was concerned, that the `hearts and minds' aspects of the counter-insurgency 
campaign remained subordinate to military tactics. For Erskine, the significance of the 
`Development Plan' for the `non-Kikuyu' was that it was only intended to be `short- 
term' 
. 
13 Moreover, the GOC made it clear that `Administrative measures' were 
important to provide `Incentives to Other Tribes". 114 The `stick' for the Kikuyu would 
CO 822/692_ Lv ttelton to Baring. n. d. (c. 12 Aug. 19-53). 
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include measures such as the confiscation of the land of Mau Mau supporters, the 
forcible imposition of villagisation, the prohibition of `all movement out of villages 
except that of communal labour parties', replacement of `all Kikuyu in employment 
outside [the] reserves', and suspension of Kikuyu political activity. The other tribes, in 
exchange for their non-participation in Mau Mau, would enjoy the `carrot' in the form 
of `entry into Kikuyu held jobs', a small increase in wages, `better living standards for 
chiefs and headmen', the promise of development funds from Britain, and the `cheap 
sale of confiscated Kikuyu cattle'. 15 It is notable that the immediate benefits to the 
`other tribes' would be provided at the expense of the Kikuyu. More significant, 
however, is that Erskine's `recommendations of a political nature' were `designed to 
obtain short term results favourable to the military operations'. 1' 
In assessing the relative importance of military victory compared to reform in 
the perceptions of the Kenya government and Whitehall, it is significant that the draft 
estimates of the cost of `Operation Anvil' (non-recurrent and recurrent for one year), 
not including the costs of transportation of the detainees, nor the actual military costs 
of the operation, amounted to £1,580,250. "' Of course, `Anvil' actually ended up 
costing more, while `Emergency expenditure' for 1954-5 ran at a rate of `something 
over' f14 million per annum, more than twice the estimated level. "' Conversely, a 
project to develop African housing in urban areas received a loan of £2 million. "' To 
put this in perspective, by July 1954 `Emergency expenditure' was running at about £1 
"` Ibid.. para. 13. (d) (iii). 
116 Ibid.. para. 3. 
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118 T 220/386, Gorell Barnes (Assistant Under-Secretan- of State. Colonial Office) to Lvttelton. 19 
June 1954. 
119 PRO file T 220/417 provides details of the levels of finance provided for 'African development. 
8-5 
million a month. Approximately a third of this was `for military forces and operations', 
the rest covered the `cost of closer administration, the increase in the police forces, the 
cost of detention and rehabilitation camps, and emergency public works'. Moreover, 
the figure was expected to be 25 per cent higher for the remainder of 1954.120 
While Erskine's proposals did not herald the introduction of political reform 
(the arguable precursor to decolonisation), they certainly helped, if they did not 
directly bring about the granting of the first government ministry to an African in 
Kenya. In late 1953, Baring suggested to Lyttelton that a means of increasing trust and 
improving relations between the peoples of Kenya would be to allow them to share `in 
the responsibility of government'. As Baring somewhat naively put it: `If men of 
different races take executive positions in government they will be compelled to work 
together'. Baring's proposals did not, however, conceive of African political 
representation in the immediate future. Three Europeans, two Asians, and an Arab 
were to fill the proposed six new positions in the government. "' Discussions with 
European political representatives began in January 1954, and the Asian community 
was approached some time between January and February. ' 2 
Plainly, the Lyttelton Constitution of March 1954 was intended to demonstrate 
the government's willingness to accept African desires for political representation on a 
par with the other (numerically-inferior) Kenyan communities. It certainly reinstated 
earlier Colonial Office proposals intended to institute a multi-racial polity in Kenya. 
This was a far cry from decolonisation, though. Surely, a principal aim at the time was 
to deflect the non-Kikuyu tribes from supporting the political aims of Mau Mau. The 
120 110), 5 30. col. 476.14 July 19-54. 
'`' Douglas-Honie. Evelyn Baring. pp. 271-2. 
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Lyttelton Constitution was intended to last until `the next [Kenyan] general election, 
which was to take place six months after the Governor had proclaimed that the State 
of Emergency had come to an end, or on June 30th, 1955, whichever was the later'. '23 
Obviously, that meant when the security forces had won, and the Kenya government's 
negotiating position on political matters would be correspondingly strong. It is 
noteworthy that by the time the registration of African voters for elections to the 
Legislative Council began in late 1956, the military campaign against Mau Mau was 
apparently all but won. 124 
This interpretation is confirmed by the ban, until 1960, of African political 
organisations above the district level, designed more to foster political representation 
among the non-Kikuyu African ethnic groups (who largely had not resorted to the 
radical politics of violence), despite increases in 1956 and 1958, in African 
representation in the Council of Ministers. Moreover, even as late as 1959, the date for 
eventual Kenyan independence was `pencilled in' as 1975, while Lyttelton's successor, 
Alan Lennox-Boyd, told the House of Commons that `I cannot now foresee a date 
when it will be possible for any British Government to surrender their ultimate 
'', 5 responsibilities for the destiny and well-being of Kenya. 
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Another arguable feature of the so-called `hearts and minds' aspect of the anti- 
Mau Mau campaign, villagisation, also pivoted on `Operation Anvil'. While the District 
Administration had earlier felt unable to consolidate its position in the reserves 
sufficiently to impose villagisation, following the success of "Anvil" the policy began 
to be officially implemented on a large scale. ' 26 Hitherto, some Kikuyu apparently loyal 
to the government had begun voluntarily to co-operate with villagisation, in order to 
gain protection from the Guard Post around which each village was built. '-'- Indeed, 
such co-operation was taken as a `fair test of loyalty' 
.' 
28 
The purpose of villagisation was clearly not just to provide protection for loyal 
Kikuyu. As early as December 1952, O'Rorke had suggested that `both from the short- 
term police point of view, and the long-term social point of view, he would like to see 
all Africans in the Reserves living in villages instead of scattered about as they were at 
present'. 12' While villagisation did enable the introduction of various social 
improvements, such as the training of Kikuyu women in `practical hygiene', the 
establishment of schools and churches, facilitated agricultural reform, and did indeed 
increase residents' security, it also served a more practical purpose from the security 
forces' perspective. 13' As Erskine had envisaged, villagisation made `the maintenance 
of law and order as simple as possible'. 13' Not only could curfews be imposed upon 
those villagers found, for whatever reason, to be still supplying Mau Mau guerrillas 
with food, but a whole range of communal punishments and control measures could be 
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imposed more easily. ' 3' The `carrot and stick' approach was applied from the outset, 
by rewarding `loyal' Kikuyu with economic and social provisions in `model villages, 
while those considered to be disloyal were concentrated into `punitive villages', which 
remained unclean and under-developed. ' 33 Anyone who remained `tardy in moving' 
into a village had their hut burned down, leaving them little choice but to co-operate. '34 
Most important, the effect on Mau Mau of concentrating the Kikuyu into villages, as 
opposed to leaving them scattered about the reserve, was to force the guerrillas once 
and for all to remain in the forests, where their isolation would be almost total. 135 From 
then onwards it would be just a matter of closing the military net. 
Post `Anvil' military operations proved to be so successful that by 1955 the 
monthly `killing rate' was raised to 66, compared with 39 in 1953 and 49 in 1954.136 
Although there was still work to be done, Erskine was convinced that the Emergency 
had entered its last phase, and suggested that `it is not optimistic to expect a reduction 
in the RAF and the Army later in the year'. "' Nevertheless, the failure of surrender 
negotiations led Erskine's successor, General Sir Gerald Lathbury, to resume military 
operations against the 5,000 guerrillas estimated to have remained in the forests. 
Lathbury also increased the number of `pseudo-gang' (mainly surrendered Mau Mau) 
patrols, resulting in the numbers of guerrillas being reduced by half by December 
1955.1; g This apparently vindicated Lathbury's decision, announced that September, to 
", RHL. MSS Afr s 1784 (20), memoirs of Maurice K. Akker (Assistant Commissioner of Police. 
Nairobi). fo. 14, Trench, loc. cit. 
l;; Heather, 'Counterinsurgency and Intelligence. pp. 179-8 1. 
j' Trench.. 1 fen Who Ruled Kenya. p. 267. 
"` Füredi. 'Kenia: Decolonization through counter-insurgency'. p. 157. 
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13 WO 216/884. Erskine to Harding. 12 April 1955. 
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withdraw 3,500 British and African troops and a brigade headquarters by the end of 
the year. 
In January 1956, with yet still no sign of surrender, Lathbury decided to focus 
the pseudo-gang operations on capturing the guerrilla leadership. '39 By the end of July, 
a further 1,430 guerrillas had been accounted for, and two more British battalions had 
been withdrawn. With the capture of guerrilla leader Dedan Kimathi on 21 October 
1956, and remaining Mau Mau strength estimated at approximately 450, Lathbury 
could announce that `we now return therefore to the normal state of affairs in any 
British territory, where the Police are responsible for law and order'. 140 Superiority of 
arms, numbers, and tactics had apparently won the day. However, as British efforts to 
consolidate victory and `vital' interests over the next three years (while maintaining a 
`technical' State of Emergency) demonstrate, the `state of affairs' was far from 
`normal' (see Chapter V). 
Britain's task, or rather that of the Kenya government, was not made any easier 
by the ever-increasing cost to the British Treasury of maintaining internal security 
throughout the Empire, a burden which threatened to impair, rather than assist, broad 
defence strategy. As the Chair of the Cabinet Committee on Defence Policy, Lord 
Salisbury, explained in July 1954: `We were instructed to review, in the light of recent 
developments in atomic weapons, the strategic assumptions underlying current defence 
policy and the scale and pattern of defence programmes, military and civil. In doing so, 
we have sought to secure all practicable economies in defence expenditure in 1955 and 
139 WO 216/892. 'Appreciation by the Commander-in-Chief East Africa. January 1956'. 23 Jan. 1956. 
140 Ibid.; Lathburv to Templer. 30 July 1956. WO 276/4. 'Appreciation by the Commander in Chief 
East Africa July 1956', 28 June 1956: WO 276/517. 'The Kenya Emergency. 3 May 1955 
- 
17 
November 1956. report by Lathbuiy. 14 Dec. 1956, paras. 74-80.88. 'Order of the Day by 
Lieutenant-General Sir Gerald Lathburv. KCB. DSO. MBE, Commander-in-Chief East Africa. 13 
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subsequent years. ' 141 These economies would include a reduction in the size of the 
British Army by April 1956 from 435,000 to 400,000. but far more important was the 
necessity to bridge the gap of £130 millions in projected defence expenditure and 
available finances. '42 
The colonies were among the first targets where projected reductions in 
military expenditure could be expected, especially given the view in the MoD that the 
Colonial Office had failed to keep abreast of subversion in the territories for which it 
was responsible. As the Permanent Secretary, Sir Harold Parker, complained to the 
then Defence Minister, Harold Macmillan: 
We have drifted into trouble in many Colonial territories-Malaya, Kenya, British 
Guiana. The S of S for War and the Chiefs of Staff feel that had our local intelligence 
and our local security forces been better organised, we might never have got into the 
mess, or, alternatively, if help had to be given by the Army it might have been given 
earlier in the day. [... ] To put it in other words, the Army argues that the Colonial 
Office gets into a mess and then asks the Army to help it out. [... ] The Colonial 
Secretary will probably not accept this view. He has his difficulties. Personally, I have 
always felt that the share of the budgets of the various Colonies devoted to law and 
order may well be inadequate. 143 
Defence reviewers in London therefore saw room for considerable improvement in 
colonial police and intelligence structures, as well as the necessity to `build up local 
Colonial forces in order to reduce the demands on our own Army. 144 
Further deliberations on these questions led to the formation in January 1955 of 
a Ministerial Committee to examine colonial security, under Lord Swinton's 
CAB 129/69. C (54) 250. 'Report by the Committee on Defence Policy', memo. by Salisbury. 24 
July 1954, cited in: Goldsworthy (ed. ). The Conservative Government and the End of Empire Part I: 
International Relations. doc. 14. p. 45. 
''' Ibid.. pp. 46 para. 6.49 para. 16. 
''3 DEFE 7/415. '[Colonial armed forcesbrief by Sir H Parker for Mr Macmillan. 27 Nov. 1954. 
cited in: ibid.. doc. 16. pp. 51-2. 
144 CAB 129/71. C (54) X29 (Annex). 'Defence Policy'. report by Lord Swinton (CRO). 3 Nov. 1954. 
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chairmanship (later replaced by Lord Kilmuir). 145 This committee then invited General 
Sir Gerald Templer to make enquiries about the causes of the emergencies in British 
Guiana, Cyprus, Kenya, Malaya, and elsewhere, and the state of colonial intelligence 
and security generally. 146 
While detailed consideration of the Templer Report, at 79 pages, must remain 
beyond the current remit, several crucial points can be made. First, upon reading the 
report, it is difficult to accept Goldsworthy's view, based on his reading of 13 of a 
possible 464 paragraphs, that it `is generally regarded as having little impact on 
policy'. 147 For a start, the Cabinet accepted all of Templer's recommendations 
regarding colonial intelligence, policing, and security establishments, with one 
exception. Lennox-Boyd had objected to Templer's suggestion that a `reverse colour 
bar' should be imposed on the recruitment and promotion of locals within colonial 
police forces (in preparation for future independence), because of the probable 
negative effects on serving European officers' morale. 14' However, Templer's 
argument that major changes were necessary to Britain's approach to colonial security 
were approved and, it seems, implemented widely. This was not least within the 
Colonial Office itself, where separate police, and intelligence and security, desks were 
established. A permanent Colonial Office appointment was also made to the Joint 
1-15 CAB 131/14. D (54) 43, 'United Kingdom Defence Policy, memo. by COS, 23 Dec. 1954. cited 
in: ibid., doc. 17, pp. 52-7: CAB 129/72, C (54) 402. `Internal Security in the Colonies. memo. by 
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Intelligence Staff in order to augment the department's work with the JIC. The JIC, in 
turn, would have its Charter withdrawn and `reissued jointly' by the Foreign Secretary, 
Minister of Defence and, for the first time, by the Secretary of State for Colonial 
Affairs. 149 
As for colonial armed forces, the major impact of Templer's report, 
unsurprisingly, involved the reversion of financial `responsibility' to the colonies 
themselves. As Templer explained: 
The last time that a comprehensive review of the Colonial forces took place was in 
1949. That review was written against the background of the second world war and at 
a time when fears of a third war were prominent in the minds of both Ministers and of 
the Chiefs of Staff [... ] Now that the chance of a third war has receded and with the 
practical certainty that we have ahead of us many years of cold war, during which the 
Colonies and dependent territories will form one of the main battle fields, it has 
become apparent that the whole matter should be reviewed afresh, in the light of our 
new strategy. 150 
Of course, the ever-increasing cost of imperial military commitments generally, as well 
as the inter-departmental tensions brought about by the fact that for the most part the 
colonial governments were expected to pay bills determined in advance by the War 
Office, had a considerable bearing upon all of this. ''' 
Certainly, the Chiefs of Staff had already concluded that with global war 
unlikely in the foreseeable future, and even in such an event, the principal role of 
colonial armed forces would be to `provide for' internal security and `as far as 
possible, for their own local defence'. 152 Crucially, `it would be more in accordance 
with the normal principles of British Colonial administration [preparation for `self- 
government'] if the administrative control and policy direction of the Colonial forces 
149 CAB 129/76. CP (55) 89. `Report on Colonial Security'. pp. 3.12.14-5.18-20.22- 3.32. paras. 
20.22.42-5.74-88.101-10,178-9. 
1 ` ) Ibid.. p. 3 2. paras. 178-9. 
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were devolved on to Colonial Governments'. ''; This would also conveniently provide 
annual savings of some £980,000 on the War Office vote, thus to the Treasury, of 
maintaining local armed forces in East Africa (not including Emergency 
expenditure). 154 The local governments would also have to settle for reduced army 
contingents (from seven to c. five battalions). "' Given the situation in Kenva at the 
time, these military recommendations could not be implemented immediately, although 
it did not take long for the principle to be established. '56 
In September 1955, Lennox-Boyd outlined Templer's recommendations to the 
governors, and informed them of the change which was likely to take place in the 
summer of 1957, recalcitrant Mau Mau allowing. 157 As will be seen in Chapter V, the 
colonial state would therefore have to employ an ever more sophisticated armoury, in 
both political and socio-economic terms, and especially regarding matters of defence 
and internal security, if it was going to retain a foothold, let alone any influence, in 
`fortress' Kenya. Yet, as will be shown in the next chapter, unbeknownst to all 
concerned in late 1955, the strategic assumptions regarding East Africa, which were 
set to entail considerable local financial difficulties, would change rapidly within a year. 
Rather less rapidly, the local colonial administrators would eventually see the fulfilment 
of even their most wildly optimistic defence and internal security desiderata, if not for 
long (see Chapters VI and VII). 
15 Ibid., pp. '338-9, para. 221. 
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Conclusion 
Between 1945 and 1950, increasing African socio-economic hardship and political 
marginalisation led to a steady rise in crime, civil disobedience, and anti-colonial 
militant action, including the murders of Europeans and loyalist Kikuyu alike. As 
government repression led to the onset of the Emergency it was designed to forestall, 
so the level and sophistication of that repression had to be increased. Irrespective of 
the piecemeal political reforms and selectively targeted socio-economic developments 
introduced during the 1952-6 period, British counter-insurgency was clearly not 
designed to pave the way for the transfer of power to anti-colonial nationalists. What 
mattered to Britain, first and foremost, was that it reimpose its authority and control. 
By the end of 1956, this had largely been achieved, well at least apparently. As will be 
seen in the next two chapters, this was all well and good for Britain given that its broad 
regional strategic priorities would change, albeit coincidentally, within days of the Mau 
Mau guerrillas' defeat. 
9 
Chapter III 
East Africa, East of Suez: I, 1956-7 
Introduction 
Lathbury's announcement in November 1956 of the withdrawal of all but one battalion 
of the British Army from Kenya following the apparently successful completion of 
counter-insurgency operations coincided, ironically, with Britain's humiliating retreat 
from Suez. ' The `Suez affair' led not only to a reassessment of Britain's options in the 
Middle East under the auspices of the ongoing review of long term defence policy, but 
to an almost overnight upgrading of Kenya's strategic importance. 2 As a result, British 
soldiers would be back on Kenyan soil much sooner, and in far greater numbers than 
the military run-down and the process of electoral reform, which began there in June 
1955, might have suggested. This chapter examines post-Suez British decision-making 
concerning the deployment in Kenya of an element of the United Kingdom Strategic 
Reserve. In doing so, it illuminates a hitherto largely neglected, but significant, sub-text 
to the diminution of the British Empire in East Africa. The implementation of Kenya's 
constitutional reforms in 1958 did not occur in isolation from Britain's overseas 
defence planning. `Fortress Kenya' would remain largely unassailable, at least until 
March 1959. 
' WO 276/517, 'Order of the Day by Lieutenant-General Sir Gerald Lathbur-y. KCB. DSO. MBE, 
Commander-in-Chief, East Africa. 13 November 1956'; Keith Kyle. Suez (New York: St. Martin's. 
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`The long retreat'? the decision to establish the UK Strategic Reserve in Kenya 
The reversal of British defence policy on Kenya followed soon after the Suez 
operation. In early February 1957, the British Chiefs of Staff submitted a memorandum 
to the then Defence Minister, Duncan Sandys. They `proposed that an infantry brigade 
should be positioned in Kenya, with the equipment for some supporting arms, to act as 
a reserve to reinforce any threatened area east of Suez'. ' The reasons for the change in v 
policy were listed succinctly as: 
(a) the present air barrier which divides the Middle East is likely to remain, at least as a 
potential threat, for the foreseeable future. 
(b) similarly, there can be no guarantee that the Suez Canal will not be closed to 
movement of our forces by adverse political decision from time to time. 
(c) the potential commitments south of the air/sea barrier are likely to increase, and 
because of the existence of the barrier, speedy intervention from the Eastern 
Mediterranean becomes doubtful. 
(d) there is some uncertainty on the long term reliability of even the West African air 
route under all circumstances. 4 
These ` problems' would be `to a great extent overcome by the stationing of a force in 
Kenya'. Moreover, the Chiefs of Staff now apparently accepted, in line with Baring's 
earlier arguments, that `the presence of some land forces in the area would help to 
ensure the tranquil development of British territories in East and Central Africa'. 5 
Of course, with the `role in war' of Africa south of the Sahara already 
downgraded, Kenya would still constitute simply an adjunct to British defence strategy 
in peacetime. Britain's main concern, especially in the wake of the abandonment of the 
Suez operation, was the defence of its supplies of Middle East oil. For this reason the 
Chiefs of Staff were unequivocal in explaining the role of the proposed new Kenya 
3 DEFE 5/733. COS (57) 4. `Long Term Defence Policy. memo. by the Chiefs of Staff. > Feb. 1957. 
CO 968/693. annex to MOI/LM/5683/507.19 Feb. 1957. 'Draft ECAC [Executive Committee of the 
Arnn CouncilI Paper: Stationing of an AnnY Reserve in Kenya. note by the VCIGS. 18 Feb. 1957. 
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garrison: `The primary purpose of the force is the maintenance of the internal security 
and territorial integrity of dependent territories in the Arabian Peninsular [sic], Central 
and East Africa, and the Indian Ocean'. 6 The existence of `a permanent UK garrison'. 
it was thought, would not only provide readily available assistance in the event of 
serious internal troubles `beyond the capabilities of the local forces' in Kenya and 
elsewhere in East and Central Africa: the existence of the base `would itself tend to 
inhibit further troubles'. 7 Clearly, given the apparent recent victory over the Mau Mau 
guerrillas, on the one hand Kenya was considered to be safe ground for British 
strategic thinkers. On the other hand, the presence of a permanent garrison of British 
troops, it seems, would help to keep it that way. 
The estimate by the Chiefs of Staff of the likely future commitments east of 
Suez, and the extent of such commitments, was crucial in gaining approval for their 
recommendations. Nasser's `victory' had contributed to `a general worsening' of 
Britain's position in the Arabian Peninsula. This, combined with the `vital importance' 
of the area made it essential for Britain to be able to `reinforce rapidly'. The proposed 
new reserve force for Kenya would not necessarily be confined to operations in East 
and Central Africa, and the Arabian Peninsula. The clearest possible indication of the 
albeit extrinsic strategic significance that the Chiefs of Staff now ascribed to Kenya 
was provided by the extent and vaned nature of the other possible future commitments 
which any British troops based there might be called upon to undertake: `In addition to 
the two battalions planned to be stationed in Aden, there is a requirement for 
reinforcements by up to four battalions'; up to one brigade was earmarked for British 
Somaliland; one battalion was committed to reinforce Central Africa while the `Central 
Ibid.. fos. 2.8. 
Ibid.. fo. 3. 
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African battalion' was deployed in Malaya ('We would be unwise to assume that this 
represents the full extent of our commitment in the long term'. ); `The current 
commitment to reinforce Zanzibar, Mauritius and Rodriques [sic], with up to one 
battalion, is likely to be a continuing one'. 8 
Furthermore, the possibilities for deployment of British soldiers to be stationed 
in Kenya extended far beyond the environs of their immediately projected `out of area' 
role: 
There is a current commitment to reinforce Singapore in the event of Internal Security 
troubles with up to two brigades. There are also commitments to ANZAM[*] in the 
event of limited war. Immediate reinforcement of the Far East could be mounted more 
quickly from Kenya than from [the] UK. [... ] With the present political alignment in the 
Middle East, we might reinforce the Baghdad Pact Area with more certainty from 
Kenya than from Cyprus, in spite of the greater distance. However, a more realistic 
contribution to the Baghdad Pact might be the maintenance of tranquility [sic] in the 
Persian Gulf during an emergency, and for this the force from Kenya would be 
invaluable. 9 
Given the extent of the above operational commitments, the Chiefs of Staff 
concluded that `ideally' a full infantry brigade group should be sent to Kenya. In 
reality, financial and manpower shortages limited the size of the force available for 
deployment in Kenya to `the equivalent of three major units' only. Artillery was not 
required for normal internal security purposes, so a brigade headquarters, two infantry 
battalions, and a field squadron of engineers `should be included'. 
As for future command arrangements, the fact that the proposed Kenya 
garrison and the Aden base were over 1,000 miles apart made it impracticable for them 
to be `linked' under the same commander. Accordingly. the Chiefs of Staff 
recommended that the British brigade to be stationed in Kenya should be placed under 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid.. fos. 3.8. * Michael Carver. Tightrope !t inking: British Defence Police 
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the administrative command of the GOC, East Africa, and under the operational 
control of the C-in-C, MELF. 
Under the present trial command of the Arabian Peninsular [sic] there are two brigadiers with operational powers, in the Persian Gulf and Aden respectively. Units despatched from Kenya to one of these areas would need to be placed under the local 
commander. It is only if the Kenya brigade moves as a formation to a new area of 
operations in the Peninsular, [sic] that the command system would need to be 
modified. 
Implementation of the new scheme was further complicated by `current plans' 
for East Africa. Templer's report on colonial intelligence and security of 23 April 1955 
had led to a reassessment of the administrative, command, and financial arrangements 
for locally-recruited armed forces in Kenya. " The consequent redoubling of the 
emphasis on the internal security role of local forces led to yet another reversal in 
policy and related command arrangements. Intensification of the Mau Mau Emergency 
had provided the impetus for the somewhat belated establishment of East Africa 
Command in its own right in May 1953.12 The GOC was henceforth responsible 
directly to the War Office, and in operational command of all military, police, and 
auxiliary forces. 
By November 1956, the effective withdrawal of British soldiers from military 
operations in Kenya, and the consequent resumption of responsibility for internal 
security by the police, left the way clear for the implementation of `Longshot III' 
. 
From 1 July 1957, East African forces would be under the operational control of the 
governor of the territory in which they were stationed; GOC, East Africa would be the 
military commander; and the East Africa High Commission (EAHC) would be 
CO 968/693, 'Stationing of an Army Reserve in Kenva'. fo. 6. 
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responsible for overall administration. Crucially, while `Imperial units' would be paid 
for by the British government, the colonial governments `will be entirely responsible 
through the High Commission for financial control of the East African Forces'. " This 
in itself would create problems, both financially and politically, for the respective East 
African administrations. 
The `Longshot' plan also envisaged that the Kenya government would meet the 
extra cost of stationing the British infantry battalion and 250 administrative personnel 
due to remain there until the middle of 1958 under separate arrangements made with 
Baring. 14 While the Chiefs of Staff were aware that consultation with the 
administrative and military authorities in East Africa `would be essential before the 
administrative plan for the UK force in Kenya' could be drawn up, they also 
anticipated the likely response of the colonial East African governments to the news of 
its implementation: `There can be no question of reversing LONGSHOT III [sic] and 
the UK force will therefore need its own chain of supply'. There would be a sop or 
two to the Kenya government, though: 
However some integration of administrative arrangements with the local forces might 
be possible. Since the whole force would be retained in Kenya primarily for strategic 
reasons, it will probably no longer be possible to ask the Government of Kenya to meet 
the costs of any Imperial units in Kenya, other than the costs of internal security 
operations there. '' 
Significantly, the estimates for completion time and the cost of accommodation 
for the new force served as a good indicator of how long the British military intended, 
or believed it would be able, to stay in Kenya: 
Building resources in Kenya are limited and even semi-permanent accommodation is at 
present estimated to take about 6 years [sic] at a cost of 
... 
[£5.5 million 
- 
roughly £55- 
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60 million at current values] 
... 
(excluding a war reserves depot). This cost should however be measured against the big reduction in the long term building costs in the Mediterranean due to the reduction in the projected garrisons in that area. The annual 
cost of maintaining a force of this size in Kenya rather than in the UK would be about £600,000 [£6 million]. Against this should be set the reduction in movement costs for 
emergency moves to meet likely commitments in the area. 16 
Proposals and plans were one thing. Implementation turned out to be 
something completely different. Lathbury, for one, complained to the War Office that 
the new proposals rendered obsolete certain aspects of the `Longshot III' plans. In 
particular, the plan for a centralised administrative body for all East African local 
forces would have to be scrapped. Not only would the existence of such a body 
`working parallel' to a similar body for British forces prove to be 'inefficient and 
uneconomical', but it was doubtful that the governments of the East African territories 
would accept it. '7 As will be seen below, this hinged largely on the East African 
governors' reluctance to find additional funds to cover the administration of soldiers 
for internal security purposes in East Africa when, clearly, given Kenya's enhanced 
strategic significance, it was now in Britain's interests to do the utmost to ensure the 
continuing stability of the region. The Uganda government had its own specific 
concerns: administering the East African forces centrally, on a quasi-federal basis, 
would have clear `imperial' overtones, and would be unacceptable to Africans at a time 
when Ghana in West Africa had just been granted independence. '8 There seemed to be 
a clear distinction between Ugandan and Kenyan Africans. 
Before any plans could be finalised, let alone implemented, a War Office 
planning team had to `study the administrative problems of stationing an infantry 
16 Ibid.. fo. 8. 
' Ibid.. extract from Signal 30686, C-in-C. East Africa to War Office (WO). 31 March 1957. 
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battalion in KENYA [sic] within 18 months in semi permanent accommodation. ) 
. 
19 The 
planning team had the following tasks: 
The team will recommend a site for a permanent barracks for the infantry battalion. 
The following factors will be taken into consideration. 
- (a) Availability of Crown Land. 
(b) Existing accommodation and site facilities. (c) Availability of hirings for married quarters. (d) Amenities for the troops. 
(e) Communications. 
(f) Adequate water supply. 
(g) Availability of public utilities. 
(h) Training facilities. 
As a general guide the site selected should be in the general vicinity of NAIROBI. It 
should be capable of expansion later to accommodate the whole force 
... 
[2,200 
personnel]. 
British soldiers would therefore be stationed within easy reach of Eastleigh Airport, 
should the need arise for quick despatch to other `trouble spots' in the Empire; equally, 
if not more important, within close proximity to HQ, East Africa Command; the offices 
of the EAHC; and the seat of British colonial administration in the principal territory of 
the region, which had until so recently been the main urban area for Mau Mau 
activities and organisation. Nairobi was also entering into a new phase of heightened 
political activity with the recent African elections to the Kenya Legislative Council. 
Given the post-Suez reassessment of strategy in the Middle East, enunciated in 
Paragraph 26 of the April 1957 Defence White Paper, Britain's other military 
deployments had been placed under close scrutiny. Following a tour by the Vice- 
Quartermaster-General of Britain's military bases in the area, in early April, Templer 
(Field Marshal and CIGS since September 1955) reported that Lieutenant-General Sir 
Geoffrey Bourne, the new C-in-C, MELF, `and local political leaders and 
commanders' had concluded that `not more than half the present infantry battalion in 
19 CO 968/693. 'Terms of Reference for Kenya Planning Team (draft). n. d. (c. April 1957). 
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the Persian Gulf is now needed there 
... 
[and] 
... 
no further British infantry is at present 
required in Aden. These are in fact very convenient conclusions because of our 
difficulties in providing hot-weather accommodation in the Arabian Peninsula. '20 
Templer accordingly recommended the withdrawal of roughly half of the First 
Battalion, Scottish Rifles (1 Cameronians), 21 or 370 `all ranks' from Bahrain and 
Sharjah to Kenya `where they can be held in readiness to. return to the Arabian 
Peninsula if required' 
. 
22 
This was all `very convenient' for the military, the main concern being the 
administrative problems which might arise from stationing British soldiers in Kenya at 
a time when East African forces were to become the responsibility of the colonial 
governments. Lathbury was asked to confirm that temporary accommodation could be 
made available for the 370 personnel by I May 1957, `without detriment to plans for 
Longshot III'. The planning team would also investigate the extent to which the 
administration of the British force could be integrated with that of the local forces. 
With politics in Kenya entering into a new phase as the newly-elected African 
Members of Legislative Council (MLCs) prepared to take their seats, the Colonial 
Office had to take account of broader considerations. As Lennox-Boyd put it to 
Baring: `You will no doubt be able to settle the practical difficulties direct with 
Lathbury but if you, or the other Governors to whom I am repeating this, foresee 
adverse political or other repercussions arising out of this proposed move I should be 
'2; grateful for your very early views. 
'" DEFE 5/74, COS (57) 80. 'Army Deployment in the Arabian Peninsula' note by the Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff (MO1/P (57) 254). 1 April 1957: Blaxland, The Regiments Depart, p. 495. 
21 Blaxland. The Regiments Depart. p. 485: Ian S. Hallows. Regiments and Corps of the British . lrmv 
(London: Cassell. 1994 11991]). p. 282. 
2 DEFE 5/74. loc. cit. 
'; CO 968/69'. telegram 25. Lennox-Boyd to Baring. 5 April 1957. 
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The replies to Lennox-Boyd's enquiry from two of the governors concerned 
are instructive. They reflect different priorities as a function both of political 
developments within the territories themselves, and estimates of their future course, 
and because of the more immediate restrictions likely to result from limits on financial 
and manpower resources. As Baring explained: 
The news of the establishment of a British base in Kenya is very welcome indeed. It 
will give the country a sense of security and of permanency. It will, therefore, assist in 
the attraction of capital. The administrative arrangements will not be easy. I hope that 
no final decisions will be taken until the various alternatives have been carefully 
considered on the spot. There is a tendency in the War Office to forget that the number 
of capable officers available in East Africa is very limited and in fact that any East 
African administration and pay machine can only cope with a limited force. 24 
The response from the recently-appointed Governor of Uganda, (Baring's former 
deputy) Sir Frederick Crawford, while positive, expressed a significant reservation: 
Neither I nor my advisers foresee any adverse political or other repercussions to the 
stationing of British troops in East Africa so long as it is made quite clear that these 
troops will not be stationed in Uganda and that control over internal security forces in 
East Africa remains as proposed in Longshot III with individual Governors in their 
capacity of Commander-in-Chief. 25 
However, such albeit guarded reassurance about the local impact of news of 
the force had to be weighed against both British domestic and international opinion. 
Referring to the War Office planning team, Lennox-Boyd, in reply to Crawford, 
explained that 
Their presence is in any case likely to excite comment and speculation. In reply to any 
enquiries they will state that their task is to examine the implications of [the] last two 
sentences of paragraph 26 of [the] Defence White Paper (Cmd. 124) [sic] which read: 
"In the Arabian Peninsula Britain must at all times be ready to defend Aden Colony and 
Protectorates and the territories on the Persian Gulf for whose defence she is 
responsible. For this task, land, air and sea forces have to be maintained 
in that area 
and in East Africa". They have been instructed not to go beyond this in any public 
statements. You will no doubt wish to adopt [a] similar line in answering Press or 
24 CO 822/1252. GH 1953/5/39/II, letter. Baring to Lennox-Boyd. 10 April 1957. See also: CO 
968/693. telegram 301. Baring to Lennox-Boyd- 6 April 1957. 
25 CO 968/69 I. telegram 16. Crawford to Lennox-Boyd. 6 April 1957. See also. 
ibid.. Crawford to 
Maj. 
-Gen. N. P. H. Tapp (GOC. EAC). 10 Sept. 1957 
105 
other enquiries. In discussions which might become public they would not wish to disclose [the] contemplated strength of [the] force involved. 26 
Meanwhile, the size of the eventual British force to be deployed in Kenya, in 
itself was brought into question. Post-war pressures on the British economy, coupled 
with a potentially overwhelming defence burden in Europe and overseas, had led the 
1951-5 Churchill administration to produce Global Strategy Paper 1952 (GSP 1952). 
In advocating that in future much greater reliance `should be' placed upon nuclear 
deterrence than upon conventional forces, GSP 1952 sought to equate defence means 
and ends, and was a significant precursor to the 1957 Defence White Paper, heralding 
the reduction in British armed forces personnel so irksome to the British service chiefs 
and several government ministers. 27 Ironically, Sandys first statement to the Commons 
as Defence Minister on 13 February 1957, when he announced the shift in defence 
policy to deterrence, and the intention to end National Service as soon as possible, 
coincided roughly with the appraisal by the Chiefs of Staff of the need to deploy British 
soldiers in Kenya. 28 
This apparent contradiction led to difficulties at the most basic planning level. 
At a meeting held in the War Office on 5 April 1957 (the day that the Defence White 
Paper was published), `to resolve outstanding points necessary for the briefing of the 
War Office team', Brigadier D. C. Mullen, the Adjutant to the Director of Military 
Operations (A/DMO), explained that `the long term War Office task is to establish in 
KENYA a brigade'. Clearly aware of the renewed emphasis on financial stringency in 
,6 Ibid., telegram 16. Lennox-Boyd to Crawford. 6 April 1957. Cmnd. 124. Defence. Outline of 
Future Policy (London: HMSO. April 1957). cited in Ovendale. British Defence Policy since 19-15. p. 
115. 
27 Colin Gordon, 'Duncan Sandy s and the Independent Nuclear Deterrent. in Ian Beckett and John 
Gooch (eds. ). Politicians and Defence: studies in the Formulation of British Defence Police 1845- 
19 70 (Manchester: Manchester University- Press. 1981), pp. 138-9. 
,` Ibid., p. 144. 
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the Defence White Paper, the lack of any strategic certainty in the immediate aftermath 
of the Suez operation, and the likely effect of political developments elsewhere in 
Africa, Mullen continued: 
As security of tenure and the operational commitment is subject to change it was 
proposed, in the interest of economy, that the brigade would be established by stages. 
The War Office therefore propose to concentrate first on building adequate 
accommodation for one battalion within 18 months; this would avoid the dangers 
inherent in embarking on large scale projects for which the plans may have to be 29 changed. 
As will be seen below, Britain did its utmost to ensure that political developments in 
Kenya would accord with strategic plans for the area. This, of course, was the 
responsibility of the Colonial Office and the Kenya government. 
Meanwhile, the War Office concerned itself largely with the administrative and 
financial mundanity involved in planning to establish a British garrison in Kenya, which 
seemed to depend upon broader policy issues. Given that the 1957 Defence White 
Paper `promised reductions in our overseas commitments', the minutes of the April 
War Office meeting show that at least one Treasury official, T. J. Bligh, kept his eye 
firmly on the bigger picture. Bligh stressed that although his department would not 
object to the planning team being sent to Kenya, he `would wish to reserve their 
position on the stationing of the brigade' there. As tends to be the case with new policy 
initiatives, of whatever nature, plans are all well and good, while paying for them is a 
different matter. 
Clearly, Bligh had needed to be more emphatic in the face of Colonial Office 
and War Office determination. As he put it to Mullen in a subsequent letter: 
It was my understanding at the meeting that the Working Party would not in any way 
at all be making any commitment on future policy about either a battalion or a brigade. 
[... ] I said that although the Treasury did not want to object to the Working Party 
29 CO 968/693. 'Stationing Part of the Strategic Reserve in Kenya', summary of a meeting held in the 
War Office. 5 April 1957. 
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going we would certainly have to reconsider our attitude if the very fact of their going 
implied a firm commitment. [... ] I think that the drafting of 
... 
the minutes has been 
rather economical, and I would find it more suitable if the sentence ran "Mr. Bligh said 
that there would be no Treasury objection to a team going to Kenya provided that no 
commitments of any sort were entered into 
. 
"30 
In the light of the above, and given that the full-scale military building 
programme in Kenya was scheduled to take six years, Phillip Darby's retrospective 
remarks deserve consideration: 
That Kenya attained full internal self-government less than six years after the decision 
was made to proceed with the cantonment, and that the last British troops left Kenya 
little more than five years after work first began on the major construction project, is 
now common knowledge. What is not so clear is how the defence establishment came 
to undertake building the base in the light of the territory's uncertain future as a 
colony. The answer seems to lie in changed political objectives and lack of co- 
ordination within the government machine. " 
Undoubtedly, Britain's political objectives in East Africa did change, and this, along 
with the implications for defence planning, and British efforts to secure a strategic 
foothold in Kenya will be considered in Chapters VI and VII. As will be shown below, 
it would be inaccurate, however, to suggest a lack of co-ordination between 
government departments so far as defence and political, and related matters were 
concerned. This is not to say that there were not disagreements over ends and means, 
particularly given the at times seemingly mutually-exclusive `global strategy' concerns 
of defence ministers and planners, and the arguably more parochial local political focus 
of the Colonial Office juxtaposed, of course, by the financial restraint imposed by the 
Treasury. 
It should be stressed that, at least until January or March 1959 and, as Darby 
concedes, in 1957 `when the Ministry of Defence decided to go ahead with the scheme 
to station troops in Kenya, independence for the East African territories seemed 
i" Ibid.. Bligh (Treasury) to Mullen (War Office). 11 April 1957. 
31 Darbv. British De/c'nce Policy East o/'Slr('Z. p. 205. 
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several generations away'. '2 Indeed, as will be argued below and in subsequent 
chapters (VI and VII), Britain did the utmost to ensure this, with a combination of 
piecemeal political concessions and attempted delaying tactics, along with strictly 
targeted, and limited, financial and military aid packages. Moreover, British efforts to 
foster divisions between the African nationalists were intended to promote the 
`moderate' African politicians who, it was thought, would be more amenable to the 
`responsible government' constitutional model that gave Britain the best hope of 
safeguarding `vital' economic and strategic interests. 
The emergence of the Middle East air/sea barrier brought about renewed 
speculation concerning the requirement for a British military base in East Africa. The 
Times `concluded that there was undoubtedly a need for some sort of half-way house 
in the area, although it was doubtful whether a full-scale garrison in Kenya was the 
answer'. 33 This, and further newspaper speculation quickly came to the notice of the 
new African MILCs. As Reuter's News Agency reported in April 1957: `There has 
been opposition from some African politicians in Kenya who suggest [that] the 
establishment of a British military base here will needlessly involve Kenya in any future 
war and will enable the British Government [to] counter their political demands with 
the argument that an essential military base cannot be compromised. ' 34 
This report, based upon a statement attributed to the African nationalist, Tom 
Mboya, again prompted Crawford to request that he be allowed to make a statement 
to the effect that it was not the intention to station British soldiers in Uganda. 35 
32 Ibid. 
;; Ibid., p. 124. 
34 CO 968/693, teleprint. Reuter (Nairobi), n. d. (c. 10 April 1957). 
3i Ibid., telegram 17. CraNNford to Lennox-Bord. n. d. (c. 11-24 April 1957); 'Stationing of Part of the 
United Kingdom Strategic Reserve in Kenya'. brief (draft) for the Secretary of State. n. d. (c. 
April/Max 1957). 
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Meanwhile, the War Office gave clear instructions to Lathbury and Bourne: `The 
following statement may be made to the Press if the Press raise the matter and only if 
they raise it. ["]A detachment of 1 CAMERONIANS is being moved in the first half of 
May from the PERSIAN GULF to KENYA as a routine matter["]' 36 
It seems that the British desire for minimal publicity regarding the subject of the 
possible British force for Kenya had little to do with concerns for African sensibilities. 
As The Times had speculated, there was no guarantee that a suitable site would be 
found for the size of force envisaged, especially given the increasing requirement in the 
British Army for `accompanied postings' overseas. 37 The move of the Cameronians 
from the Arabian Peninsula to Kenya might well have ended up as simply 'routine'. 
Also, the physical separation of local commands south of the air barrier from Middle 
East Command in Cyprus had imposed a review of the overall command structure in 
the area. Kenya was being considered as a possible location for the proposed new 
headquarters: ` In view of this it is most important to prevent [the governments of the] 
East African Territories hearing rumours perhaps through [the] Colonial Office that [a] 
new Command in these parts is under consideration. [The] 
... 
[e]ffect of [the] possible 
return of [the] War Office might be most disruptive to LONGSHOT'. 38 
Given the refusal of the Kenyan African MLCs to participate in government 
following the March 1957 elections, and that they would not, in any case, have any 
direct involvement in defence and security related decisions until independence in 
December 1963, it is clear that what mattered in this regard was the intention of the 
British defence establishment that the administration, where possible, and the financing, 
3" Ibid.. 14177 (MO4). TROOPERS (WO) to MIDEAST MAIN FORCE NAIROBI HQ BFAP [British 
Forces Arabian Peninsula. 25 April 1957. 
37 Darby. British Defence Policy East of Suc':. p. 205. CO 968/6933. 'Stationing of Part of the United 
Kingdom Strategic Reserve in Kenya'. brief (draft). n. d. (c. April/May- 1957). 
CO 968/693, telegram 3 1092/SD. Lathbun- to VCIGS. 25 April 1957. 
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in particular, of the East African Land Forces (EALF) should not continue as a direct 
British responsibility. There was also the matter of the practicality of competition 
between `Imperial' forces and the EALF for land and facilities upon which any base 
might be built. Certainly, when demonstrating the British government's apparent lack 
of concern or understanding for local African objections, Lennox-Boyd, perhaps 
somewhat disingenuously, stated to the Commons on 1 May that `he disagreed with a 
suggestion that there was widespread anxiety in Kenya about its use as 
... 
a base'. '9 
On 23 April 1957, the War Office planning team recommended Kahawa, ten 
miles from Nairobi, as the `most suitable' site as a base for `Imperial troops'. This was 
followed at the end of April by a statement by John Hare, the Secretary of State for 
War: `In addition, as indicated in the policy statement on defence, plans are being 
prepared to enable certain British forces to be stationed in East Africa to help to 
safeguard our general interests in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf . 40 Further 
statements in Kenya's Legislative Council, and ever-increasing newspaper speculation 
led Sandys to decide to tour Aden, Kenya and Libya in mid-June, in order to assess the 
situation for himself. 4' 
While in Kenya, Sandys was briefed by Baring and Lathbury. Baring, tending 
more towards imperialist `hawk' than decolonising `dove', went to great lengths to 
convince Sandys of the efficacy of the plan for the British garrison: 
The United Kingdom has, I believe, a chance to maintain in Kenya both a stable state 
and an important point of British influence in eastern Africa. Admittedly such points of 
influence are threatened in these days by emotional and unthinking nationalism. In 
other parts of the world this threat has proved irresistible. All the same the 
circumstances of Kenya differ from those of most of the territories which we have 
abandoned. Thus 
- 
[... ] The element of stability in Kenya, which is lacking both in West 
39 Ibid., teleprint. Reuter (Nairobi), 3 May 1957. 
10 Ibid.. brief for Sands b-, Baring. 20 June 1957. fo. 3. 
41 Ibid.. Reuter. 23 April 1957; Darby. British Defence Policy East of Suez, pp. 124-5; The Daily 
Telegraph, 'New Ken) a Base Not Rush Project', 30 April 1957: The Times. 'Strategic Base in Kem a'. 
2 May 1957. and 'British Base in Kenya. Mr Sandes to See Possible Site'. 15 June 1957. 
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African colonies and in Arabic speaking territories, is a permanently settled European 
population. [... ] This element of stability, this existence as an important section of the Kenya population, of people determined to maintain the British connexion, [sic] is by 
far the most important and re-assuring feature which distinguishes Kenya from many 
other territories. 42 
Baring went on to explain that the relative lack of contact between East Africans and 
Europeans compared with West Africa, and the consequent lack of sufficiently 
educated Africans in the area had given rise to a situation whereby Kenyan Africans 
were ill-prepared to run the country. On the other hand, as this situation improved, an 
external threat `from the Arabic speaking world would give the impetus to make a 
mixed government in Kenya not only a working success 
- 
as it has already been 
- 
but 
also something with a popular appeal to many men and women in all communities'. 43 
Fully aware of the developing pressures for independence, not only in East 
Africa, but from within Britain, Baring elaborated: 
Provided Britain does not herself lose her nerve, the future of Kenya need not be the 
bleak prospect of an incompetent African government attaining independence and then 
trying to cope with problems far beyond its capacity. Admittedly there are many in 
Britain who wish to see independence at any cost and who, if in power, might be 
prepared to exercise the constitutional right of the United Kingdom Government so to 
alter the constitutional arrangements of Kenya that an independent African government 
would come into being quite soon. Whatever the constitutional position may be, there 
is however reason to believe that a move in this direction would present the United 
Kingdom Government of the day with a series of troubles and a series of decisions 
which it is most unlikely that it would be prepared to face when the time came. 
Among these difficulties, Baring cited the fact that a `large section of the 
government activities of the country is run by Europeans not in Government service'. 
Many government servants owned land in Kenya and had children educated there, 
and intended to retire in Kenya and to become Kenyans. An attempt, therefore, to 
"impose" a very drastic constitutional change from the United Kingdom 
... 
would lead 
first to the paralysis of Government since the attempt would cause a flow of 
resignations. Then this would almost certainly be followed by an outbreak of violence 
... 
[from within the] 
... 
considerable Afrikaner element in this country 
... 
[who] 
... 
12 CO 968/69',. brief by Baring. 20 June 1957. fo. 1. 
43 Ibid.. fo. 2 (emphasis added). 
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cannot pack up and remove themselves quietly to Cheltenham! Their natural instinct 
would be to resist by force any attempt to bring the new changes into practice and they 
would follow that natural instinct. [... ] I doubt whether the sort of United Kingdom Government likely to wish to impose changes leading to "Ghana in our day" would 
also be the sort of government likely to face and to quell a violent movement. [... ] If it is worth making an effort to succeed in the far from hopeless task of preserving Kenya in stability and in close connexion with Great Britain, then an important factor 
contributing to success will be the presence of British troops. 44 
Moving on to explain that the various telegrams from the Colonial Office, 
public statements by British and Kenya government ministers, and intense newspaper 
speculation about the new British base were tantamount to a fait accompli, Baring 
played his trump card: 
All this is not by itself a decisive point. But the general public here, both European and 
African, have read in the newspapers of announcements by Ministers both in the 
United Kingdom and in Kenya that British troops will be stationed here. They have 
read of an attack on this decision by the African Members of the Legislative Council. If 
there is now an announcement that no British troops will be stationed here, whatever is 
said they will draw the conclusion 
- 
especially if they are Africans 
- 
that Mr. Mboya 
has forced the United Kingdom Government to change its mind. 45 
Summing up, Baring then reiterated that the presence of British soldiers would 
`give a sense of the permanence of the British connexion'. Curiously, given his earlier 
remarks about the `Afrikaner element', he also explained that: `All African political 
movements, if faced with resistance, are liable to become violent and the British troops 
would have a strong preventive and deterrent effect'. Certainly, the former would be 
less fearful for their future. Finally, referring to the `Longshot III' arrangements in as 
much as they implied a loosening of the connection `in defence matters' between East 
Africa and Britain, and with one eye clearly on the broader picture, Baring concluded, 
shrewdly, that such a `danger' would be averted by the presence of the garrison, `either 
'a Ibid.. fos. 2,3 (emphasis added). 
15 Ibid.. fos. 3-4. 
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as a support for troops in the Arabian peninsula or as a place to which, if things go 
wrong, they could retreat from Arabia' 
. 
46 
With half the Cameronians from the Persian Gulf already in temporary 
accommodation in Gilgil, some 80 miles from Nairobi,. Lathbury's major concern was 
to determine the exact size of the force to be stationed in Kenya. As he reported to the 
War Office, `although the accommodation is reasonable as a temporary measure for 
half a battalion and a few families, it could in no way be considered as satisfactory 
from the long term point of view, nor could it take all the battalion families. It will 
therefore be necessary to build barracks and Kahawa seems to be the most suitable 
site. '47 Apparently unconcerned by such minutiae, Sandys remained non-committal, 
making it `quite clear' that no final decision had been taken on `what troops would be 
stationed where in the East African and South Arabian area'. As if Baring's note were 
not enough, the Defence Minister also `closely questioned' him on `the future of 
Kenya' 
. 
48 
Upon Sandys' return, continuing newspaper speculation suggested that the 
base project for Kenya would be pushed forward. 49 Labour MP Fenner Brockway, 
apparently prompted by Kenyan African nationalists, asked in the Commons for a 
statement from Sandys about the matter. He was told that Sandys ` hoped to be able to 
announce some of the decisions regarding the strength and disposition of forces in 
Aden, Kenya and Libya in the near future'. 5° While the subsequent implementation of 
construction work in Kenya would serve to demonstrate that, at least in the short term, 
46 Ibid., fo. 4 
47 Ibid.. 'Note by C-in-C East Africa Command 
- 
Stationing British Troops in Kenya', 20 June 1957. 
48 Ibid., Baring to Lennox-Boyd 21 June 1957. 
a9 Darby. British Defence Police East of iu'z. pp. 124-5. 
s0 CO 968/693, 'Establishment of United Kingdom Base in Kenya 
- 
Stationing British Troops in 
Kenya', brief for John Profumo (Parliamentary, Under-Secretan- of State. Colonial Office). )1 July 
1957. lo. 1. 
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Sandys had been persuaded by Baring's arguments, no announcement was made until 
five months later. This was partly because the proportion of forces to be allotted 
between Aden, the Persian Gulf, and Kenya depended upon Sandys striking a balance 
between the size of the forces that could be stationed south of the air barrier as a 
function of both the economies in conventional forces set out in the 1957 Defence 
White Paper, and a combination of broader strategic considerations and the immediate 
security requirements of the governors of Aden and Kenya. 51 While Sandys had ruled 
out stationing a whole brigade group in Kenya, Baring had hoped for at least four 
companies (c. 320 personnel), equating roughly to those soldiers already stationed in 
Gilgil. 52 This would also help the Kenya government to make economies by disbanding 
the 2nd/3rd King's African Rifles (23 KAR) reserve battalion which had been raised 
during the military phase of the Kenya Emergency. 53 It seems that the matter of a 
definitive announcement on the future of forces to be stationed south of the air barrier, 
rather than the actual decision, was in itself the cause of the delay. 54 
Shortly after Sandys returned from Kenya, his Chief of Staff, Marshal of the 
Royal Air Force, Sir William Dickson (the nominal Chief of the Defence Staff), had 
submitted a report outlining the `more likely possibilities' for troop deployments. 
These were summarised as follows: 
(a) to accommodate one battalion in Kenya, one battalion in Aden and one in the 
Persian Gulf less two companies in Kenya and married quarters for the whole of this 
battalion in Kenya; 
(b) 
... 
one battalion in Aden and 
... 
half the Persian Gulf battalion in Kenya with 
married quarters for the whole of this battalion; 
Ibid. The 1957 Defence White Paper had proposed reducing the British armed forces from 690.000 
personnel to 375.000 by 1962. Murphy-1/an Lennox-Bond. p. 128. 
,- CO 968/693. Lennox-Boyd to Sandes. 9 July 1957. 
Ibid., telegram 639. Baring to Lennox-Boyd. I Aug. 1957. 
Ibid.. telegram 109, Hare (Secretary of State. War Office) to Lennox-Boyd. 4 Nov. 1957. 'War 
Office however confirm that although wishing to avoid publicity at this juncture. reply does not affect 
plan to locate one infantry battalion in Kenya. No announcement to this effect 
is however 
contemplated at present'. 
llý 
(c) to accommodate in Kenya half the Aden and half the Persian Gulf Battalions [. sic] 
with married quarters for the whole of both battalions. 15 
The Colonial Office naturally favoured solution `(a)' because of Barings long-standing 
desire that a full battalion be stationed in Kenya on a permanent basis, and because the 
Governor of Aden, Sir William Luce, had amended his requirements from two 
companies to a full battalion. 56 This latter decision had arisen because of a general 
increase in widespread anti-British unrest in the Middle East, which in turn was 
heightened by British military intervention on 23 July 1957, in support of the Sultan of 
Muscat and Oman against a Saudi-backed revolts' More importantly, the fact of the 
Oman operation in itself, and the lessons learned, added fuel to the fire of those 
government ministers, including the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, and Lennox- 
Boyd, who opposed Sandys' shift to a defence policy reliant on nuclear deterrence, and 
the consequent projected reductions in conventional forces. 58 
Lloyd's statement to the Commons on 29 July, explaining Britain's motives for 
intervention in Oman, and that there was `no need to emphasise the importance of the 
Persian Gulf was crucial in this regard. Equally so was the Foreign Secretary's 
exposition of the British government's `interpretation of its commitments in the Persian 
Gulf : 
the difference between a formal obligation and the obligations of a long-standing 
relationship of friendship is not readily apparent to the local rulers and people. If we 
were to fail in one area it would begin to be assumed elsewhere that perhaps the anti- 
British propaganda of our enemies had some basis to it, and that the Government were 
no longer willing or able to help their friends. 59 
Ibid.. 'Establishment of United Kingdom Base in Kenya 
- 
Stationing British Troops in Kenya, 
brief. fo. 2. 
Ibid., Lennox-Boyd to Sandes (Minister of Defence. MoD). 9 July 1957. 
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The implication of this statement, that the likelihood of Britain's military intervention 
to preserve the status quo in the area would increase, and its corollary, that sufficient 
forces would have to be maintained in order to undertake such commitments, has been 
well noted by Darby. Added to the key military lesson of the Oman operation, that air 
power was no substitute for soldiers on the ground, the tide began to turn back in 
favour of those defence chiefs and ministers who opposed large-scale reductions in 
conventional forces. 60 
Sandys waited until 7 November 1957 to state publicly that `an element of the 
strategic reserve would be stationed in Kenya. Hare added, in response to questions 
from the Labour Party, that this might entail one or two battalions. At the same time, 
Sandys announced the creation of a separate integrated command in Aden for British 
forces in the Arabian Peninsula and British Somaliland. On 10 July he had announced 
the review of the command structure in the Middle East 
. 
61 This latter decision had been 
made effectively by the end of that month. 62 It is difficult to ascertain what, exactly, 
caused the delay in any announcement being made. Apart from the summer recess, for 
example, and the wish of the Foreign Office to avoid further inflaming Arab opinion 
with mention of the Persian Gulf, a few points regarding Kenya can be brought 
together tentatively. 63 
Firstly, in response to agitation from Mboya in particular against the proposal 
to establish any form of British military base in Kenya, Baring had argued that should 
Sandys decide not to go ahead with the project, this would not only prove to be 
60 Ibid., pp. 13 1-3. 
61 IICD, 577, cols. 3334,446,7 Nov. 1957; HCD 573. cols. 49-50,10 July 1957. cited in ibid.. p. 12 5. 
nn. 88.89, and 91. 
6, CO 968/693. 'Establishment of United Kingdom Base in Kenya - Stationing British Troops in 
Kenya', brief, fo. 3. 
63 Ibid.. Hare to Lennox-Boyd 22 Nov. 1957. 
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embarrassing for the Kenya government, but would also show the British government 
to have retreated in the face of such pressure. This in turn would provide further 
encouragement to the African nationalists to press for more rapid constitutional 
advance than Britain was prepared to concede, along with the concomitant dangers 
that Baring had outlined, and could well have serious repercussions elsewhere. 
Certainly, Lennox-Boyd, in support of Baring's viewpoint, had pressed Sandys in July 
`not to make an announcement to the effect that no base would be set up there at the 
present time' 
. 
64 
Secondly, it surely must have been no mere coincidence that Sandys' and 
Hare's statements to the Commons on 7 November were made the day after Lennox- 
Boyd sent a telegram to Macmillan informing him of the decision to replace the 
Lyttelton Constitution with `minimum delay'. 65 Of course, this is not to suggest that 
the final decision on the British force for Kenya was made, then announced, within 24 
hours, although this would not be far wide of the mark. It is certain that on 4 
November 1957, following discussions with Baring and the new GOC, General Tapp, 
Lennox-Boyd requested that an announcement on the stationing of British soldiers in 
Kenya should be made on 11 November: `We [Lennox-Boyd and Baring] also both 
feel that it would be politically unwise for me to make the announcement myself at my 
final press conference here'. 66 Hare's reply, transmitted on the same day, is instructive: 
I am anxious that we should make a statement 
... 
but owing to recent developments in 
Oman we are not yet able to give a final decision on the future of the Persian Gulf 
battalion. We shall get this resolved as quickly as we can and shall then be able to 
agree something suitable. As matters now stand I am sure you will appreciate that we 
64 Ibid., 'Establishment of United Kingdom Base in Kenya', brief, fo. 3. 
65 Kyle. Politics of' Independence. pp. 81-2: Murphy. Alan Lennox-Boyd, pp. 223-4. Under the 
Lennox-Boyd Constitution the African Elected Members (AEMs) were provided ww ith six additional 
seats in Legislative Council. giving them parity with the European members (MLCs). 
66CO 968/693, telegram 873. Lennox-Boyd (from Kenya) to Hare. repeated to the Earl of Perth 
(Minister of State for Colonial Affairs). 4 Nov. 1957. 
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cannot agree to putting anything out for the present. Meanwhile I am discussing [this] 
with the Minister of Defence. 67 
A month earlier, having examined the administrative and accommodation 
difficulties with Tapp, Bourne had already recommended that the bulk of two British 
battalions should be stationed in Kenya; all that remained was to decide the size of the 
element, if any, of the Cameronians to be left in the Persian Gulf. 68 Nevertheless, it is 
surely significant, if `in retrospect laughable', that at the same time as Lennox-Boyd 
announced his amendments to the Kenya Constitution, he also `promised' that the 
proportions of communal representation in Kenya's Legislative Council would not be 
changed again for ten years. In the Commons a week later he stated that `I do not 
foresee a date 
... 
when it will be possible for the Colonial Office to relinquish 
control'. 69 Equally important, despite Mboya's subsequent protests that the British 
government still had not made any firm commitments regarding Kenya's ultimate 
`destiny', in Britain the `Lennox-Boyd plan received a broad initial welcome across the 
political spectrum'. 70 
It should be stressed, also, that well before Lennox-Boyd's October visit to 
Kenya in order to attempt to remedy the political `deadlock' there, Baring already 
knew Sandys' decision on the British base. Indeed, on 2 August 1957, the Assistant 
Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office, Gorell Barnes, sent a telegram to Kenya 
explaining that `[the] Secretary of State has been informed by [the] Minister of 
Defence that whilst "no final conclusion has yet been reached, it seems probable that 
we shall decide normally to station in Kenya one battalion of the central reserve for 
67 Ibid.. telegram 110, Hare to Lennox-Boyd 4 Nov. 1957. 
68 Ibid., Maj. 
-Gen. J. R. C. Hamilton (War Office) to A. Campbell (Principal. Colonial Office Defence 
Department). 10 Oct. 1957. 
69 NC, D, 577, cols. 1112-4.14 Nov. 1957. cited in Kyle. Politics of Independence. p. 82: Murphy. 
Ilan LennOX-Boyd. p. 2231. 
70 Kyle. loc. cit. 
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which permanent accommodation would be required"'. 71 It was also vitally important 
that the decision received no publicity, ironically, to give as `little handle for agitation 
as possible to Mboya. We should need to agree text, timing and place of issue between 
us and I shall need to consult ministers. '72 
In the end, the announcement of the British battalion for Kenya was made 
before the decision on British forces in the Gulf There can be little doubt that 
implementation of the Lennox-Boyd Constitution helped to secure this. It seems that 
while British strategy in Aden and the Gulf, and imperial policy in Kenya were 
becoming synonymous, in being so they were also precariously inter-dependent. While 
the veil of renewed constitutional stability in Kenya apparently provided conditions 
suitable for Britain's strategic requirements south of the air barrier, by somewhat 
circular logic, that stability in itself depended to a certain extent upon the presence of 
British soldiers. More will be said about this in relation to politics and internal security 
in Chapters V and VI. 
Meanwhile, a good indication of Lennox-Boyd's early awareness of the uneasy 
connection between political development and security in Kenya, and the perceived 
vital role, at least initially, of the new British base in this regard, is provided by some 
correspondence following Sandys' and Hare's respective Commons statements of 7 
November 1957. This, and the other political aspects of the implementation of the 
decision are examined in the next chapter. 
71 CO 968/693. telegram 60. Gorell Barnes to Baring. 2 Aug. 1957. 
ý` Ibid., telegram 64. Gorcll Barnes to Baring. 19 Aug. 1957. 
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Conclusion 
If for no other reason,. Britain's decision to `permanently' station elements of the 
Strategic Reserve in Kenya, above all, confirms that the political and socio-economic 
reforms introduced during the military campaign of the previous four years were 
designed to ensure British control of the colony. Prospects for the planned transfer of 
power to an African majority government could not have been further from British 
defence planners' minds. Indeed, while military planners concerned themselves largely 
with the administrative and logistical niceties of moving troops to Kenya, the Colonial 
Office went to great lengths to smooth the way politically, at least in theory. While 
with hindsight it would be easy to suggest that Britain's strategic flirtation with Kenya 
was doomed from the start, it certainly did not look that way to those involved at the 
time. 
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Chapter IV 
East Africa, East of Suez: It, 1957-9 
Introduction 
This chapter will confirm that Britain's strategic plans for Kenya Colony were far from 
being an irrelevant side-show to political developments. Rather, assurances from the 
men on the ground, combined with political concessions which can only be understood 
in terms of constituting a holding operation, served to increase confidence among 
British defence planners, as evidenced by the steady increase in the levels of military 
personnel stationed in the territory. Colonial administrators in East Africa were more 
concerned about the administrative and financial burdens imposed by establishing the 
UK Strategic Reserve in Kenya, and the implications for their internal security 
provisioning, than they were about its political effects. Only when the outward 
appearance of political progress and stability was unceremoniously undermined by the 
Africans' refusal to validate the process any longer in January 1959, did Britain even 
begin to reassess the all too convenient strategic assumptions which had underpinned 
the decision to station British troops `permanently' in Kenya in the first place. 
The politics of implementation 
Two weeks after the announcement that an element of the UK Strategic Reserve 
would be stationed in Kenya, Hare informed Lennox-Boyd that `we have this very day 
been able to confirm our intentions for the future of the Persian Gulf battalion and I 
can now agree to be rather more precise though we have to take account of Foreign 
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Office views in our references to the Persian Gulf. ' It had been decided that, from 
April 1958,1 Cameronians would replace the First Battalion, King's Shropshire Light 
Infantry (1 KSLI), which had been held over in Kenya at Baring's request. In addition 
to the replacement of one battalion by another, and the transfer of its status from 
residual internal security duties to element of the strategic reserve, this force would be 
bolstered by `a detachment' of the First Battalion, Royal Fusiliers (1 RF). Sandys made 
it clear that he did not want references to the extra battalion included in any public 
statements. 2 
While this again seems simply to be a matter of determining the precise size of 
any forces required for the Persian Gulf and gauging the sensitivity to Britain's actions 
and intentions in the area, Lennox-Boyd was quick to show the importance that he 
attached to a more substantial contingent of British soldiers being stationed in Kenya. 
Although the Secretary of State was aware that the British soldiers in Kenya were not 
`primarily there in that Colony's interest', he explained to Sandys: 
I know from my recent talks with the Governor in Nairobi, that he puts much store by 
the issue of an early and positive announcement to bolster local confidence at a 
difficult constitutional stage. The Governor set out the position very forcibly to you in 
his minute of 20th June when you yourself were in Kenya. This confidence can best be 
engendered by a statement that British troops and their families, in excess of the 
battalion already in the Colony, will be stationed there: [... ] I hope therefore you will 
reconsider your view that no reference should be made to the second battalion, its 
name and time of arrival in Kenya. 
Significantly, Lennox-Boyd had not visited East Africa in October 1957 with 
the sole purpose of ending the political stalemate in Kenya. Initially, he flew to Uganda 
for a conference with the East African governors on future policy' .4 This coincided 
' CO 968/693. Hare to Lennox-Boyd 22 Nov. 1957. 
Ibid.. Campbell, minute for Carstairs and Mathieson (Colonial Office). 26 Nov. 1957 
Ibid., Lennox-Boyd to Sandy s. 29 Nov. 1957. 
-' CO 822/1818. 'Colonial Office. African No. 1191. Not for Publication: Proceedings of the 
Conference with East African Governors on Future Police', 7-8 Oct. 1957. See also: 
CO 822/1807. 
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with the visit of General Bourne to Nairobi in order to consider the administrative 
implications of stationing British soldiers in Kenya, Aden and the Persian Gulf in the 
wake of Sandys' visit and the Oman operation. 5 
The Entebbe conference covered the whole spectrum of policy, from `political 
and constitutional' and `economic development', to `defence, police and internal 
security'. The papers for circulation at the conference were prepared by the Colonial 
Office,. in consultation with the local governments and Whitehall departments, and 
were provided as additional briefs for Lennox-Boyd prior to his departure for the 
region. An important paper in this regard, EAC (57) 6, `Defence, Police and Internal 
Security', was amended by the Colonial Office in order to reflect the reassessment by 
the Chiefs of Staff `of the employment in the Middle East of Commonwealth and 
Colonial forces in the post-nuclear phase [of global war]'. 
While in the late 1940s and early 1950s it had been British military policy that, 
apart from their local internal security role, soldiers recruited in East Africa would 
contribute to the defence of Egypt, the loss of the Suez base and subsequent 
developments brought about a change. Thereafter British defence planners `did not 
envisage any primary global war requirement for East African forces outside their 
area-). 6 However, the internal security role would not necessarily be confined to 
assisting in the maintenance of the economic and political stability of the region and its 
CO 968/693, 
-Brief for the Secretary of State', (probably by A. Campbell), 30 Sept. 1957. telegram 
CIC/10188, Bourne (War Office) to Tapp, 23 Sept. 1957: telegram 18336 (MO4). Director of Military 
Operations (DMO). War Office, to Force Nairobi. 19 Sept. 1957; letter M04/73 3. Maj. D. M. Pontifex 
(War Office) to T. O'Neill (Colonial Office. Defence Department). 25 Sept. 1957. -Foreign Office 
wish to avoid reference to OMAN or reinforcement of the PERSIAN GULF in any press release 
concerning the visit. Explanation to press should be limited to saying that the visit is to a 
neighbouring Commander for purposes of routine liaison', telegram 18574 (MO4) to MIDEAST 
(INFORMATION: FORCE NAIROBI). 1 Oct. 1957. See also: CO 822/1813. 
" CO 968/693. minute by Campbell to Mathieson. 10 Sept. 1957. 
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individual territories in peacetime. In the event of global war, East African soldiers. 
apparently, 
would be profoundly disturbed by events in Europe, and likely developments in the 
Middle East, and 
... 
the political and economic situations of the territories will be 
severely shaken. For these reasons it is thought that the situation is unlikely to be 
stable enough to warrant Governors risking the release of troops for excursions 
outside their own territorial borders. 7 
If anything, this underpinned the rationale behind stationing British soldiers in Kenya. 
While `global war' was not expected in the `foreseeable future', recent political 
developments in Africa and increasingly vocal African nationalists, juxtaposed by their 
anti-British counterparts in the Middle East, made it politically, if not militarily, 
inexpedient to rely upon East African forces for even the most minor of `fire brigade' 
duties elsewhere in the Empire. If it was politically unacceptable to use East African 
soldiers in an internal security role beyond their own area, why was it any more 
acceptable, or even feasible, to put faith in `guided' political development, leading to 
independence ` within a generation', thus relatively long-term security of tenure for the 
British base? 
The conference paper on East African political and constitutional matters 
reiterated the strategic importance of the region and Britain's economic interests. 
Apart from Kenya's climatic and geographical suitability for British soldiers, there 
were three `major airfields' in the region - Dar-es-Salaam. Entebbe, and Nairobi - and 
two smaller ones at Kisumu and Mombasa, also in Kenya; two commercial sea ports at 
Dar-es-Salaam and Mombasa, the latter having `certain rudimentary naval facilities 
which could be improved with some expenditure of time and money'; with the 
possibility that an oil refinery would be built at Mombasa. `At the present time the 
Ibid. 
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airfields of the region are essential links in the air reinforcing route from South Africa 
to the Middle East and from Europe and West Africa to the Arabian Peninsula and the 
Far East'. Significantly, the sources of the Nile in Uganda constituted, `while under 
British control, at least a psychological threat to Egyptian ambition'. 8 
So far as economic interests were concerned, Britain had a surplus of visible 
trade with East Africa. For example, diamonds (a significant source of dollar earnings) 
were imported from Tanganyika (over £3 million in 1955), and East Africa was 
`almost the sole supplier of sisal [99.8%] to the United Kingdom and the principal 
supplier of coffee [58.8%]'. 
The relative importance of East Africa in the United Kingdom market for 
... 
[such] 
... 
commodities 
... 
is a post-war phenomenon, resulting from the dollar shortage, but as 
far as can be seen there will always be a substantial advantage in having these sterling 
sources of supply at competitive prices. [... ] If the possibility of denial of supplies is 
envisaged, the principal difficulty would arise with sisal, for which there is no obvious 
alternatives [sic] available in the sterling area. 9 
There was therefore every reason why Britain should wish to exercise control of the 
defence and security arrangements, and to retain trading links with the whole of the 
East Africa region. 10 It is axiomatic that this would be made all the more simple by 
retaining control of political developments. 
This of course had a considerable bearing upon the discussions at the Entebbe 
conference. The more commonly known of East African governors' conference at 
Chequers in January 1959 can arguably be seen as a watershed in terms of British 
CO 822/1806. extract from East African Governors' Conference paper EAC (57) 1. 'East Africa: 
Political and Constitutional'. n. d. (c. Sept. 1957). fos. 11-12. 
'' Ibid., fos. 12-14. 
10 It is significant that when Kilmuir presented Macmillan with his colonial 'profit and loss account 
in June 1957. economic considerations were 'even1v matched'. In other words. it would make no 
difference. from the economic point of view. whether Britain retained or disposed of its colonies: 
Ritchic Ovendale. 'Macmillan and the Wind of Change in Africa. 1957-1960', Historical Journal. 
; 8/2 (1995). pp. 459-60: John Ramsden. The II Inds of Change:. 1lacmillan to Heath, 19 7-19., 5 
(Harlow: Longman. 1996), p. 22. 
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policy towards East Africa, albeit in the ironic sense, because dates for independence 
were `pencilled in', then revised within a matter of months, if not weeks. However, the 
October 1957 conference had not been convened with a view to providing a timetable 
for the transfer of political power. Lennox-Boyd's November statements concerning 
political development in Kenya had been pre-empted in discussion at Entebbe: 
In summing up on the problem of a statement of ultimate intention 
... 
the Secretary of State said that it was agreed that a portentous statement aimed to cover the whole of East Africa was certainly undesirable, and probably impossible at the present stage. If 
any such statement were required it must be related to individual territories. The 
conference accepted, as being a good basis for responding to questions in Kenya and 
Tanganyika, something on the following lines. 
- 
"It is our intention to promote gradual evolution towards democratic forms of 
government in a controlled and orderly way but not to abandon our ultimate 
responsibilities until there is a reasonable prospect that, when we have done so, all who 
have made their homes here will be able to continue to live here and pursue their 
occupations in security". " 
The conference paper EAC (57) 6, covering defence, police and internal 
security had been prefaced with African nationalists' demands for more rapid 
constitutional advance and statements of British intentions in mind: `A prerequisite of 
orderly political progress in East Africa is the ability of the East African Governments, 
backed by Her Majesty's Government, to maintain law and order and to counter 
outside interference'. 12 On the latter point, the paper explained, in somewhat 
contradictory terms that, in wartime 
no direct military threat to East Africa is expected, at least initially. If such a threat 
should eventually materialise it would be mainly from the north-east [Somaliland], and 
since it would most probably arise in a confused post-nuclear phase the United 
Kingdom could not be counted on to give fresh assistance to back up East African 
forces. The proper defence in global war of East Africa, indeed of the African 
Continent, lies in the Middle East, and existing strategic plans concentrate on the 
provision of forces, particularly of air forces with nuclear capability, in that theatre. In 
such circumstances East Africa's role must be primarily one of a staging area and in 
CO 822/1818. 'Proceedings of the Conference with East African Governors on Future Policy'. 7-8 
Oct. 1957, p. 48. para. 209. 
12 CO 822/1813. EAC (57) 6 (Final). 'Defence. Police and Internal SecuritN'. n. d. (c. Sept. /Oct. 
1957). fo. I. 
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this context the special function of the local forces must be the maintenance of internal 
security, as much for their own as for the Imperial interest. " 
Lennox-Boyd summarised the above as `the latest views of the Chiefs of Staff on the 
role, or absence of one, of East African Forces in global war' 
. 
14 
While all this would have provided little comfort to Mboya except, that is, as 
further grounds to campaign against the establishment of the Kahawa cantonment, an 
`external threat to the East African territories short of global war may be discounted; in 
so far as any lesser external threat exists it is likely to be confined to one arising out of 
a breakdown in effective administration in neighbouring territories'. ', Gorell Barnes 
and Baring both stressed that this latter point did not take into account current political 
uncertainty in Italian Somaliland which, in peacetime, could well lead to `every 
possibility of a military, as distinct from a police situation developing as a result in 
northern Kenya. Lennox-Boyd therefore undertook to inform the Defence 
Committee in London that it was the `unanimous view' of the conference that the 
military appreciation in the paper had to be qualified accordingly. 
As a significant precursor to defence and security considerations in the context 
of political negotiations on the eve of Kenya's independence in December 1963, a date 
hardly envisioned in October 1957, the conference also considered `the problem of co- 
13 Ibid. 
' CO 822/1818, 'Proceedings', 7-8 Oct. 1957, p. 48, para. 210. 
' CO 822/1813. EAC (57) 6 (Final). fo. 1. 
16 CO 822/1818, 'Proceedings', 7-8 Oct. 1957, p. 48, para. 211. Baring referred to the possibility, that 
Italian Somalia might fall under Soviet influence, as had happened in the case of Syria. This view was 
derived from intelligence appreciations concerning Italy's desire to relinquish its Trusteeship. 
Independence for Italian Somaliland, leading to pressures for a 'Greater Somalia'. would not only 
affect British Somaliland but would also add to calls for secession by the Somali peoples in Kenv a's 
Northern Frontier District. Such pressures. including violent action to varying degrees. were also 
expected from within the British Somaliland Protectorate if Britain's position in the Arabian 
Peninsula were to deteriorate. CAB 158/31. JIC (58) 15 (Final) (Revise). 'Likely Developments in the 
Arabian Peninsula over the Next Five Years'. report by the Joint Intelligence Committee. 11 Feb. 
1958. 
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ordinating East African defence'. Despite the `Longshot' re-organisation for primarily 
internal security purposes, the Chiefs of Staff considered that there was 
every advantage from the Imperial as well as the East African point of view in treating 
local defence on a regional basis and the East African forces as a unified instrument. 
The problem for the future is how to maintain the existing defence co-ordination if the 
three East African territories increasingly diverge in their political development. Should 
one attain independence before the others this would automatically make it difficult, 
and, if the territory in question joined the neutralist camp, impracticable, to maintain 
inter-territorial defence co-ordination. The only effective way of countering this may 
be to foster the concept of East African instead of territorial land forces, to encourage 
local interest in defence planning, particularly among local unofficials undergoing the 
education of Ministerial office,, and to propagate the necessity of regarding East 
African defence as a regional and not a territorial problem. The maintenance of HQ 
East Africa Command will help to foster this concept. '7 
This seems to have been perfectly acceptable at Entebbe, with only Crawford 
remarking that `so long as defence remained in the hands of the Governors' (thus 
Britain) co-ordination on a regional basis should not pose a problem. Significantly, 
supporting the above premise that co-ordination could be maintained even if one 
territory became independent, in all likelihood involving treaty arrangements, Crawford 
added that `he hoped it would be possible, even then, to persuade East African 
Governments to deal with defence on a joint basis->. 18 While Chapters VI and VII will 
show the extent of British persuasion in this regard, as the pace of constitutional 
advance in the East African territories accelerated significantly from 1959, the main 
issues of the Entebbe conference, as outlined above, are noteworthy in several 
respects. 
Although the possibility of independence for any of Britain's East African 
territories was not discounted entirely, it was certainly not considered as a short-term 
prospect: timetables were conspicuous by their absence. This clearly accorded with the 
" CO 822/1813. EAC (57) 6 (Final). fo. 2. 
1 CO 822/1818. 'Proceedings'. 7-8 Oct. 1957. p. 48. para. 212 (emphasis added). 
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contemporary views of the Colonial Office and defence planners in London. Given the 
foregoing examination of British strategic provisions, for both internal security in East 
Africa and the Middle East, and the broader defence assessment, especially as it related 
to Kenya, one point is particularly notable. The `men on the ground' expressed very 
little, if any, disquiet concerning East Africa's viability in the British imperial, thus 
strategic, connection. Baring, again, reiterated his welcome for British soldiers: 
`because they provided a sense of security and permanency. It was precisely for these 
reasons that the move was opposed by African politicians'. Besides, `experience in 
India, the Sudan and elsewhere had shown that the presence of such troops was no 
barrier to independence'. 19 
Most important is the backdrop which all this provided for Lennox-Boyd's 
subsequent negotiations with Kenya's African politicians and the constitutional `award' 
of six extra seats in Legislative Council, giving parity with the European Elected 
Members. Clearly, defence and security did not amount to a side issue when it came to 
constitutional matters. It could be suggested reasonably that when Lennox-Boyd 
introduced his ten year `standstill' on any further alterations to the proportions of 
communal representation, he did so with one eye firmly, and necessarily, on Britain's 
broader strategic interests. It should be noted, also, that this all took place while a legal 
State of Emergency was still technically in being. Although, with the benefit of 
hindsight, it could be argued that the British colonial project in Kenya, as elsewhere, 
was doomed from 1945 onwards, it is not stressed enough that policy-makers had to 
act, as they saw it, on what could be predicted as reasonably likely. The unforeseen 
often undercut such assumptions. 
19 Ibid., para. 227. 
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Thus, having made and announced the strategic and constitutional decisions 
concerning Kenya by the end of 1957, with new elections due in March 1958, it 
remained for Britain to begin to implement the plans for the garrison for the strategic 
reserve. 20 For logistical and security purposes, the precise timing of the transfer of 
status of the British soldiers already in Kenya had not been set when the initial 
decisions were taken. The gradual movement of elements of 1 Cameronians from the 
Gulf to Kenya related as much to the readiness of locally-recruited forces, such as the 
Oman Scouts, to take over from the British, as to the availability of accommodation. 
Equally, `conditions in the Arabian Peninsula' had dictated that the size of the 
detachment of 1 RF bound for Kenya would remain uncertain. 21 
In addition, Baring's residual internal security requirements had to be taken 
into account. 1 KSLI were due to be relieved between April and May 1958, and it was 
`generally understood within the War Office' that Baring would not require a British 
battalion in a `purely' internal security role after May 1958, making the relief the ideal 
time for the role of the battalion to change. 22 The `actual relief was scheduled to 
extend over a number of weeks, while the War Office hoped to bring the change into 
effect in order to coincide with the reorganisation of the command structure in the 
20 In the end, Sandys acceded to Lennox-Boyd's request that an announcement be made about a 
'detachment' of I RF being sent to Kenya in addition to the Cameronians in April 1958, CO 968/694. 
telegram 147, Lennox-Boyd to Baring. repeated to Tanganyika (743), Uganda (P 80). and Sir Bruce 
Hutt (Administrator, East Africa High Commission) (309), 10 Dec. 1957, telegram 20397 (MO4), 
War Office to Force Nairobi. 11 Dec. 1957. The announcement was made jointly in London and 
Nairobi on 23 Dec. 1957, ibid.. 34660 SD. Force Nairobi to War Office. 21 Dec. 1957; Press Office 
Handout No. 1181. 'British Troops in Kenya'. 23 Dec. 1957. 
,l CO 968/694. telegram 147. Lennox-Boyd to Baring, repeated to Tanganyika (743). Uganda (P 80). 
and Administrator, EAHC (309). 10 Dec. 1957. It remains uncertain as to wN hy. precisely. this was the 
case. Speculating, it would seem to be simply a matter of not wishing to publicise troop movements in 
the area in order to deny any freely-available intelligence to agitators and those disposed towards 
violent unrest. 
2' Ibid., letter M04/'309. Colonel J. A. Hunter (War Office) to Campbell. 3 Jan. 1958. 
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Middle East, particularly the date when Headquarters British Forces Arabian Peninsula 
(HQ, BFAP) in Aden would become autonomous, on 1 April 1958. 
Before this could go ahead, however, approval had to be obtained from East 
Africa Command, regarding matters of accommodation, for example, and from the 
Kenya government via the Colonial Office. This amounted simply to a matter of 
administrative routine. As Lennox-Boyd explained: 
In our view, the earlier the transfer takes place the better, particularly as this should 
save you £100,000 on [the] month of April alone on [the] Emergency Fund in respect 
of [your] contribution towards [the] upkeep of [the] KSLI. Grateful if you will 
telegraph [your] concurrence to [the] agreement which we have already provisionally 23 
given. 
While acceptance of the proposal was correspondingly routine, some points should be 
highlighted. 24 
Firstly, although on the face of it Baring would be losing a British battalion for 
internal security purposes, the transfer of status amounted effectively to no loss at all, 
especially given the increased establishment. Obviously, the presence of British soldiers 
in Kenya at little or no cost to that territory was a considerable boon, from both the 
financial and the security perspectives. On the latter point (as has been suggested 
above and will be developed further in Chapter V) it should be reiterated that, in both 
Whitehall and Government House, political and security conditions in Kenya were not 
considered to be stable enough to end the State of Emergency. 
If anything, the major problems to beset Britain's plans to station troops in 
Kenya, at least initially, were matters of administrative, financial, and logistical 
integration with local forces, and extraneous circumstances which brought about 
3 Ibid.. telegram 21. Lennox-Boyd to the Officer Administering the Government (OAG) of Kenya. 10 
Jan. 1958. 
`a Ibid., telegram 34908. Force Nairobi to War Office. 13 Jan. 1958. telegram 89, Governors Deputy 
to Secretary of State. 31 Jan. 1958. A. J. Fairclough (Colonial Office. Defence Department) to Hunter. 
5 Feb. 1958. 
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frequent reassessments of troop deployments south of the air barrier. When it became 
clear, in October 1957, that `there may be fairly substantial Imperial Forces stationed in 
Kenya as a strategic reserve', C. H. Hartwell, Chief Secretary to the Uganda 
government, took up the former matter with East Africa Command, explaining that 
this is likely to necessitate engineering workshops and other facilities which would not 
otherwise be required at all. It may also be necessary for the GOC and his staff, and the 
civil organisation coming under his control, to perform services for and in respect of 
the Imperial Forces stationed in East Africa. It follows, therefore, that it will be 
necessary when more detailed information is available 
... 
to work out in detail the 
financial arrangements which will be necessary between the War Department on the 
one hand and the East African Governments on the other. 25 
In April 1957, when the War Office planning team began to consider where in 
Kenya the strategic reserve would be located, the East Africa Defence Committee 
(EADC) convened a working committee (EADWC) to examine the administrative and 
financial questions. The preliminary view of the EADWC was. 
"(a) that the War Department should pay the whole cost of any organisation or facility 
which is necessitated wholly by and works only for the Imperial Forces; and 
(b) that the War Department should pay an appropriate share, to be agreed between it 
and the Governments, of the cost of the Command and civil organisations, on account 
of the service performed by them for the Imperial Forces. " 
... 
it is still the view of the 
Uganda Government on the subject, and I shall be grateful if you will take note of 
this. 26 
By November, of course, such views had to be taken into account, especially 
given the wish of the War Office that, in the interests of economy, while in East Africa 
the British force should `be as far as possible integrated with the East African Land 
Forces for [the] purposes of training and administration'. 27 For similar reasons, it was 
also considered desirable that the GOC, East Africa Command, should command and 
I' CO 968/695 letter S 8398. Hartwell (Chief Secretary. Entebbe) to Brig. J. C. D'A. Dalton (Chief of 
Staff. HQ, EAC), 5 Oct. 1957. 
26 Ibid., memo. by Hartwell. under cover of letter S 7032.18 April 1957. 
27 Ibid.. 'Command and Administration of a Strategic Reserve Battalion in Km a. Record of decisions 
taken at a Meeting held in the War Office (Main Building). Room 237 on Monday. 4 Nov. 1957'; 
memo. 0165/ 3888 (SD2b). by Brig. I. C. Hams (War Office. p. p. Maj. -Gen. [DSD - Permanent Under- 
Secretary of State) to Tapp. 11 Dec. 1957. 
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administer the British soldiers through `his EALF Command Headquarters'. Cost- 
saving would also, where possible, extend throughout the range of "`Q" Services' 
(equipment). 
For example, although there would be separate `WD' and EALF storage 
depots, `the maximum possible use' was to be made of EALF resources. For this 
reason, the War Office requested that Tapp ascertain whether the EALF could deal 
with the `receipt, storage, maintenance and issue of clothing and General stores; 
returned stores (inc. technical); storage of reserve vehicles (if cheaper than if WD 
depot [were] responsible); storage of reserve ammo? ' Also, so far as possible, stores 
would be purchased locally through EALFO. Cost-saving would also extend to the 
numbers of staff to be added to the EALFO establishment for the additional 
administrative requirements for the `Imperial troops'. 
While all this might have caused problems for East Africa Command, the very 
ad hoc nature of the planning for integration in itself gave the greatest cause for 
concern, especially regarding "`Q" Services'. This was highlighted in January 1958 at a 
War Office meeting to discuss command and administrative arrangements. D. Rees, 
Command Secretary, East Africa, 
explained the problems facing HQ East Africa Command under the War Office 
proposals which entailed two separate financial responsibilities and sources of revenue. 
The crux of the problem is: 
- 
where do the stores come from, who pays for them and 
what officer controls them? He then gave various examples pointing out the difficulties 
attaching to the War Office proposal that responsibilities should be split making the 
best possible use of EALF resources, and suggested that the solution was to hand over 
the complete responsibility to EALFO. 28 
On the one hand, this was considered to be an acceptable proposal because 
tasking one organisation with administrative responsibilities for all military forces in 
2"' Ibid., 'Minutes of a Meeting held in Room 220 Main Building on Friday. 24 Jan. 1958 to discuss 
the Command and Administration of a Strategic Reserve Battalion in Kenya'. para. 3. 
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East Africa would avoid duplication of staff, thus unnecessary expense. On the other 
hand, a crucial aspect of the principal reason for British soldiers being sent to Kenya in 
the first place had to be taken into account. As Buttenshaw, the War Office "`Q" 
(Ops)' representative put it, 
the criterion must be the capability of the Imperial Forces to operate as a strategic 
reserve at short notice. We must be certain that the day to day administration meets 
this, as second best will not do. Because the GOC is finally responsible he should 
decide whether the EALFO solution would meet this requirement. Seconded British 
officers should be made available if he requires them. The War Office should, 
therefore, accept the EALFO solution if the GOC East Africa is satisfied that it can be 
made to work, bearing in mind that the battalion must be properly equipped. 29 
Allowing the decision to rest with Tapp was significant because proposals for 
various `methods' of administration that he had submitted in October 1957 had been 
either rejected by the Colonial Office and War Office, respectively, because of relative 
cost to the East African or British governments, or were subject to the difficulties 
considered in the January War Office meeting. The War Office now agreed that, 
whatever the outcome, the GOC should be asked to `propose a solution which would 
satisfy the requirement to maintain the Imperial Forces at the correct standard and 
state of readiness and without being influenced by previous War Office views'. 
30 This 
would give Tapp greater flexibility in tailoring his proposals to suit the capabilities of 
East Africa Command and the EALFO, and, equally important, would enable him to 
cater for the objections and requirements of the East African governments. 
Before any new solutions could be proposed, let alone adopted, planning fell 
down at the preliminary stage. A prerequisite for planning to begin was that the 
governments of the East African territories should agree to Tapp being requested to 
29 Ibid.. para. 3. c). 
30 Ibid.. para. 2O: Harris to Tapp. 11 Dec. 1957. 
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command and administer the British units, in addition to his local responsibilities. ' i 
What had seemed to be simply a matter of routine, especially in discussion in the War 
Office, quickly brought to light a set of problems which had hardly been anticipated 
when the strategic reappraisals of the previous two years or so had been undertaken. It 
should be stressed, in line with the earlier analysis, that political problems, as such, did 
not figure in any of this. 
In early February 1958, a somewhat impatient War Office official enquired 
whether the Colonial Office had yet made a formal approach to the East African 
governments requesting their agreement to Tapp taking command of the British 
soldiers, as its representative had undertaken to do during the January meeting. 32 A 
month later, the head of the Colonial Office Defence Department, A. Campbell, 
explained that the delay was the result of 
some disagreement in East Africa on the role of the [EALF], and consequently on the 
form and functions of the [EALFO]. There appear also to be financial difficulties in 
connection with the administration of the [EALF], and consequently some mis- 
apprehensions as to what looking after the United Kingdom garrison in Kenya might 
entail. We therefore felt it necessary to dispose of these matters before approaching 
[the] Governors 
... 
in order to avoid a possible danger that your requirements might 
become entangled with and overlaid by the problems of the [EALF], and a favourable 
3' decision thereby delayed. 
On the matter of `financial difficulties' the Colonial Office hoped that the War 
Office would extend the concession of `Estimates Customer status' (ECS) to the East 
African territories `in respect of stores items in common use' by the British and local 
forces. '' The `great financial help' that this represented would `undoubtedly be a big 
3' Ibid., 'Command and Administration of a Strategic Reserve Battalion in Kenya. Record of 
decisions 
taken at a Meeting held in the War Office (Main Building). Room 217 on Monday. 4 Nov. 1957'. 
memo. 0165/3888 (SD2b). by Hams. to Tapp. 11 Dec. 1957. 
-2 Ibid.. 16/Abroad/4978 (Fl). T. A. G. Charlton (War Office) to A. Campbell. 10 Feb., 1958. 
3; Ibid.. Campbell to Charlton. I1 March 1958. 
34 
'ECS' amounted essentially to credit terms at cost price for stores plus a percentage to cover 
' yJ 
departmental expenses and freightage to Mombasa. hand-written notes in margin. unattributed. 
in 
ibid.. 856/58. Baring to Lennox-Boyd 12 April 1958. The procedure was introduced during the 
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factor in securing wholehearted 
... 
co-operation'. With this agreed by the War Office 
representative, apparently as a matter of routine,. Lennox-Boyd wrote to the East 
African territories, formally announcing the decision on the Strategic Reserve, and 
making the requisite enquiries regarding Tapp's assumption of administrative 
command of the British units from 1 April. 35 While also summing up the key points 
from the earlier deliberations over the Strategic Reserve, the Secretary of State 
dangled the ECS carrot. Significantly, Lennox-Boyd added that, whatever 
administrative and financial arrangements were eventually finalised, they would have to 
be `capable of providing for any expansion of the force which [HMG] with the 
agreement of the Governor of Kenya may consider necessary in the future'. 
The coup d'etat in Iraq in July 1958 would ensure that. future British strategic 
necessities would alter much more quickly than planners in London had anticipated. 
This would again lead to an upgrading of Kenya's strategic status. Meanwhile, the 
EADC agreed to the War Office proposals concerning the administrative and 
command arrangements for all military units `now in Kenya'; the EALFO `could accept 
complementary responsibilities'. The EADC also agreed that there should be a fully- 
integrated headquarters, with administrative arrangements to be agreed between the 
GOC and the governments of the East African territories. 
Yet, the EADC continued to protest against any possibility that the new 
arrangements would prove to be financially disadvantageous to the East African 
governments. Moreover, `modifications which would result in fundamental alterations 
Second World War 'when colonial and other overseas forces were using identical equipment supplied 
along the same supply lines. ibid.. secret savingram 33, Lennox-Boyd to Sir Bruce Hutt 
(Administrator. EAHC. and Permanent Secretary. EALFO). repeated to Kenya (1240). Tanganvika 
(886). and Uganda (803). 16 July 1958. 
Ibid.. Charlton to Campbell. 20 March 1958, Lennox-Boyd to OAG. Kenya (482). Crawford. 
Uganda (326). Twining. Tanganyika (337). Hutt. Administrator EAHC. Private Secretary. EALFO. 
21 March 1958. 
13 7 
to our present policy for the administration of the EALF and the composition and 
organisation of their supporting installations etc. [sic] would be unacceptable'. 36 This 
was not simply a case of the East African governments wanting to have their cake and 
eat it. 
It is now clear that the figures and assumptions on which the Longshot stores handover was based 
- 
and on which the territorial Governments had, perforce, to make 
their financial arrangements 
- 
contain an unreasonable margin of error. This is a serious 
embarrassment to us and, in consequence, we would find it necessary to request an 
adjustment of the provisions of the Longshot Agreement (Comd 281) [sic] relating to 
stores and scalings as part of any negotiations concerning the arrangements for the UK 
Central Reserve. 37 
The EADC would simply not `accept any financial burden on [the] East Africa 
governments for [the] administration of British Troops Kenya [BTK]; we were 
convinced that we could not undertake responsibility for UK units unless the EALFO 
was granted estimates customer status 
... 
' 
If anything, the very mundanity and the routine nature of all this demonstrates 
the `matter of fact' and workman-like approach to these military arrangements taken 
by both the British and East African governments. It also underlines the apparent, if 
transient, importance given in London to the views of the administrators `on the 
ground'. Certainly, in May 1958 the Colonial Office stressed the desirability of a `very 
early agreement on temporary financial arrangements so as to avoid creating 
unnecessary financial confusion in East Africa. Such confusion could only lead to a 
sharpening of the East African Governments' bargaining attitude'. 38 The EALFO, for 
its part, argued that the ECS proposal should be implemented `forthwith', because 
even if the War Office were to end up resuming administrative (and financial) 
36 Ibid.. 856/58, Baring to Lennox-Boyd. 12 April 1958. See also: ibid.. 57405 SD. Tapp to J. Amer 
(Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State. War Office), 13 March 1958. 
;' Ibid.. Baring to Lennox-Boyd. 12 April 1958. 
3S Ibid.. N. B. J. Huijsman (Colonial Office. Defence Department) to H. W. Browne (War Office. F I). 7 
May 1958. 
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responsibility for EALF this would end up being the case. 39 Implementation of the 
former would certainly help to facilitate that of the latter. 
With well over a year having passed since the Chiefs of Staff had made their 
initial recommendations, and six months since Sandys' announcement to the 
Commons, the requirement that command and administrative arrangements for all 
military forces in East Africa should take account of Britain's and East Africa's 
respective strategic, local defence and internal security commitments, while remaining 
cost effective, created a kind of bureaucratic stalemate. By June 1958, the command 
and administrative arrangements for British and `local' forces stationed in East Africa 
had by no means been finalised. While proposals were being put forward for yet 
another War Office planning team to visit East Africa in order to resolve this, in effect 
attempting to `marry' the British demand for high standards for the UK Strategic 
Reserve detachment with East African financial, material and practical necessities and 
limitations, no final decision on financial matters could be taken. As a result, there 
would be `no further consideration of proposals for interim financial and provision 
arrangements'. 40 In practical terms, therefore, the War Office could not, or rather 
would not grant the EALFO `Estimates Customer status', thereby effectively negating 
the earlier negotiations and proposals upon which the East African governments' 
agreement had been based. 
The difficulties that this presented did not amount simply to a matter of 
principle. Clearly, achieving administrative and financial efficiency in the command and 
control of all of the military forces in East Africa was in the interests of all parties 
concerned. Yet, as Tapp explained to the War Office, uncertainty regarding what on 
39 Ibid.. un-numbered secret telegram. EALFO (Hutt or Lisle? ) to Lennox-Boyd. 28 June 1958. 
40 Ibid.. 3695I/SD. Tapp to WO (MAGIC LAMP) [sic]. 17 June 1958. 
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the face of it might appear to be simply a matter of who should pay, and how much 
should be paid, for EALF stores procurements would have `serious repercussions'. 
The EALFO was already experiencing considerable monetary difficulties for the 
financial year beginning 1 July 1958: 
In spite of drastic economies planned and discussions lasting 6 [sic] months [the] 
territories have not yet agreed [the] budget for funds considered [to be the] absolute [minimum] for [the] effective [operation] of EALF. [... ] Gap is nearly 4% [sic] of total 
estimate or £100,000 [£l million]. Delay in decision of [administrative] arrangements 
will cause [the] gap to widen because [the] estimates as framed are based on [sic] [the] 
assumption [that] EALFO would enjoy 
... 
[ECS] 
... 
with lower average prices, quicker [supply] and lower freight rates. Prolongation [of the] system of [supply] through 
Crown Agents [is] therefore [a] serious matter. [... ] Provided [the] final decision is [for 
an] integrated system under either WD or EALF and EALFO [ordnance supply] will 
presumably be through normal WD channels. [... ] Strongly recommend therefore [that] 
EALFO [be] granted 
... 
[ECS] 
... 
immediately in anticipation of what seems [the] 
inevitable outcome as far as [ordnance stores are] concerned. " 
Remarkably, given the earlier agreement in the War Office that Tapp should be 
allowed to make the final decision over the command arrangements in East Africa, this 
latter plea was rejected. With the report of the War Office working party having only 
just been submitted prior to the planning team's visit to East Africa, it was by `no 
means inevitable' that future administrative and command arrangements for the UK 
strategic reserve in Kenya would be integrated with EALFO. There was, therefore, no 
justification for granting ECS to EALFO `at this stage if at all and regret your request 
cannot be agreed. There are strong reasons for restriction of [ECS]'. 42 Despite already 
conceding that EC S should be granted to the EALFO, the War Office was `in the 
41 Ibid. (emphasis added). By July. the shortfall between the financial provisions made by the East 
African governments and Tapp's 'minimum requirements' had apparently more than doubled to 
£221.000, as the colonial authorities continued to press for the granting of estimates customer status. 
This will inevitably mean reappraisal of the whole scheme for [EALF] in spite of our views. shared 
by Uganda, that Tapp's requirements are minimum necessary for effective operation of IEALF1. I 
bring this matter to your attention at once as I have no doubt you would wish to consult Turnbull 
I Governor, Tanganyika] with the object of making pressing representations to the War Office that 
EALFO be granted [ECS] as envisaged by the S of S in paragraph 8 of his despatch No. 482.1 
understand Tanganyika Government would agree that such representations should be made'. ibid., 
telegram 504. W. F. Courts (Chief Secretary. Nairobi) to Baring (visiting S of S. London). 8 Juli 1958. 
12 Ibid.. 25820/Q (Ops) 1. Troopers (WO) to Tapp. 1 July 1958. 
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process of winding up this procedure, and by 1960 the only force which will still enjoy 
such status is the Canadian Brigade in Germany, which is so integrated with the British 
forces that it can be treated as part of them". 
As Lennox-Boyd (undoubtedly briefed by the War Office) explained, there was 
an important distinction: 
This is not the case with the KAR. To grant "full" estimates customer status would 
compel the War Office to order, hold and supply stores and equipment which would 
not at any time be needed by the British Army, and this would both tie up capital funds 
for a considerable time before recovery, and also involve use of extra manpower in 
depots, offices, etc. 43 
This last point seemed to be contradicted by the probability that the British Army 
would establish its own ordnance depot in Kenya. Nonetheless, the War Office did at 
least agree to provide `common use items' which the East African forces could draw 
`as required'. This, Lennox-Boyd suggested, would enable the East African 
governments to make savings in their estimates for forward provisioning, `given no 
need to build up stocks of such items'. Although Lennox-Boyd apparently accepted 
the War Office line, joining in presenting the governors of the East African territories 
with a, fait accompli, the matter did not rest there. 
In the meantime, Tapp had continued to press for the effective reversal of the 
`Longshot' arrangements, arguing that although integration of the administration and 
command of all military forces in East Africa under the EALF and EALFO `could be 
made to work, it would be to everyone's advantage if the War Office resumed control 
of all forces in East Africa Command'. 44 This would be facilitated because he already 
commanded all military forces in British East Africa. 
43 Ibid., secret savingram 33, Lennox-Boyd to Hutt. repeated to Kenya (1240). Tanganyika (886). and 
Uganda (803). 16 July 1958. 
14 Ibid.. 57405 SD (copy). Tapp to Amer. 10 June 1958. 
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A principal reason for the GOC to press for the policy reversal was that, in his 
view, the EALFO establishment was understaffed. Moreover, the organisation was 
top-heavy with civilian administrators, thought suitable only for `the standards that are 
needed in a force maintained for purposes of internal security and a measure of local 
and regional defence'. He added: `My Headquarters [sic] and the administrative 
machine available would have been inadequate to accept responsibility for operational 
War Department units'. 45 In addition, the very nature of the interim administrative and 
financial measures gave rise to a situation in which there were two sources of funds 
(EALFO and the War Office), two sets of `estimates, allotments and financial 
regulations, and two systems of financial advice, control and audit. This arrangement 
has even meant [sic] that civilians, not only in different units working side by side, but 
actually within my Headquarters, have served on different rates of pay and conditions 
of service. ' Tapp stressed that this situation `was acceptable only as a purely temporary 
measure. Its operation has been a great strain on all concerned. '46 
With British forces in Kenya likely to number around 3,500 `for at least a year 
and in all probability for considerably longer' Tapp thought it `necessary to weigh 
carefully the disadvantages of the integration of their command and administration 
under the [EALF] and [EALFO]'. 47 From the GOC's perspective, these disadvantages 
can be summed up as follows. Firstly, there was a `pressing need' for just one source 
of funds and a single, rational administrative system, without which `effective 
integration' would be `impracticable'. Because the annual cost of stationing British 
forces in Kenya (£6 [60] million) amounted to more than twice that for EALF (£2.8 
' Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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[28] million), in Tapp's view it seemed `logical for the contributor of the larger amount 
to control the whole'. 
Secondly, the East African governments' refused to meet the shortfall between 
their financial provisioning and Tapp's minimum requirements. While this could be 
addressed with pressure being applied on the territories from various quarters, Tapp 
felt that `the system would be at best ponderous and at worst ineffective'. Thirdly, the 
territories had already insisted that all financial systems 
generally should depart to some extent from the procedures used in the British Army, 
and I have little doubt that pressure towards conformity with Colonial Government 
practice will continue. There are serious disadvantages to subjecting British officers, 
posted to East Africa Command for purely Imperial purposes to unfamiliar financial 
systems and to financial dependence on officials who are not answerable to the War 
office in any way. 
48 
Finally, and perhaps most damning, was Tapp's observation that the governments of 
the East African territories `are unused to the administration of a military force'. 
Although this might have been overcome with time, the greater `complication' of the 
British force's equipment and higher costs `would greatly increase these difficulties'. 49 
While Baring, for one, might have disagreed with some of the bases for Tapp's 
arguments, he certainly would not have rejected their substance nor, for that matter, 
the GOC's conclusion. Tapp continued: 
We have always assumed that reversion to War Office control was entirely 
unacceptable to both the War Office and the Colonial Office for political reasons. It 
appears, however, that this is not necessarily so. Kenya, who opposed the transfer of 
control in 1957, would of course be delighted to change back and I do not believe that 
Uganda and Tanganyika would seriously object to a return to the pre-July 1957 
arrangements, provided that their annual expenditure on defence thereby fell or at any 
rate did not increase other than in ordinary inflationary ways, that they were told in 
some detail how their contributions were applied, and that they could still exercise 
some measure of control over the strengths and standards of the King's African Rifles. 
[... ] In conclusion I would again stress the urgency of integration one way or the other, 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
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and I request that the possibility of an early return to a system of War Office control of 
all the forces in East Africa Command should be examined. 50 
Tapp's intervention could well have been decisive and, as will be seen below, were it 
not for the determination of policy-makers in London to adhere to recent `political 
decisions regarding the administrative and financial control of colonial forces by their 
local governments, the GOC's views might have won the day. 
In the same month as Tapp put forward the case for the War Office to resume 
control of all military forces in East Africa, the working party `on the future method of 
command and administration of imperial forces in East Africa' submitted its report. 
This outlined the three methods of administration that had been proposed by the GOC, 
but dismissed his main recommendation: 
METHOD W. For the War Office to reassume [sic] control of all forces in East 
Africa. From a military point of view, this is most desirable and it is recommended by 
GOC East Africa. However, it is against HMG policy of making Colonial 
Governments responsible for their own local forces, and therefore, it is not acceptable 
politically. There would also be serious financial objections. This method is, therefore, 
not examined any further. s1 
Method `B' entailed placing all `Imperial troops' in East Africa under EALFO 
administration, requiring adequate financial provision to be made by the War Office, 
while method `C' involved providing `Imperial administrative backing' for the strategic 
reserve, thereby establishing the `Imperial force in East Africa independent of 
EALFO'. 52 
The working party had obtained the views of the various interested War Office 
branches on methods `B' and `C', regarding, among other matters, accommodation, 
financial responsibilities, secondment of British officers and other ranks (OR) `into key 
Ibid. 
'' Ibid.. 016-5/3920 (SD2b). 'Report by War Office Working Party on the Future Method of Command 
and Administration of Imperial Forces in East Africa'. by Maj. L. W. A. Gingell. Maj. P. R. Richards. 
Maj. S. P. H. Simonds. and D. J. Harwood. June 1958. fo. 2. (Underlining in original. ) 
Ibid.. fo. 3. 
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positions', and manpower requirements. It then assessed the relative impact on the 
`standard of service' and ability of BTK to operate anywhere south of the air/sea 
barrier at short notice, comparing the respective advantages and disadvantages of both 
methods. 53 The working party concluded that the `only real disadvantage' of method 
`C' (the `Imperial establishment' solution) was that it would involve dividing the 
existing Command HQ into three separate headquarters (East Africa Command, 
Imperial Forces East Africa, and EALF District). 54 While an increase in manpower to 
enable the effective working of ECS for the EALFO had been cited as a principal 
reason for the initial War Office proposal to be rejected, it seems that the increased 
establishments required to staff three separate, if in many ways functioning in parallel, 
military administrative organisations was a different matter. 
Conversely, because method `B' (the `EALFO system') had not been tried out, 
it is difficult to say with any certainty whether or not it will definitely maintain 24 
Infantry Brigade Group at the correct standard. War Office branches are suspicious of 
the system and there is a strong doubt if it will work in practice. This cannot be 
considered as acceptable for a formation of the UK Strategic Reserve. The EALFO 
system will also entail complicated financial arrangements and it is likely to prove no 
more economical than Imperial administration. For these reasons, Method "C", i. e. 
Imperial administrative backing for 24 Infantry Brigade Group, should be adopted. " 
Thus, the working party recommended that the War Office planning team should use 
method `C' as its basis for discussions with Tapp on how exactly the administrative 
structure would take shape. It also recommended that manpower allocation should be 
re-examined accordingly, and that accommodation requirements should be submitted 
by the War Office branches on that basis. That was not the last of the matter. 
Ibid., fos. 3-6. 
Ibid.. fos. 4-5.7. 
Ibid.. fo. 7. 
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The working party had also examined the feasibility of setting up a system 
whereby the `Imperial Organisation' in Kenya would supply `common user services 
and items' to EALFO on an `agency basis', and had recommended that method `C' be 
modified to provide this service. 56 However, as might be expected, the War Office was 
less concerned with placating the East African colonial governments than it was with 
maximising the effectiveness and the efficiency of the `Imperial units'. 
Having examined the working party's report and Tapp's letter, Brigadier I. C. 
Harris, Assistant Under-Secretary of State in the War Office, was alarmed that, despite 
the GOC's recommendations, method `A' for administering all soldiers in East Africa 
(under War Office control) had been so readily dismissed. Given Tapp's views, Harris 
considered that `the political and financial aspects of Method "A" should be re- 
examined, with a view to determining whether or not a detailed examination of this 
method should be made'. 57 For reasons which remain unclear little, if anything, seems 
to have been done in this regard. Whether the result of administrative procedure or 
simply time available, or because of concerns for the situation in the Middle East 
following the coup d'etat in Iraq in July 1958, there were no further substantive 
military discussions on Kenya in the War Office until August. 
Notably, the agenda for that War Office meeting betrayed a surprising amount 
of indecision on policy generally. It seems `official War Office policy, which has never 
been countermanded', was that `Imperial troops' should be administered by EALFO. 
58 
Earlier objections regarding the `standards' for BTK, and the working party's 
Ibid.. Appendix 'A" to 0165/3920 (SD2b). 'Provision of an "Agency Sen-ice" for EALFO by the 
Imperial Organisation proposed for Kenya'. n. d. (c. June 1958). fos. 1-3- 
57 Ibid.. secret loose minute to 0165/3 920 (SD2b). 'Future Method of Command and Administration 
in East Africa'. by Brig. I. C. Harris (War Office. DSD. 2). 19 June 1958. 
58 Ibid., 'Agenda for DSD's Meeting on Future Organisation in KENYA. to be held in Room 218 
Main Building on 11 August at 1430 hrs 
. 
n. d. (c. June/July 1958). fo. 1. para. 1. 
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recommendation that separate `Imperial administration for the brigade' was therefore 
essential `to its proper functioning as part of the Strategic Reserve', nevertheless left 
the issue of policy open to question. This had to be decided before the minutiae of the 
command structure in East Africa could be determined. 
The only constant to work with was the British government's seemingly 
contradictory policy (in this particular instance), based upon the Templer Report, that 
colonial governments should administer and finance their `local' military forces. 
Nevertheless, it seems all the more surprising given Britain's experience with colonial 
military exploits, garrisons overseas, and command and control of local levies, for 
example, that the principles for administering and financing British and local forces 
established essentially in parallel had not hitherto been cast in bronze. Much of this, of 
course, reflected the traditional British practice of dealing with each situation on its 
own merits, what might be called an ad hoc approach, and the relative novelty of the 
situation pertaining to Kenya. 
In many respects these latter points were demonstrated by the third item on the 
agenda for the August War Office meeting. Provided that items one ('Imperial 
administration' of BTK) and two (`common user' stores for EALFO) were agreed as 
matters of policy, the proposed `solution' was that there should be in East Africa one 
HQ, with parallel staffs for EALF and BTK, respectively. 
59 By then, however, Tapp 
had become aware that reversion to War Office control seemed increasingly unlikely, 
and had modified his earlier objections to the current system, despite the difficulties of 
dual financial responsibilities. 60 Apparently, the War Office had to clarify whether or 
59 Ibid.. paras. 1-3. 'Proposed War Office Policy on the Future Organisation 
in Kenva 
. 
(draft). n. d. (c. 
June/July 1958). fos. 3-4. para. 16. 
60 Ibid.. 'Agenda'. fo. 1. para. 3. 'Proposed War Office Policy . loc. cit. 
147 
not this objection still applied, as well as deciding if staff of similar rank serving in the 
same HQ should receive the same rates of pay and, indeed, whether or not the 
proposed planning team should even go to Kenya. Only then could the draft paper on 
policy be approved or amended, let alone implemented. 61 
It seems that, in terms of both broader and immediate policy considerations. 
examining each case based upon its merits imposed far more restrictions on action than 
the flexibility that might have been expected, and which might have been achieved, by 
more firmly established policy guidelines. Again, it should be reiterated that the 
financial and political objections referred to above were matters of inter-governmental 
policy and had little, if any, relation to African sensibilities. This was confirmed in early 
June 1958, when ministerial approval was given to the recommendation of the Chiefs 
of Staff that `until 1963 at least an infantry brigade group should be established in 
Kenya', and by the latter's view that Britain's operational requirements south of `the 
Barrier' could be met only by doing this `on a permanent basis'. 62 
By the time of the August 1958 War Office meeting, Lennox-Boyd had become 
even more convinced that EALFO should be allowed to continue its functions in 
respect of EALF, and that control of the East African forces should not therefore 
revert to the War Office. British government policy aside, the Secretary of State felt 
that it was `only natural' that any new organisation was bound to have `teething 
troubles', and that any difficulties could be `adjusted locally'. 63 In Lennox-Boyd's 
view, a year was simply not long enough to have concluded (as the governments of 
Kenya and Tanganyika had) that the organisation should be `wound up' entirely. 
61 Ibid., 'Agenda'. fos. 1-2, paras. 3-6. 
62 Ibid.. 'Proposed War Office Policy, fo. 2, para. 9: DEFE 5/84, COS (58) 150. 'UK Po1icý in the 
Arabian Peninsula. memo. by the Chiefs of Staff. 9 June 1958. 
63 CO 968/695, DEF 78/6/0 10 (copy). Lennox-Boyd to Baring. 31 July 1958. 
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Besides, in Uganda, Governor Crawford's views had `hardened against any reversion 
[to War Office control] because: 
- 
(i) It is politically difficult for him to convince his 
Government of the necessity. (ii) He is not satisfied that it would be cheaper' 
.6` Thus, 
with no unanimity between the governors of the three territories, the case for adhering 
to current British policy was strengthened and, moreover, with no perceived 
requirement to station any British troops in Uganda, it was clearly unnecessary to risk 
unsettling African opinion there. With the `technical' State of Emergency still in place, 
and Lennox-Boyd's ten-year `standstill' on further political concessions, Britain was 
therefore apparently firmly `in control', and this latter consideration did not seem to 
apply in Kenya. 
There seemed to be only one justification remaining for the War Office to 
resume administrative and financial control of all military forces in East Africa: the 
current assessment of the potential threats to East African security. As Tapp put it, 
In July 1957 when the East African Governments became responsible for their own 
forces there was no serious external threat and, therefore, the EALF was organised for 
a purely internal security role. At that time it was not proposed to station an Imperial 
force permanently in East Africa. [... ] In the next three to four years it is possible that 
Imperial forces will have to operate alongside EALF in meeting an external threat from 
the SUDAN, ETHIOPIA or SOMALILAND. 65 
Although Tapp cited the above as his reasons, `from a military point of view', for 
recommending reversion to full War Office control, he now recognised that this was 
impracticable, and realised that, in any case, British soldiers would be made available 
to help combat any such external threats to East Africa. 66 
64 Ibid.. `Minutes of a War office Meeting on Future Organisation in East Africa held in Room 218 
Main Building on 12 August 1958'. taken by Maj. L. W. A. Gingen (Secretary. War office. SD. 2). 12 
Aug. 1958, fo. 2. para. 5 (d). 'The Secretary of State for the Colonies has therefore informed the three 
Governors that they should re-examine the structure of EALFO with a view to making it work more 
efficiently, and that until it had been proved that EALFO could not be made to work 
lie would not 
attempt to reverse HMG policy. 
65 Ibid., fo. 1. para. 3. 
66 Ibid. 
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Moreover, the Colonial Office had determined with the governments of Kenya 
and Tanganyika that external threats could be sub-divided into three types: `(i) 
Unorganised tribal raiding. (ii) Tribal raiding encouraged by an independent 
SOMALILAND. (iii) Frontier warfare of the type now being experienced on the 
YEMEN/ADEN frontier'. 67 While (iii) was considered to be unlikely in `the reasonably 
foreseeable future', the other two threats could be dealt with by the KAR. 68 Tapp and 
Baring agreed with most of the above, but they `could not agree with the Colonial 
Office view that the KAR are correctly organised to meet tribal raiding encouraged by 
an independent SOMALILAND'. 69 Plans for the War Office and the Colonial Office to 
convene jointly a `high level committee' to examine the situation `on the ground' in 
East Africa had been postponed until the three governors had `re-examined and 
reorganised the structure of EALFO on the lines suggested by [the] Secretary of State 
for the Colonies'. 70 
In summary, Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Pyman, the Deputy Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff (DCIGS), reiterated that the present organisation in East Africa 
was based upon a Cabinet decision, and that any reorganisation would require Cabinet 
approval. The issue was therefore held in abeyance, and the meeting moved on to 
discuss `the present problem' of determining the overall command structure for East 
Africa. " Much of what has already been outlined above in this regard was then 
painstakingly considered, the principal conclusions being that `Imperial administration 
must be provided as soon as possible for the strategic reserve brigade', and that a 
« Ibid.. fo. 2. para. 5. 
Ibid. 
69 Ibid.. para. 6. 
'" Ibid., paras. 7-8. 
71 Ibid., fos. 2-3. para. 9. 
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`local examination' should take place, but the approval of the three governors should 
be obtained beforehand. 72 
With this latter condition satisfied as a matter of routine, it remained to inform 
the East African governments officially that the proposals for the War Office to resume 
control of all forces there, or for EALFO to administer the strategic reserve, had both 
been rejected. 7' After some subsequent confusion, it was also made clear that any 
Colonial Office representative attached to the planning team due to visit East Africa in 
October, would be acting in the interests of that Office, and not on behalf of the East 
African governments, which would not be allowed to second their own representatives 
as `members' of the team. ('Team will of course work in close consultation with 
EALFO. ')74 Despite several protests from the three governments in East Africa, the 
War Office planning team would be tasked to deal `purely with military organisation 
and not with Governmental matters' which, given the preceding account, appear 
almost certainly to be related more to fiscal and financial concerns than `political' 
issues, as such. 75 
As an indication of the British government's single-mindedness, if not a quiet 
confidence, the secrecy surrounding the precise nature of previous War Office visits to 
Ibid., fo. 4, paras. 19-20. 
73 Ibid., telegram 98, Macpherson (Colonial Office), to Baring, repeated to Turnbull, Tanganyika 
(394), and Hartwell, Uganda (38), 14 Aug. 1958; telegram 567, Baring, (478) Turnbull. (27) Uganda, 
to Lennox-Boyd, n. d. (c. Aug. 1958). Harris, p. p. Maj. 
-Gen. DSD, to Tapp, 22 Aug. 1958; DEF 
127/74/05, telegram 1561. Lennox-Boyd to Baring, repeated to Tangamika (1128),. Uganda (1022). 
Permanent Secretary, EALFO (47), Administrator, EAHC (600), 5 Sept. 1958. 
" Ibid., telegram 33, Hartwell (Uganda) to C. Y. Carstairs (Colonial Office). 6 Sept. 1958; telegram 
45, Carstairs to Hartwell, 9 Sept. 1958, telegram 530. Turnbull (Tanganyika) to Carstairs, 9 Sept. 
1958; telegram 607, Cusack (Deputy Governor. Kenya) to Carstairs, 12 Sept. 1958. Maj. -Gen. DSD to 
Tapp, 10 Sept. 1958, restricted, un-numbered telegram, Troopers (War Office) to Tapp. 1I Sept. 
1958, Carstairs to Hartwell. 22 Sept. 1958, savingram 872 (S 8390). Acting Governor. Uganda 
[Hartwell], to Lennox-Boyd. 23 Sept. 1958: telegram 556, Deputy Governor. Tanganyika [A. J. 
Grattan-Belleww''j, to Lennox-Boyd, 25 Sept. 1958. letter S. 8398. Hartwell to Carstairs, 26 Sept. 1958; 
telegram 633, OAG Kenya to Lennox-Boyd. 26 Sept. 1958. 
r5 Ibid., telegram 63's. OAG Kenya to Lennox-Bond. 26 Sept. 1958. DEF 127/74/05. telegram 1561. 
Lennox-Boyd to Baring_ repeated to Tanganyika (1128),. Uganda (1022). Permanent Secretary. 
EALFO (47). Administrator, EAHC (600). 5 Sept. 1958. 
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Kenya regarding the strategic reserve, and the earlier reticence regarding longer-term 
plans, were then abandoned. In an apparent signal of Britain's determination to protect 
its interests in the Middle East, and certainly to remain in Kenya for several years, the 
War Office announced in August that `new barracks now being built in Kenya were 
"part of our policy of long-term planning" and was "a natural development". It also 
said the new accommodation would not be ready for two or three years' 
. 
76 In late 
September, the Kenya government followed this up, and announced the imminent 
arrival of the War Office team, `to consider command changes necessary when 
additional troops are stationed in Kenya'. " 
The War Office team duly arrived in Kenya on 5 October 1958. '8 In 
anticipation of this,. Tapp had consulted the three governments, and had prepared 
detailed proposals to be put to the team regarding the changes required to the 
command and administrative structures. 79 Essentially, both parties were agreed and, 
the minutiae aside, settled on a system whereby both the `Imperial' and EALF 
establishments would exist as separate units, except for the matter of dividing the 
EALF into two categories. `Category "A"' would include the GOC, Chief of Staff, 
Aide-de-Camp (ADC), General Staff, signals staff, and chaplains from East Africa 
Command, who would be responsible for both `Imperial and EALF matters'. The War 
Office would make a financial contribution to EALFO for the use of these staff, along 
with making financial provision for other costs incurred by EALFO as a direct result of 
any arrangements made to cater for `Imperial requirements'. `Category "B"' would, of 
76 Ibid., teleprint. Reuter (Nairobi). 27 Sept. 1958. 
" Ibid. 
^x The Tieres, 6 Oct. 1958. 
79 CO 968/695,57405 SD. 'Report by a Working Party convened by the Chief of Staff to consider 
organisational changes in East Africa Command. 19 Sept. 1958. Tapp to the 
Under-Secretary of 
State (SD 2). War Office (J. Ariers ). 23 Sept. 1958. 
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course, `include staff and services required solely for EALF purposes'. 80 It was 
expected that the Executive Committee of the Army Council (ECAC) would agree to 
the planning team's recommendations as a matter of course; unsurprising given the 
earlier lengthy deliberations. In the War Office it was hoped that the proposals could 
be `put into effect 
... 
with the minimum of delay' (1 April 1959), so all that apparently 
remained was to formally obtain the approval of the East African governments. 81 
Meanwhile, concerns in East Africa over interim arrangements for the placing 
of orders for `common user' military equipment with Crown Agents, which would 
result `overall in considerable extra costs' compared with items purchased under ECS, 
were allayed by the Colonial Office instruction to hold back such orders in preparation 
to submit them to the `WD Depot'. 82 By the end of November 1958, Brigadier Harris 
had informed East Africa Command that, `in anticipation of the Army Council agreeing 
the War Office Team's report there is no objection to the Imperial Ordnance Depot in 
Kenya [Kahawa] supplying EALF with common user items on repayment, provided 
there is no detriment to British needs'. In response, Lisle felt it necessary to reiterate 
that the East African governments did not expect EALF requirements `automatically to 
have a second priority' 
. 
83, 
Indeed, I have no doubt that one of the fundamental factors which influenced their 
representatives in favour of proposals which would entail the large scale surrender of 
their "rights" in Kahawa was that they believed that the plan would provide the EALF 
with supply arrangements better than an adequately stocked EALF Depot. Sub- 
SU Ibid., 0165/3920 (SD2b), 'Paper by DCIGS for consideration by ECAC: Future Organisation in 
East Africa' second draft, attached to loose minute by Brig. I. C. Harris. DDSD 'A'. 22 Oct. 1958. 
para. 32 c) (i)-(iii). d), PS/S/30 V.. savingram 27/58. J. T. Lisle (Permanent Secretary. EALFO) to J. A. 
Sanken (Principal, Colonial Office, Defence Department). 23 Oct. 1958. Lisle to Sankey. 24 Oct. 
1958. 
81 CO 968/696,0165/3983 (SD2b). Maj. 
-Gen. G. S. Thomas. (Under-Secretary of State [DSDJ. War 
Office). to Amery. 11 Dec. 1958, savingram. Lennox-Boyd to OAGs. Kenya (2078). Tanganyika 
(1566). Uganda (1478). Lisle (Permanent Secretar. EALFO) (61). 16 Dec. 1958. 
CO 968/695. Lisle to Sankey. 31 Oct. 1958. PS/S/30 V. DEF 127/74/05. Sankey to Lisle. 5 Nov. 
1958. 
83 CO 968/696. PS/S/30 VI/26. Lisle to Sankey. 29 Nov. 1958. 
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paragraph 10 (b) of Appendix "A" to the latest draft of the War Office Team's report 
emphasises this as part of the quid pro quo [sic]. 84 
Conversely, while the ECAC agreed the War Office planning team's proposals, 
as had been expected, it rejected Tapp's recommendation that staff on both the 
`Imperial' and the EALF establishments should be on `Imperial' terms of service (i. e. 
lower pay), rather than secondment terms of service, as currently enjoyed by EALF 
staff, in order to avoid friction among ranks serving together. 85 As the ECAC saw it, it 
was unfair to reduce the pay for EALF staff because other staff seconded on other 
colonial duties enjoyed secondment pay: `The East African Governments offer such 
terms as they see fit to attract the right quality and sufficient quantity of British ranks 
to serve with the EALF. '86 
By January 1959, all of the major problems concerning the command and 
administrative control, and the financing of military forces in British East Africa appear 
to have been resolved. The East African governments had given their agreement `in 
principle' to the War Office and Colonial Office proposals, subject to the successful 
completion of all related `detailed negotiations'. 87 The reorganisation of the military 
command structure in British East Africa as a whole and, more importantly, on the 
ground in Kenya, therefore seemed set to take place on 1 April 1959. In the meantime, 
various officials in the War Office, the Colonial Office, East Africa Command, and 
EALFO, continued to disagree over relatively minor issues like whether the command 
paymaster should serve on the HQ EALF (shared) establishment (thereby attracting a 
84 Ibid. 
Ibid., minute by Maj. 
-Gen. G. S. Thomas. 4 Nov. 1958. ECAC/P (58) [016/3920 (SD2b)]. The 
Executive Committee of the Army Council: Future Organisation in East Africa'. paper b\ DCIGS. 
Dec. 1958.0165/3983 (SD2b). Brig. I. C. Harris. p. p. DSD (Thomas). to Amery. 2) Dec. 1954. 
`' Ibid.. 0165/39831 (SD2b). draft letter. War Office to GOC. East Africa. n. d. (c. Jan. 1959). J. R. 
McGregor (War Office) to Tapp. 20 Feb. 1959. 
87 Ibid.. sav-ingram 119/59 [DEF 4/2AA-IV], Acting Governor. Kenya. on behalf of OAG, Uganda, 
and OAG. Tanganyika. 19 Jan. 1959. 
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financial contribution from the War Office), and whether some of the motor spares 
required by EALF might not `strictly speaking, be "in common use between the two 
forces"'. 88 
While these various government departments continued to `split hairs', political 
considerations in East Africa had already begun to militate against Britain's longer- 
term strategic and political plans. British policy-makers and defence-planners had spent 
three years deciding whether to station British soldiers in Kenya `on a permanent 
basis', finding the most suitable location and determining how large such a force 
should be, as well as going to great lengths to iron out the complexities of 
administration, command and control, and finance. Britain now had to begin the 
process of aligning its strategic requirements in East Africa more closely with political 
developments, instead of vice versa. This response was far from immediate, however, 
and would take the best part of five years to conclude to Britain's, and independent 
Kenya's satisfaction. British attempts, from January 1959 onwards, to secure `vital 
interests' in Kenya, while making further political concessions to African nationalists, 
will be examined in the subsequent chapters. 
Conclusion 
With Mau Mau apparently defeated, and following the imposition of the Lennox-Boyd 
Constitution, political development in Kenya appeared to have been aligned with 
Britain's strategic requirements in East Africa. This left British defence planners, 
interested government departments, and officials on the ground free to haggle over the 
Ibid.. 39905/SD. Brig. P. W. P. Green. p. p. Tapp. to H. Fraser. (Under-Secretary of State I S1331. \Var 
Office), 13 Jan. 1959. Gingell to Sankey. 21 Jan. 1959. PS/S/30 %11113. Lisle to Browne. 26 Feb. 
1959. PS/S/ 30 VII/ 14. Lisle to Sankey. 26 Feb. 1959. 
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related administrative, financial, and military implications of implementing the new 
strategy. While the nationalists adhered to the substance, if not the spirit, of the 
Colonial Office standstill on further constitutional advance, little regard had to be paid 
to African political sensibilities. Yet, at the very moment that all of the numerous 
problems associated with stationing British troops in Kenya seemed to have been 
settled, ironically, political considerations returned to the fore. Only then would Britain 
begin to seriously contemplate its strategic options in Kenya with regard to the 
Africans' refusal to legitimise the process further with their participation. As Britain's 
political legitimacy in Kenya was brought increasingly into question, the grounds for 
retaining its military bases there became all the more difficult to justify. Yet, as will be 
seen in the subsequent chapters, Britain's efforts to solve its Kenyan defence and 
internal security conundrum were far from hasty. Three years of painstaking military 
planning and implementation would not be thrown to the wind. 
1ý0 
Chapter V 
Internal Security and Decolonisation: I, 1956-9 
Introduction 
It is virtually a commonplace that the financial and material strains of the Second 
World War, more than any other factor, made it inevitable that the British Empire's 
days were numbered. ' The steady, if gradual, transition of several countries to 
independence after 1945 supports this interpretation. 2 With Ghana's independence in 
1957 it was only a matter of time before the rest of Africa followed suit, subject to the 
requisite constitutional and administrative, and `collaborative' arrangements being put 
in place. ' Successor governments were `encouraged' to remain within the western or 
`free world' orbit, non-aligned at worst, and to retain trading links with their former 
suzerains, serving the same purpose. 4 It has been suggested that `constitutional and 
administrative' development were `the two major areas of policy' in this regard. ' Of 
course, this can hardly be disputed given that administrative and constitutional 
' For example, see: Betts, Decolonization, pp. 19-36; John Darwin, The End of the British Empire: 
The Historical Debate (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991). pp. 40-55. idem. Britain and Decolonisation, pp. 
69-125, and `British Decolonization since 1945', pp. 187-209, J. D. Hargreaves. Decolonization in 
.l frica (Harlow: Longman. 1990 [1988]), passim.; Holland, European Decolonization, pp. 37-8, and 
idem., The Imperial Factor in British Strategies', pp. 165-86; A. N. Porter and A. J. Stockwell (eds. ), 
British Imperial Policy and Decolonization, 1938-64. Vol. 1: 1938-51 (London: Macmillan, 1987), 
pp. 46-_51. 
-For a summary of scholarly explanations of Britain's withdrawal from Africa and the Empire 
generally, see: Darwin, The End of the British Empire. pp. 1-9. and Ovendale, 'Macmillan and the 
Wind of Change', pp. 455-7. 
D. R. Thorpe, 
. 
llec Douglas-Horne (London: Sinclair-Stevenson. 1996), p. 195. Note that during 'the 
decade after 1947 recruitment into the colonial service increased by 50 per cent' : David Reynolds. 
Britannia Overruled. British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Centuri (Harlow: Longman. 
1991), p. 221. See also: Anthony Kirk-Greene. On Crown Service:. =1 History o0.11 Colonial and 
Overseas Civil Service's, 1S. 37-1997 (London: I. B. Tauris. 1999). pp. 39-6 1. 
4 Louis and Robinson. 'The Imperialism of Decolonization', passim: Murphy. 'Lennox-Boyd at the 
Colonial Office'. pp. 2-3. 
Cranford Pratt. 'Colonial Governments and the Transfer of Power in East Africa'. in Prosser Gifford 
and Wm. Roger Louis (eds. ). The Transfer of Power in 
.I frica: Decolonization 1940-1960 (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press. 1982). p. 249. 
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development represent the legal and practical instruments which underpin and succeed 
any ceremonial transfer of power. The substantive aspects of political decolonisation in 
Kenya, particularly the constitutional and administrative, have therefore received 
considerable scholarly attention. 6 
But decolonisation did not amount simply to an administrative exercise. 
Important as administrative and constitutional arrangements were, transferring power 
to local nationalist politicians was not just a matter of finding the `right man' (or men) 
for the job; the conditions had to be right too. More recently, the arguably subordinate 
area of policy, internal security, particularly the `ubiquitous presence' of the colonial 
police, has received more attention than had hitherto been the case. 7 For example, 
David Throup examines the `role and functions' of the various police departments in 
Kenya in the context of the problems of wartime expansion to combat rising crime, 
post-war `political policing' and, of course, decolonisation. 8 As with other works on 
colonial policing, Throup's essay is also concerned with the problems of adaptation to 
6 See, for example: George Bennett and Carl Rosberg, The Kenvatta Election: Kenya 1960-1961 
(London, New York and Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1961). Bennett, Kenya: A Political 
History, pp. 135-61; Berman. Control and Crisis, pp. 377-423; Füredi. alau \Iau Il "ar, pp. 149-224, 
and Colonial Liars, passim.; Kanogo, Squatters and the Roots of, 11aar Wall, pp. 162-78; Ogot and 
Zeleza, 'Kenya: The Road to Independence and After', pp. 401-26. 
' Anderson and Killingray. Policing and Decolonisation. pp. 1-2, Mockaitis. British 
('ounterinsurgencty: Paget, Counter-Insurgencv Operations, pp. 83-113, and Townshend. Britain 's 
Civil Wars. 
" Throup, 'Crime, politics and the police'. pp. 127-57. Other notable works on policing and law and 
order in Kenya include, for example: David M. Anderson. 'Policing, prosecution and the 
law in 
colonial Kenya', in D. M. Anderson and D. Killingray (eds. ). Policing the Empire: Government, 
, 
Authority and Control, c. 1830-1940 (Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1991). pp. 183-200: 
the general study by Clayton and Killingray, Khaki and Blue, which is an amalgamated reproduction 
of earlier surveys by the authors of documents collected under the auspices of the 
Oxford Development 
Records Project (ODRP). many of which were used in Throup's essay. supplemented by volumes of 
the Kenya Police Annual Review (KPAR). which are available in the PRO under reference CO 544- 
W. Robert Foran. The Kenya Police 18S77-1960 (London. 1962), and two other more recent general 
surveys. William F. Gutteridge. 'Military and Police Forces in 
Colonial Africa. and David Killingray. 
'The Maintenance of Law and Order in British Colonial Africa'. African . Iffairs, 
85 (1986). pp. 411- 
7. 
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these new circumstances, particularly the pressures of nationalism and accelerated 
decolonisation. 
While all such studies are invaluable in increasing our knowledge and 
understanding of the intricacies of colonial rule and disengagement from Kenya they 
tend, understandably, to concentrate on the `events' of crime, rural and urban unrest, 
and nationalist protest, especially in the late colonial period, in the context of 
negotiated constitutional development. Yet, this focus on the relative success of the 
Kenya Police in maintaining internal security between the apparent military defeat of 
Mau Mau and independence obscures the real significance to Britain of internal 
security issues in Kenya during the transfer of power. 
This is not to say that internal security policy is ignored by these studies; the 
opposite is, of course, the case. As Anderson and Killingray make clear, the rapid 
progress towards independence in Africa in the late 1950s and early 1960s put many 
strains upon the colonial police in general. 9 However, the maintenance of internal 
security in Kenya was not solely the concern of the police, and the situation in Kenya 
was not always as peaceful as the authorities portrayed it to be. 
It is well known that the British Army became actively involved in counter- 
insurgency operations and in support of the police and the KAR during the Mau Mau 
Emergency. '° Indeed, all studies of British counter-insurgency necessarily examine the 
9 Anderson and Killingray, Policing and Decolonisation. p. 18. 
10 For the background and course of the Mau Mau Emergency and decolonisation in Kenya from the 
political and socio-economic perspectives, with some reference to the British counter-insurgency 
campaign, see: Bennett and Rosberg. The Kenvatta Election. Bennett. Kenya: A Political History; 
Berman, Control and Crisis; Berman and Lonsdale, Unhappy fallet , Edgerton, Ilan 
_t 
lau; Füredi. 
. 
flau 
_1 lau 
War. Colonial liars: Heather, 'Intelligence and Counter-insurgency; Kanogo. Squatters 
and the Roots of. l Tait 
-1 fait. Kyle. Politics of 
Independence: Maloba.. 11au 
_IIau and Kenia: 
Ogot and 
Zeleza, 'Kenya: The Road to Independence and After'; B. A. Ogot and W. R. Ochieng' (eds. ). 
Decolonization and Independence in Kern"a 1940-93 (London: James Currey. 1995); Throup, Origin. 
of_Ilau 
_11au; 
Robert L. Tignor. Capitalism and 
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British Army's experience in Kenya, stressing the `duties in aid of the civil power' 
aspects of this, and the determination to hand back responsibility for law and order to 
the police and civil administration. However, particular emphasis is still laid on the role 
of political reform, especially decolonisation, in British counter-insurgency. " Although 
this approach is persuasive, it tends to over-simplify and, in some respects, to over- 
estimate the process of decolonisation. 
This over-emphasis on Colonial Office planning and the readiness to grant 
political concessions in order to combat insurgency, has been mirrored by certain 
works which suggest that the declaration of the State of Emergency in Kenya in itself, 
as in other colonies, represented plans for a `managed' withdrawal. 12 This approach 
ignores the reluctance of the Colonial Office to agree to Baring's initial request to 
declare an emergency, let alone to commit British troops. Equally, the three year gap 
between the military defeat of Mau Mau and Britain's acceptance that African majority 
government would have to be conceded sooner, rather than later, sheds doubt upon 
such interpretations. 13 
" Füredi, `Kenya: Decolonization through counter-insurgency', `Creating a Breathing Space'. and 
Colonial Wars: Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency. pp. 64-5: The need to use force in a highly 
selective manner compelled the British to develop a comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy. one 
that combined limited military action with broad-based social, economic and political reform. Reform 
attacked the causes of unrest on which the insurgency fed, while military operations provided a shield 
behind which reform could be implemented. [... ] This progress was not uniform, nor was every 
campaign an unqualified success. The British were much quicker to grasp the importance of civil- 
military co-operation than they were to engage in reform. [... ] Only when the Second World War 
made the dissolution of the empire clearly inevitable were the British willing to grant what was for 
many the ultimate political concession, independence', Paget, Counter-Insurgency Operations. pp. 
83-113, Popplewell, "`Lacking Intelligence"'. p. 337: `Britain's achievements in suppressing 
insurgency were the result not only of counter-insurgency operations, but also of the major political 
concessions which the British were prepared to make. Most of Britain's successes occurred in the 
context of the end of Empire [sic] when the British were no longer concerned with maintaining their 
physical presence but with securing a smooth transition to independence and maintaining close 
relations with the newly independent states and the former metropolis', and Townshend. Britain's 
Civil 1t ars. 
Frank Füredi. 'Britain's Colonial Wars: Playing the Ethnic Card'. Journal of Conmronwealth and 
Comparative Politics, 28 (1990), pp. 70-89. 'Kenya: Decolonization through counter-insurgency '_ 
Creating a Breathing Space, and Colonial If ars. 
13 Percox. 'British Counter-Insurgency'. passim. 
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In a recent study, Murphy has argued that: `The most orthodox and self- 
serving of myths surrounding the decolonisation of the British Empire was that this 
was the natural culmination of a political mission to prepare colonial peoples for 
democratic self-government'. 14 More recently, he has suggested `that if one wants to 
discover why the pace of constitutional reform in Africa accelerated so dramatically 
after 1959, one needs to look to Africa and not to Whitehall'. " Of course, it was not 
simply events in Africa which dictated Colonial Office policy there. 16 
Yet, the idea that after the Second World War Kenya's independence was a 
foregone conclusion, especially given the implementation of political reforms after the 
apparent defeat of Mau Mau, has been so persuasive that studies of post-war British 
overseas defence policy have paid scant regard to Kenya's significance. " The albeit 
essentially correct view that Kenya was largely an adjunct to the Middle East and Far 
East theatres in British `global strategy' has gone hand-in-hand with those illustrated 
above. 
18 
1' Philip Murphy. Party Politics and Decolonization: The Conservative Parti' and British Colonial 
Policy in Tropical Africa, 1951-1964 (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1995). p. 2. Murphy successfully 
builds on the ideas of Darwin and Holland. See, for example: Darwin. The End of the British Enipire. 
Britain and Decolonisation. and 'British Decolonization since 1945': Holland, European 
Decolonization, and `The Imperial Factor in British Strategies'. 
1-5 Murphy, "`Holding Back the Tides"? Alan Lennox-Boyd at the Colonial Office. 1954-59, 
Universits of London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies Postgraduate Seminar Paper. 28 March 
1996. mimeo. courtesy of the ICS, p. 2. 
16 Anderson and Killingray, Policing and Decolonisation. p. 14, Murphy, 'Lennox-Boyd at the 
Colonial Office, p. 3. 
" See, for example: Ovendale, British Defence Policy since 1945. p. 7. which, while mentioning 
British Army deployments in Kenya between 1952 and 1956, provides no references to the strategic 
reserve in Kenya (1958-64). nor the 'base strategy'. See also: David Sanders. Losing an Empire, 
Finding a Role: British Foreign Policy 
. 
since 1945 (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan. 1990), pp. 
87.88,99,227,274.289. 
1" David R. Devereux. 'The Middle East and Africa in British Global Strategy. 1952-56'. in Richard 
J. Aldrich and Michael F. Hopkins (eds. ). Intelligence, Defence and Diplontac.: British Policy in the 
Post-It ar World (Ilford: Frank Cass. 1994). p. 173. 'However, Africa was more important to British 
strategic thinking in the mid-1950s than has traditionally been portrayed. It is now known that British 
and American uranium came from the Belgian Congo as part of a 1944 agreement. and both countries 
viewed the strategic minerals of Southern Africa NA ith considerable em leading to acti\ e attempts to 
woo South Africa despite its racial policies. 
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Effectively, this can be summarised as follows: counter-insurgency and political 
(and socio-economic) reform in Kenya were synonymous; therefore Britain could only 
ever expect, and indeed did expect, limited security of tenure; and the withdrawal of 
British Land Forces Kenya (BLFK) to Aden following Kenya's independence was the 
logical culmination of a seemingly holistic process. As this and the next chapter will 
show, by the time of Macmillan's `wind of change' speech and the January Lancaster 
House conference, and even as late as the `Independence Conference' of September- 
October 1963, British withdrawal from Kenya was by no means a formality. 19 
It is not intended here to examine the details of the political bargaining, 
constitutional reform, and the devolution of political power, which have been covered 
by the studies referred to earlier, among others. 2° If anything, detailed examination of 
internal security policy and planning sheds new light on the background to the transfer 
of power in Kenya, the significance of security issues to this process and, given this 
significance, the very real sense in which it could be said that independence on 12 
December 1963 was far from inevitable, that is, until literally months beforehand. It 
should also be stressed, as Kyle has shown, that the British government's October 
1963 decision to back the Kenya African National Union (KANU) administration as 
the means by which a civil war in Kenya would be most likely avoided, did not allay 
British fears of that eventuality. 21 
This last point is demonstrated clearly by the British government's willingness 
to intervene militarily in Kenya to evacuate the European settlers at the last minute if a 
19 Keith Kyle. The End of Empire in Kenva, University of London. Institute of Commonwealth 
Studies Postgraduate Seminar Paper. 14 March 1996. [courtesy of the ICS]: Murphy. Parts Politics. 
'Lennox-Boyd at the Colonial Office. Kenneth Young. Sir. 4 lec Douglas-Home (London: Dent. 
1970). p. 114. 
," For an excellent recent study of the transfer of power in Kenya. see. Kyle. Politics oj Independence. 
2' KN le. 'End of Empire. p. 26. 
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political settlement were not reached and if the security situation had in fact 
deteriorated. The survey of the internal security aspects of the seven years between the 
defeat of Mau Mau and independence, in this chapter and the next, demonstrates the 
precariousness of Britain's position, as the colonial power sought to balance the 
`shaping' of Kenyan politics with offsetting pressure from African nationalists for a 
`quick withdrawal', while attempting to secure `vital' economic and strategic 
interest S. 
22 
As the next section will show, British concerns for internal security in Kenya in 
the context of limited resources following the apparent military defeat of Mau Mau 
cast doubt over the commonly held interpretation of events during the latter half of the 
State of Emergency. Far from having the luxury of simply introducing incremental 
constitutional reform, the British authorities faced the prospect of renewed challenges 
to their rule on a par with Mau Mau, while they struggled to construct a political 
settlement in Kenya, and made desperate attempts to portray a situation of `normality' 
`The consolidation of reaction', 1956-9 
The three years between the defeat of Mau Mau and ending the State of Emergency 
were very much a period of political and socio-economic tutelage. The British 
authorities certainly hoped that this would be seen to be the case. For the British, a 
crucial aspect of the consolidation of victory was the legitimisation, thus stabilisation, 
afforded by the normalisation of politics in the territory. Yet, defence and security 
matters had a considerable bearing on British policy, and go far in explaining the 
retention of the `technical' State of Emergency until 1960. 
^, DEFE 7/1014. Gorell Barnes to A. D. Peck (Treasury). 11 May 1959. 
lo') 
In this respect the political reforms of 1957-1958 can be seen not so much as 
means of `guiding' the nature and pace of developments in the name of some higher 
and noble cause, such as `nation-building', but rather as a significant weapon in 
Britain's policy armoury. Only by keeping a firm grip on the political process, and by 
maintaining internal security, could Britain hope to sustain `vital' economic and 
strategic interests in Kenya, while at the same time being seen to make concessions to 
the increasingly radical `African' political consciousness which had gained impetus 
from Ghana's independence in 1957. 
Prior to the resumption of responsibility for the maintenance of law and order 
by the police in November 1956, the security situation, future prospects, and future 
policy had to be decided. At a meeting of the War Council in December 1955, 
Lathbury concluded that `as the number of terrorists at large was now so few, routine 
patrols and large scale operations became less rewarding. If all security forces were 
maintained at their present strength it might be that the Emergency would be finished a 
little earlier but a balance had to be drawn between the effort and the result. '23 
Lathbury also had to bear in mind the ongoing reduction in the numbers of British 
Army personnel. 24 `Pseudo-gang' operations would therefore be the best way to 
eliminate the remaining `terrorists', clearing the way for a further reduction by two 
battalions of the British Army by May of the following year. This would leave just one 
British battalion, 1 KSLI, alongside the KAR in support of the police. 
Besides these and other manpower and tactical considerations, there were other 
matters of security policy discussed which, while not of immediate concern, were 
,' CO'822/772. War Council Minute 1594. 'Appreciation of the Situation by the Commander-in-Chief 
East Africa'. n. d. (c. Dec. 1915). 
"' WO 216/856. Head to LyItelton. 17 Aug. 19533. 
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significant in respect of the future post-military phase and ultimate end of the State of 
Emergency. A matter of considerable importance was the fate and release rate of Mau 
Mau detainees. 25 On this point Baring `drew attention to the statement that the release 
of detainees was unlikely to present a serious security problem if the release was 
governed by the ability to provide land or work'. To this he added that the `release rate 
was inevitably governed by the ability to absorb those released'. Although detention 
and rehabilitation policy is not the concern of this study, given that detainees, by 
definition, cease to be a direct security threat, Baring's implicit awareness of the 
potential for problems later on is in itself significant. 
This is especially so in the light of the necessarily limited success of land 
consolidation, and its impact on post-Emergency Kikuyu militancy and politics. 26 
Again, the concern here is not with reforms, as such, but with Britain's approach to 
planning for a breakdown in internal (or public) security, the ultimate expression of a 
perceived failure of reform. Also, by assessing the severity and extent of Emergency 
planning in its latter stages, it is possible to gauge the seriousness with which ministers 
and officials in London and Nairobi took threats to security vis-ä-vis their perceptions 
of the success of reform. In short, how close, and how frequently, did the British and 
Kenya governments believe they had come during the seven or eight years since 
control was militarily re-imposed in Kenya, to again losing that control, and what were 
they prepared to do about it? This, more than anything, it could be argued, is the true 
measure of the success of socio-economic and political reform in the run up to Kenya's 
independence. 
25 CO 822/772. WAR/C 817. 'Emergency Policy. Note by the Secretary of the War Council'. 12 Dec. 
1955. 
26 Füredi.. 1 ! au 11 lau liar, pp. 149-224- Monone Omosule. 'Kiama kia Muingi: Kikuyu 
Reaction to 
Land Consolidation in Kenya. 195 5-19-5 9'. Transafrican Journal of History. 4/1-2 (1974), pp. 115- 34. 
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The security situation in December 1955 gave Kenya's then Commissioner of 
Police, Richard Catling, sufficient reason to hope to reduce the African KPR `element 
by about a sixth and also to disband some of the GSU Platoons during the second half 
of 1956' in line with the withdrawal of the British Army. However, the seemingly 
improving situation did not give the War Council reason to throw caution to the wind. 
While Farm Guards were still considered essential for food denial, requiring them to be 
kept at full Emergency strength, along with the Regular Tribal Police and Tribal Police 
Reserve (TP[R]), it was considered inadvisable to keep large numbers of Kikuyu 
`under arms' if the army was to be run down. 
Although Kenya's then Minister for Internal Security and Defence, J. W. 
Cusack, had suggested that the plan for a reduction of tribal police elements should `be 
amended to draw attention to the need to relate reductions in the [TP(R)] to the run- 
down of the Army', the consequent requirement to maintain the strength of the `civil 
arm' in readiness for the likely future releases of detainees, prompted another solution. 
The Tribal Police would be disarmed, as they had been before the Emergency. 
Replacing the rifle with the baton at the end of 1956, therefore, did not just represent 
an improvement in the security situation: it was a means of ensuring that security risks 
were minimised. 27 So, by reducing the potential threat of armed Kikuyu, the War 
Council was also able to make provision for the `policing' of released detainees. 28 
Baring had already decided that one British battalion would have to stay in Kenya `at 
least until the end of the Emergency situation'. As a further precaution, the War 
Council decided that `as a means of maintaining a nucleus of the police force trained in 
I? CO 822/772. 'Note on the Kenya War Councils Views on the Future Role of the Security Forces. 
n. d.. (c. Jan. 1956). See also: Throup. 'Crime. politics and the police', p. 149. 
,8 CO 822/772. Baring to Lennox-Boyd. 28 Jan. 1956. 
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forest operations, both the Army and Police [GSUs] should continue to operate in the 
Prohibited Areas until the end of the Emergency' 
. 
29 
Lennox-Boyd, was far from confident about all of this. He expressed his fears 
to Crawford, then Baring's deputy: `I feel some misgivings about the effect so steep an 
overall reduction of forces might have on control of the reserves in the future 
especially after December'. The Secretary of State was also greatly concerned that the 
strength of the TP(R) would be too great without sufficient `military control'. With the 
prospect of `some 40,000' detainees remaining at the end of 1956, Lennox-Boyd's 
most pressing concern was whether there would be `sufficient forces left to deal with 
any situation which may arise in the reserves from [the] release of detainees during 
1957? 30 
Lennox-Boyd's fears had been prompted by his realisation that the improving 
situation would bring `pressure from various quarters for the speed up [sic] of the 
release rate, without regard to the degree of rehabilitation and the capacity of the 
reserves to absorb released detainees'. Crawford's reply was unequivocal: 
I note with some misgivings your reference to pressures from various quarters to speed 
up release and should like to reaffirm that the Council of Ministers and the War 
Council are firmly of the opinion that the rate of release can only be determined by 
security conditions, including rehabilitation and absorptive capacity of the country and 
that pressure on any other grounds must be firmly resisted from the outset. " 
Crawford also dismissed fears that manpower levels would be insufficient, 
explaining that following a proposed review of the situation in June 1956, if it were 
found to be necessary, African military personnel could be increased. ` In addition, in 
emergency call can be made on four KAR in Uganda and six KAR in Tanganyika, a 
29 Ibid.. 'Note on the Kenya War Council's Views on the Future Role of the SecuriP Forces. n. d. (c. 
Jan. 1956). 
30 Ibid.. telegram 222. Lennox-Boyd to Crawford (Deputy Governor. Kenya). 3 %larch 1956. 
Ibid.. telegram 266. Crawford to Lennox-Boyd. 7 March 1956. 
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total of about 1,000 troops. Strength of [the] police in [the] emergency area in January 
1957 
... 
will be the same as now [c. 8-9,000] except that the KPR may be reduced to 
2,500'. Also significant in terms of potential manpower for the security forces was that 
at least one British Army battalion earmarked for Aden would stay in Kenya until 
`about January 1957, go to Aden for the cool season, and probably return to Kenya in 
the spring of 1957' 
With the effective end of military operations in November 1956, and the 
expansion of the Kenya Police to over 12,000 personnel, it seems that despite the 
temporary absence of the KSLI in Arabia, standing manpower and provisions for 
emergency expansion would have given cause for optimism. 32 After all, economic and 
social reforms were well under way, as evidenced by the ongoing implementation of 
land consolidation under the Swynnerton Plan; and March 1957 would see the first 
elections of Africans to Kenya's Legislative Council. Life in Kenya was `essentially 
back to normal', with the main interest of the press being politics. The Emergency 
received little attention and, if at all, then only on the back pages. " Indeed, as Throup 
shows, the police had to adapt to `renewed African political activity', especially the 
growing number of mass meetings. 14 Yet, normality did not herald the immediate 
termination of the State of Emergency. 
Ironically, the apparently successful conclusion of Britain's military campaign 
in Kenya had coincided with the forced withdrawal from Suez at the hands of US 
diplomatic and economic pressures. The subsequent imposition of the Middle East `air 
barrier', leading to Britain's decision to locate a permanent British Army garrison in 
32 Blaxland. The Regiments Depart. p. 412; Throup. 'Crime. politics and the police. P. 149. 
'; CO 822/1229. 'Brief for the Secretary of State's Visit to Kenya. 195,7. n. d. (c. Oct. 1957). 
34 Throup. 'Crime. politics and the police'. pp. 150-1. 
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Kenya only added to the irony. More importantly, however, this latter decision (and its 
implementation) confirms that the political concessions made before Lennox-Boyd-s 
April 1959 Commons statement served in many ways as a holding operation, aimed at 
legitimising politics according to a British model, and in doing so attempted to 
demonstrate that nationalists could achieve more by eschewing any recourse to 
violence. Crucially, the delay rather than acceleration in the transfer of power implicit 
in Britain's policy of `gradualness' might well have bought more time were it not for 
the divisive aspects of socio-economic reforms and the upsurge of African political 
consciousness during the Emergency. With Ghana independent in 1957, it must have 
seemed peculiar, to say the least, for Kenyan Africans to still be living under a State of 
Emergency, especially as this had been no barrier to Malaya's independence that same 
year. 
Prior to his October 1957 visit to East Africa, Lennox-Boyd had been aware 
that there was likely to be pressure to end the Emergency, `or at least a reduction in 
Emergency measures'. Although it was `the acknowledged policy to dispense with 
those as soon as possible' there were several security-related problems. `The official 
and legal termination of the Emergency would mean the automatic withdrawal of all 
Emergency Regulations and the powers assumed under them. This would create both 
immediate and more distant difficulties'. The immediate difficulties included the mass 
release of 20,000 detainees and the cessation of `psychological discipline' for some 
50,000 who were already at liberty. Added to this was the problem of the 
`irreconcilables' who were perceived, probably correctly, to be a considerable security 
risk and could not be released en masse. 
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The main problem was that if the Emergency were to be revoked the Kenya 
government intended to enact legislation enabling it to retain powers to detain 
`trouble-makers without trial', to continue to hold the `hard core', compelling them to 
work `where necessary', and to `forestall would-be subversive movements, including 
political movements, which they at present wield by Emergency Regulation'. The 
difficulty with this, according to the Colonial Office, was the British government's 
adherence to several international Conventions, particularly the European Convention 
on Human Rights and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Forced Labour 
Convention (1930), with a second, `more rigid' ILO Convention in the process of 
ratification. Accordingly, the introduction of such non-Emergency legislation as the 
Kenya government required would mean an open breach of `these international 
obligations'. 
It is clear that, given the problems associated with the reabsorption of 
detainees, the only course of action was to retain the legal Emergency. So, what of 
political restrictions? As a Colonial Office brief explained: 
Secondly, the disappearance of all Emergency checks on African political life could 
quickly lead to a deterioration in security, so that a further emergency would be 
created requiring special measures. [... ] In the last resort we must be prepared to 
sustain existing practises [sic] deemed essential for the maintenance of peace in Kenya 
even if we stand frankly in default of international obligations. [... ] The conclusion 
must be that for as long as possible the Emergency must be kept alive and that 
attempts for its revocation should be resisted. " 
There are essentially two ways that all this could be interpreted. First, the 
detainees other than the `irreconcilables', if released, did not represent a significant or 
direct threat to internal security and what mattered, as evidenced by the restriction on 
colony-wide political activity, was the likelihood of the former Mau Mau adherents' 
;' CO 822/1229. 'Brief for the Secretary of States Visit to Kenya*. 
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affiliation to radical, anti-colonial political movements. There is undoubtedly some 
truth in this, but a second possibility is more convincing. As Baring and Crawford 
noted in late 1955 and early 1956, detainees simply could not be released to an 
uncertain future which might only serve to breed further disaffection and militancy; 
certainly not 20,000 in one go, and certainly not the unrehabilitated or `irreconcilable'. 
Releasing the detainees and simultaneously lifting restrictions on political activity, 
given the potential for a return to violence, along with the capacity to organise on a 
colony-wide basis, it seems, was just too much of a risk to take. 
Of course, control was what mattered, but not simply control of the political 
process. While there can be no doubt that Baring and Lennox-Boyd were disturbed by 
the prospect of political `deadlock' in the Legislative Council, and efforts by Mboya 
and Odinga to co-ordinate political action with Ugandan and Tanganyikan nationalists, 
it is clear that the granting of parity to the African Elected Members (AEMs) was not 
intended to lead to the `destruction of the multi-racial idea, the road along which 
Africans would advance to an ultimate overall majority on communal polls'. 36 
It seems that the Lennox-Boyd Constitution represented as much an attempt at 
offsetting pressures for an end to the Emergency, as it did a concession to the 
Africans' refusal to participate in the legislature.; ' This almost classic example of a 
`half-measure' in itself, then, was motivated by broader security considerations than 
simply `meeting the demand for constitutional advance fast enough to keep the peace 
and retain a guiding influence over developments'. 8 For all the apparent improvements 
"' CO 822/12-52, GH 5/5/39Nol. I1, Baring to Lennox-Boyd, 27 Feb. 1957. GH 195 3/5/ 39Nol. II. 
Baring to Lennox-Boyd. 10 April 1957. Lennox-Boyd to Baring, 20 May 1957. Bennett. Kenti'a:. 4 
Political Hi. ctorv. pp. 141-2. 
;' Bennett. loc. cit.. Ogot and Zeleza. 'Kenya: The Road to Independence and After. p. 410. 
3S CAB 129/76. CP (55) 97. ' Singapore Constitutional Crisis: Memorandum by the Minister of State 
for Colonial Affairs (Henry Hopkinson). 10 Aug. 1955. cited in Murphy. 'Lennox-Boyd at the 
Colonial Office. p. . Dennis Austin. The Transfer of Power: \V'hv and How. in W. H. 'Morris-Jones 
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in the security situation, it should not be forgotten that in late 1957 Kenya was still 
very much in the `shadow' of Mau Mau. 
If the retention of Emergency Regulations was simply a device for maintaining 
control of the political process, it would not be unreasonable to expect a fairly 
optimistic view of the security situation, especially in the run up to and immediately 
before the revocation of the State of Emergency. However, de-militarisation, if it can 
be called that, and political concessions in themselves brought new security risks. 
Although throughout 1957 Mboya had made statements to the effect that `if African 
wishes for increased representation were not met, the results would be far worse than 
anything Mau Mau produced', this was not taken too seriously. In itself, the threat of 
civil disobedience might not have caused too much concern but, combined with 
political consciousness at the grass roots level based largely on ethnic origin, a 
resurgence in urban crime, and the persistence of Kikuyu subversion in one form or 
another, highlighted many of the security problems faced by the Kenya government. 
As Baring explained to Lennox-Boyd in early 1957: 
What is more significant is that Kodhek and some of his supporters are beginning to 
talk openly about starting a form of passive resistance. They mention plans for 
organised bands of Africans deliberately to break some of the less important or more 
unpopular laws. They foolishly go on, though not in public, to speak of organised 
attempts to intimidate watchmen and arrange crimes from which Europeans and Asians 
will suffer. [... ) While this news has come in from Nairobi, in the overcrowded area of 
the southern locations of North Nyanza there are signs of the possibility of the same 
39 
sort of trouble. 
This, along with the `recrudescence' in Nairobi `of the type crime of which there was 
far too much before the Emergency', related to African unemployment and housing 
shortages, was a matter for the police. Yet, while `these straws in the wind in Nairobi 
and Georges Fischer (eds. ). Decolonisation and After The British and French Experience (London: 
Frank Cass. 1980). p. 29. 
39 CO 822/1252. GH 5/ /'19Nol. II. Baring to Lennox-Boyd 27 Feb. 1957. 
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and in Nyanza' were not considered to be a `very big affair', they served as `an 
indication of the sort of trouble which we can expect in the future if things go wrong'. 
It is noteworthy that by February 1958, a month before the elections under the 
Lennox-Boyd Constitution, Kenya's ISWC had prepared a draft of a revised Colony 
Internal Security Scheme. Based upon `the experience gained in the last [five-and-a- 
half] years, and in the light of the Kenya Intelligence Committee's (KIC) most recent 
appreciation', the scheme recognised that: `In any future Emergency, trouble is likely 
to take the form of strikes, civil disobedience, sabotage, and the dislocation of 
transport and supplies rather than armed insurrection. '40 
The Kenya government had already set up an Economic Priorities Committee, 
headed by the leading white settler politician, Sir Michael Blundell, then European 
Minister without Portfolio, `to study supply problems in such an eventuality' in April 
1957, a month after the first African elections to the Legislative Council 
. 
41 This would 
continue in being under the auspices of the revised internal security scheme. The 
principal aim of the scheme, as one might expect, was: `In the event of unrest to 
prevent the breakdown of law and order, to maintain services essential to the 
community, and where necessary, to safeguard life and property. '42 
This was quite natural, of course, but betrays a sense that despite the `normal 
situation', officials in Kenya feared that everyday law enforcement might not be 
sufficient. Of greatest concern to the ISWC was that while sufficient `resources', or 
`Colony reserves' (i. e. personnel) were available to deal with perceived threats to 
40 CO 822/ 1 306. WAR/C 1105. The Colony Internal Security Scheme: Memorandum by the Internal 
Security Working Committee'. 21 Feb. 1958. For discussion of the pre-Emergency internal security 
scheme see: Chapter I. and Percox. 'British Counter-Insurgence'. 
41 CO 822/1306, WAR/C 1105. The Colony Internal Security Scheme': Bennett. Kenia: A Political 
Hi sto»V, p. 141. 
42 CO 82 2/ 1306. 'Annex "A" to WAR/C 1105: Kenya Colony Internal Security Scheme'. 
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internal security as they stood: `If a serious threat were to materialise in the Northern 
Province, necessitating the use of two battalions of troops 
... 
the combined military and 
police forces available might not be adequate to meet simultaneously internal security 
situations without the addition of further [GSU] platoons. "' 
There was also the problem of civilian manpower to maintain essential services. 
It is again noteworthy that while the Tribal Police were placed at the disposal of the 
Provincial and District Security Committees, and were not, therefore, available for 
colony-wide provisions, as such, additional reserves were comparatively meagre. Apart 
from only 2,600 convicts from a colony total of over 16,000 (not including Mau Mau 
detainees), the rest being available to the Provinces, the ISWC could only rely on `a 
register of some 13,000 male Europeans liable to call-up under the Compulsory 
National Service Ordinance'. 
Yet, ironically, the very effort to make contingencies for a breakdown in the 
security situation, albeit at the economic level, had its attendant risks. Expansion of the 
numbers of GSU platoons as a colony reserve, and of the police that might be required 
for the Nairobi area could not be undertaken without `equivalent economies'. While it 
was decided that Asians and Africans should be registered as volunteers, the latter, it 
was thought, `would be particularly susceptible to intimidation'. The greatest difficulty 
43 Ibid., WAR/C 1105, 'The Colon), Internal Security Scheme', para. 10. `Resources available' 
included: 207 Royal East African Navy (REAN) personnel. two Kenya KAR battalions 'so far as not 
committed to operations on the Northern Frontier or elsewhere, the [East Africa] Command Reserve 
KAR battalion 'available if not committed elsewhere in the Command; one British infantry battalion 
of the UK Strategic Reserve. 'which is normally stationed in Nairobi - available with War Office 
approval, but may at any time be serving outside East Africa': part of a British infantry battalion of 
British Forces, Arabian Peninsula (BFAP). normally stationed at Gilgil 'available with War Office 
approval, but its presence in Kenya cannot be guaranteed'. the Kenya Regiment (Territorial Force). 
comprising about 700 men. 'available except for members whose civilian employment is in essential 
services'. the UK Colonial Internal Security Brigade, 'available on application to and approval by Her 
Majesty's Government. 12 GSU platoons. comprising 411 men: and five Prison Department Special 
Platoons. c. 180 men. The latter 'would be required to guard convicts if any considerable number of 
convicts was enlarged to work on essential services such as the operation of Mombasa Port. 
174 
with the registration of any volunteers, it seems, was that the preparation of nominal 
rolls of European volunteers in particular `would cause alarm and despondency-, 
exacerbate African feeling and serve little purpose since the lists would soon be out of 
date'. 44 However, despite the potential pitfalls, the War Council agreed, within weeks 
of the forthcoming African elections, that `it was particularly important to be prepared 
during the next few months'. Publicity was to be kept to a minimum. 
This contradictory approach, minimising publicity so as not to `scaremonger', 
yet wishing to be seen to be making adequate preparations for all eventualities, was a 
constant feature of internal security planning, as were re-appraisals to take account of 
possible renewed threats to security. By December 1958, it appeared `from recent 
utterances of certain African politicians' that a `plan of "positive action"` focused on 
Nairobi, Mombasa, and Nakuru was imminent: 
The Director of Intelligence and Security [DIS] in his brief to the Security Council in 
September anticipated that this campaign might develop in early 1959. He was of the 
opinion that the campaign would take the form of boycotts, spasmodic industrial 
strikes, and general civil disobedience. [... ] In these circumstances it can be anticipated 
that racial relations will deteriorate with a consequential increase in anti-European and 
anti-Asian incidents. It may even be that in an atmosphere of racial disharmony, the 
economic affect [sic] on strikers may well lead to an increase in attacks on non-African 
property. At worst a planned campaign against unprotected and easy targets such as 
old folk and isolated women might develop. 45 
The short-term solution to this potential problem was to reconstitute the Asian 
and European Home Guard system which had operated during the anti-Mau Mau 
campaign. Significantly, these Home Guards would not be issued with firearms, and 
every effort would be made to ensure that the `jittery' Asians and Europeans were led 
to believe that the government was `quietly taking action to meet the eventuality of 
'' Ibid., War Council Minute 2284, n. d. (c. I', March 1958). 
a' Ibid.. SC 44. 'Security Council Ach-isory to the Governor: Memorandum by the European Minister 
without Portfolio IN. F. Harris I- Security in Urban Areas'. 9 Dec. 1958. 
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"positive action" being accompanied by sporadic violence'. To help perpetuate this 
semi-fiction, which was intended to restore confidence, even government officials were 
instructed that the measure was precautionary `but in no way foreshadows serious 
trouble'. 
Both of these aspects of internal security contingency planning were, of course, 
consistent with the aim of maintaining Kenya's economic viability, by dealing with both 
direct threats and the related issues of domestic and international confidence. 
However, even the requirement that the `Regular Police' contact the ex-leaders of the 
Asian and European Home Guards to get plans underway met with difficulties. In 
discussion, Catling explained that `the hands of the Police were already full, and they 
should not be expected to undertake the responsibilities which it was suggested in the 
memorandum should be required of them; they were very short of European Police 
Officers '. 46 
Manpower shortages were a perennial problem for the Europeans concerned 
with Kenya's internal security management. 47 This was reflected particularly in the 
arrangements for the protection of Colony Vulnerable Points which included, for 
example, water supplies, airports, oil installations, hospitals, and `certain factories'. ` `g 
In some cases steps were taken `to enlist employees in essential services as Special 
Constables; in the event of an emergency they would assist in the protection of their 
own installations while performing their normal, essential duties'. It was fortunate, 
-16 Ibid., S/C/MIN 156. 'Security in Urban Areas', n. d. (c. 22 Dec. 1958). 
" CO 822/1255. CM (57) 140, 'War Council Business. Ist March. 1957 to the 30th April. 1957'. note 
by the Secretary to the War Council (Corfield). 2 May 1957. One of the problems. for example. was 
that 'only about 30 percent Isici of members of the Kenya Regiment were at present fulfilling their 
statutory duties 
... 
' 
48 CO 822/1306. SC 58. 'Protection of Vulnerable Points'. memo. by A. C. C. Swann (Minister for 
Defence. Nairobi), 21 March 1959. 
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perhaps, that: `Members of the staffs of many essential installations were already in the 
KPR. ' 
Yet, even then manpower was still thin on the ground: `It would be impossible 
to provide guards for all the Vulnerable Points, and Provincial Security Committees 
would have to decide, if and when the need arose, how they could best dispose the 
forces available to them. A9 The view of at least one Colonial Office official on this 
matter is telling: 
I hope it will be possible to "leak" the manpower preparations to the general public. 
The next few months will be crucial and weakness never has paid off; public 
knowledge that the Gov[ernmen]t are rigid in their determination to act quickly and 
vigorously against any threat would allay disquiet felt by Europeans both here and in 
Kenya and make even the most extremist of the African "black nationalists" think twice 
before agreeing to a full-scale campaign of disobedience and non-co-operation. [... ] Mr 
Rolfe would no doubt like to see these papers in case Tanganyika are preparing a 
similar scheme, or in case they are not (! )50 
Security considerations after the apparent military defeat of Mau Mau were not 
just confined to politics and the economic survival of the colony. For example, an 
outbreak of Mau Mau oathing in Meru in late 1957, although relatively small and 
quickly dealt with, raised concerns because it had taken three or four months before 
the government had become aware of it. " This apparent failure to anticipate trouble 
was all too familiar, and no less disturbing. By contrast, potential unrest in Nyanza 
Province in early 1957 had been detected early on as a result of `increased and 
extended' coverage by Special Branch, no doubt because of the prominence of Luo 
politicians in the run up and subsequent to the election. 
52 However, because the 
49 Ibid., S/C/MIN 220. n. d. (c. March 1959). 
50 Ibid.. Colonial Office, hand-written minute. signature illegible (W. J. Dunn? ). 27 March 1958. 
CO 822/1254. `Mau Mau Oathing in Meru District, memo. by the Office of the Director of 
Intelligence and Security. 24 Jan. 1958. 
S` CO 822/1278. EMER 45/77/IA/253. E. W. M. Magor (Ministry of Defence. Nairobi) to J. L. F. Buist 
(Colonial Office). 24 April 1957. Annex to WAR/C 1047. 'A Review of the Security Situation in 
Nv anza Province'. by the Kenya Intelligence Committee (KIC). n. d. (c. April 1957). 
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successful candidates had apparently been elected because of tribal affiliation `rather 
than their political opinions', the assessment of future security prospects was not 
overly sanguine. In reviewing the security situation in Nyanza, the War Council 
reported: 
There is no doubt that these newly Elected Members are well aware of this fact and 
they will be compelled to give considerable attention to local tribal interests, despite 
their desire to promote African unity in order to further their nationalist policies. [... ] Their activities may further unsettle those sections of the population, particularly in Central and North Nyanza, which are already disturbed by their increasing economic difficulties. " 
A particular economic difficulty was presented by the greater availability of 
Kikuyu labour, whether former detainees or those displaced by mechanisation or a 
failure to obtain or retain land under the land consolidation schemes. '`' This 
corresponded with the need in Kiambu District, for example, to `de-villagise' in order 
that land consolidation could proceed uninterrupted. It seemed inevitable that the 
African politicians would exploit many Africans' `justifiable fears' for their economic 
security, and that the African intelligentsia, especially those who looked to `the 
ultimate establishment of an African state in Kenya', would become increasingly 
concerned with politics: `In view of these inevitable political trends the establishment 
of a Central Convention of District Political Associations should be delayed, at least 
until the present predominance of Nyanza tribesmen amongst the African Elected 
Members has been countered by the return of the Kikuyu into political life'. 55 What at 
first appears to a be concern to avoid ethnic tensions rather than to manipulate them, 
seems more likely to represent the cynical, if pragmatic, approach of the old policy of 
'3 Ibid.. Annex to WAR/C 1047, 'A Review of the Security Situation in Nyanza Province' (emphasis 
added). 
sa By April 1958, there were less than 15.000 detainees, the release rate being about 1.000 per month. 
See: CO 822/1252, Baring to Lennox-Boyd. 8 April 1958. 
5; CO 822/1255. CM (58) 83. 'War Council Business. 4th Dec.. 1957 to the 4th March. 1958. note by 
F. D. Corfield (Secretary to the War Council. Nairobi). 13, March 1958. 
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`divide and rule' ! Certainly, the prevalence of African `tribalism' in Kenyan politics 
only highlighted the failure of the Emergency policy of restricting African political 
participation to the local level, a policy which inevitably proved to be counter- 
productive given British hopes for implementing a `multi-racial' state. Moreover, the 
prominent Luo politicians, particularly Mboya, were proving to be far too successful in 
furthering the African nationalist cause. 
Indeed, even piecemeal political concessions, in an atmosphere of aggravated 
socio-economic hardship, created more problems, at least potentially, than they solved. 
At the grass roots level the best that the administration could hope for was to remove 
or alleviate the causes of African grievances: `It is clearly important on security 
grounds, that there should be increased agricultural production and that the fertility of 
the soil should be maintained and improved. ' In Central Province `Welfare Centres' 
were considered to be a useful option, if for more cynical purposes: `In my view, it is 
important to provide some form of recreation and mental stimulus for the African 
employee during his leisure hours, lest his activities turn to less desirable channels. '56 
While thought unlikely, a major concern remained that the various reforms and 
mechanisms of supervision and control could still fail. Aware of the potential for 
widespread African disaffection as the Kenya government was, frequent reminders of 
Mau Mau proved to be more than a little unnerving. Again, this was not so much 
because the administration felt unable to deal with security risks, but because the 
extent and potential of such risks, as ever, had often been under-estimated. The 
emergence of Kiama Kia Muingi (Council/Society of the People), or KKM, was a 
case-in-point. 
S6 CO 822/1280. WAR/C 1082, 'Markets and Welfare Centres in Settled Areas. memo. by \V. F. 
Coutts. (Special Commissioner [for African Elections]). 3 Dec. 1957. 
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At one level, it was the popular perception of KK1vI that gave cause for 
concern. 57 In explaining that the movement was spreading, and that there had been an 
increase in violent crime, including the murder of a European farmer, Baring wrote to 
Lennox-Boyd in April 1958, and explained that: `The security position gives cause for 
some anxiety, but not for the fears expressed by some people in this country. ''8 The 
expansion of KKM `particularly on farms of Europeans who are not good employers' 
did, however, give enough cause for anxiety that a week earlier Baring had concluded 
that 
this is yet another proof that as long as detainees and convicts are being released into 
the country, and as long as they are being absorbed into employment, we cannot afford 
to abandon Emergency powers. A still more important conclusion is the strength of the 
habit of playing with secret societies in the Kikuyu mind. I hope you will agree that this 
is a very strong argument in favour of having on our permanent Statute Book certain 
important powers to replace those which we will abandon when the Emergency comes 
to an end. 59 
Lennox-Boyd's reply to Baring is instructive: 
In many ways your task must present itself as a race to get these people safely back 
into permanent work before they are got at by KKM, and so either turned into 
missionaries in their eventual homes or inhibited from being resettled at all. [... ] I have 
never felt that we could revert entirely to the legal position as it was before the 
Emergency and shall feel very sympathetic to any proposals you put forward to 
strengthen your anti-subversive powers, although as you know some of the 
suggestions which are now being examined present peculiar difficulties [see pp. 190- 
60 6]. 
Yet, the apparent emergence of KKM from the so-called Mau Mau `passive 
wing' in Embu and Nairobi and the adjoining reserve had been discovered in March 
1955, and as a measure of how seriously it was at first taken, the movement was not 
5' Oginga Odinga.. \"ot Yet Uhuru: the autobiography of'Oginga Odinga (London. Ibadan. Nairobi: 
Heinemann, 1969 11967]), pp. 161-2. 
CO 822/1252. Baring to Lennox-Boyd. 8 April 1958. 
59 CO 822/1347. Baring to Lennox-Boyd. 2 April 1958. 
60 Ibid.. Lennox-Boyd to Baring, 6 May 1958. Colonial Office and Kenya government deliberations 
over post-Emergency or 'twilight' legislation included proposals for pre-emptive measures to 
deal 
with potential subversion. and legislation to enable the restriction of -specified 
detainees. thereby 
circumventing the limitations of the ILO and Human Rights Conventions. 
See. for example: CO 
822/13,34. C0822/1337. CO 822/1420. CO 822/2090. and CO 822/2091. 
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proscribed until January 1958.61 The Kenya government's reaction to KKM was not, 
therefore, as swift as has been suggested. 62 This seemingly belated response was again 
a function of changing intelligence appreciations and, more importantly, an apparent 
desire not to be too `heavy handed'. This, in itself, was a security expedient, aimed at 
avoiding unnecessary antagonisation of Africans and the consequent potential for 
political disaffection and its attendant difficulties. Consideration of Britain's response 
to KKM, and the timing of that response, is crucial to understanding how the 
authorities perceived the balance between political progress and the likelihood of a 
repeat of Mau Mau. 
By being seen to be helping to secure the surrender of the remaining guerrillas, 
KK M hoped that all Emergency restrictions on the Kikuyu would thereby be lifted. 
However, as the Secretary to the War Council (and later author of the now infamous 
report into the origins and growth of Mau Mau), Frank Corfield, explained to the 
Colonial Office, `the real but undeclared aims of the body were to unify the Kikuyu- 
speaking peoples as a first step and then to strive for the acquisition of more land, the 
eviction of Europeans and, ultimately, self-government as a second'. Despite this early 
realisation that KKN'l's aims were synonymous with those of Mau Mau, its apparently 
`passive' nature, lack of central direction, and limited geographical extent precluded 
proscription. Regardless of Colonial Office protestations, it seems that the Kenya 
government considered that, so long as KKM did not resort to subversive activities, it 
61 CO 822/789, telegram 1041, Crawford to Lennox-Boyd. 16 Sept. 1955. Annex to WAR/C 731. 
'Kiama Kia Muingi: An Appreciation by the Kenya Intelligence Committee. n. d. (c. 6 June 1955): 
CO 822/1346. telegram 32. R. G. Turnbull (Chief Secretary. Nairobi) to Lennox-Boyd. 13 Jan. 1958. 
Omosule, ' Kiama Ida Muingi'. gives details of the seemingly complex aims of KKM. which appear to 
have been ver much an extension of those of the so-called Mau Mau. albeit exacerbated by the 
dispossessions and disaffection resulting from land consolidation. See also: Füredi.. \lau 
-haar liar. 
pp. 149-224. 
62 Omosule. 'Kiama kia Muingi'. p. 127. 
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could be regarded as a quasi-legitimate expression of those Kikuyu aims which had 
been shown to be unobtainable by violence. 63 Besides, proscription would have merely 
given the organisation `undesirable publicity). 64 
Although by January 1958 KKM had apparently committed no violent acts, its 
similarity to Mau Mau in terms of being a secret society, bound by an oath, and the 
discovery that the movement was in fact better organised than had previously been 
thought, were sufficient legal grounds for its sudden proscription. 65 Indeed, there was a 
firm belief that KIMM too closely followed `the same pattern as did Mau Mau in the 
period leading up to [the] outbreak of violence which brought on [the] Emergency' 
With the forthcoming elections under the Lennox-Boyd Constitution, and the imminent 
arrival of BLFK, the erstwhile secret compilation by K KM of lists of Kikuyu `loyalists' 
and their families may not simply have raised concern for their safety. 66 The Kenya 
government was not only concerned that KKM sought to `undermine the authority of 
African administration in [the] Reserves'. As Kenya's then Chief Secretary, Richard 
Turnbull, explained to Lennox-Boyd: 
Activities of this Society must be particularly dangerous at the present time when [the] 
most difficult type of rehabilitated detainee is being returned to [the] Reserves in 
increasing numbers and it is essential [that] conditions should be stable. Existence of 
[an] organisation deliberately seeking to undermine established authority would present 
[a] serious threat to [the] rehabilitation and re-absorption programmes. 67 
With the March 1958 elections on the way, the Colonial Office was anxious 
that KKM should not be seen as another Mau Mau. Political solutions to Kenya's 
63 822/789. CAB 18/7, Corfield (Kenya War Council) to Mathieson (Colonial Office), 17 Sept. 1955. 
EAF 15/61/01, Mathieson to Corfield. 29 Sept. 1955. INT 38/10A. 43. E. W. M. Magor (MoD. Nairobi) 
to M. Scott (Colonial Office). 16 Dec. 1955. EAF 16/61/01. Mathieson to Crawwford. 16 Jan. 1956. 
CAB 25/14, Crawford to Mathieson. 31 Jan. 1956. 'Extract from Minutes of War Council Meeting 
held on 16 April 1956: Kiama Kia Muingi'. 
64 Ibid., 'Kiama Kia Muingi: Appreciation by the Kenya Intelligence Committee'. 4 April 1956. 
65 CO 822/ 1346. telegram 32. Turnbull to Lennox-Boyd. 1) Jan. 1958. 
66 Ibid.: Omosule. 'Kiama kia Muingi', p. 125. 
67 CO 822/1346. Turnbull to Lennox-Boyd. 13 Jan. 1958. 
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difficulties should be seen to be working, especially by observers in Britain: `Suggest 
that, if further public references cannot be avoided, it would restore perspective to 
refer to [the] ease with which embryo [sic] secret societies of this nature are now 
uncovered because of African co-operation and [the] desire to prevent their grow-th. '68 
Equally, if not more important, so long as African nationalists adhered to the Colonial 
Office formula for constitutional advance, Britain could, or hoped at least, to proceed 
with strategic plans for the area. Britain had hoped, therefore, that the veneer provided 
by the Lennox-Boyd Constitution would not only demonstrate a willingness to make 
reasonable concessions to nationalist demands, but in doing so would provide an 
incentive for the African politicians to adhere to the spirit, and the delay implied by the 
Colonial Office policy of `gradualness'. 
This may well have prompted Baring to be a little economical with the truth in 
his April 1958 assessment. What is certain, is that for the remainder of 1958, as arrests 
of KKM oath administrators and `manager types' proceeded apace, more information 
gathered about the organisation gave increasing cause for concern. Not only did the 
KKM oath `include a pledge to kill loyal Africans and Europeans', with `plans to resort 
to violence at some future date if it did not achieve its aims by non-violent means'. 
There was also evidence of KKM taking on `military ranks' and, more ominous, the 
movement was much more widespread than previously thought, with `probably 
20,000' members in Kandara Division of Fort Hall District alone. 69 
Also integral to KKM plans was the year 1960 when, it was believed, Kenyatta 
would be released, and European supremacy in Kenya would naturally come to, or 
68 Ibid.. Roberts (Colonial Office) to Griffith-Jones (Member for Legal Affairs. Nairobi). 17 Jan. 1958. 
69 Ibid.. telegram 386, Baring to Lennox-Boyd. 19 May 1958, Annex to SC 5. Security Council 
Advisory to the Governor. 'Kiama Kia Muingi: Report by the Director of Intelligence and Securit\ 
20 May 1958. KIC (FINAL) 4/58. 'Ken va Intelligence Committee: Kiama Kia Mtuingi'. 25 June 1958. 
Secret Saving 1692/58. Coutts to Baring. 5 July 1958. 
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rather be fairly rapidly brought to, an end. In Kihara Division, KKM had another name: 
`Kiarna Kia 1960'. 70 The Kenya government was already aware that proscription of 
KIUvI in itself would not prevent its re-emergence under other names, and `will deepen 
and perpetuate the rift between the loyalists and the rest of the [Kikuyu] tribe. The 
society will continue to exist more secretly than before. -)71 As the ringleaders and oath 
administrators were being arrested, the tried-and-tested techniques of `Closer 
Administration' were applied: curfews (sometimes 23 hours), restrictions on 
movement, the closure of markets, and good old confessional barazas. 
KKM apparently received `stimulus' from `the intemperate utterances of 
African politicians'. While `Mboya and his associates in the production of the 
[newspaper] "Uhuru"' received warnings, the fear was that pressure on KKM might 
not be maintained indefinitely `owing to the present difficulty in obtaining suitable 
Special Branch staff 
. 
72 The British Army kept a close eye on the situation: `From the 
evidence available it would appear that Mau Mau has never been eliminated. There is 
no requirement for troops at the present stage but should the growth of the society 
out-run the efforts of the Security Forces, military assistance might be required in 
about three months time. '73 
Fortunately for the Kenya government, a re-run of the early phase of the anti- 
Mau Mau campaign was avoided. (Although it could be suggested that levels of 
political and socio-economic development were by this time sufficient to offset the 
`negative' aspects of the police counter-subversion campaign. ) By September 1958, it 
appeared that curfews and barazas had brought an end to the KKM `crisis', with 217 
70 Ibid.. 'Kiama Kia Muingi: Report by the Director of Intelligence and Security'. 20 May 1958. 
" Ibid., KIC (FINAL) 2/58. `Kenna Intelligence Committee: Kiama Kia Muingi'. 10 Jan. 1958. 
12 Ibid., Secret Saving 1692/58. Coutts to Baring. 5 July 1958. 
73 WO 276/375. Major, GSO 2 (INT) to Maj. 
-Gen. Sir N. Tapp. (GOC. EAC). 2 May 1958 
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committees `known to have been destroyed since April 1958', compared with only two 
attempts `known to have been made to reform [sic] a committee'. 74 Any expansion had 
at least, apparently, been put in check. 75 The head of Special Branch, Ian Henderson's 
assessment was that while 
KKM or a similar movement under another name, would inevitably continue to 
smoulder [... ] with our present organisation we should catch such a movement before 
it became very strong or resorted to large scale violence. On the other hand, like all 
people who know the Kikuyu well, and who have had active experience of the troubles 
of the last six years, he ended with the warning that we must be prepared for a series of 
surprises. 76 
Henderson's warning very quickly turned out to have been prescient. By 
December 1958, KKIM had re-emerged in Fort Hall and Embu. 77 This in itself gave 
little cause for concern, but the discovery of contacts between the Limuru branch of 
Mboya's Nairobi Peoples' Convention Party (NPCP) and `prominent KKM 
personalities' was another matter. While the apparent involvement of KKM in the open 
arena of political discourse might well have represented the successful combination of 
action against KK1VI subversion and political development, there were a number of 
reasons to be cautious: `The new approach is not the same as the approach of the first 
half of 1958. Thus, there is hardly any mention of poisoning 
- 
the emphasis is on the 
Kenyatta Cult and on future action at an unspecified but comparatively distant date. ' 
-74 CO 822/1346. `Extract from K. I. C. Appreciation No. 9/5 for period 1-3 1.8.58'. In August 1958. the 
Secretary to the Cabinet was able to report to the Council of Ministers that given the measures taken 
against KKM 'so it was possible gradually to relax some of the restraints on the movement of KEM 
with effect from the 1st June: these include the employment of former detainees in forest villages. an 
extension of the process of allowing approved tenant farmers to move out to live on their holdings. 
and in allowing cattle to be moved out of the villages to manvattas'. CO 822/1255. 'Review of the 
Business of the Security Council Advisory to the Governor up to the end of July 1958. note by the 
Secretary to the Cabinet. 7 Aug. 1958. 
CO 822/1346. Baring to Lennon-Boyd. 4 Sept. 1958. 'Extract from KIC Appreciation No. 10/58 for 
period 1-30.9. i8". 
" Ibid.. Baring to Lennox-Boyd. 4 Sept. 1958. 
" Ibid.. Security Council Minute 150. Dec. 1958. GH 1953/5/17 VI/. Baring to C. M. Johnston 
(Minister for African Affairs). 23 Dec. 1958. 
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This led, in particular, to the decision to slow down the release rate of KKM 
detainees. The last thing the administration wanted was for proven or potential 
militants to be given access to the coverage afforded by political organisations, nor did 
it want a blurring of the distinction between politics and violence. The KKM detainees 
who could be released, however, were that small number who had not only confessed, 
but in doing so had also implicated others. This limit on numbers, it was thought, 
would enable the police to `scrutinise' the whole of Kiambu, Fort Hall, and Embu for 
KKM throughout 1959 without risking a resurgence of subversive activity. The release 
of KIMM detainees would also depend upon the extent of subversion in their home 
area 
. 
78 
Security planning for 1959 was all well and good, but the failure of Britain's 
political strategy in Kenya brought future policy-making into sharp relief. Britain's 
plans for Kenya were not helped, either, by events elsewhere in East Africa and the 
Hola controversy. No sooner had Britain got its strategic plans for Kenya well 
underway, and the colony's future set within the acceptable limits of `gradualness', 
than British ministers were forced to reassess their approach to maintaining a `guiding 
influence' in the territory's political affairs. The next chapter will examine the 
increasingly sophisticated, if sometimes desperate, measures taken to ensure that 
Kenya, and Britain's `vital interests', would remain stable and secure until, and beyond, 
independence. 
Ibid.. 'Extract from KIC Appreciation No. 1/59 , 'Extract 
from KIC Appreciation No. 5/5ýý 
. 
'Extract 
from KIC Appreciation No. 7/59'. 
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Conclusion 
Having achieved an end to the Mau Mau insurgency, Britain did its utmost to be seen 
to make concessions to legitimate African nationalist aspirations. In doing so, it was 
hoped that Kenya would remain stable enough for Britain to `guide' future political 
developments at its leisure, thereby securing existing economic interests and facilitating 
the post-Suez regional strategy. However, the imperatives of economic efficiency, and 
limited financial resources, ensured that a great many Africans would not benefit from 
selective socio-economic reforms, such as land consolidation, and there were simply 
not enough jobs to go around. With resultant crime and militancy on a par with levels 
seen before the Emergency, and the seemingly perennial dearth of resources to cater 
for all perceivable internal security contingencies, the myth of `normality' in Kenyan 
society could only ever be perpetuated while the African nationalists continued to 
legitimise Britain's interpretation of the nature and pace of political developments in 
Kenya through their participation. Once this was withdrawn, Britain would have to 
meet the nationalists halfway in an effort to avoid a repeat of Mau Mau and the 
dangerous prospect of an irreversible loss of control. 
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Chapter VI 
Internal Security and Decolonisation: II, 1959-65 
Introduction 
As the pace of constitutional advance in Kenya began perforce to accelerate in 1959, 
and the nationalists made maximum capital of ongoing and widespread African socio- 
economic grievances, Britain had to be seen to make sufficient concessions to maintain 
political credibility. Military victory over Mau Mau in 1956 had not been decisive, and 
selective reforms, by definition, still left too many disaffected Africans for threats of 
subversion to simply go away. The first section of this chapter (1959-63) will show 
how, as pressure increased for a quick withdrawal, Britain had to combine political 
tactics designed to foster `moderate' government with ever-sophisticated means of 
ensuring that internal security did not collapse. There was just too much to lose. 
The next section (1963-5) will show that once Britain was presented with the 
kind of African nationalist leadership in Kenya with which it could do business, 
considerable risks were taken to ensure that this government would be seen, so far as 
possible, to possess impeccable nationalist credentials. The supposed `extremists' 
would be given no quarter. This was the only credible alternative to a return to 
widespread violence and even civil war. It was also imperative that, given Kenyatta's 
new-found acceptability, the utmost be done to ensure that he, or his `moderate' 
colleagues, would remain in power after independence. Britain therefore redoubled its 
efforts to build up Kenya's security services, this time in Kenyatta's favour. Only then 
could Britain safeguard its `vital interests' without risking a blood bath and the 
ignominy of having to retain formal administrative control. 
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Securing `vital interests': Britain's efforts to maintain control, 1959-63 
In July 1959, Kenya's then European Minister without Portfolio, N. F. Harris, cited the 
discovery of yet another secret society, Kiama Kia Thayu (Council/Society of Peace), 
to justify the continuation of the State of Emergency. Yet, events had already dictated 
that this would not continue for long. ' As is well known, the murder of 11 detainees by 
African wardens at the Hola Detention Camp in March had caused considerable 
political embarrassment for the British government, both at home and abroad. ' This 
added urgency to Lennox-Boyd's April announcement of future constitutional talks, in 
response to pleas from Baring following the Africans' January boycott of Legislative 
Council. 3 The announcement was, of course, as much a domestic and international 
political bridge-building exercise in the wake of Hola as a palliative for the African 
MLCs. 4 What matters here, though, is that for constitutional talks to take place (with 
African participation), let alone work, the State of Emergency would have to be lifted. 
Baring `felt that if it should be possible to do this some time in advance of the opening 
of the Constitutional Conference, that might do much to ensure a reasonable political 
atmosphere for negotiation' 
.5 
The prospect of ending the Emergency presented both the Colonial Office and 
the Kenya government with a dilemma. Much depended on the readiness of security 
' CO 822/1348, 'Extract from "Kenya Calling" [Kenya government Public Relations Department 
Newsletter]', 25 July 1959; Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation, pp. 244-69, 'British Decolonization 
since 1945', pp. 202-5; Holland, European Decolonization, pp. 241-2; Lapping, 
End of Empire. p. 
435. 
2 Alistair Horne, Vacinillan 1957-1986 (New York: Viking, 1989), pp. 174-6; Richard Lamb, The 
. 
1facrnillan Years 1957-1963: The Emerging Truth (London: John Murray. 1995). pp. 60.223-4.237- 
40,241-2,244. Maloba, 
.1 lau 
. 
11au and Kenya, pp. 155-6 John Turner, 
_tlacmillan 
(London: 
Longman, 1994). p. 187-8. 
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legislation to replace the Emergency Regulations. As Webber in the Colonial Office 
put it to Kenya's then Minister for Legal Affairs, E. N. Griffith-Jones: 
We are tentatively exploring [the] idea of ending [the] Emergency on say 31st December and announcing [the] intention of so doing before Baring goes. We wish to 
advise Ministers urgently whether, leaving aside all other considerations, it is realistic 
to assume that such replacement legislation as must (repeat must) be enacted before [the] Emergency is lifted could in fact be enacted before 31st December. [... ] [I]t 
would be helpful to know now your assessment of [the] political effects of ending [the] Emergency and seeking, as a prelude, to enact [a] body of pretty controversial legislation. Would it strengthen or embarrass moderates of all races? What has been 
your latest thinking on [the] likely date of ending [the] Emergency? 6 
The Kenya government agreed with the Colonial Office's timetable `which 
accords with our own thinking', provided that `we would be authorised to enact the 
Preservation of Public Security [PPS] Bill 
... 
before the ending of the emergency'. 
Griffith-Jones continued: 
Political effect would be generally good. The operation would be conducive to success 
of conference in the new year and would remove certain targets of political agitation 
and generally clear the air. [... ] Moderates would, we think, be strengthened and 
encouraged rather than embarrassed. Replacement legislation would be welcomed by 
moderates but would be strongly opposed by African extremists. Divisions among 
Africans might become more acute. Generally speaking responsible opinion recognises 
both sides of Fairn's penny, which we have accepted, i. e. end the emergency as early as 
possible but replacement legislation essential. ' 
Crucially, the PPS Bill was intended to provide for Regulations to enable the 
continued detention and restriction of `the residue'. Other legislation to pre-empt 
subversion would be enacted to replace the Emergency Regulations dealing with public 
meetings, seditious publications, control of printing presses, and control of movement. 
Effectively, the Kenya government would retain Emergency powers in all but name. 
Moreover, the arguably most controversial measure was the replacement of Ordinance 
L. N. 37 (1956) `for control of African Colony wide political Associations to such an 
6 Ibid., telegram 225, Webber (Colonial Office) to Griffith-Jones (Nairobi). 16 Sept. 1959. 
Ibid., telegram 934. Griffith-Jones to Webber, 17 Sept. 1959. 
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extent as can be justified 
... 
either by amendment 
... 
or perhaps more acceptably, as [a] 
temporary measure by Regulations under the [PPS] Bill'. 8 
There are two ways that this can be interpreted. The most cynical, and perhaps 
obvious intention was, by using the threat of subversion, to ensure that African 
political progress would thereby be kept in check, enabling the perpetuation of the 
colonial state. There is certainly some truth in this, and the measure undoubtedly met 
with settler approval. However, as others have shown, the Colonial Office and the East 
African governors had, in early 1959, already conceded that Kenya would become 
independent, albeit some time between 1970 and 1975. Yet, events in Tanganyika, and 
`deadlock' in Kenya's Legislative Council brought an early reassessment of the 
timetable; Hola certainly added to these pressures. 9 Indeed, Murphy shows clearly that, 
in March 1959, the Secretary of State was more than a little perturbed by the lack of 
any reference to an eventual African majority in the Kenya government in the draft 
statement on policy provided by Baring. It seems that only Blundell's formation of the 
`multi-racial' New Kenya Group persuaded Lennox-Boyd to remove the `punch line' 
from his April speech to the Commons. 1° There was at least a `good chance' that the 
`moderate' option would still work. 
So, was the `twilight' legislation intended to put a brake on African nationalism 
per se, and only veiled under the issue of security? In his 10 November speech 
announcing the legislation, Baring's successor, Sir Patrick Renison, outlined the 
8 Ibid. 
9 CO 822/1819. `Future Policy in East Africa: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies', n. d. (c. Jan. 1959); Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation, pp. 244-69. `British 
Decolonization since 1945', pp. 202-5, Holland, European Decolonization. pp. 241-2: Lapping. End 
of Empire, p. 435.: Murphy `Lennox-Boyd at the Colonial Office'. p. 6. 
10 CO 822/1861. Lennox-Boyd to Baring. 26 March 1959, cited in Murphy 'Lennox-Boyd at the 
Colonial Office, p. 6. 
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provisions in the PPS Bill for stricter controls over public meetings and over the 
registration of colony-wide political associations: 
The Bill is therefore both an insurance against future troubles and a means of giving 
notice to any would-be trouble-makers of the Government's determination to maintain law and order and to take any measures essential to that end In pursuance of that determination and because I am satisfied that it is not possible, or compatible with the 
interests of security, to abandon completely the present controls under the Emergency 
legislation of political organisations and public meetings, it is my intention to make 
regulations under the [PPS] Bill, on its coming into force, to provide for the 
continuance of these two controls for the time being in such form as I may then 
consider to be still called for. I shall be guided not by race or racial politics but solely 
by my judgement of the needs of law and order. [... ] Please understand that I am not 
trying to restrain politics but to ensure peace for our development. l' 
Should Renison be taken at his word? It is clear that, like his predecessor, the 
new governor did not wish to restrain politics so long as it was of the moderate 
variety. It is fair to argue, therefore, that the legislation, and even its announcement, 
was intended to serve as a warning to Africans to play by the Colonial Office and 
Kenya government's political rules. Moderate government was, after all, the best 
safeguard of Britain's interests in Kenya. The same motives could be said to have 
applied, if indirectly, to the maintenance of powers of restriction and detention on the 
so-called 'politicals'. This was both a warning against subversive activity, and a 
precaution. 
In justifying the need to continue to exercise controls over the alleged Mau 
Mau managers Koinange, Mouria, and Murumbi should they return to Kenya, one 
Colonial Office official wrote: `Although these people have sat out the Emergency in 
this country [Britain], they are dangerous men, who hold high places in the mythology 
of Mau Mau and if allowed freely at large in Kenya at the present time would be a 
focus for disaffection and a constant threat to peace and security'. 
12 Again, it was 
" CO 822/1230, transcript of speech by Renison to Legislative Council. 10 Nov. 1959. 
CO 822/2091. Colonial Office minute by Hull. 31 Dec. 1959. 
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perception that mattered. The African had to be shown that the only way of achieving 
political progress was to abide by Colonial Office interpretations of the appropriate 
means to that end. The risk to the Colonial Office of Africans pursuing a militant 
alternative was just too great. 
The concept of `twilight legislation' to reinforce powers to maintain law and 
order in a pre- or post-emergency situation had been under consideration since Lord 
Salisbury's visit to Africa in early 1956. Salisbury noted a `defect' in `our machinery 
for preserving law and order in our Colonial territories 
... 
At present, it seems to be 
geared only to deal with two completely different sets of circumstances, what may be 
called normal times and what may be called emergencies. 13 That summer, Lennox- 
Boyd argued that existing powers were sufficient. Nevertheless, the CPC invited the 
Secretary of State to consider whether the powers of colonial governors `needed to be 
reinforced'. 14 
It is difficult to ascertain when, exactly, Lennox-Boyd's review of the 
governors' powers began. It is certain, and significant, that the examination was 
completed by the end of 1957, when the Lennox-Boyd Constitution and the decision to 
13 CAB 134/1202. CA (56) 18 'Powers of Colonial Governors to Preserve Order. Note by the Lord 
President of the Council', 16 May 1956. 
14 CAB 134/120 1. CA (56) 33rd Conclusions. 23 July 1956, CAB 134/1202, CA (56) 21. 'Powers of 
Colonial Governors to Preserve Order', memo. by Lennox-Boyd.. 31 May 1956. Lennox-Boyd had 
earlier experience of the problems referred to by Salisbury. In July 1955 the Governor of Cyprus, Sir 
Robert Armitage, had pressed the Colonial Secretary to allow him to declare a State of Emergency in 
order to deal with the Greek-Cypriot EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kuprion 
. 
4goniston 
- 
National 
Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) insurgents. But this might prejudice forthcoming negotiations with 
the Greek and Turkish governments over the future of the island. as well as being seen to be a 
prejudicial act in itself. The London negotiations and subsequent talks broke down over a combination 
of issues, including self-determination for the island. Enosis (union wr ith Greece). and the 
complexities surrounding Britain's relationship with Turkey in the Baghdad Pact. Only following the 
replacement of Armitage by Field Marshall Sir John Harding. the Chief of the Imperial General Staff 
with experience of counter-insurgency in Malaya and Kenya. and the clear lack of either ability or 
desire of the police to restore order did the British Cabinet accept that a State of Emergency- should be 
declared. as occurred on 26 Nov. 1955. David M. Anderson. 'Policing and communal conflict: the 
Cyprus Emergency. 1954-60'. in Anderson and Killingrav. Po/icing and Deco/onisation, pp. 187-98. 
Murphy, Alan I. ennox-Bovd, pp. 114-23. 
193 
station a `permanent' garrison of British troops in Kenya were public knowledge. The 
existence of `adequate powers to deal with subversion' it seemed `could be useful in 
itself as a stabilizing influence in the background of a Colony's political life'. As 
suggested in previous chapters, stable political conditions would also be useful to 
British defence strategists. 
Because there might well have been multiple factors which could contribute to 
unrest in any given colony (many of which would be territory-specific) it was 
considered too difficult to formulate `a general policy'. Given the perception in 
Government House and Whitehall that proposals for reinforcing security powers in 
Kenya should be examined prior to the withdrawal of Emergency Regulations, the 
colony was therefore singled out to become the `guinea pig-). 15 All the more important 
given Britain's strategic aims in the area. 
However, the lead was taken in Northern Rhodesia, where an ordinance was 
enacted enabling the governor to make regulations `to correct a situation which, if 
allowed to occur or continue, would be likely to lead' to the declaration of a State of 
Emergency. This provided for a situation whereby, under Article 15 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, Article 5, which prohibited detention without trial, 
could be derogated: `such derogation must be limited "to the extent strictly required by 
the exigencies of the situation". Whether or not an emergency exists is a question of 
fact. '16 Another advantage of dispensing with the need for a formal proclamation of an 
emergency was that it would be less damaging to `morale and to the economic and 
political situation in a territory'. 
1 CAB 134/1556, CPC (57) 38, 'Powers of Colonial Governors to Preserve Order', memo. by 
Lennox-Boyd. 20 Dec. 1957. 
16 CAB 134/1558. CPC (59) 5, 'Security Powers of Colonial Governors', memo. by Leimox-Boyd, 9 
June 1959 
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By June 1959, however, as pressure increased to bring the Kenya Emergency 
to an end in the wake of the Hola affair, concomitant political tensions created a 
paradox. In considering the prospects for ending the emergencies in Kenya and 
Nyasaland, Lennox-Boyd was concerned that `in present political circumstances' the 
introduction of legislation effectively giving colonial governors emergency powers 
when a State of Emergency did not formally exist `would provoke serious 
controversy'. 17 Much pivoted on the fact that the need for `twilight legislation' 
depended on `how important it was to end the technical state of emergency'. 
In Lennox-Boyd's view it was not essential to do so at the time because the 
continuation of the `technical' Emergency `did not really make the possibility of native 
African co-operation with the administration more unlikely, nor did it in reality reduce 
the chances of capital investment in the territories'. Equally important, given the 
forthcoming British general election, was that an early announcement of permanent 
security legislation might lead the Labour Party to make a commitment to reverse the 
policy. If the legislation were withdrawn subsequently `it would mean that the 
Governors would be entirely deprived of the powers they needed'. 18 It was hoped that 
the Fairn Committee (Hola) and the Devlin Committee (Nyasaland Emergency) might 
recommend the continuation of detention without trial of those incarcerated during 
`emergency conditions', thereby enabling the legislation to be limited, thus less 
controversial. The British government would not therefore authorise the introduction 
of the legislation before the summer recess: Lennox-Boyd would state in the Commons 
" Ibid.. CPC (59) 2nd Meeting. 18 June 1959. 
'ý Ibid.. CPC (59) Ord Meeting. 1 July 1959. 
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that no decision on the matter had been taken; and both governors would be authorised 
to continue to annul any Emergency Regulations that were no longer necessary. 19 
By 5 November 1959, when security powers in Kenya were again discussed in 
the CPC, the Conservative Party had retained office and lain Macleod had succeeded 
Lennox-Boyd at the Colonial Office. In Macleod's view the situation in Kenya had 
been transformed since his predecessor's policy announcement in April and the 
emergence of moderate political groups. He had hoped initially to `refer to Kenya in 
some detail"' in Colonial Debate in the Commons on 2 November, but there was 
insufficient time for Renison to examine the final proposals for the post-Emergency, or 
`twilight' legislation and to convince his Council of Ministers of their adequacy. 20 
Accordingly, the new Secretary of State proposed that Renison should be authorised 
to announce the end of the `formal' Emergency simultaneously with the introduction of 
the new legislation when opening the Legislative Council on 10 November. " 
To overcome the difficulty of any possible infringement of human rights, 
Macleod proposed a `two-tier system of emergency powers': 
The first tier would enable the Governor, after making an appropriate announcement, 
to assume certain strictly defined powers, such as those concerning public meetings, 
societies, publications and movement, but not the all-important power of detention 
without trial; these powers would be used either in a situation where there appeared to 
be a gradual development of unrest, intimidation and lawlessness, or in circumstances 
such as those existing in Kenya at present, where certain powers were needed but a full 
State of Emergency was no longer necessary. The second tier would enable the 
Governor, after issuing the necessary proclamation, to assume more drastic powers, 
including the right of detention without trial, in circumstances where the safety of the 
22 
nation was being endangered. 
19 Edgerton. Hau 
. 
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The declaration of the ending of the Emergency would also coincide with the 
announcement of an `act of grace' whereby 300 detainees ` and others convicted of 
certain offences in connection with the emergency' would be released. This would also 
allow the release of six `African loyalists convicted of offences against Mau Mau 
sympathisers' and `two junior European officers'. 23 Kenyatta, however, would remain 
under restriction, at least for the time being_24 
The ending of the State of Emergency and the concession of further 
constitutional advance in Kenya had broader implications for British policy, particularly 
overseas defence strategy. This applied at two levels. First, there was the matter of the 
UK Strategic Reserve, a Brigade Group stationed at Kahawa since June 1958, for 
internal security operations in Arabia and the Persian Gulf and, if necessary, to 
reinforce the KAR in East and Central Africa (see Chapters III-IV and VII). Then 
there was the KAR itself While the British troops in the UK Strategic Reserve had 
always remained under War Office control, and what mattered for Britain with regard 
to future constitutional development in the territory was the security of tenure of their 
base, the KAR, as East Africa's `local' military force, was far more intricately 
connected with Kenyan politics. 
In July 1957, following the end of active military operations against Mau Mau, 
the Templer Report was implemented, and control of the KAR reverted back to the 
governments of the East African territories, eventually under the administrative 
auspices of the East African Land Forces Organisation (EALFO). Almost from its 
inception, the EALFO suffered from financial problems, despite its military 
`3 Ibid. 
24 CAB 131/151. AT (GH) 18. 'Prime Ministers Visit to Africa January 1960: Jomo Kenyatta'. brief 
by the Colonial Office. 31 Dec. 1959. fo. 2. para. 4. 
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administration by the GOC, East Africa Command (see Chapters III-IV). This 
difficulty arose primarily from the practice of each of the three territories being 
responsible for its share of the EALFO estimates, which led to there being three 
separate, if not too dissimilar, yet competing sources of revenue. Invariably there were 
difficulties because one or another, if not all, of the territories could not find its full 
share. 
As we have seen, throughout 1957-60, this led to protracted negotiations 
concerning the relative administrative, financial, and military merits of a reversion back 
to War Office control, or variations on that theme. 25 It is unnecessary to cover old 
ground by a more detailed examination of these aspects of the subject here, but one 
policy decision in particular warrants greater attention: the British decision, after three 
years of resisting the change, that the War Office should resume financial and 
administrative control of the EALF after all. 
Murphy tells us that lain Macleod's `first major battle in the Cabinet in 1960 
was not over the speed of constitutional advance in the colonies but rather over his 
proposal that the British government should resume financial responsibility for the East 
African Land Forces'. 26 As his predecessor had done, Macleod suggested that this 
could be presented as a means by which local revenues could be freed up for `more 
constructive purposes, such as the development of agriculture and education'. 27 This, 
Macleod thought, `might have a decisive effect' on the forthcoming Lancaster House 
conference. Although there were protests, particularly from the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, D. Heathcoat Amory, who argued that the proposal represented a reversal 
,, For details, see: CO 968/693. CO 968/694. CO 968/695. and CO 968/696. 
26 Murphy. Party Politics. P. 181. 
27 CAB 1218/3 
. 
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of normal British policy towards its colonies, ultimately Macleod's argument 
concerning the `military and administrative advantages' of the change won the day. 28 
Accordingly, in a contrived spirit of magnanimity, the Cabinet agreed to announce the 
change along with a British pledge of a £5 million loan for land development. 29 So, 
what were these `military and administrative' advantages? 
Since the `Chequers decisions' of January 1959, and the adoption of the policy 
of `gradualness' (a euphemism for `delay') towards decolonisation, the issue of the 
EALF had been under considerable scrutiny. At the administrative, financial, and 
military levels it made perfect sense, from the points of view of both the Army and the 
East African governments, if the control of all military forces in East Africa were 
resumed by the War Office. 3o 
Politically, the motives for Britain's policy reversal were far less mundane. As 
Gorell Barnes put it to Baring the day before questions in the Commons on the Hola 
affair: 
In the first place we have to "sell" the policy of gradualness to those who would have 
us out of East Africa within the next few years. To do this we must make it clear that 
we are going to assist the local governments so far as we possibly can to finance 
programmes of development aimed at increasing prosperity and bringing the local 
people on in sufficient numbers to be able, more or less, to run things for themselves 
when the time comes. [... ] In the second place, we do not want what will in fact be a 
fairly rapid move forward to internal self-government (even on the middle road policy) 
to prejudice our own interests. [... ] If HM Government are to retain ultimate 
responsibility whether for defence or for ensuring that African or predominantly 
African Governments do not turn out the Asians or Europeans, or both, they will need 
the ultimate sanction of force. Furthermore, in so far as FIMG's interests remain 
"strategic" they will have an interest in the internal security of the area. [... ] At this 
moment the situation is secure because we are doing the governing. But our middle 
road policy envisages the beginning of responsible government for Tanganyika and 
Uganda and conceivably Zanzibar (possibly also Kenya) by 1965. From that time 
onwards we can expect increasing friction with Elected Ministers and Legislatures over 
the forces if the money has to be voted locally. Any attempt to take over the cost of 
,s Ibid., CC (60) 2nd Conclusions. 18 Jan. 1960. 
-9 Ibid., CC (60) 11th Conclusions. 22 Feb. 1960. 
3o CO 968/696. Gorell Barnes to Baring, 2-5 March 1959. See also: CO 822/1819. fo. 77. 
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the forces then would be met with violent opposition. But if we do it now (i. e. 1960), if we are prepared to talk fairly freely about when responsible government can be 
achieved and if we demonstrate that we are prepared to assist Governments to spend 
money on the really important things, we stand a fair chance of not being accused of 
planning to depend on force not so much to maintain our position in East Africk but to hold back the Africans from catching up with the more advanced communities. ' 
This admittedly long quotation (which barely does justice to the letter from 
which it is extracted) is necessary because it provides a good indication of the general 
thrust of Colonial Office policy towards East Africa at the time. However, even this 
seems sanitised when compared with Gorell Barnes' justification to the Treasury within 
a week of publication of the Hola Inquiry report: 
The probability that political advance towards self-government will have to be faster 
than we desire or think right leads us to the conclusion that we should, as a brake on 
that advance, do all we can now, before it is too late, to insulate all the internal security 
forces of the territories from local political control, and secure them in the hands of the 
Governors and so Her Majesty's Government. [... ] The fact that it will not be possible 
to divorce administration of the police altogether from local politics does not, 
fortunately, affect the general value of such a change, as the Governor's unfettered 
control of the military forces will give him the necessary backing in the event of serious 
32 trouble, and restore to us one political counter which we need. 
Clearly, the first Lancaster House conference on Kenya's constitutional future was no 
radical political watershed, despite appearances. " Moreover, Britain would have to 
employ increasingly elaborate tactics as the devolution of power in Kenya moved into 
the endgame. 
Meanwhile, as if to validate British concerns, it did not take long for Mboya, as 
ever, to remind the administration of the dangers presented by apparently radical 
African politicians. No sooner had the Emergency been lifted, and the first Lancaster 
House conference concluded, than the young Luo, concerned by his political rivals' 
efforts to undermine his support base by branding him a colonial collaborator, began to 
;' Ibid. 
32 DEFE 7/1014. Gorell Barnes to A. D. Peck (Treasury). 11 May 1959. 
33 Harold Macmillan. Pointing the 11 qv, 1959-61 (London: Macmillan. 1972). p. 132. 
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threaten a campaign of civil disobedience if African demands for majority government 
were not met. 4 
Throughout 1960-3, constitutional negotiations and the electoral process were 
punctuated by civil disturbances and the threat of, if not actual inter-ethnic and racial 
violence, as Kikuyu subversive organisations continued to proliferate. 5 The very real 
fears of `another outbreak of Mau Mau' which, were it to occur, would have to be 
`crushed at great cost and effort' and `leave us in no better position', compelled Britain 
to persist with efforts to secure a constitutional solution to `the grave dangers of the 
Kenya situation'. For example, this thinking had necessitated the decision to remove 
the restriction on Kenyatta becoming a member of the legislature, conceded in 
principle in November 1961.36 It should be stressed that this, and similar concessions, 
demonstrated Britain's capacity for shrewd political manoeuvring in the face of such 
fears. Britain was not, however, going to leave anything to chance, as will be shown 
below. 
In the wake of the Emergency, the ISWC, necessarily, had to review security 
provisions for the colony. In May 1960, its conclusions differed little from those of 
1958: the main threat to internal security was still `positive action' rather than armed 
insurrection. The ISWC's thinking on the likely extent of such action is particularly 
significant: `[T]o be effective, a Colony-wide campaign of positive action must depend 
on the prior existence of 
- 
(i) united and definite African leadership at the centre; (ii) a 
Colony-wide organisation, all embracing and disciplined, to give effect to decisions 
taken at the centre; (iii) a sufficiently popular cause to provide a clear objective'. '' 
3a David Goldsworthy. Torn Albova: The Alan Kenya 11 anted to Forget (Nairobi. London: Heinemann. 
1982). pp. 135-9. Kyle. Politics oflndependence, p. 108. 
3ý Edgerton. 
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The logic of the legitimisation of the political process itself had compelled 
Britain to grant a constitutional conference to the African nationalists, necessitating an 
end to the State of Emergency. However, the aftermath of the conference soon 
dispelled any hopes that `gradualness' and multi-racialism, with all the implications for 
British interests, would win the day. The inevitable outcome of earlier gestures 
towards political reform was demonstrated by the post-conference formation of 
colony-wide political parties which were divided largely along ethnic lines. Leaks to 
the Nairobi press about Macleod's constitutional proposals were interpreted as 
meaning imminent independence, and led to some African rioting. " 
Although the ban on colony-wide political parties had been lifted, the united 
African front of Lancaster House had soon reduced down to the ethnic divisions 
incorporated by KANU and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). 39 While 
this may have suited Britain to some extent because in Tanganyika the existence of a 
popular, colony-wide African nationalist party, the Tanganyika African National Union 
(TAND), had accelerated the pace of decolonisation, in Kenya continued ethnic and 
racial tensions served only to exacerbate an already fragile situation. 40 
In 1960, violence was erupting all over Africa: first in newly independent West 
Cameroon; inter-tribal warfare in the Belgian Congo grew progressively worse; then 
came the `Sharpeville massacre' in South Africa. Worst of all, the situation in the 
Congo came to a head that summer. Following independence, on 1 July 1960, the 
Congolese Army mutinied against its Belgian officers, European civilians came under 
' Bennett, Kenya:. 4 Political History. p. 148. 
;9 Ibid., p. 152. Murphy. 'Lennox-Boyd at the Colonial Office'. p. 7. 
40 CAB 134/1353. minutes of the Africa (Official) Committee. AF (59) 3rd Meeting. 'The Next Ten 
Years in Africa: East Africa, 28 Jan. 1959. AF (59) 5. 'Prospects for the African Territories for 
Which the Colonial Office is Responsible'. memo. by the Colonial Office. (c. 6-9) Jan. 1959. fos. 2.4- 
6. paras. 4.6-8. 
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attack, and the country descended into civil war. This did not bode well for Britain's 
future plans in Kenya. More immediately, the arrival of several thousand Belgian 
refugees in Kenya prompted angry reactions from African crowds who shouted, 
ominously, "the same will happen to Europeans here". 41 
While this prompted Kenya's white settlers to call for the creation of a 
European Defence Force, as well as stockpiling supplies and weapons at 
`strongpoints', on 25 July Mboya told President Kennedy in New York, `I can 
definitely say that Kenya is ready for independence. ' Perhaps coincidentally, the 
following day Britain took steps to ensure against the worst case scenario, and 
despatched a battalion of troops by air to reinforce Kenya. Shortly after this, the 
aircraft carrier HMS Bulwark arrived in Mombasa, along with an additional 
complement of 600 Royal Marines (RM). 42 Plans were soon tabled, too, for an 
exercise ('Kerry Blue') to practise and assess capability for the airlift of a brigade of 
British troops to Kenya. 43 
All this brought the potentially volatile situation in Kenya into sharp focus. The 
ISWC recognised that the absence of colony-wide organisations did not rule out the 
possibility of a campaign of civil disobedience ` as circumstances could quickly change', 
and that if the `Kenyatta issue' were the `raison d 'etre for the campaign 
... 
the whole 
of Central Province would be involved from the start'. This would provide just the 
scenario whereby, under the `twilight' powers, the governor would be empowered to 
make regulations `in the security field, provided His Excellency "is satisfied that it is 
necessary for the preservation of public security so to do". The ISWC assume that this 
"Edgerton. pilau l1au, p. 207. Harold Macmillan.. It the End ojthe Day, 1961-63 (London: 
Macmillan. 1973). pp. 286-94. 
42 Edgerton. 
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subjective test would be discharged by a campaign of civil disobedience. '`}`` Effectively, 
the same sanctions that had been applied against Mau Mau and KIMM would be 
available to prevent the governments' hands from being forced on any issue., 
In the immediate aftermath of the Emergency, the importance to Britain of 
maintaining stability in Kenya after independence was illustrated by the emergence of 
the Kenya Land Freedom Army (KLFA, or LFA) from the ashes of KKM and Mau 
Mau, followed by over a dozen more pretenders to the ethnic sub-nationalist crown. 46 
Reflecting the KLFA's apparent lack of activity, and Britain's desire for politics to be 
seen to be working, in essence if not in fact, the organisation was not proscribed until 
September 1962. 
Beside the considerable body of work on constitutional negotiations and so on, 
there have also been two creditable studies of the increasing disaffection and militancy 
of Kikuyu squatters and wage-labourers in the post-Mau Mau era, as a function of the 
It emerges from these non-inclusive policies adopted under the Swynnerton Plan. 47 
works that the major vehicle of such discontent was the KLFA which, seeking an 
equitable distribution of land as its name suggests, represented a fundamental and 
diametric opposition to the Kenya government's policy of creating a class of African 
yeomen, or `moderates'. `A closer inspection of events shows that agitation for land 
was restricted to illegal squatting and civil disobedience 
... 
' ýg 
14 CO 822/2024, SC (60) 18, 'Civil Disobedience, 12 May 1960. 
45 Ibid., `Extract from Minutes of the Security Council Advisory- to the Governor'. 31 May 1960. 
46 Edgerton. lllau flau, pp. 215-6, Füredi.. 1Jau 11Iau 11är. pp. 161,175,176.177.179-80,182-6.187. 
190-1,192-3.198-9,200: Kanogo, Squatters and the Roots of. 1lau Mau, pp. 6.148-9.164-9.171- 3. 
174. Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru, p. 221. 
' Füredi, 
. 
flau afau 11 ar, loc. cit.; Kanogo, Squatters and the Roots of 
_tlau 
Mau. loc. cit. 
48 Füredi, 1 lau 
. 
flau IU'ar, p. 193: 'The movement of landless Kikuyu did not initiate any violent 
actions, much less did it engage in subversion. Large numbers of Kikuyu were oathed. but the KLFA 
had no perspective of armed struggle or "civil war" as suggested in government propaganda. During 
the course of events a number of loyal headmen and newly established African landowners were 
assaulted but these acts were not part of any systematic campaign. I... I To ascertain the reasons 
for the 
arrest of nearly one thousand Kikuyu for KLFA activities in 1962. the 
Daily Crime and Incident 
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As Füredi rightly suggests, this `absence of violence' does indeed show that the 
police action against the KLFA was pre-emptive. By 1962, the authorities were not 
going to take any chances. There had already been too much volatility in the open 
political arena, especially during the registration of voters for the February 1961 
elections based upon the 1960 Lancaster House ('Macleod') Constitution. Many of the 
KANU leaders had campaigned on a `free Kenyatta now' ticket, and refused to take 
office unless this demand was met. 49 Britain's initial response to all this was to assign 
KAR battalions and British troops from 24 Brigade `spheres of influence' under the 
auspices of `Operation Prophesy '. 50 The Chiefs of Staff had already begun to re- 
evaluate plans for the air-reinforcement exercise which had been tabled during the 
previous summer. 51 
Potential subversion remained a constant threat in the form of the KLFA. If 
anything, the gravity of the problem with the KLFA, as with KKM and Mau Mau, was 
that they amounted essentially to the same thing. A `possible resurgence of Mau Mau' 
could not be ruled out. 52 Notably, the origins of the KLFA, or `Kenya Parliament', 
were traced back to Nairobi between 1953 and 1955, when it had apparently been one 
of the unsuccessful cells vying for control of Mau Mau. Although at first the KIC did 
Reports of the Kenya Police were consulted for that year. Of these reports only one, occurring on 15 
September, deals with an incident which could be interpreted as the use of force against authority 
... 
' 
a9 Edgerton. Mau 
, 
haar, p. 209. 
so CO 822/2024. telegram 107, Renison to Macleod. 1 Feb. 1961, telegram CAPCOS 3, C-in-C. HQ 
British Forces Arabian Peninsula, to Admiral of the Fleet Earl Mountbatten of Burma. the Chief of 
the Defence Staff (CDS), 4 Feb. 1961, telegrams 982/OPS. Force Nairobi to War Office (MO 4), `OP 
PROPHESY Sitrep 1'. 13 Feb. 1961,229/OPS, `Sitrep 2'. 20 Feb. 1961.468/OPS. 'Sitrep 3', 27 Feb. 
1961.704/OPS, `Sitrep 4', 3 March 1961. 'Minutes of 2nd Meeting of the Security Council Advisory 
to the Governor' 2 Feb. 1961. 'The Security Council advised that 
... 
the Secretary to the Cabinet 
should replace the Minister without Portfolio as Chairman of the Economic Priorities Committee'. 
thereby removing the possibility of African political interference with the post. 
ýs ' DEFE 5/110, COS (61) 26, 'Major Exercises 1961/62'. 27 Jan. 1961. COS (61) 39. 'Major 
Exercises 1961/62'. 6 Feb. 1961. 
'` CAB 1 34/ 13 8, AF (61) 9. `Political Situation in East and Central Africa'. note by the secretaries to 
the Africa (Official) Committee. 7 April 1961. with attached JIC (61) 23 (Final). 'Background to the 
Political Situation in British Territories in East and Central Africa'. report by the JIC. 2 March 
1961. 
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not consider the KLFA to be a colony-wide threat, its apparent aim of achieving 
`Kikuyu domination after independence, a domination to be exercised by and for 
KLFA members' certainly placed it in a serious category. " 
By 21 July 1961, the KLFA was known to have been in existence for about 15 
months, and the KIC was well aware of its lack of activity to date, but one factor in 
particular gave serious cause for concern: 
Most KLFA members will undoubtedly be members of 
... 
KANU 
- 
every individual so far arrested in connection with KLFA activity has been in possession of a KANU 
membership card 
- 
and certain aims of KANU, for example, the release of Jomo KENYATTA [sic] and a redistribution of land, form part of the fundamental faith of 
the Land Freedom Army. 54 
As with KKM, it was considered important to secure the co-operation of the 
African political leaders, particularly the Kikuyu, `in the campaign against' the KLFA. 
As Kenya's Minister for Defence, A. C. C. Swann, reported on 28 July 1961: 
This cooperation [sic] is very necessary for two reasons 
- 
first we must convince them 
of the dangers of the threat, how it will grow, and how much more difficult it will be to 
tackle if it is not tackled now; secondly, we must strive to make them see that KLFA 
restrictees are not political martyrs, and that restriction is vital to the security of the 
State if we are to proceed peacefully to independence. 55 
The timing of all this was crucial. Earlier in the month, Renison had pressed 
Macleod to release Kenyatta, following this up with a phonecall on 25 July. Renison's 
own change of heart occurred not only because he hoped to prevent the KADU-NKP 
(and therefore multi-racial) coalition government from resigning, but because of a 
seemingly reluctant volle face by Special Branch, which `now felt that Kenyatta had 
better come out while the British were still firmly in command'. 56 Perhaps more 
S' CO 822/2114. KIC/K/7 (14) The Kenva Land Freedom Army'. Appreciation by the KIC. 21 July 
1961. and attachment to KIC/K/7 (14). 'A Note on the Kenva Land Freedom Army', July 1961. 
`-' Ibid.. 'A Note on the Kenya Land Freedom Army', July 1961, fo. 4. 
55 Ibid.. CM (61) 559. 'The Kenya Land Freedom Army', memo. by A. C. C. Swann (Minister for 
Defence, Nairobi). 28 July 1961. 
Kyle. 'End of Empire'. p. P. - CAB 134/1560. CPC (61) 10th Meeting. Item 2. 'Kenyatta', 19 July 
1961. CAB 12 8/3 5 (11). CC (61) 44th Meeting. Item 5. 'Kenya: Jomo Kenyatta'. 27 July 1961. 
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important, KANU had won the February 1961 election by 16 seats in Legislative 
Council to KADU's nine. 57 While earlier refusals to release Kenyatta may well have 
served British purposes by temporarily keeping KANU out of office,, the KADU 
leadership, if not that of the NKP, surely realised that they could not command 
widespread support, even in a coalition, while not at the same time talking up 
Kenyatta's cause. It is only possible to speculate here whether the British authorities 
hoped, by releasing Kenyatta, to kill several birds with one stone. While his release 
removed the pretext for the KADU AEMs to resign, it also allowed the security forces 
to gauge the impact on popular disaffection. The Kenya government certainly hoped to 
enlist Kenyatta's co-operation in denouncing the KLFA. 58 
Indeed, the very issue of KLFA subversion vis-ä-vis KANU constitutionalism 
provided further proof of Kenyatta's `moderate' credentials. 59 In October 1962, 
Kenya's DIS, Mervyn Manby, reported on Kenyatta's recent denunciations of the 
KLFA: 
The reciprocal attitude of the KLFA towards KENYATTA [sic] is unfavourable. It 
regards Oginga ODINGA as the only true nationalist in the top KANU leadership, 
although he is not Kikuyu [... ] KENYATTA it regards as an old man, a spent force, 
far too moderate, and probably "sold to the imperialists". The KLFA also, of course, 
disapproves of his limited co-operation not only with Europeans and Asians, but with 
members of other Kenya African tribes: he is indeed a tribalist, but not enough of one 
for the KLFA. 60 
5' Edgerton, 
. 
11au. tlau, p. 211. 
CO 822/2114, CM (61) 559, The Kenya Land Freedom Army'. 28 July 1961. 
59 Apparently. in late 1958, Special Branch had appealed to Baring for Kenyatta's release. Some 
(unspecified) Special Branch officers shared Grogan's view that `Kenya's politics would be in turmoil 
as long as Kenyatta remained a martyr in prison'. There is even some evidence which suggests that 
some of these `police intelligence officers' did their utmost to ensure that Kenyatta would be convicted 
at Kapenguria `because his imprisonment would make him an irresistible symbol for Africans: after 
his release he could be relied on as a "safe" leader from the British point of view'. It seems that 
Baring rejected the request. claiming that Kenyatta `could never be set free'. See: Edgerton. 
_1 lau 
,I lau. p. 211. 
60 RHL, MSS Afr s 2159. Manbv papers. The Links between Kikuyu Subversion and KANU'. report 
by Manby, 18 Oct. 1962, box 2. file 3. fo. 126. paras. 10-1 (emphasis added). Apparently. Odinga 
fulfilled the main KLFA criteria for a non-Kikuyu' because they believed that he supported many of 
their ainis. particularly the expulsion of all Europeans. and appeared ready to 'concede to the Kikuyu 
the dominant place in a future Kenya'. ibid.. fo. 124. para. 3. 
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By September 1962, despite denunciations from Kenyatta and other African 
politicians, the movement had spread, with an estimated 3-4,000 members in Rift 
Valley Province alone: `military drills' were becoming more common; oaths tended 
increasingly towards violence; and, since January, over 200 precision and home-made 
guns had been seized from KLFA adherents and members of other Kikuyu subversive 
organisations. 61 This was especially significant, given the KADU-KANU feud over 
regionalism, control of the police, and access to the White Highlands that had 
simmered since the February 1962 constitutional conference, and which by September 
threatened to explode in violence at any moment. 62 
In March 1963, further disagreements between KADU and KANU, this time 
prompted by the findings of the Regional Boundaries Commission, seemed ever more 
likely to push Kenya towards another civil war. 63 All had `gone well up to now in 
difficult and tedious talks with Kenya Ministers', who accepted the then Secretary of 
State, Duncan Sandys', decisions on outstanding points of disagreement: 
However at the last moment KADU (D for DONKEY) [sic] Ministers are threatening 
to resign and to provoke riots and bloodshed unless KITALI district is transferred 
from the Rift region [sic] to the Western Region. It seems quite likely that 
... 
[the 
commission] 
... 
made a mistake 
... 
But since both parties agreed in advance to accept 
the commission's findings and since some of its 
... 
decisions went against KANU (N 
for NOBODY) it is extremely difficult for me to make a change without precipitating 
immediate resignation of KANU (N for NOBODY) Ministers, who are being as 
unhelpful as possible on this question. 64 
61 CO 822/21 14. 'Subversive Tendencies Among the Kikuyu: A Review of the Period 1st Feb. - 22nd 
Sept. 1962', Office of the Director of Intelligence (Manby), 27 Sept. 1962. CMM (62) 258, Kenya 
Land Freedom Army", memo. by Swann. 28 Sept. 1962. 
62 CAB 134/1561. CPC (62) 4th Meeting, Item 4. 'Kenya'. 16 Feb. 1962. CAB 128/36 (I), CC (62) 
20th Meeting, Item 4, `Kenya', 8 March 1962, CC (62) 22nd Meeting. Item 4. 'Kenya'. 20 March 
1962, CC (62) 25th Meeting, Item 7, 'Kenya'. i0 March 1962, CC (62) 26th Meeting. Item 4. 
`Kenya: Constitutional Conference, 5 April 1962. Bennett. Kenva:. I Political Hisio, -v, p. 157. 
63 Kyle. Politics (o/Independence, pp. 169-7 1. 
64 DEF 13/297, SOSCRO No. 80. Tel. Ia. Sandy s to Macmillan, Earl of Home (Foreign Secretary). 
Thornes croft. and Lord Lansdowne (Minister of State. Colonial Office). 7 March 1963. 
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In the NFD, soon to be renamed the North Eastern Region, the ethnic Somali 
shi, fta rebels were being equally unhelpful. 65 Civil unrest during the fortnight or so 
before the announcement on the future of the area prompted the Kenya government to 
request that 70 Brigade, with British units in support, be placed on 12 hours' notice 
(Operation `Instalment' ). 66 The ongoing fear that civil disturbances throughout Kenya 
might coincide with the commitment of most, if not all, of these units to the NFD, 
while the rest of the British troops in Kenya were earmarked for operations elsewhere, 
brought about the contextually novel situation whereby plans to reinforce the territory 
from Britain might have to be reactivated. 67 Once again, the shoestring was starting to 
pinch. 
While the KADU-KANU feud threatened to explode in violence between the 
parties' `Youth Wings' at any moment, any increase in Kikuyu subversion had to be 
taken very seriously. 68 Swann's recommendation to the Council of Ministers that the 
KLFA should be proscribed therefore served several purposes. Firstly, the 
determination of the colonial state to resist any illegal challenges would again be re- 
iterated, this time with the legitimacy apparently gained from the blessing of the elected 
African politicians. They, in turn, would be seen to be taking action against a 
subversive movement with which some of them may well have had links, certainly 
serving to distance them. Perhaps more important, given Britain's evolving political 
strategy, the proscription of KLFA provided Renison with the opportunity to press 
65 CAB 134/1561, CPC (62) 9, 'Kenna Constitutional Conference: Future of the Northern Frontier 
District, joint memo. by Lord Home (Foreign Secretary) and Maudling. 26 Feb. 1962. CPC (62) 5th 
Meeting, Item 1, 'Kem a: Future of the Northern Frontier District. 2 March 1962. CPC (62) 7th 
Meeting, Item 3. 'Kenia: Future of the Northern Frontier District. 5 April 1962. 
66DEFE 13/297. OCS 357/8/3/63. 'Operational Co-ordinating Section brief for Week-End 9/10 
March 1963, : Kenya (Northern Frontier District)'. OCS 357/22/3/63. 'Operational Co-ordinating 
Section brief for Week-End 23/24 March 1963: Somali and Kenya Northern Frontier District. ' 
67 Ibid., 'Internal Security in Kenya'. minute by Mountbatten for Thornevcroft' 14 Feb. 1963. 
`'` Edgerton. 
.1 
lau 1 Iau, p. 214. 
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upon the African ministers the importance of dealing with security issues on a national 
and non-party-political (thus non-racial) basis, leading to a `political truce'. 69 If matters 
were to get seriously out of hand subsequently, the British will to maintain security in 
Kenya until independence would not just rely on the `longstop' of 24 Brigade, the 
reserve stationed at Kahawa. By March 1963, the British had prepared plans to 
`reinforce Kenya for internal security purpose with a Brigade Group of up to three 
Infantry Battalions' 
. 
70 
By June 1963, the formation of Kenyatta's `well balanced' cabinet might well 
have allayed many British security fears, at least on the surface. 71 However, bitter 
rivalry between KADU and KANU continued, prompting Kenya government officials 
to act swiftly to remove the internal security portfolio from the Home Ministry to 
which communist-funded Odinga had been appointed. This reduced the ability of one 
of Kenyatta's main rivals to use his position to further his personal political ambitions, 
while reducing the KADU leaders' disquiet at the prospect of future communist 
interference with the nascent polity. 72 
In this context, Sandys' decision to press for 12 December 1963 as the date for 
Kenya's independence is significant. In putting his proposal to the Cabinet, Sandys 
explained 
that in the light of developments in recent weeks there was now a reasonable prospect 
that a Federation of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika would be established. Such a 
development would be welcome since, apart from the economic advantages, a 
Federation would tend to reduce the risk of tribal dissension in Kenya and to reinforce 
the position of other minority groups. '' 
69 CO 822/2114. 'Extracts from the Minutes of the 44th Meeting of the Kenya Council of Ministers: 
472. The KLFA'. 4 Oct. 1962_ Immediate. Secret Telegram 714. Renison to Sandys. 24 Oct. 1962. 
70 PREM 11/4328. brief by Thorne croft. for Macmillan, 7 March 1963. 
71 CO 822/30-53. 'Extract from East African Defence Committee Minutes of 25th Meeting. 9 May 
1963N. 
-, Ibid.. telegram 338. MacDonald to Sandy s. 8 June 1963, Edgerton. tlau _I lau, p. 227. 
71 CAB 128/317. CC (63) 41st Conclusions. 24 June 1963. Kyle. 'End of Empire. pp. 24-6. 
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Much earlier, Britain had hoped to be able to `foster the concept of East African rather 
than territorial' defence. 74 Of course, a Federation would have facilitated such ends- as 
well as `achieving stability' in the region. 75 Because of the apparent desire of the three 
governments to create the Federation by the end of the year, in order to retain their 
goodwill, and for procedural reasons, the British government could no longer put 
brakes on the transfer of power in Kenya. All that was now required was a conference 
in September to finalise the Constitution. However, the early realisation that the 
Federation would not materialise soon put an end to any hopes for that solution to 
Kenya's security problems, and Britain's defence requirements. 
Despite ongoing efforts to repress the KLFA, including further denunciations 
from Kenyatta and attempts to stem the movement's infiltration of KANU with the 
arrests of 11 officials from the Naivasha and Gilgil branches of the party, it had 
continued to expand. 76 The landless and unemployed Kikuyu were just too viable a 
constituency, as evidenced by continued invasions of European farms, stock thefts and 
destruction of farm property. " In October 1963, at the end of the `deadlocked' 
constitutional conference, the security situation seemed potentially more unstable than 
ever. 78 Sandys therefore decided to hedge his bets by supporting KANU's proposed 
centralist amendments to the Constitution, in the hope of minimising the `danger of 
74 CO 822/1813, EAC (57) 6 (Final), 'Defence. Police, and Internal Security'. paper for the 
conference of East African governors. n. d. (c. Sept. -Oct. 1957). fo. 2. 
S CAB 134/1560. CPC (61) 1st Meeting. Item 2. 'Colonial Problems. 1961' 
.5 
Jan. 1961. fo. 6. para. 
76 CO 822/3053, CMM (63) 36, 'Law and Order Report No. 7'. memo. by Swann. 19 Jan. 196'$". 
Füredi, ;f lau 
.1 lau [f ar . pp. 188-9. 
CAB 128/38 (I). CM (63) 7th Meeting, `Kenya: Land Settlement. 21 Nov. 1963: CAB 129/115. CP 
(63) 18. The Future of European Farming Land in Kenya'. memo. by Sandes. 19 Nov. 196 ý. and 
Annex thereto. An Appreciation by the Director of Intelligence on the Security Situation in the 
Nvandarua District of the Central Region with Particular Reference to Land Settlement'. Special 
Branch HQ, Nairobi. 28 Oct. 19633. 
PREM 11/4328. 'Kenya'. brief by Burke Trend for R. A. B. Butler (First Secretary of State). 14 Oct. 
1963. 
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civil war and damage to British interests'. 79 Kenyatta had shown that he was moderate 
enough and, more importantly, would not countenance violent attempts to undermine 
the state. 80 In a sense, the erstwhile `leader to darkness and death' had become 
Britain's `man in Kenya'. 
It follows that Kenyatta's position would be bolstered by the very fact of 
holding the reins of power of a strongly-centralised government. All parties to the 
September/October `Independence Conference', bar KADU, accepted KANU's 
proposals for strengthening the centralisation of control of the police. The newly- 
formed National Security Council would have powers to determine the maximum and 
minimum police establishments in the regions, while the Inspector-General of the 
Police (appointed by the centrally-controlled Police Service Commission) would enjoy 
`sole responsibility' for all police postings. The Inspector-General would also be 
empowered to transfer `sufficient Police officers' to any region that had not filed its 
minimum establishment, and without reference to that region's Law and Order 
Committee. 8' 
In contrast to February 1962 (see pp. 261-2), the British had also done their 
utmost to avoid `forcing a split between the moderates and the extremists in the 
Government which might have strengthened Odinga's hand'. 82 While the British had 
not yet entirely abandoned the white settlers, they had wrested the mantle of 
'9 Ibid., CAB 128/37. CC (63) 58th Meeting, Item 2, 'Kenya', 3 Oct. 1963, CC (63) 59th Meeting. 
Item 1, 'Kcnva', 8 Oct. 1963, CC (63) 60th Meeting, Item 3, `Kenya'. 15 Oct. 1963: Kyle. 'End of 
Empire', pp. 26-7. See also: CAB 130/192. Cabinet ad hoc Committee, `Kenya'. 17 Oct. 1963, CAB 
148/15. Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy Committee. DOP (63) Ist Meeting. Item 1. 'Kenia', 18 
Oct. 1963, and CAB 128/38 (I). CM (63) Ist Meeting. Item 5. `Kenya'. 22 Oct. 1963. 
80 Füredi. flau Mau If ar. pp. 188-9. Maloba.: 1lau 
_llau and Kenia, pp. 
164-6. 
81 CAB 133/215, KIC (63) 2. 'Kenya Independence Conference. 1963: Amendments to be made to the 
Present Constitution for Independence'. Annex K. 'The Police Force'. 25 Sept. 1963. Odinga. Xot yet 
Unirtu, pp. 238-40. 
82 Kyle. Politics ojlndependencc'. p. 179. 
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`gamekeeper' from KADU, gambling all on erstwhile `poachers' KANU. Having sided 
with the Kenyatta faction before independence, Britain was not about to squander its 
political investment. 
This was indeed a gamble. Only days before Sandys decision to back KANU, 
preparations were made for a meeting of the British Cabinet to discuss contingency 
plans for a likely KADU backlash, including threats of civil war and secession. 
Concluding a brief on the subject, the Cabinet Secretary, Burke Trend, asked `is there 
any risk that British troops will be required to support Kenyatta in repressing the 
KADU tribes who, on the whole, were our friends in the days of the Mau Mau 
troubles? There could be no more ironical conclusion to the history of our 
administration of Kenya. '83 
Nevertheless, the likelihood of a violent response from KADU supporters to 
the KANU success, and British fears of civil disturbances beyond the capacity of the 
police and the KAR, prompted the Cabinet to instruct the C-in-C, Middle East Land 
Forces (MIELF), General Sir Charles Harington, to make 24 Brigade available for 
internal security operations in Kenya. 84 He was also asked to consult with Renison's 
successor, Malcolm MacDonald, on the local plan for the evacuation of Europeans. ` It 
was, however, most important that no news of these consultations should reach Kenya 
Ministers, and the strictest security precautions should be taken to prevent this. '85 
On 15 October 1963, following discussion of the problem, the Cabinet invited 
the Minister of Defence, Peter Thorneycrofi, in consultation with Sandys, ` to examine, 
as a matter of urgency, the steps which should be taken if tribal warfare broke out in 
8 PREM II /43 2 8. 'Kenya', brief. 14 Oct. 19633. 
84 CAB 148/1-5. DOP (63) 1st Meeting. Item 1.18 Oct. 1963. 
%ý' Ibid.; CO 822/30-54. 'OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE. UK EYES ONLY. Telegram COSMID 99. 
Exclusive. Mountbatten (CDS) to Harington. 18 Oct. 1963. 
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Kenya, with particular regard to the need to afford the maximum degree of protection 
to the Europeans in the Colony'. 86 On this point, the acting Governor. Griffith-Jones, 
reassured the Colonial Office that while 24 Brigade remained in Kenya `there are 
adequate means of controlling any foreseeable security threat and protecting [the] 
European population in the same way as others, either locally or by concentration in 
safe areas, whence evacuation outside Kenya could be improvised, in the unlikely event 
of the need-. 87 It should be stressed that Griffith-Jones also explained that in 
preparation for what the Colonial Office termed `Stage 3' (the likely withdrawal of 24 
Brigade from Kenya at the end of 1964) plans should be drawn up for the subsequent 
introduction of British troops for the protection or evacuation of the European 
settlers. 88 
The policies of repression and targeted socio-economic engineering, along with 
strict control of the political process and the encouragement of moderate African 
politicians following the collapse of multi-racialism appeared to have worked. In the 
end, British troops were not required to restore order, well not yet anyway, and the 
temporary truce between KADU and KANU enabled an apparently smooth transition 
to independence. Yet, the early political history of Kenya shows that the socio- 
economic and ethnic divisions which were arguably both created and contained by the 
British colonial regime, were certainly not alleviated by decolonisation. 
The British had been well aware of this problem in advance of independence. 
Although they had been seen to successfully devolve power to a moderate and stable 
86 CAB 128/37, CC (6 3) 60th Conclusions. 15 Oct. 1963. See also: CO 822/3289. 
87 CO 822/3053, telegram 575, Griffith-Jones to Webber. 11 Oct. 1963. 
x" Ibid. (Stage 1: the period up to independence. Stage 2: the period between independence and the 
departure of 24 Brigade. ) Reinforcement plans had been in existence for several years. of course. and 
were reviewed again in March 1961 during the possible furore over the Regional Boundary 
Commission's findings: PREM 11/4328. Thorne\croft to Macmillan. 7 March 1963. See also: DEFE 
13/297, 'Evacuation Plans 
- 
Kenya'. minute by D. S. S. O'Connor (VCDS). 14 Oct. 1963. 
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African government, this was a close run thing indeed. The British were also aware of 
their luck in this matter. On the eve of independence MacDonald reported that there 
were `a number of shafts of sunlight to illuminate the scene despite one or two thunder 
clouds ahead' 
. 
89 
On the other hand among the have-nots, especially among the Kikuyu in the Central 
Region and Nairobi there is increased activity, and organisation; although at present 
those with grievances lack leadership, it is to be feared this leadership may be 
forthcoming from among those political prisoners to be released under the 
independence amnesty, resulting in a growth of [a] more organised subversives 
movement. [... ] In the North Eastern region unfortunately the horizon is uniformly 
black. 90 
Against this background, the victory of the `moderates' in the KADU 
parliamentary group, the isolation of KADU `extremists', the defection of four KADU 
MPs to KANU, and the `very marked detente in KADU 
- 
KANU rivalry', seem all the 
more fortunate for the British government. 9' While Britain would no longer administer 
Kenya, as such, it did its utmost to ensure that Kenyatta would remain in power well 
beyond 1964, with a little inadvertent help, that is, from disaffected elements in the 
Kenya Rifles, Somali secessionists in the North Eastern region, and a certain Mr 
Odinga. 
Preventing war: insuring Kenya's `independence' and British `influence', 1963-5 
On 19 December 1963, concern over ongoing shifta violence in Kenya's North Eastern 
Region prompted a far from optimistic assessment from Thorneycroft. The Defence 
Minister informed Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home: `I think you should know 
that, although Kenya is now independent, there remains a risk of our military 
89 CO 822/3055. telegram 946. MacDonald (Governor of Kenya) to Sand, -'vs (Secretary of State. 
Colonial and Commonwealth Relations Office). 6 Dec. 1963. 
90 Ibid. 
91 CO 822/305' 
. 
telegram 721. Griffith-Jones to Sandes. 24 Oct. 1963. MacDonald. Titans and 
Others. p. 260. 
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involvement there. '92 These were prescient words indeed. Although, in the first 
instance British troops were not called upon to repress the shiftas, nor the disgruntled 
KADU supporters, who had been mollified to some extent by the defection of four of 
their MPs to KANU; nor even the Kikuyu have-nots, as might have been expected. 
The threat from the militant dispossessed and ethnic Somali secessionists would be 
curtailed later by an arguably more subtle approach, so far as Britain was concerned, 
anyway. 
In terms of the threat posed to the stability of the newly-sovereign Kenyatta 
regime, the January 1964 `copycat' mutiny by the Kenya Rifles had very little real 
significance. 93 Far more importantly, the intervention of 24 Brigade to assist in quelling 
the revolt demonstrated in no uncertain terms that Kenya still relied upon British 
military largesse. This was especially important for Britain given the forthcoming 
defence and financial negotiations over the levels of military aid to be given in 
exchange for certain military `facilities' (see next chapter). Equally important, given the 
far reaching implications for independent Kenya's future internal security, the 
bonhomie created by Kenyatta's independence amnesty for KLFA members still at 
large in the forests had begun to break down when it became clear to the ex-guerrillas 
and their supporters that free land was not part of the deal. The amnesty was brought 
92 PREM 11/4889, Thorneycroft to Douglas-Home. 19 Dec. 1963. 
9' For brief references to the January 1964 mutiny, see: Blaxland. The Regiments Depart. pp. 
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to an end on 15 January, when the `oxen ran out. Moreover, the guerrillas had by no 
means surrendered in their entirety. 94 
On 23 January 1964, Kenyatta requested that British forces be authorised to 
intervene to help restore law and order, `without prior reference to HMG' and 
apparently `he wanted to make this fact public'. Britain wasted little time, with Sandys 
announcing the request openly the following day. On 25 January, 41 RM Commando 
was despatched as reinforcements, to arrive in Nairobi at 17: 35 hrs. 95 British troops 
already in Kenya were assigned to assist the police in protecting `key points', including 
the Kenya Broadcasting Station and Nairobi Airport. By 20: 00 hrs, on 26 January. 
British troops had `maintained their positions dominating Kenya Army units in the 
Nairobi area', and the Lanet Barracks of 11 Kenya Rifles, in Nakuru, was `firmly under 
British control'. 96 
At the same time, in a seemingly desperate attempt to defuse the situation, 
Kenya Radio announced that Kenyatta's government would set up a commission to 
examine army grievances, and had decided to recruit an extra one thousand soldiers. 
This would be good news for the British Army Training Team (BATT), but there was 
a sting in the tail. All British officers in `executive command appointments' would be 
replaced by Africans by the end of the year. To add to Britain's chagrin, following the 
successful conclusion of the operation to put down the mutiny, Kenyatta refused to 
make the required public pronouncement of gratitude. The `old man' was fully aware 
Q4 Edgerton, : 1Iau 11laus. pp. 221-1223. 95 PREM 11/4889. 'East Africa Situation Report No. 20 
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of the political risks inherent in such a gesture, and even went so far as to question the 
`scope of the consent he had given as to the limits of British troop movements in East 
Africa', which were in Kenya `at present merely on sufferance until the ne« defence 
agreement was worked out'. 97 Britain's earlier contingency planning would have to 
come into its own. In the meantime, Kenyatta took steps to ensure stability within the 
Kenya Army by infiltrating all units with intelligence personnel. They would alert the 
government at the first hint of dissent within the ranks. 98 
Towards the end of January, in the wake of the East African mutinies, British 
officials began to consider whether more action should be taken to stabilise the local 
governments, and saw a renewed defensive and political opportunity. Perhaps the 
governments of the three countries might now be persuaded to co-operate in a `joint 
defence force'? Of course, British officers would be made available for training and 
advice in setting up the force. `Co-operation of this kind in the defence field might give 
new impetus to the proposals for a political federation (which should, if possible, 
include Zanzibar) which had been halted by the reluctance of the Uganda Government 
to take full part. '99 
With a view to `arresting the spread of Communism in this part of the world', 
given Britain's `substantial financial and economic interests in East Africa', and `for 
strategic reasons', there was `clearly a strong case for' Britain `responding to requests 
9^ PREM 11/4889. telegram 246, Sir Geoffrey de Freitas (British High Commissioner. Kenya) to 
Sand\s. 29 Jan. 1964. Kyle. Politics of' Independence. p. 198. For Kenyatta's statement on the Kenya 
Army mutiny. in which no reference is made to assistance from British troops. see 
Keirva New. 
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for either military or economic help from the Governments concerned'. 1°° As the 
Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee explained to ministers: 
In parallel with the training mission, special effort would have to be devoted, less 
obtrusively, to increased British assistance to local police forces and Special Branches. If an additional training mission for this purpose were accepted, it could work to some 
extent in parallel with the defence forces on the intelligence side and might assist in 
preventing a reoccurence [sic] of the recent type of trouble. 10' 
Kenyatta was far from an innocent pawn in all of this, however, especially 
given the forthcoming detailed defence negotiations between British and Kenyan 
ministers and officials (see next chapter). Defence agreements tend, by their very 
nature, to be reciprocal affairs. The detailed defence negotiations had hardly concluded 
when Kenya's Prime Minister decided to test Britain's resolve to fulfil its side of the 
bargain. Much like the rest of Kenya, the North Eastern Region had not suddenly 
become peaceful at independence; far from It. 102 Following the murder of the brother 
of a Kenyan MP by shifta rebels on 1 April, Kenyatta decided to abandon his earlier 
`restraint and compassion', and declared a State of Emergency in the trouble spot. He 
also instigated planning for an all out military assault to end the problem once and for 
all. Reminiscent of the British response following Waruhiu's assassination, it seems 
that it had now become `very necessary' to `destroy life' in the North Eastern Region 
10') CAB 148/ 1, DO (64) 9, 'The Policy Implications of Developments in East Africa'. note by the 
Chairman of the Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee'. 4 Feb. 1964. See also: CAB 
128/38 (II), CM (64) 7th Meeting, Item 2. 'East Africa', 28 Jan. 1964. 
lo' CAB 148/1, DO (64) 9, 'The Police Implications of Developments in East Africa. 4 Feb. 1964. fo. 
2, para. 9. See also. ibid.. DO (64) 6th Meeting, Item 3. 'East Africa'. 5 Feb. 1964: CAB 148/4. DO 
(0) (64) 3. 'Draft Report on Policy Implications of Developments in East Africa'. 31 Jan. 1964 
('British information activities should be organised on a scale sufficient to overcome any local 
prejudice against our renewed involvement in East African affairs and to enlist popular support for 
our policies'), CAB 148/4, DO (0) (64) 2nd Meeting. 'East Africa'. 3 Feb. 1964 ('It was to our 
advantage to maintain the present moderate leaders in power and to provide them with all possible 
military and governmental support'), CAB 148/1. DO (64) 10th NIeeting. Item 3. 'East Africa. 2O 
Feb. 1964. 
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after all, unlike the pre-independence pronouncements of less than six months 
before. 103 
However, with local forces thoroughly committed, this could only be done with 
the active participation of British forces, which Kenyatta requested on 2 April. This 
request went far beyond the `technical and logistic support' provided by British troops 
to the Kenya Army, and had not formed part of the earlier agreement. Moreover, 
British troops were, at that very moment, being held in readiness for possible 
operations in Zanzibar. British officials were well aware, however, that Kenyatta may 
even demand it as an additional price for military facilities which we are in the process 
of negotiating'. 104 
Within a week of Kenyatta's request, political pressure on him had apparently 
diminished, allowing Britain to agree in principle, provided that Kenya made a `specific 
request' as to the exact nature of the requirements for BLFK. 105 By May, the Kenya 
government had tabled such a plan. Given British diplomatic sensitivity to the reaction 
of Somalia, across the border, the scope of assistance was later refined. British troops 
would act only as a reserve, in support of the Kenya Army, and not in an offensive or 
`spearhead' role, and certainly not on Somali soil. Unlike their role during the Mau 
Mau Emergency, RAF Shackletons would provide reconnaissance only. Also, Britain 
made a commitment to deliver more Ferret armoured cars to the Kenya forces `soon'. 
In return for this assistance, the Kenya government was expected to `abandon 
the more repressive and unpalatable features of the operation (e. g. Evacuation [sic] 
from Isiolo area and polluting wells) and agree to sincere negotiations with Somali 
'"' Edgerton. 
_1 lau. 1 lau, pp. 218,223. 
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Government thereafter'. 106 Britain also hoped that by agreeing to provide this 
assistance it might enlist Kenyatta's endorsement of British operations against rebel 
tribesmen in the Radfan area of Southern Arabia. Kenya's request for troop-lifting 
helicopters would, however, be rejected. '°7 
With the defence agreement as good as secure, and the stability of Kenya's 
frontiers reasonably assured, Britain still had work to do to safeguard Kenyatta's 
position at the head of it all. On 14 July, Kenyatta was assaulted during his visit to 
London to attend a meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, causing considerable 
irritation and embarrassment to the British government. 108 Although perhaps a little 
negligent in their own back yard, so to speak, British ministers could not afford to risk 
allowing a far more serious, possibly fatal attack on Kenyatta in his home country. 
In line with earlier commitments, by the time Kenya had become a Republic on 
12 December 1964, Britain had already set about training a Kenyan Special Force 
Unit. 109 As an SAS officer explained to Labour's Secretary of State for Defence, Denis 
Healey: 
The aim of the Special Force Unit is to provide a bodyguard for the President and to 
act as a counter revolutionary force. SAS observations are that both these 
requirements, because of the political situation in the country and what could develop 
in the next few years, are necessary if stability and continuity of government is to be 
assured. Because the armed forces are not trusted, and there are efforts to infiltrate 
106 PREM 11/4889, telegram 996. de Freitas to Sandes. 29 May 1964. See also CAB 148/6. DO (0) 
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them by people trained in communist countries, this Special Force Unit is to be 
recruited from the Kenya Police Force. "0 
The rationale underpinning such decisions had received early impetus, and was 
soon vindicated. Towards the end of 1964, Kenya's Special Branch, `with the 
enthusiastic assistance of British and American intelligence' warned Kenyatta of a 
possible communist-backed coup d 'etat. lli On 4 April 1965, Kenya's Attorney- 
General, Charles Njonjo, warned MacDonald of reports that Odinga and his associates 
might attempt to seize power that month. Kenyatta hoped that Britain would send 
some Royal Navy ships to the area under the guise of a routine exercise. Ironically, if 
the need were to arise, Kenya's President would also ask for the intervention of British 
troops from Aden! 112 While the despatch of an empty commando carrier to Mombasa 
was facilitated quickly, before agreeing that troops could be sent Britain required 
assurances from Kenyatta that `Kenyan forces of suspect loyalty' would be kept away 
from Nairobi, and that British forces would not be required in a primary offensive role. 
`Our troops cannot "reconquer" Kenya for President Kenyatta, nor should they 
become involved in protracted operations against rebels. ' 113 
Having done the utmost to ensure that international opinion might remain as 
favourable as possible in the event of renewed British military intervention, Britain also 
made some rather more secretive arrangements. The brief for the SAS team was that 
they would be authorised, without prior reference, to intervene `in collaboration with 
10 DEFE 25/121, Maj. J. D. Slim (22 SAS, Hereford) to Denis Healey (Defence Secretary). 1 Feb. 
196-5. For an explanation of the role of the GSU (from which the Special Force Unit was recruited) 
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their GSU friends' to protect Kenyatta and certain key ministers against 
assassination. 114 While the assassination of Odinga's chief adviser, the radical Asian, 
Pio Gama Pinto, and the seizure of a cache of arms from Odinga's headquarters 
minimised the immediate risk of a coup taking place, Britain realised that plans for 
intervention would have to be refined for the mid- to long-term. "' Ironically, internal 
dissent in Kenya had provided Britain with legitimate cause for future military 
intervention, negating earlier plans for the introduction of troops to assist in the 
evacuation of British citizens and subjects, and those of `certain other Commonwealth 
countries'. 116 
Britain was also finally beginning to learn the oft-neglected internal security 
maxim that `prevention is better than cure'. This notion had already underpinned the 
provision of British finance to the Kenya government and Kenya Land Bank for the 
purchase of European farms for resettlement by Africans. 117 By satisfying some 
Africans' `land hunger' to a certain extent and helping to stabilise Kenya's economy, at 
least the causes of unrest would be reduced. Barbara Castle, the Labour government's 
Minister for Overseas Development, was certainly alive to this necessity. By the end of 
1964, the Kenya government had proposed an extension of the `Million Acres 
Scheme', but not with the sub-division of European-owned land into smaller plots. 
Rather, these farms would be sold as going concerns. This, it was thought, would help 
"a Ibid., telegram 620, MacDonald to Bottomlev. 9 April 1965. 
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to stabilise Kenya's economy and by extension would, of course, enhance Anglo- 
Kenyan trading relations. In order to finance the new land settlement scheme, Britain 
would have to grant a further £30 million in aid to Kenya, incrementally by 1970. 
While the increasingly dissatisfied European expatriates looked for British 
assistance to help them to leave Kenya, Britain was more concerned by the possible 
economic upheaval which might ensue if aid were not forthcoming. As Castle, who 
admittedly had never been a friend of the settlers, put it: 
Moreover, the continued presence of so many British settlers in Kenya is an 
embarrassment to us. Scattered in the countryside they constitute a serious potential 
security risk which could develop into another Stanleyville situation. Their presence 
already inhibits our freedom in conducting our relations with Kenya and if things 
threaten to go seriously wrong with Kenya they would be hostages to fortune. [... ] 
Unless a new scheme is announced to follow on after the present million acre scheme 
has finished I believe there will be a risk of a serious political situation arising with 
grave consequences for the Kenya economy. ' 18 
In the summer of 1963, Britain had already begun to assess the likelihood of 
hostile competition for influence in developing countries. The Foreign Office 
Information Research Department (IRD) had circulated a paper on the scope, nature, 
and objectives of communist economic and technical aid overseas. In 1964, Kenya was 
known to have accepted $62.5 million in aid ($18.1 m. from China, and $44.4m. from 
the USSR), but had drawn $1.5 million only. ' 19 To counteract the possible 
effectiveness of this aid with regard to the extent of influence that it might buy for the 
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communist bloc, Britain's future policy would be to continue to support Kenyatta and 
the other `moderates' in the event that he should cease, for whatever reason, to be 
President. On 14 April 1965, Kenyatta had again demonstrated the right credentials, 
when he rejected a shipment of Soviet arms apparently bound for Odinga. In a sense, 
the latter proved to be more of an asset to the British government than it would have 
liked to admit. The old policy of `divide and rule' continued to retain some, albeit new- 
fangled, relevance. "' 
Having outlined the extent of financial and military support that Britain was 
prepared to offer the Kenyatta regime it remains to consider the manner in which the 
former suzerain aimed to ensure that `hostile influences' might be dissipated. As we 
have seen,. Britain was not only prepared to intervene militarily and to provide support 
for Kenya's armed forces and police in order to minimise direct communist 
interference. Financial constraints had forced Britain into a situation in which far more 
subtle tactics would be required. 12' As the Cabinet Counter-Subversion Committee's 
recommendations reveal, Britain would continue, 
but with great discretion and flexibility, our factual and overt information services and 
contacts; improve BBC reception if we can; and pursue the IRD's covert programmes; 
and find ways of training and influencing Kenyan journalists; [... ] go as far as we can, 
in considering the Stamp Mission Report, towards helping the Kenya Government's 
land settlement programme, which will be vital to the Government's future; [... ] be as 
flexible as possible in maintaining expatriates in Government service, whether as 
executives or advisers; [... ] avoid embarrassing Kenya by introducing "cold war" 
issues; [... ] show relaxation and understanding in [the] face of occasional outbreaks of 
African nationalist feeling; and discourage the element of unhealthy sensationalism in 
the interest shown by the British press in Kenyan affairs[ !] 122 
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British ministers and security advisers had long been well aware that a great 
deal of influence in maintaining independent Kenya's internal stability would be gained 
by training Kenyan military officers in Britain. In September 1965, the Counter- 
Subversion Committee began to consider the importance of the role of service attaches 
and defence advisers in carrying out `counter subversion work with foreign armies-. 
`this might have an effect on the allocation of posts and particularly on the selection 
and training of individual Attaches [sic] '. 123 Clearly, these appointments had to be filled 
by the right types of individual, `suitably qualified Officers who will also require 
detailed political guidelines'. While precise evidence of the `scope and nature' of the 
activities of British military attaches in Kenya remains scarce, their `objectives' were all 
too clear. 
At the level of overt intervention, in 1971, yet another attempted coup was put 
down with the assistance of British troops. 124 Kenya continued to send members of its 
armed forces for training in Britain, and to receive British military personnel in 
`training and advisory' roles, albeit in gradually decreasing numbers, at least until 
1976.125 By then, British involvement in independent Kenya had diminished, with the 
baton being taken up by Britain's senior partner in the fight for the preservation of 
western global interests, the United States. That Britain had laid the foundations for 
this must surely be beyond dispute. 
123 Ibid.. SV (65) 1 3. 'The Counter-Subversion Role of Service Attaches and Defence Advisers'. note 
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Kenyatta had naturally played his own part in securing his political position, by 
first dismantling the majimbo state and then forming the Republic at the end of 
1964.126 Next, the post of KANU Vice President was abolished, precipitating Odinga's 
resignation from the government, and his formation of the Kenya People's Union 
(KPU). With Odinga's faction effectively neutralised following the 1966 `little general 
election', thereby heralding the `dominant party state', Kenyatta's fiefdom was 
politically secure. 127 In January 1965, following Kenyatta's second amnesty offer to the 
remaining KLFA guerrillas, which was largely ignored, the police began a major 
offensive against the leaders in the forests, and killed them all. 128 There could have 
been ` no more ironical' beginnings to the history of the administration of independent 
Kenya. 
Conclusion 
Throughout colonial Kenya's history, Britain's wider interests and global competition 
had dictated, as with most states, that its administrative and political structures should 
be secured by the build up of security forces and the occasional resort to arms. The 
greater the threat to the state, as with the `Mau Mau revolution', the more massive the 
force employed. With the political climate apparently moderated by Kenyatta's 
rehabilitation, and the circumstances ripe for the withdrawal of formal British 
administration, Britain did all in its power to bolster Kenya's independence. By arming 
' 
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the Kenyatta state Britain ensured that future threats to Kenya's stability could be dealt 
with by largely `political' means. The iron fist of the government's legitimate 
monopoly of the use of force was nonetheless wrapped firmly within the velvet glove 
of effective one-party democracy. President Moi was hardly the first exponent of 
nyayoism. Kenyatta had British footsteps to follow. 
The next chapter will examine one of the key motives which underpinned 
Britain's political and security policy in Kenya from the ending of the Emergency to 
beyond independence: the hitherto largely neglected defence aspects of decolonisation. 
This contributes to a more complete picture of British decolonisation in Kenya, and 
surely must have implications for our understanding of Britain's transfers of power to 
its colonies elsewhere. 
?? 8 
Chapter VII 
Defence and Decolonisation, 1959-65 
Introduction 
If the few, scant references to colonial and newly-independent Kenya in the existing 
secondary literature on post-war British defence and foreign policy were taken at face 
value, it would be easy to conclude that Britain's post-Suez experiment with Army and 
RAF bases on Kenyan soil was ill-conceived and practically doomed from the start. ' 
The same can be said of the almost complete absence of analysis of defence-related 
issues from works on British decolonisation in East Africa. Even the most recent 
published study of the transfer of power in Kenya, which draws on an extensive range 
of primary sources, includes only a few passing references to British defence policy and 
just two pages devoted to `military considerations'. 2 As the previous chapters have 
shown, this hardly does justice to Kenya's role in British overseas defence planning. 
The aim of this chapter is to show that, as Kenya began its relatively rapid 
progress to independence from 1959, Britain's strategic interests were far from 
compromised. This is not to say that there were not difficulties, but simply that 
For example, the documentary readers edited by Goldsworthy. Hyam, and Kent (see Chapters I and 
II), and Devereux's British Defence Policy, include occasional references to Kenya's passing 
significance in British strategic thinking during the post-war. pre-Suez period in relation to the 
necessarily refers to Middle East. Although Darby's pioneering British Defence Policy East of Site. 
the establishment and demise of Britain's post-Suez strategic project in Kenya. like earlier studies. his 
reliance on contemporary secondary sources, interviews. and official publications, does little more to 
enhance our knowledge and understanding than many of the subsequent studies which naively cite 
Darby. and accept the inevitable. and factually incorrect, failure of British defence policy as the colony 
gained independence under the extreme pressures of African nationalism. For other studies which 
refer to Kenya in a post-war British defence context, see: Correlli Barnett. Britain and Her. -lrmiv 
1509-1970 (London: Allen Lane/Penguin, 1970). p. 481: Blaxland. The Regiments Depart. pp. 411-9; 
Robert Holland, The Pursuit of'Greatness: Britain and the World Role, 1900-1970 (London: Fontana. 
1991), pp. 293.300. Low and Lonsdale. Introduction: Towards the New Order'. pp. 3-7: Elizabeth 
Monroe. Britain s , 1Ioinent in the.. Iiddle East 1914-1956 
(London: Chatto & Windus. 1964). pp. 157- 
8.214, Jeffrey Pickering. Britain's ü ithdrm+-al from East of Suez: The Politics of Retrenchment 
(London: Macmillan. 1998). pp. 4.117.121.122. 
. 
183-4. KyIe. Politics of Independence. pp. 122-3 
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constitutional advance in Kenya did not proceed in isolation from Britain's efforts to 
secure its military requirements. Indeed, British decolonisation and defence policy in 
Kenya were far more intricately connected than has hitherto been acknowledged, if 
only as evidenced by the post-independence defence agreement and Britain's continued 
involvement in the defence and internal security of its former colony well beyond 
December 1963. 
As will be seen in the first section of this chapter, it is possible to trace the 
relative importance to Britain of securing defence interests vis-ä-vis constitutional 
advance in Kenya from at least as early as January 1959. Moving on, the next section 
will show how, despite the apparently accelerated pace of the transfer of power from 
April 1959 onwards, British ministers, officials, and service chiefs adapted their 
military `wish list' to accommodate the `fast moving tide of African nationalism'. By 
doing so, they facilitated the succession and longevity of a `moderate' and 
`responsible' African government that remained largely friendly to the west. (Chapter 
VI has demonstrated the lengths to which Britain went in order to establish and 
maintain this government in power. ) This successor regime, in turn, granted Britain 
`defence facilities' which made it unnecessary to station a permanent garrison of 
British troops in Kenya anyway. By examining Britain's close involvement in defence 
matters in Kenya from independence until 1965, the last section will show that with 
regard to overseas defence policy, far from having to `scram from Africa', Britain 
enjoyed a large degree of continuity. This was even maintained by the first Wilson 
administration and to a certain extent by successive British governments. 
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The `Chequers timetable' and British strategy 
Recent scholarship has added to contemporary accounts and subsequent publications 
by participants in furthering our understanding of the background to, and decisions 
taken during, the Conference of East African Governors at Chequers, in January 
1959.3 Such studies necessarily, if somewhat dismissively, consider the `Chequers 
decisions' in the broad context of political development in East Africa as a whole. For 
example, it seems that Britain's approach of `gradualness' towards constitutional 
advance in East Africa generally, and particularly the `multi-racial' policy in Kenya, 
began to collapse following the appointment of Kenya's former Chief Secretary, Sir 
Richard Turnbull, to the governorship of Tanganyika in June 1958.4 Blundell, for one, 
heard rumours that Turnbull was `forcing the pace'. 5 However, it does not necessarily 
follow that Britain, in adapting its political outlook in East Africa, abandoned all 
strategic interests in the region. 
Certainly, Turnbull was a liberal and, undoubtedly drawing on his experience in 
Kenya, was opposed to violence, from whatever source, and even made it clear to 
Tanganyika's nationalist leader, Julius Nyerere, that he was not committed to `multi- 
racialism'. Besides, Turnbull had quickly become aware that Nyerere was basically a 
`moderate' (that most preferred type of African nationalist), and that TALAU was a 
united and widely popular nationalist party. More important, in Turnbull's view, given 
that political conditions in Tanganyika were as favourable as they were ever likely to 
be, any failure by Britain to make substantive concessions to African nationalism in the 
3 Blundell. So Rough a Wind. pp. 261-2, Douglas-Home. Evelyn Baring. pp. 282-4. Edgerton. . flau 
Mau. p. 202, John Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganvika (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
1979). pp. 563-5. Kyle. Politics ot*lndependence. pp. 89-90: Murphy. Lennox-Boyd, p. 2241 
Shepherd, Lain. 1lacleod, p. 161. 
' Ilife. Tnnganvika. p. '36 ". 
Blundell. So Rough a Wind. p. 261. 
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United Nations Trust Territory could well have instigated an internal security crisis. 
Tanganyika's security forces, the police in particular, were simply too weak to deal 
with an Emergency situation. 6 
In Kenya, too, `gradualness' began to be undermined by the Africans' decision 
to walk out of Legislative Council, and to boycott the legislature thereafter, following 
a speech by Baring on 4 November 1958, which they interpreted as a firm rejection of 
their demands for a constitutional conference. 7 The political impasse in Kenya, and the 
potential for major security problems in Tanganyika, prompted Lennox-Boyd to make 
arrangements to call the East African governors to the now notorious conference at 
Chequers. As the Permanent Under-Secretary in the Colonial Office, Sir John 
Macpherson, put it to the governors and the British Resident, Zanzibar: `Recent 
correspondence' with Baring and Turnbull on the political problems in their respective 
territories `is leading us to [the] view that we shall have to decide very quickly now 
whether to maintain the policy of gradualness in East Africa or whether to take the line 
of least resistance in face of mounting pressures'. 8 
Little need be added here to existing accounts of the Chequers conference in 
terms of the abortive `timetable' for the independence of the East African territories. 
Suffice it to reiterate at this stage that the conference concluded that Tanganyika 
would be the first British East African territory to gain independence, but not before 
1970, with Kenya and Uganda's transfers of power `pencilled in for a date about 1975 
... 
'9 It seems from subsequent accounts that, irrespective of the detailed deliberations 
6 Ibid.. Ili ffe. 7 angan vi ka, pp. 563 -4 
. 
Kyle. Politics of Independence. p. 88. 
CO 822/1819. telegram 'Personal No. 5'. Sir John Macpherson to Baring, repeated to Tanganyika 
(12). Uganda ('Personal No. 2). and Zanzibar (5). 9 Jan. 1959. 
9 Douglas-Home, Ev'el. i n Baring. p. 283. 
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at Chequers, within weeks, if not days of the conclusion of the conference, its policy 
decisions had to be reversed. 
At Chequers, Baring and Crawford had protested against the prospect of 
Britain making news of the `timetable' public. However, no sooner had the conference 
ended than upon his return to Kenya concerns over the African boycott of Legislative 
Council prompted Baring to press Lennox-Boyd for a public statement on British 
policy for the territory. 10 The veneer of `multi-racialism' in particular, and of political 
progress in general, would be severely tarnished if the Africans continued to fail to 
participate in the process. " 
TANU's overwhelming election victory of February 1959, and the collapse of 
the `multi-racial' alternative, the United Tanganyika Party (UTP), was followed on 17 
March by the Tabora Conference threat of `positive action' if it were not granted 
`responsible government' by the end of the year. Turnbull's consequent fear that if 
Nyerere failed to gain a promise of further constitutional advance he would be 
unseated from TAN-U's leadership by `an extremist', led in the first instance to the 
governor's announcement that he would replace Tanganyika's Executive Council 
(ExCo) with a Council of Ministers. Although seven of the places would be held by 
officials, the five `unofficial' positions would comprise of three elected Africans, one 
European, and an Asian. 12 While Turnbull subsequently recommended that in the near 
future the ratio of officials to unofficials should be reversed, the matter was left 
largely 
unattended until Macleod took office in October 1959.1' 
'o Ibid.. Murphy. Lennox-Boyd. p. 224. 
11 Murphy. 'Lennox-Boyd at the Colonial Office". p. 6. 
Iliffe. Tanganyika. p. 564: Murphy. Lennox-Bogt!. p. 224.228-2? 2: Rodger 
Yeager. Tanzania:. 4n 
. 
-l frican Experiment (London: Dartmouth. 1989). p. 
24. 
13 Murphy, 'Lennox-Boyd at the Colonial Office'. pp. 4.7. 
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With regard to Kenya, on the other hand, as we have seen in the previous 
chapter, Baring's pleas and Blundell's formation of the NKG, which apparently kept 
prospects for `multi-racialism' alive, along with the impetus added by the Hola 
murders, led to Lennox-Boyd's April 1959 announcement of a future constitutional 
conference, albeit with no references to an eventual African majority government. '4 
There appears to be a fairly broad consensus (supported by greater or lesser degrees of 
detailed evidence) that, from this moment onwards, the devolution of power in Kenya, 
as with Tanganyika and Uganda, amounted only to a more or less complicated series of 
political manoeuvrings. 
However, by concentrating on the abortive Chequers constitutional timetable 
and the subsequent political horse-trading and rapid policy reversal brought about by 
events `in Africa', previous studies have largely ignored, if they have not dismissed, the 
continuity in the defence and security aspects of British decolonisation in East Africa in 
general, and in Kenya in particular. Given the analysis of the internal security aspects 
of decolonisation in Kenya in the previous two chapters, it seems prudent to re- 
examine the Chequers conference with regard to Britain's strategic `requirements'. It 
will then be possible to discern the essential continuity in British defence policy in 
Kenya in so far as it related to constitutional advance. Britain's hopes of maintaining 
responsibility for the administration of Kenya `for a generation' were indeed dashed by 
nationalist tactics and, as demonstrated in the last chapter, fears of civil war. 
l` As will 
be seen, however, divisions within Kenyan African nationalism and genuine fears for 
Kenya's frontier security and the possibility of externally sponsored internal subversion 
Murphy. Lennon-Boni. pp. 224-5. 'Lennox-Boyd at the Colonial Office. pp. 5-6. 
Murphy. 'Lennox-Boyd at the Colonial Office". p. 5. 
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helped to ensure that British strategic interests in East Africa would remain largely 
unfettered until well beyond independence. 
It is significant that in first broaching the subject of a conference on future 
policy with the East African governors, Macpherson explained: 
Our present view in the Colonial Office is that both the interests of the inhabitants and 
our own strategic requirements point to the 
... 
[line of least resistance] 
... 
course, if it is 
at all practicable, and that we should consider making it clear beyond doubt that we 
intend to retain control for a considerable period 
- 
something of the order of perhaps 
15 or 20 years though whether this period should be specifically stated would be one 
of the matters for discussion. We would, of course, continue step by step political 
development but we should concentrate in this period on educational and economic 
development and on building up local civil services so as to demonstrate to Africans 
that we had every intention of bringing them to the stage when HM Government could 
with reasonable confidence hand over to them and the other communities much of the 
responsibility now resting with us. 16 
The purpose of the conference could not have been made more clear. 
Two of the participants at Chequers, Blundell, and Baring's former ADC, 
Charles Douglas-Home, allude to the serious consideration given to defence and 
security issues. Referring to the `timetable', Blundell explains that this `overall pattern 
was generally agreed by the British Government and certain steps were taken to enable 
the British to adhere to it'. " Blundell confirms that the policy of administration and 
financing of EALFO by the local governments, portrayed as a precursor to the 
assumption of control by the eventual successor regimes, was reversed `after' 
Chequers (see Chapter VI) `in order that full responsibility could be maintained during 
a period which must inevitably involve moments of political tension'. 
18 
From Douglas-Home's account, it is clear that there was general agreement at 
Chequers as to policy priorities: 
16 CO 822/1819. telegram 'Personal No. 5'. Sir John Macpherson to Baring. repeated to Tanganyika 
(12). Uganda (`Personal No. 2), and Zanzibar (5), 9 Jan. 1959. 
' Blundell, So Rough a Wind, p. 262. 
18 Ibid. 
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The Governors agreed that the three main British interests involved in Kenya were the 
military bases essential for British global strategy, the need to ensure that the area 
remained economically friendly to the west, and the need to secure the area as a stable home for those people of Asian and European stock who over the years had been 
encouraged to settle there by successive British governments [... ] "On the assumption 
that there can be no question of even an independent Kenya, let alone an independent East Africa, under local European political control 
- 
an assumption which even Kenya Europeans now seem tacitly to make 
- 
it is so long as HMG retain ultimate control that 
these three interests can be secured for certain and it is not practical for HMG to 
maintain ultimate control unless that means defence, external relations and law and 
order, " concluded one of the working papers. 19 
The `timetable' was arrived at because the governors realised that Britain would be 
unable to maintain such control indefinitely. As subsequent events and scholarship 
suggest, a principal condition for Britain securing its strategic interests, by retaining 
political control of Kenya, was soon rendered doubtful. 
However, as is often the case with retrospective accounts, especially by 
participants, the `devil' is not so much `in the detail', as in what such accounts omit. 
Clearly, whether abortive or otherwise, Britain's attempts at Chequers to fudge an 
acceptable formula for the management of nationalist politics in East Africa, were 
undertaken with at least one eye very firmly on strategic interests. As early as April 
1957, when planning to station British troops in Kenya was well under way, War 
Office officials had been aware that `security of tenure and the operational commitment 
is subject to change' and it was accordingly `proposed, in the interest of economy, that 
the brigade would be established by stages'. 20 This recognition that strategic interests 
might become hostage to political fortune had crystallised by the time of the Chequers 
conference, as had contingency plans for such an eventuality. These went far beyond 
provisional timetables for constitutional advance. 
19 Douglas-Home. Ei c'lvn Baring. p. 283. n. 6. 
," CO 968/693. 'Stationing Part of the Strategic Resent in Kenya". summary of a meeting held in the 
War Office. 5 April 1957. 
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A fortnight before the Chequers conference, the Africa (Official) Committee 
(A[O]C) met in the Cabinet Office to make arrangements for co-ordinating its study of 
likely British interests and general developments in Africa over the next ten years. `The 
study had been generated by a view that Africa was likely to be the next object of 
Soviet attack and influence in various forms, and that it was, therefore, timely for the 
interests of the United Kingdom to be clarified, in consultation with the United States, 
and for the means of defending these interests in the next ten years to be decided 
upon. '21 It should be noted in passing that the A(O)C planned to clarify British policy 
before consultations began with the Americans: `it was important that we should not 
give the impression of allowing these to determine unduly our future policy towards 
our own colonial territories'. 22 More important, the A(O)C stressed that, primarily, 
British policy towards its colonies generally would be to ensure that, in the event of 
independence, successor governments would remain stable and maintain `a pro- 
Western outlook'. At worst, `neutrality' would be acceptable. 23 
Significantly, the A(O)C considered that `in East Africa, in particular, where 
there was as yet no reasonably educated middle class, withdrawal would lead to 
administrative chaos and a dangerous vacuum which would open the way to anti- 
Western influences 
... 
'24 Also, it thought that in East Africa the European population 
relative to the Africans was too small for a `multi-racial form of Government' to be 
maintained `over a long period'. Britain should therefore be seen to be continuing with 
21 CAB 134/1 353. AF (59) Ist Meeting. The Next Ten Years in Africa'. 14 Jan. 1959, fo. 1. AF (5o)) 
6th, Item 1, The Next Ten Years in Africa: International Influences. 2 March 1959, fo. 2. para. 1. 
22 Ibid. In the end, and perhaps reflecting Britain's difficulties in formulating policy from March 
onwards. discussions did not begin with the US until after the 1959 UK general election. A 'suitably 
adjusted version' of the paper had been given to the Americans that summer. See: ibid.. AF (59) 14th 
Meeting. Item 1, 'Africa: The Next Ten Years: Talks with the Americans'. 15 Oct. 1959. 
2' CAB 134/1353, AF (59) Ist Meeting, 14 Jan. 1959. fo. 2. 
24 Ibid.. fo. 3. 
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administrative, educational, political and socio-economic development in East Africa, 
with a view to making adequate preparations for eventual independence: ` If we could 
demonstrate that this was our aim, the period before control was relinquished and 
during which anti-Western infiltration could be prevented would be likely to be longer, 
with the result that the final outcome would be more in accord with our general 
political interests than would otherwise have been the case. '25 
Turning to Britain's strategic interests, the A(O)C felt that in the event of a 
great many independent countries in tropical Africa emerging with a `neutralist' 
geopolitical stance, `defence rights' and access to military `facilities' might well be 
curtailed. `The question therefore arose of how essential it was that these rights and 
facilities should be preserved. '26 Moreover, any notion that Kenya did not figure 
prominently in British `global strategy' can be dismissed by a further reading of the 
A(O)C's assessment. As C. W. Wright from the MoD made clear, Britain's defence 
interests in Africa 
principally comprised the stationing of the strategic reserve in Kenya and the 
possession of over-flying and staging rights in certain territories. The need to retain the 
strategic reserve in Kenya depended wholly, and that of over-flying and staging rights 
partly, on the extent to which the United Kingdom would in the long term be prepared 
to safeguard its oil supplies in the Persian Gulf by the use of force; this was currently 
under consideration at a high level. 27 
In Wright's opinion, British oil interests could be safeguarded if they retained control 
of Aden, although this was an `extremely expensive' option. Certainly, the emphasis in 
`S Ibid. 
26 Ibid., AF (59) 1st. 14 Jan. 1959, fo. 3. See also: ibid.. AF (59) 1. The Future in Tropical Africa: 
Defence', note by the MoD, 7 Jan. 1959, fo. 2: 'A territory is of concern to the Defence Departments 
either (a) because there is a political commitment to defend it (and this may mean either "external 
defence" or "internal security"). (b) because, if it falls into the wrong hands, this would constitute a 
threat to the security of vital UK interests in neighbouring territories. or (c) because the use of the 
territory or its air space is necessary for the discharge of defence commitments elsewhere. ' 
Ibid.. AF (59) 1st. 14 Jan. 1959, fo. 3. ibid.. AF (59) 5. 'Prospects for the African Territories for 
Which the Colonial Office is Responsible'. memo. by the Colonial Office. (c. 6-9) Jan. 1959. fo. I. 
para. 2: 'Since 
... 
[May 19571 
... 
the strategic importance of East Africa has. if anything. increased. '
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planning would have to be on the long term, but `for the foreseeable future the United 
Kingdom would continue to be prepared to use force, in the last resort 
, 
in defence of 
its oil interests in the Persian Gulf' This was supported by the MoD's paper 
contribution to the A(O)C's proceedings, which added, importantly: `For the present, 
therefore, we should assume that if, during the next ten years, we continue to have 
strategic requirements for reinforcing the Middle East or Far East by air, we shall 
continue to need overflying and staging rights across Africa. -)28 In summing up this 
aspect of its discussion, the A(O)C concluded that a `pro-Western Africa' would be 
the best means of securing Britain's `defence requirements'. 
An important benchmark was then tabled. This has vital significance for our 
understanding of Britain's approach not only to its defence interests in Kenya, but 
more importantly the often frenetic and sometimes desperate political bargaining that 
preceded independence: 
But in aiming at this ideal we might in the event lose the opportunity of securing the 
least satisfactory solution that was acceptable from a defence point of view. It was for 
consideration, therefore, region by region, whether it would not be wiser to adopt in 
the first place political aims which would ensure that our minimum strategic 
29 
requirements were met, rather than risk losing all by aiming too high. 
It appears that, irrespective of the abortive Chequers `timetable', the British already 
had a clear idea of how they would proceed politically in East Africa in the face of 
difficulties arising with regard to securing their defence requirements and, more 
importantly, what those minimum requirements would be. 
In a review of the Chequers conference proceedings of 24 to 25 January, 
Lennox-Boyd outlined the governors' and his conclusions. Unsurprisingly, `British 
interests' were at the top of the list. Significantly, and in apparent contradiction of the 
, Ibid.. AF (59) 1. The Future in Tropical Africa: Defence', 7 Jan. 1959. fo. 4. 
19 Ibid., AF (59) 1st. 14 Jan. 1959, fo. 4. 
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A(O)C's assessment, Lennox-Boyd explained that Britain's `positive defence interest' 
comprised of 
the need for over-flying and staging rights and the use of ports and, for the time being 
at any rate, the need to station in East Africa the forward reserve for use in Southern Arabia and the Persian Gulf. The former need is of considerable importance though not 
necessarily vital. The latter need is vital so long as HM Government are prepared to 
use force to protect their [oil] interests 
... 
and so long as there is no alternative method 
of effectively protecting those interests (e. g. a kind of' sixth fleet" defence policy). '" 
Britain's `negative defence and economic interest' entailed ensuring that `the area is as 
friendly to the West as possible and, at the very least, is benevolently neutral. Failure to 
secure this interest, even after the positive defence interest was not no longer [sic] 
important, would seriously prejudice British prestige and influence. ''' Ensuring the 
security of the immigrant minorities in East Africa was next, thus last, on the list. 
However, regardless of relative priorities, Lennox-Boyd and the governors concurred 
with the view that all such interests could be secured `for certain' so long as Britain 
retained control of defence and external relations, law and order, the legal system and 
`the internal security side of the work of the Provincial Administrations'. '2 
Of course, the political uncertainties which had necessitated the Chequers 
conference had a considerable bearing upon how all this might be achieved. ;' Given 
what we now know about the ultimate achievement of political independence in 
Britain's East African territories, it would be futile to analyse Lennox-Boyd's 
assessment of the `four possibilities' for constitutional development that Britain could 
30 CO 822/1819. 'Future Policy in East Africa', draft memo. by Lennox-Boyd. n. d. (c. 26 Jan. 1959). 
fo. 1. See also: CAB 134/1354. AF (59) 23. 'Draft Paper for Submission to the Colonial Policy 
Committee: Future Policy in East Africa", memo. by Lennox-Bovd. 4 March 1959; and the final 
version, printed for the Colonial Policy Committee. CAB 134/1558. CPC (59) 2. 'Future Policy in 
East Africa'. 10 April 1959. 
it CO 822/1819. 'Future Polic\ in East Africa'. fo. 1. 
32 Ibid., fo. 2. 
33 Ibid.. fos. 2-10. 
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pursue. Suffice it here to again mention the `timetable' and the Secretary of State's 
recommendation that Britain should adhere to the policy of 'gradualness). 
However, for the purpose of clarifying the lengths that Britain was already 
prepared to go to in order to secure its strategic interests, several points are 
noteworthy. Firstly, one of the three political `possibilities' rejected at Chequers was 
that of allowing the East African territories `to develop normally towards full self- 
government'. This was effectively a euphemistic substitute for abandoning the other 
possibilities, including ideas of staying in Kenya indefinitely (while the other territories 
became ` fully self-governing'), maintaining control of Mombasa and the coastal strip 
only (a kind of `sovereign base areas' strategy), or developing all the territories 
together under a federal umbrella. 34 Secondly, while the actual pattern of constitutional 
advance in East Africa resembled most closely the former possibility, it is particularly 
significant that Lennox-Boyd suggested that, in the event of Britain choosing to pursue 
that political option, it would `rely on defence agreements for the securing of any 
interests which might still be vital to HM Government'. 3S Given that the political stakes 
in East Africa were raised soon after Chequers, Britain's strategic `bottom line' should 
be borne in mind when considering the relationship between constitutional 
development and the rise and fall of defence-related construction projects in Kenya. 
Clearly, British political and strategic deliberations at Chequers were far more 
significant than has hitherto been acknowledged. Perhaps most significant of all were 
Lennox-Boyd's precautionary recommendations. Kenya's revenues were already 
suffering because of the decline in global commodity prices, and it would cease to 
draw Emergency aid and loan assistance at the end of the year. In line with earlier 
31 Ibid.. fo. 12. 
'; Ibid. 
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thinking, Lennox-Boyd therefore suggested that Britain should be seen to be `prepared 
to come to some extent to the assistance of the territorial governments to prevent the 
slowing down of educational and other programmes through financial stringency'. The 
all too convenient solution to this was for Britain to take over the cost of `the East 
African defence forces 
... 
' 
We saw in Chapter VI how, in practice, this suggestion was aligned closely 
with Britain's `vital interests'. 36 This had certainly been the intention at Chequers, 
rather than after. As Lennox-Boyd put it: 
In making the specific suggestion that the cost of the defence forces should be taken 
over I have naturally had regard to the possibility of devising a method by which HM 
Government might retain for a considerable, of [sic] not indefinite, period some 
control in the area. The question will not assume any urgency until one or more of the 
territories attain internal self-government, but it may be as well to give preliminary 
consideration to the matter now. [... ] A further advantage attaching to this 
arrangement is that the evolution from internal self-government to full self-government 
may not be so rapid as might otherwise be the case if the successor Governments, who 
would doubtless wish to have control over their own defence forces, were faced with 
the prospect of finding a considerable sum of money from territorial resources to pay 
for them. '' 
As will be seen below, Britain did not adhere to a policy of `gradualness' when it came 
to this latter proposal. 
Following Chequers, the British government awaited further inter-departmental 
consultation, and settled for a likely decision in March on how to proceed politically in 
East Africa. 8 In February, however, government officials had already begun to 
consider the possibility of reversion of EALFO back to War Office control, well before 
completion of the political compromises which culminated in Lennox-Boyd's April 
lo Ibid.. fos. 10-1. 
Ibid.. fos. 1 1-2.12-31. 
38 CAB 1 4/135 3. AF (S9) 3rd. Item 2. The Next Ten Years in Africa: East Africa. 28 Jan. 1959. fo. 
242 
Commons statement. 39 Their conclusions make interesting reading in the light of our 
knowledge of subsequent events. At that time, it seems, Britain's control of EALF was 
ensured under the governors' administrative auspices through EALFO, so any transfer 
of responsibility was deemed to be unnecessary provided that a Colonial Office 
representative were appointed to that body. It was, however, financially and politically 
`essential' that Britain should assume 100 per cent of the costs of EALFO, rather than 
the current 80 per cent, in line with earlier considerations. ` ° Of course, as we saw in 
Chapter VI, within a month these comfortable assumptions had to be revised when a 
more rapid withdrawal of administrative responsibility seemed likely. 41 Irrespective of 
this, as can be seen clearly above, the defence-related internal security groundwork 
was, perhaps fortunately for Britain, already in place, at least conceptually, to cater for 
such eventualities. It was time for Britain to begin to aim its sights lower than had 
hitherto seemed desirable. As will be shown below, while Britain's `political objectives' 
in Kenya perforce had to change soon after Chequers, strategic objectives were 
retained rather than abandoned, subject to some far from novel modifications to the 
means of attaining them. 
39 CO 822/1819. `Future Administration and Financing of the East African Land Forces: Note of a 
Meeting in Mr Carstairs's room on Friday, Februar- 13th, 1959. ' 
40 Ibid., fo. 4. 
" It is noteworthy. and perhaps also indicative of a kind of 'bailiwick mentality' that. in the current 
political climate in Africa generally. the Foreign Office considered the prospects of retaining control 
of East Africa and stationing the strategic reserve in Kenya to be incompatible: if our primary 
strategic interest in Kenya is as a base for our strategic reserve. this reserve must retain its mobility-. 
The disorders provoked by the application of the policy recommended by the Colonial Office could 
involve the reserve uni local tactical commitments and thus vitiate its primary function. ' See: CAB 
l 34/13 54. AF (59) 22, 'Comments on the Colonial Office memorandum (AF (59) 5) on "Prospects for 
the African Territories for which the Colonial Office is Responsible"'. note by the Foreign Office. 26 
Feb. 1959. fo. 1. para. ?. 
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British defence and the `fortress Colony', 1959-63 
As the previous chapter has shown, with the stakes in Kenya so high from early 1959 
onwards, the British government was not satisfied with relying simply on legal devices 
and political concessions to attempt to maintain control. Within days of news of the 
Hola murders, the Colonial Office had begun to unravel the British policy on the 
control and financing of colonial armed forces, as Lennox-Boyd had suggested at the 
January Chequers conference. Further arrangements proposed by Lennox-Boyd at 
Chequers were already in place, `whereby a report, agreed by Local Intelligence 
Committees, should be submitted at six-monthly intervals on the state of security in 
locally raised colonial forces'. 42 There were apparently many `military and 
administrative advantages' in the War Office taking back control of EALF, and any 
funds thereby released would be presented as additional resources to be used for 
agricultural and educational development. The measure was announced at the January 
1960 Lancaster House conference, along with the pledge of a loan of £5 million for 
land development. On the one hand these `sweeteners' were intended to help Britain 
`to "sell" the policy of gradualness to those who would have us out of East Africa 
within the next few years'. On the other hand, removing EALF from `local [African] 
political control' would `restore to us one political counter which we need' and enable 
1` CO 968/588, EADC (59) 7, 'Security of East African Forces'. memo. by the chairman of the East 
Africa Regional Intelligence Committee, 20 March 1059. 'We do not consider that the effectiveness of 
any of the East African forces was impaired by political or any other subversion 
during the period 
under review. ' For the detailed assessment. see: ibid.. 'Annexure to EADC (59) 7 (Draft) Security of 
East African Forces Period ist July 
- 
31st December 1958'. memo. by the East Africa Regional 
Intelligence Committee. 7 March 1959, attached 'Draft Report on the Security of the East African 
Forces during the Period Ist July 
- 
31st December 1958.7 March 1959. EARIC/FINAL/59/3. 'The 
Influence in East Africa of recent EN ents in the Horn of Africa: Appreciation by the 
East Africa 
Regional Intelligence Committee'. 7 March 1959. and EADC (59) 1. 'East Africa Defence Committee 
Periodical Report to the Colonial Office on External Subversive Influences'. memo. bý Hutt. 13 Feb. 
1959. It is noteworthy that Britain's inability to anticipate the 1964 
East African mutinies was 
considered by MI5 to be one of its major intelligence failures. or 'hotspots': 
Tom Bower. The Perfect 
English Spie: Sir Dick il hite and the Secret war 19"-i-90 (London: Heinemann. 1995). p. 42. For the 
1963 Colonial Office review of security within the British and Kenyan armies. see: 
CO 822/3288. 
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Britain, so it was thought, to apply `a brake' to rapid political advance. By avoiding a 
`premature withdrawal of our authority' Britain hoped to be able to leave behind a 
political structure which would `safeguard our vital interests'. ` ' Principal among these 
interests, of course, was the British Army's base at Kahawa and the RAF installations 
in Nairobi and elsewhere in Kenya. 
In the political arena, following Lennox-Boyd's April 1959 Commons 
statement, the Africans had returned to Legislative Council, only to boycott the 
opening of the constitutional conference in January 1960. This was because Kenyatta's 
associate, Peter Mbiyu Koinange, was refused entry to the proceedings. 44 With this 
difficulty overcome by the compromise of allowing Koinange to enter Lancaster 
House, but not the inner chamber, the conference proceeded. 45 The conclusion of the 
Lancaster House conference, which was seen widely as a victory for the Africans, led 
to a `slump' in the Nairobi stock market and property dealings, reflecting not only 
European but also international uncertainty. 46 Among other things, this prompted the 
British government to take financial steps to ensure that members of the Oversea Civil 
Service did not resign precipitately, and to consider measures to assist East African 
building societies. 47 
43 CAB 134/115 8, AF (61) 3 (Final), `Economic Consequences of Political Development in East and 
Central Africa'. report by the Africa (Official) Committee, 12 July 1961. fo. 5. para. 7. From 1 July 
1960, the three East African territories saved around £3 million per year as a result of the War Office 
resumption of financial control of EALF: `Kenya benefits to the extent of about £ 1.5 millions and 
Tanganyika and Uganda to the extent of about £700,000 each. ' See also: CO 968/696. 'Report bN 
Colonial Office/War Office Working party on Army Organisation in east Africa'. Sept. 1959. fo. 1. 
and Percox, 'Internal Securit'. pp. 105-6. 
'`' Bennett, Kenva: A Political Histor i, p. 147. 
45 For details. see: ibid.. 146-50, Kyle, Politics of Independence, pp. 102-6. and Shepherd. lain 
.l lacleoc/. pp. 175-86. 46 Bennett. Kenvn: A Political History, p. 149. Macmillan. Pointing the IT-qv. p. 165. 
a' CAB 128/34. CC (60) 44th Meeting. Item 7, 'Ovvcrsea Civil Service'. 27 July 1960. CC (60) 46th. 
Item 1. 'Oversea Civil Servvice'. 26 July 1960. CC (60) 52nd Meeting. Item 2. 'East African Building 
Societies'. 6 Oct. 1960. CC (60) 55th Meeting. Item 5. 'East African Building Societies'. 25 Oct. 
1960. 
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By the time of the July 1960 Congo `crisis', Britain had resumed direct control 
of EALF, and Kenya's various political parties were preparing for elections the 
following year. Demands for Kenyatta's release had been forestalled, at least 
temporarily, by Renison's `leader to darkness and death' speech and the publication of 
the Corfield Report which, unsurprisingly, confirmed the findings of the 1953 
Kapenguria trial. While racial barriers to access to education and land had been 
removed, at least in principle, it was the Kenyatta issue which kept KANU, by its own 
volition, from government, even after winning the February 1961 election with 67.4 
per cent of the vote. 48 Clearly, the legitimacy of Britain's political project in Kenya was 
thereby brought into question, at least until Kenyatta's release in August 1961, if not 
until June 1963. 
Naturally, all of this activity, or lack of it, led to deliberations behind the scenes 
in London, especially with regard to defence. In early 1960, as a result of the 
deepening Middle East air barrier and the earlier assumptions which had led to the 
seemingly abortive `Next Ten Years in Africa' study, the Chiefs of Staff began to lay 
the groundwork for a study of British military strategy until 1970 in `circumstances 
short of global war'. 49 In line with usual practice, given the wide-ranging financial and 
political implications of the study, the Chiefs of Staff incorporated the views of the 
three services and related government departments. The study therefore underwent 
several revisions before its initial presentation to ministers. This was not least because 
the political situation in Cyprus and Malta had enhanced the importance of the `east of 
4" Bennett, Kenva: 
_I Political 
History. pp. 151-5. Before the completion of polling for the 1961 
election, the British Cabinet decided. on Renison's advice, to keep Kenyatta under restriction because 
his release would prejudice 'political development and possibly security': CAB 128/35 (I), CC (61) 
9th Meeting, Item 6. 'Kenna: Jomo Kenvatta'. 21 Feb. 1961. 
49 DEFE 5/99, COS (60) 20. 'Outline for a Joint Study on the Tasks and Force Requirements of the 
Three Services for Limited War'. note by the Secretaries to the Chiefs of Staff Committee. 27 Jan. 
1960. 
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Suez' role, and gave rise to another upgrade of Kenya's strategic significance. 50 One 
squadron of a British tank regiment had already been shipped to Aden in Februarv 
1960; the rest moved to Kenya later that year. 
One of the principal assumptions underlying the review and upgrade of 
Britain's `east of Suez' strategy was that continued restrictions on the rapid movement 
of troops and military hardware brought about by the `barrier' necessitated 
strengthening military installations overseas and stationing sufficient reserves in the 
area. 51 The upgrade in the `east of Suez' role and its implications for determining the 
necessary levels of conventional forces had been greatly assisted by the appointment of 
Harold Watkinson as Sandys' successor as Minister of Defence. Watkinson shared the 
view of the Chiefs of Staff that the greatest threat to Britain's defence interests would 
arise in the `east of Suez' area, and that nuclear capability, although still essential 
generally, was effectively an irrelevance in such circumstances. 52 The problem was that 
there was only so much of the fiscal pie to go around. As Darby explains: 
In 1960 
... 
49 per cent of total defence expenditure went on paying the forces and 
looking after them. Add to this the cost of the deterrent, variously estimated at 
between 10 and 20 per cent, and with the best will in the world and regardless of how 
much nibbling was done around the edges of the nuclear component, the development 
of conventional capability was inevitably a piece-meal affair. " 
Certainly, when the Cabinet Defence Committee first met to discuss the issue, in July 
1960, Macmillan felt that the complexity of the `strategic, political and financial' issues 
50 DEFE 5/101. COS (60) 93, The Strategic Importance of Malta. 11 April 1960; DEFE 5/104. COS 
(60) 175. 'Military Strategy for Circumstances Short of Global War 
- 
1960-1970: A Joint Study 
- 
Part 
III: Broad Force and Logistic Requirements'. 24 June 1960, DEFE 5/105. COS (60) 200. 'Militarn 
Strategy for Circumstances Short of Global War 
- 
1960-70: A Joint Study'. 5 July 1960. COS (60) 
208. 'Military Strategy for Circumstances Short of Global War - 1960-70: A Joint Study: Effects on 
Force Levels and Deployment'. 26 July 1960. See also: Darb-. British Defence Policy East of Suez. 
pp. 163-4. 
'1 Darb`. British Defence Policy East of'Sue:. pp. 1631-5. 
52 Ibid., pp. 171-33. 
S3 Ibid.. p. 172. 
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raised in the various memoranda submitted for the meeting necessitated further study 
and reflection before decisions could be taken. 54 Events in Africa, the Congo `crisis in 
particular, may well have had a bearing on this. 
Whatever the case, the committee next discussed the `circumstances short of 
global war' strategy in October. Macmillan summarised the views put forward by the 
Chiefs of Staff on the force levels needed to meet their perception of Britain's 
maximum requirements in the `east of Suez' area, inevitably necessitating increased 
expenditure; 55 `but our balance of payments position made it essential to look rather 
for reductions'. 56 Macmillan continued: 
It was desirable therefore to consider 
... 
the nature of our interests in the Far East and 
in the Middle East and the best method of preparing ourselves to forestall or to meet 
foreseeable threats to these interests, within the limits of our capacity to sustain the 
resultant level of overseas expenditure. Never before in peacetime had we attempted to 
maintain such large forces overseas as we now had in Europe, Africa and Asia. It was 
doubtful whether we could continue to carry this burden in addition to the programmes 
of economic aid without which our military effort might well be useless. 57 
Much of the discussion thereafter centred on the political and strategic 
commitments in each area generally, moving on to detailed consideration of Malaya 
and Singapore, and Cyprus, Gibraltar and Malta, for example. Reductions in 
expenditure could be found in the first instance by depending on less sophisticated air- 
to-ground missiles for base defence. A great deal pivoted on the possibility of 
reductions in the numbers of personnel stationed in a particular territory. For example, 
'a CAB 131/23, D (60) 8th Meeting, `Future Work of the Committee', 27 July 1960. 
s CAB 131/24. D (60) 48, 'Military Strategy for Circumstances Short of Global War'. note by 
Macmillan. 10 Oct. 1960. 
56 CAB 131/23, D (60) 10th Meeting, Item 1. 'Military Strategy for Circumstances Short of Global 
War, 1960-70', 17 Oct. 1960. For an overview- of the Tory government's balance of payments 
problems. see: Andrew Boxer, The Conservative Governments 1951-1964. (Harlow: Addison. Wesley. 
Longman, 1996), pp. 4.6,17,23 
-37,95-7.101. Dilw n Porter. `DoNNnhill all the way: thirteen Tory 
years 1951-64', in R. Coopey et al (eds. ), The Iiilson Governments 1964-1970 (London: Pinter. 
1993). pp. 10-28, John Turner, 
. 
Macmillan (Harlow: Longman, 1994). pp. 119,129.241.243.245-6. 
251. 
5i CAB 13$ 1/23. D (60) 10th, 'Military Strategy for Circumstances Short of Global War'. 17 Oct. 
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if the Cyprus garrison were reduced by one battalion (from four and a third), `it could 
still provide a satisfactory military force, although it would be less well balanced than a 
normally organised brigade group. 
When it came to consideration of East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, 
because of `direct commitments in Africa' and the need to safeguard Britain's air- 
staging capability in the region, the Chiefs of Staff had recommended the retention in 
Kenya of a `long-term army garrison at its present level'. In Macmillan's opinion, 
Britain's strategic interests in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf made it 
essential that the Aden base should be retained, `at least until 1966, and probably for 
longer 
... 
' However, `in view of the uncertain political future of Kenya, it was thought 
desirable that projected expenditure on works services there should be closely 
examined'. 58 
Nevertheless, unlike Cyprus and Libya, where the army contingents would be 
reduced, the Defence Committee agreed, much as they had in the case of Gibraltar and 
Malta, that the Kenya garrison should remain at its current strength, in this case three 
battalions. 59 Despite his remarks to the Defence Committee, Macmillan does not 
appear to have rejected the possibility of staying on in Kenya. Indeed, in referring 
earlier to Britain's need to protect Kuwait, Macmillan explained: `We should need 
limited ground forces, suitable for police type operations, with great mobility and air 
transportability. [... ] For these purposes retention of the Kenya base and Aden seem 
essential. '60 
ý`x Ibid. 
59 CAB 1? 1/24. D (60) 51. 'Military Strategy for Circumstances Short of Global War, 1960-70'. note 
by the Cabinet Secretary. Norman Brook. 17 Oct. 1960. 
60 Ibid.. D (60) 48. 'Military Strategy for Circumstances Short of Global War'. 10 Oct. 1960. fo. 2. 
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Given the above reference to political uncertainty regarding Kenya's future, it 
is notable that in Aden there was also a fervent nationalist movement vying v ith 
moderate elements for political influence. 61 While the British political plan for Aden, 
which was supported by the moderates, envisaged internal self-government in January 
1963, the nationalists wanted Britain out of Aden `as quickly as possible, and to unite 
Colony, Protectorate and a "reformed" Yemen with the UAR'. 62 In late 1960, in terms 
of determining the most likely area where security of tenure for British forces could be 
ensured, it must have been difficult to choose between the African and the Arab 
solutions. `Nevertheless, from 
... 
[the British] 
... 
point of view Aden was considered to 
be the safest of the Colonial territories in the [Middle East] theatre. '63 As will be seen 
below, some 18 months later, events in the Arabian Peninsula would raise questions 
about this assumption, and again bring Kenya to potentially greater strategic 
prominence. 
In the meantime, with elections due in Kenya in February 1961, officials on the 
ground had more immediate concerns. At the end of October 1960, Renison paid a 
visit to J. N. A. Armitage-Smith, Private Secretary to the Minister of State, Lord Perth, 
in London. Following on from issues raised at a recent meeting of the EADC, they 
discussed ` a number of matters affecting KAR'. These included a back-dated pay rise 
for all Africans, in line with similar increases proposed for civilians, undoubtedly 
intended to keep both in service. There was also the matter of increasing the number of 
commissioned African officers, which was `a task of higher priority' than expanding 
61 M. A. Fitzsimons. Empire by Treaty: Britain and the liliddle East in the Tirc'ntieth Century 
(London: Benn. 1965), pp. 220-1. 
`', CAB 131/24. D (60) 53. 'Constitutional Development in Aden. memo. by Macleod 27 Oct. 1960. 
f" CAB 13 1/2 7, D (62) 8th Meeting. Item 1. 'Redeployment in the Middle East'. 16 May 1962. D (62) 
26, 'Deployment of Forces in the Middle East Command'. memo. by Watkinson. 11 May 1962. 
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the size of KAR battalions except, perhaps, in Uganda. 64 Since 1949, KAR battalions 
had been reduced in size by one rifle company, and were reduced in number following 
the April. 1955 Templer Report. This had to be reversed if they were to remain 
effective. Expansion of the number of Africans in the Officer Corps could not be 
undertaken rapidly because quality would suffer, so the earlier that this could begin, 
the better. 65 It had also become clear that Tanganyika had decided to end its 
contributions to the upkeep of the Royal East African Navy (REAN). With Kenya and 
Uganda refusing to make up the shortfall, and given the need to maintain ground 
forces at full strength, the question remained regarding the `pleasant extravagance of a 
local navy' as to `whether it is worth while keeping the REAN in being'. 
66 
Clearly, the East African governments were concerned that their ability to be 
seen to be developing their respective territories, from both the financial and `African 
advancement' perspectives, would be impaired by defence and security-related 
budgetary anomalies. There was also the matter of maintaining security in a potentially 
volatile political climate, which could not be considered in isolation from Britain's 
defensive commitments in the area. More will be said about all of this later. For the 
time being, suffice it to note the stage at which Renison and his colleagues stressed the 
importance of the local defence and security implications of political developments. 
Back in London, Kenya's forthcoming general election also began to have an 
impact on the ongoing deliberations over Britain's global strategy. Mboya had come 
under pressure from both colleagues and rivals because KANU's draft election 
manifesto was `not radical enough over land', and decided to make it so, adding to the 
64 CO 968/723, minute by J. N. A. Armitage-Smith. 1 Nov. 1960. 
65 CO 822/2886, `Future of the King's African Rifles'. note by Maj. -Gen. R. E. Goodwin (GOC. East 
Africa). 31 Dec. 1960. 
66 CO 968/723. minute by J. N. A. Armitage-Smith. 1 Nov. 1960. 
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nationalist pressure on Britain. The manifesto would now include a passage which, on 
one view, set `red lights 
... 
flashing in the Defence Ministry': 67 
KANU like many of the other new nations and consistent with our policy of non- 
alignment with either the East or West military power blocks [sic], will not allow any form of foreign military base(s) [sic] to be established in Kenya. Kenya must not be a 
pawn in the struggles of the East and West nor do we want to see Kenya transformed 
into a battleground in the event of an East/West military conflict. We are certain that 
our people would not approve of Kenya being used by NATO or the British in any 
localised conflicts between NATO or British forces and any part of Africa, Asia or the 
Middle East. KANU condemns the fact that British [sic] chose to ignore African 
protestations at the time when they started to establish the Kahawa British military 
base. KANU will press for the immediate closing down of the base. 68 
This certainly put brakes on Britain's planning for its projected global strategy 
requirements. 69 With £5 million expenditure still outstanding for the completion of 
military construction projects in Kenya, Watkinson urged Macleod to investigate 
whether Britain's minimum requirement of five years security of tenure still seemed 
feasible. `In the meantime, I should be most reluctant to see any further commitments 
entered into for new works services. '70 
Given the current financial climate, Watkinson's concerns were understandable 
enough. Nevertheless, the Colonial Office did have a contingency plan to help it to buy 
some time. Labour MP John Stonehouse had tabled a written Parliamentary Question 
as to the costs and likely future of Britain's military installations in Kenya. In the event 
that this might lead to concerns being raised regarding the KANU election manifesto, 
the Colonial Office had prepared a supplementary written answer which was 
transmitted to Renison for prior approval: `it is proposed to say that HMG are willing 
67 Kyle. Politics of Independence, p. 122. 
f'' CO 822/2892. `Extract from KANU Manifesto: Foreign Military Bases". n. d. (c. Nov. -Dec. 
1960): also part-cited in Kyle. Politics of Independence. p. 122. 
69 CAB 13 1/23, D (60) 12th Meeting, Item 7. 'Review of Action Taken on the Committees Decisions 
of 16th and 17th October'. 7 Dec. 1960. 
70 CO 822/2892. Watkinson to Macleod 6 Dec. 1960. For an overview of Britain's overseas defence 
expenditure reviews from 1960-4. see: DEFE 7/1490.1698-9.1780-1.193 1-7.2091.21 55. and 
2319. 
and T 225/2434-40. and 2455-6. 
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to consider the future of bases in Kenya with the Government of Kenya at an 
appropriate time'. " However, the problem with this suggestion, at least from 
Renison's perspective, was that while the manifesto might not be KANU's `last word 
on this subject', the proposed reply 
would not (repeat not) be helpful and might have [the] opposite [of the] desired effect by antagonising the party or seeming to attempt to drive [a] wedge among them at the 
time of acknowledged differences of opinion within the party. [... ] Impossible to forecast how KANU will view such matters if and when they achieve power as much depends on personalities. 72 
Of course, Britain could not be seen to be attempting to divide the KANU politicians 
in public. As will be seen later, such tactics were reserved for behind the closed doors 
of constitutional conferences. 
The confusion over the likely attitude of KANU to Britain's defence 
requirements in the event of winning the February 1961 election, left Macleod unable 
to provide Watkinson with a definitive answer to his query. 73 
As you know, the East African Governors will be discussing defence matter [sic] with 
the chiefs of staff [sic] during the informal conference I am having with them next 
month. I hope that that Conference [sic] will enable us (against the background of 
defence and other considerations) to clear our minds on the right way to move 
politically in the foreseeable future. 74 
Much depended on the prospects for an East African Federation, which Macleod 
hoped to establish in late 1962 or early 1963: `a Federal Government, which would no 
^1 CO 822/2892, telegram 237, Webber to Renison. 12 Dec. 1960. 
'2 Ibid., telegram 1128. Renison to Webber, 13 Dec. 1960. hand-written minute by Kitcatt. I' Jan. 
1960, commenting on Renison's telegram: One of the difficulties in this situation is that decisions 
about expenditure have to be made now [sic] based on the assessment of the future of the military 
facilities after independence. another is one of the primary functions of the base is to provide support- 
not in East Africa itself. but in the Persian Gulf However, it is probably as well that future difficulties 
have come into the open now rather than at the stage of independence when much nugatory 
expenditure might already have been incurred. ' 
13 
. 
Ibid., Macleod to Watkinson. 16 Dec. 1960: Kyle. Politics of Independence. p. 113 
' CO 822/2892. Macleod to Watkinson. 13 Dec. 1960. 
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doubt be responsible for defence, might take a less extreme attitude than KANU now 
does' 
. 
75 
However, Macleod warned that even a federal government might refuse to 
allow Britain to use its military `facilities' for `the conduct of "colonial" operations'. 
Nevertheless, Macleod still held high hopes that, even in the event of failure to achieve 
a federation, `it is not impossible' that the government of an independent Kenya `will 
recognise a number of strong reasons for seeking a close understanding on defence 
matters with us'. 76 He saw `little prospect' of British troops being allowed to remain in 
Kenya `primarily for UK purposes', although he thought `we should be able to count 
on the use of our existing facilities until the end of 1965'. 
Again, because KANU's post-election attitude could not be determined at that 
stage, Macleod hoped that the final decision on new works services could be deferred 
until early in the following summer. If Watkinson were unable to postpone his final 
decision, Macleod was `particularly anxious to avoid' any `overt action' being taken in 
the `immediate future'. Britain could not be seen to be caving in to Mboya's pressure, 
lest KANU's Secretary-General sought to apply more of the same, and militant 
elements in Kenya's population decided to follow suit, if in a far less sophisticated 
manner. `On the other hand, I am not suggesting that we should openly take the 
uncompromising line that whatever Mr Mboya says we intend to hang on to the base. 
This would make the situation much more difficult than it now is. '" 
Watkinson agreed with Macleod's uncertain, if far from optimistic, assessment, 
and that the final decision on how to proceed should be deferred until after talks with 
Ibid. For further discussion of the desirability of an East African Federation. from the British 
defence point of view. see also: CAB 1', 4/1560. CPC (61) Ist Meeting. Item 2. 'Colonial Problems. 
1961 '. 5 Jan. 1961. CPC (61) 1. 'Colonial Problems in 1961'. menio. by Macleod 3 Jan. 1961. 
76 CO 822/2892. Macleod to Watkinson. 13 Dec. 1960. 
Ibid. 
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the East African governors. 78 He also initiated an examination of which of the 
construction programmes in Kenya could be deferred for either three months or eight 
months, as well as preparing a draft paper for submission to the Defence Committee in 
which he recommended postponement until 1 April 1961, when the Kenya election 
result and its implications would be clearer. '9 
Naturally, all of the above issues came under scrutiny at the Colonial Office 
conference with the East African governors, held in London between 4 and 9 January 
19600 One of the key decisions taken during the conference related to Nyerere's 
recent offer to postpone Tanganyika's independence in lieu of preparations for Kenya 
and Uganda to join in forming a federation. 81 Given the importance of achieving a 
federation to British policy generally, and defence interests in particular, Macleod 
devised yet another, albeit ultimately abortive, timetable. Tanganyika would be granted 
internal self-government in mid-May. Nyerere would then be encouraged to convene a 
federation conference that August with the (yet to be appointed) Chief Ministers of 
Kenya and Uganda, with the initiative being seen to come from him rather than Britain. 
According to Kyle, in order to lessen concerns in the MoD, in any future references to 
British defence requirements the term `facilities' would be substituted for 'base'. 82 
^8 Ibid., Watkinson to Macleod, 23 Dec. 1960. 
^9 Ibid., Hobkirk (MoD) to Kitcatt (CO), 21 Dec. 1960, telegram 246, Macleod to Renison. 22 Dec. 
1960.11/018/02, Hobkirk to Kitcatt, 4 Jan. 1961. -Kenya: Service Building Programme'. draft brief 
(for Cabinet Defence Committee). by Hobkirk. 4 Jan. 1961. 
80 CO 822/2886. EAC (61) 3, `East African Conference: Defence Interests. Security of Tenure of 
United Kingdom's Military Bases in Kenya'. paper by the Colonial Office. Dec. 1960. `Future of the 
King's African Rifles'. note by Goodwin. 31 Dec. 1960, Annex to JP (60) 103) (Final). 'Future 
Strategic Importance of East Africa: Brief for the Chiefs of Staff Meeting with the Governors of the 
East African Territories'. EAC (61) MINUTES 2. `Report of Proceedings: Defence and Internal 
Security'. n. d. (c. Jan. 1961). EAC (61) 18 (Revise). `East African Conference. 1961: Summary of 
Principal Conclusions', n. d. (c. Jan. 1961). 
For a contemporary account of the political background and manoeuvring regarding an East 
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Despite his earlier objections to making the fact public, Renison felt that 
defence negotiations should be left until as near to Kenya's independence as possible: 
`To attempt to discuss it just after an election vote on a manifesto which specifically 
stated that the bases should be removed would not be a worthwhile operation. 13 By 
continuing to pay for KAR until independence, and by being seen to be prepared to do 
so for longer, the British also hoped that they might even gain agreement to the 
retention of their troops in Kenya as a quid pro quo. 84 Significantly, with regard to 
overflying and staging rights, the conference concluded that more progress could in all 
probability be made through an informal defence agreement rather than a formal treaty 
which would have more serious political implications for Kenya's nationalist 
leadership. 85 It is noteworthy that KADU was thought to be more likely to be 
amenable to Britain's defence aims, although less capable of governing the country. 86 
Following Macleod's post-conference submission to Watkinson, eyebrows 
began to be raised in the rest of Whitehall because even though a positive outcome to 
the defence conundrum did not seem impossible, there were still likely to be 
`restrictions on our freedom of action after Kenya achieves independence' 
. 
87 If, for 
reasons of political sensitivity, British troops in Kenya could not be deployed 
elsewhere in Africa or the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf, what was the point of 
keeping them there? As a somewhat perplexed Treasury official put it to the MoD: `Is 
there thus some risk of our being forced into a Malayan type of situation where the 
83 CO 822/2886. EAC (61) MINUTES 2. `Report of Proceedings: Defence and Internal Security'. n. d. 
(c. Jan. 1961), EAC (61) 18 (Revise), `East African Conference. 1961: Summary of Principal 
Conclusions', n. d. (c. Jan. 1961),. 
`94 Ibid., EAC (61) MINUTES 2, 'Report of Proceedings'. n. d. (c. Jan. 1961). fo. 2, para. 4 (e). See 
also: Kyle, Politics of Independence. pp. 123.227, n. 41. 
85 CO 822/2892, Macleod to Watkinson. 12 Jan. 1961. 
`86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid., Peck (Treasury) to C. E. F. Gough (MoD). 19 Jan. 1961. 
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troops cannot be used for their primary purpose but are used instead partly for some 
form of internal security role and partly to bolster up the economy of the territory. "' 
Given the uncertainty over Kenya's political future, the simple fact was that 
Britain might well find itself able to use RAF Eastleigh and the Templer Barracks to 
conduct operations in Kuwait, for example, even if the rest of Africa were, by 
agreement, to end up out of bounds. 89 KANU's refusal to form a government, while 
prolonging all the political uncertainty, also left Britain's defence planners none the 
wiser. Nevertheless, the MoD decided to hedge its bets and to proceed in a piecemeal 
fashion according to the CPC's `best estimate', whereby `it was possible 
... 
that we 
might be able to retain military bases [not `facilities'] in Kenya for six to seven years 90 
The MoD reached a significant conclusion, which was later approved by ministers, and 
is particularly noteworthy if Britain's African strategic bottom line is borne in mind: 
`The technical facilities planned for Eastleigh and Embakasi were essential for the 
planned squadron deployment and to meet the staging requirements for long range 
transport aircraft and no reduction could be made unless some reduction in task were 
accepted by the Chiefs of Staff'91 
Affter a summer of continued uncertainty, exacerbated by hostile public 
comments from not only Mboya, but from Nyerere as well, and contributing to some 
rather rattled nerves in the Treasury, Macmillan decided to intercede in an apparent 
Rx Ibid. For Britain's defence agreement with Malaya. see: David Hawkins. The Defence of. llalavsra 
am! Singapore: fi"oni 
_ 
1-1 ID. 
-1 to 
.. 
LVZUK (London: RUSI. 1972). 
ý9 CO 822/2892. Gough to Peck, 26 Jan. 1961,2-DM 
-593/01. 
Peck to Gough. 27 Jan. 1961. Carstairs 
(CO) to Peck. 10 April 1961. 
9' Ibid.. MISC/M (61) 27. 'Services Building programme: Kenya - Record of a Meeting held in the 
Ministry of Defence 
... 
Monday 
. 
13 March 1961. ' 
91 Ibid.. CAB 131/25. D (61) 7th Meeting. Item 2. 'Kenya Building Programme'. 17 May 1961. D 
(61) 2-5. 'Kenya Building Programme', memo. by Watkinson. 4 May 1961. 
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attempt to resolve the situation once and for all. 92 In a directive to Watkinson, 
Macmillan explained: 
In the light of discussions which I have recently held with Ministers directly concerned 
we can now re-define the political assumptions on which our defence policy and 
strategy should be based. We cannot be sure that all the developments predicated in 
... this paper will materialise-especially since some of them depend on future 
constitutional developments in the Commonwealth or on the decisions of other Governments. But I am satisfied that we shall make the best use of our limited 
resources if we re-cast our policies and plans for the medium and longer term on the 
basis of the assumptions set out 
... 
93 
Crucial among these assumptions was that Britain would not be able to rely on 
using its `military bases or facilities' in any independent country for purposes which 
were not `in full accord with the policies and views of the Governments and peoples of 
those countries'. Britain believed that until 1970 it could rely on having `unrestricted 
use' of `facilities' in Aden, Adu Atoll, Bahrain, Gibraltar, Malta, and the Seychelles. 
However, the British could `expect to suffer restrictions on our freedom to use for 
military purposes facilities in' Cyprus, Greater Malaysia, Kenya, and Libya. The 
assumption remained that this could well be different during a global war, `and in some 
circumstances on a once-for-all basis for limited war'. Yet, even securing staging and 
overflying rights `for purposes with which the Government concerned' was not 
sympathetic might well prove increasingly difficult. While Britain had `an obligation' to 
assist any Commonwealth country in the event of external aggression, Macmillan 
stressed that this did not constitute sufficient grounds for retaining troops on an 
emergent nation's soil: `We should encourage dependent territories to take a greater 
share of responsibility for their internal security. '94 
92 Ibid., Peck to Gough. 11 July 1961. Peck to Wright, 18 July 1961, Wright to Peck. 19 July 1961. 
telegram 243. Griffith-Jones to Webber. 23 July 1961, John Orme (Air Ministry) to E. Melville (CO) 
3 Nov. 1961. 
93 CAB 1)1/26. D (61) 65. 'Defence Policy". note by the Cabinet Secretary. Norman Brook 2') Oct. 
1961. 
94 Ibid.. para. 7. 
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Given what we now know about Britain's strategic bottom line with regard to 
Africa generally, and Kenya in particular, and especially in the light of the need to 
exact economies in overseas defence expenditure, Macmillan's directive was not the 
radical departure that it appears to be at first sight. Certainly, when it came to the 
Prime Minister's outline of Britain's strategic objectives in the Middle East, while 
admittedly at the bottom of the list (after preserving the countries of the area from 
communist influence), retaining air staging facilities in Kenya `if possible' remained. 
`Future plans should be framed on the assumption that Kenya will not be available as a 
military base after 1963, when it is expected to attain independence. '95 Accordingly, 
the Chiefs of Staff would soon begin to examine plans for redeploying troops from 
Kenya to Aden. 96 Britain would, however, hope to retain training and leave camp 
facilities. 97 It is quite clear that with regard to defence aims, British policy in Kenya 
thereafter would be to `adopt in the first place political aims which would ensure that 
our minimum strategic requirements were met, rather than risk losing all by aiming too 
high', as had been envisaged two years earlier by the A(O)C. 98 
By January 1962, as a result of the Defence Committee's decisions, the Air 
Ministry and the War Office had already imposed a `standstill' on some defence-related 
95 Ibid., para. 12. 
96 DEFE 4/142, COS (62) 9th Meeting, Item 6, 'Defence Facilities in Aden'. 6 Feb. 1962; DEFE 
4/143, COS (62) 15th Meeting, Item 3, `Administrative Implications of the Redeployment of Forces 
from Kenya to Aden', 28 Feb. 1962. DEFE 4/144. COS (62) 26th Meeting, Item 2. `Implications of 
the Redeployment of Forces from Kenya to Aden'. 10 April 1962, COS (62) 32nd Meeting, Item 2, 
'Redeployment of Forces from Kenya to Aden and Increased Strength of Bahrain Garrison'. 3 May, 
1962. DEFE 4/145, COS (62) 33rd Meeting. Item 3, -Psychological Operations in the Middle East'. 
Item 4, `Television Service in Aden', 8 May 1962, COS (62) 34th Meeting. Item I. 'Redeployment of 
Forces from Kenya to Aden and Implications of Increasing Strength of Bahrain Garrison' 10 May 
1962. COS (62) 41st Meeting. Item 2. 'Retention of Defence Facilities in Aden'. 19 June 1962: T 
1/27. D (62) O. 225/2210.118/Arabia/132. H. H. Hobbs (War Office) to Peck 18 April 1962. CAB 13  
The Services Building Programme in the Middle East Command'. memo. by Watkinson. 1 June 
1962. 
9^ CAB 131/25. D (61) 17th Meeting, Item 2. 'Oversea Defence Expenditure'. 6 Dec. 1961. fo. 4. 
para. 5. 
')'ý CAB 134/1353. AF (59) 1 st Meeting. 14 Jan. 1959. fo. 4. 
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construction projects. One example, a hardened aircraft hangar, serves to demonstrate 
the curious significance that such schemes had taken on. 99 In response to the 
information that the hangar was to be dismantled, Renison explained that it was 'very 
desirable that [the] hangar should not be demolished before the Lancaster House 
conference since such action might be presumed to imply a decision to withdraw 
troops and might affect attitudes at the conference'. '°° The standstill also created 
difficulties in terms of commitments to local contractors and their employees. 
Moreover, news of the moratorium, irrespective of the fact itself, would demonstrate 
clearly that the colonial power was uncertain of the likely duration of its tenure at the 
pinnacle of Kenya politics. The last thing Britain wanted was to be seen to be 
`retreating'. 101 This might in turn have a grave effect on the already serious levels of 
capital outflow from the colony as well as further undermining inward investment. 102 
On the eve of the February 1962 constitutional conference, the CPC conducted 
an examination of a recent A(O)C report on Kenya's finances. 103 Macmillan's Private 
Secretary, Michael Cary, submitted a far from optimistic assessment: 
99 CO 822/2892 E. F. C. Stanford (AM) to Webber, 15 Nov. 1961. S 5702/S9, T. H. Shearer (AM) to 
Webber, 8 Dec. 1961, telegram 17, Monson to Renison, 11 Jan. 1962. 
100 Ibid., telegram 20, Renison to Monson, 14 Feb. 1962. 
101 Ibid., Macleod to Harold Watkinson (Minister of Defence), 16 Dec. 1960, Hobkirk (MoD) to P. J. 
Kitcatt (Colonial Office). 21 Dec. 1960, telegram 1177. Griffith-Jones (Acting Governor. Kenya) to 
Macleod, 29 Dec. 1960, 'Kenya: Service Building Programme'. draft brief, 4 Jan. 1961. Renison to 
Monson. 14 Feb. 1962. 
102 Ibid., Macleod to Watkinson, 12 Jan. 1961. 
103 CAB 134/1357. AF (61) 10th Meeting, `Financial Implications of Constitutional Development in 
Kenya', 8 Dec. 1961, AF (61) 11th Meeting, Item 2, 'Financial Implications of Constitutional 
Development in Kenya', 21 Dec. 1961, CAB 134/1358, AF (61) 29. `Financial Implications of 
Prospective Constitutional Development in Kenya'. note by Burke Trend. 5 Dec. 1961. AF (61) 32. 
'Financial Implications of Constitutional Development in Kenya'. memo. by the Colonial Office. 19 
Dec. 1961. AF (61) 32 Addendum. 'Financial Implications of Constitutional Development in Kenya'. 
20 Dec. 1961. AF (61) 33. 'Financial Implications of Prospective Constitutional Development in 
Kenya'. note by the MoD, 19 Dec. 1961, CAB 134/1359. AF (62) Ist Meeting. 'Financial 
Implications of Constitutional Development in Kenya'. 16 Jan. 1962. AF (62) 2nd Meeting. Item 1. 
'Financial Implications of Constitutional Development in Kenya'. 25 Jan. 1962. AF (62) 5 (Final). 
'Financial Implications of Constitutional Development in Kenya', report by Burke Trend 30 Jan. 
1962, CAB 134/1561. CPC (62) 3rd Meeting. Item 2, 'Kenya'. 2 Feb. 1962. CPC (62) 3. 'Kenya 
Constitutional Conference'. memo. by Maudling. -s0 Jan. 1962. 
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Already in fact bankrupt but with worse to come, wholly lacking in political, cultural, 
social and economic cohesion, threatened with internal tribal strife and external attack from the north but lacking both funds and forces to maintain adequate security 
services, an independent Kenya represents the least hopeful prospect of all the Colonial 
territories to which we have given or contemplated giving independence. Nevertheless, 
the consequences of withholding independence seem likely, both in the short and in the long term, to be even more menacing to our interests 
. 
104 
As far as British interests were concerned, the security of tenure of British troops at 
Kahawa had by now been seriously brought into question. Earlier, it had been surmised 
that in the likely event of the government of an independent Kenya requiring military 
aid from Britain, this should be limited to just enough to cover internal security 
requirements, leaving little choice in the matter. It was even considered essential that 
the African ministers should be apprised of the `good government' practice of 
restricting military expenditure, which would serve the same purpose. 
Although Mboya, for one, had consistently stated that there could be no place 
for foreign military bases on sovereign Kenya's soil, even tabling several Private 
Member's Motions in Legislative Council to that effect, the British hoped that a 
`responsible' African government would recognise the benefits of British troops in 
terms of external defence requirements. 105 British policy at the February 1962 
constitutional conference had been to attempt to promote `a split' within KANU, 
between the `extreme wing' represented by Kenyatta and Odinga, and the `essentially 
104 PREM 11/3856, `Secret Brief for Prime Minister', by M. Carl, 1 Feb. 1962, fo. 7. also cited in part 
in Kyle, `End of Empire', pp. 15-6, and Politics of Independence, pp. 143-4. 
"'S Ibid., Leg Co N/314/VII/42. `Notice of Motion Tabled on 8th June 1961 by The Hon T. J. Mbova 
(Member for Nairobi East)', telegram 210, Griffith-Jones to Webber. 10 July 1961. telegram 343. 
Webber to Griffith-Jones, 13 July 1961. telegram 936, Maudling to Profumo, 5 January 1962. For the 
immediate British response to such a motion which they had been unable to curtail by filibustering. 
see Griffith-Jones to Webber, 1 December 1961: `Mbova's motion on British bases was debated in the 
Legislative Council yesterday. and after amendment by Government. was passed in the following 
terns without opposition: 
- 
"That this Council, whilst recognising the feelings of certain sections of 
the public regarding foreign military bases, undertakes that the question of the future of British bases 
in Kenya will be the subject of negotiations between the Kenya Colony Government and the 
Government of the United Kingdom. at the time of transition to independence. and that. meanwhile 
Government will initiate discussions with HMG regarding a solution compatible with the true 
interests of a sovereign Kenya. " 
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national' Mboya and his supporters. With `national' now a euphemism for `moderate', 
the then Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs, Reginald Maudling, had hoped that the 
Mboya faction would then enter into a `moderate coalition' with KADU. The 
perceived `essentially tribal' stance of Kenyatta and Odinga might this time be used to 
Britain's advantage. '06 Certainly, as a category, relatively `moderate' nationalists like 
Mboya figured more closely in Britain's calculations for the transfer of power than 
communist-backed `extremists' like Odinga who, as we have seen in the previous 
chapter, also held the dubious honour of being acceptable to the KLFA. lo' 
Towards the end of 1961, British fears of `another outbreak of Mau Mau' had 
added impetus to efforts to secure a constitutional solution to Kenya's internal 
problems. These included the decision to allow Kenyatta to stand for election to the 
legislature as a precursor to the February 1962 constitutional conference. 108 However, 
with Tanganyikan independence imminent, and that of Uganda expected the following 
year, the wholesale expansion of the three territories' KAR battalions and acceleration 
of the Africanisation of the Officer Corps proposed earlier by the governors and local 
military authorities, although viewed `with great sympathy' in Whitehall, could not be 
approved on financial grounds, unless corresponding savings were made elsewhere. In 
lo9 
other words, unless the territories paid for the expansion themselves. 
106 CAB 134/1561, CPC (62) 3, `Kenya Constitutional Conference'. memo. by Maudling. 30 Jan. 
1962, fos. 3-4, para. 7, CAB 128/36 (I), CC (62) 12th Meeting, Item 5. 'Kenya', 8 Feb. 1962: Kyle. 
'End of Empire'. p. 9, and Politics of Independence. pp. 143-4. Maudling. Memoirs. pp. 92-6. 
"" Maloba, 
.1 fait Allaar and Kenva, p. 156, Louis and Robinson, `The Imperialism of Decolonization', 
passim. 
108 CAB 134/1560. CPC (61) 12th Meeting, `Kenya'. 16 Nov. 1961, CPC (61) 30, 'Kenya', memo. by 
Maudling, 14 Nov. 1961, CAB 128/35 (II), CC (61) 63rd Meeting, Item 5. `Kenna'. 16 Nov. 1961. 
109 CO 968/723,80050 APA, `African Officers in the KAR', memo. by Gen. R. E. Goodwin. GOC, 
East Africa, 27 Sept. 1961. C of M (61) 165, 'Plan for Training Officers for 4th KAR'. memo 
prepared by the Minister for Security and External Relations, Uganda. 30 Sept. 1960. minute by 
J. N. A. Armitage-Smith (Private Secretary to Minister of State). 1 Nov. 1960. 'Extra Expenditure on 
KAR in 1961-2 and 1962-Y, unattributed Colonial Office draft memo.. 24 Oct. 1961.2583/61, 
Renison to Maudling. 8 Nov. 1961. 'African Officers'. minute by Profumo for Watkinson. 6 Jan. 
1962.0165/4163 (SD 2 b) DEF 78/6/012. Lt. 
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While the British government accepted, on political grounds, that it had been 
slow to address the problem of training local officers, the situation was complicated by 
Britain's long-term defence aims in the region, including hopes for a federation. With 
the political climate uncertain, and internal security in Kenya ever fragile, memories of 
the former Belgian Congo had not yet faded. The withdrawal of British officers, it 
seemed, `would reduce the local forces to an armed rabble'. `We might be faced with a 
difficult choice between the involvement of British officers in internal affairs and the 
acceptance of serious disorder if the local forces were left to operate without British 
commanders or other support. ' l lo A major difficulty for Britain at the time was 
uncertainty over the levels of British forces, if any, that would be retained in Kenya 
after independence. "' 
Given this ongoing political uncertainty, Britain still had to devise a means of 
ensuring that members of its armed forces would continue to be involved after 
independence in the `executive and command' functions of the Kenyan military. The 
solution turned out to be simple enough: Britain would pay for the retention of 
expatriate personnel. As the CRO explained in a note for the Africa Committee: 
Only by doing so can we ensure that they will be retained, thus making a real 
contribution to the preservation of stability in the area and at the same time barring the 
way to penetration by hostile influences into this most sensitive sector of activity. We 
should also help to ensure the continuity of British methods, equipment etc. and thus 
of our power to exert influence, and should gain a measure of good will by giving aid 
in a desired and acceptable form. 112 
C. D. B. Troughton (War Office), 4 June 1962. DO/81350 APA, Brig. S. C. Chambers (HQ. EAC) to 
Brig. W. G. F. Jackson (WO), DO/0165/4101 (SD2b). Troughton to Adler. 31 July 1962. 
CAB 134/1560, CPC (61) 12th, `Kenva'. 16 Nov. 1961. 
CAB 134/1358, AF (61) 33, `Financial Implications of Prospective Constitutional Development in 
Kenya', note by the Ministry of Defence. 19 Dec. 1961. 
112 CAB 134/1359. AF (62) 27, 'Proposal for Militant' Technical Assistance in East Africa'. note by 
the Commonwealth Relations Office, 17 April 1962, AF (62) 6th Meeting. Item 2. 'Proposal for 
Militan, Technical Assistance in East Africa', 3 May 1962. See also: ibid.. AF (62) 26 (Final). 
'British Policy in Southern and Eastern Africa'. note by the Secretary to the Africa (Official) 
Committee. 18 May 1962. fos. 19-20. paras. 53-8. fo. 23. para. 59 (g). 
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As it turned out, as if to vindicate Britain's new-found faith in his apparently new- 
found moderate credentials, Mboya would soon take the lead in fulfilling his 
government's side of Britain's hoped for defence bargain, despite his public 
pronouncements to the contrary. "' 
In late July 1962, Mboya and Gichuru, then ministers for labour and finance, 
respectively, along with Bruce McKenzie, the minister for land settlement and alleged 
MI6 agent, held discussions with General Sir Richard Hull (GIGS) and General 
Goodwin (GOC, East Africa) over `the question of Kenya's armed forces after 
independence'. 114 In line with their pronouncements against foreign military bases, the 
two African ministers hoped to reach an agreement whereby Britain would assist 
Kenya in developing its own army, navy, and air force. `They realised that Kenya could 
not hope to have enough in defence to look after itself, and clearly hoped to have a 
Defence Agreement with us. It was clear that they would need United Kingdom help in 
training, and it was possible that they might ask for British units to stay on. ' l is While 
the latter proposition remained uncertain, the Chief of the Defence Staff, Lord 
Mountbatten, initiated the reversal of the disbanding of the REAN, requesting that it 
be reconstituted into a smaller Kenyan force. This would demonstrate Britain's bona 
fides and, by doing so, would remove the necessity for Kenya ministers to look 
113 Tom Mboya. Freedom and After (London: Andre Deutsch. 1963 ), p. 236-7. 
114 McKenzie. Kenya's former agriculture minister (1959-1961). had an interesting past. to say the 
least. Apparently a long-standing friend of SAS and Capricorn Africa Society founder. David Stirling. 
McKenzie recommended to the Kenvatta government that it should appoint Stirling 'to negotiate Ni ith 
the British government a scheme for training Kenya's special forces, including the paramilitary 
General Service Unit'. As a result of his alleged contacts wvith. if not membership of M16. he was 
apparently also able to inform Kenyatta in advance of a Soviet arms shipment. supposedly bound for 
Odinga. He also had dealings with Amin in Uganda: Bloch and Fitzgerald. British Intelligence and 
('overt Action. pp. 43.1-53-57.168. Following Sir Dick White's reorganisation of M16 in early 1966. 
McKenzie asked the new controller for Africa, John Taylor. for assistance in establishing a Kenyan 
foreign intelligence service. 'a request which was accepted with alacrity' Bower. The Per-Pct English 
. 
tip)e'. pp. 349-50. See also: Austen Morgan, Harold Ililson (London: Pluto Press. 1992). p. 515. 
"' DEFE 32/7, 'Minutes of a Chiefs of Staff (Informal) Meeting held on Tucsda). 7th August. 1962*. 
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elsewhere to satisfy their defence requirements. Equally, Britain would retain a stake in 
Kenya's naval defence, perhaps smoothing the way for continued use of dockyard refit 
and refuelling facilities. All Kenyan military forces would, of course, come under the 
direction of a `central MoD administration'. Even the reduction of British `influence' 
following the probable replacement of British officers with their locally recruited 
counterparts after independence, although preferable to that by `personnel from what 
we should regard as undesirable sources', could be addressed: `and as regards 
achieving the desired result, it would often be possible to work through a training 
mission even when secondment had ceased to be acceptable'. 
116 
In the meantime, while the Chiefs of Staff were busily planning to redeploy 
forces from Kenya to Aden, Britain had to contend with the potential crisis represented 
by Yemeni raids into Aden. "' The Governor of Aden, Sir Charles Johnston, enjoyed 
authority without prior reference to London for `counter battery and retaliatory action' 
against such incursions. Measures were also being considered `to promote the 
favourable climate of opinion in Aden necessary to ensure the long term security of the 
Aden base', including proposals for a merger of Aden Colony with the Federation of 
South Arabia, and the rather belated appointment of a `senior British Arabist'. 18 Yet 
116 CAB 134/2276, OC (0) (62) 5th Meeting, Item 1. 'Secondment of British Personnel to the Armed 
Forces of Newly Independent Countries'. 28 Sept. 1962, OC (0) (62) 14. `Subsidisation of Cost of 
British Personnel Serving with the Armed Forces of Certain Commonwealth Countries', memo. by 
the CRO, 13 Sept. 1962, OC (0) (62) 6th Meeting, Item 1, `Subsidised Secondment of British 
Servicemen to Commonwealth Countries', 19 Oct. 1962. For the importance attached to training 
African military officers in Britain. see: CAB 148/46. OPD (0) (A) (65) 3. 'Africa South of the 
Sahara, note by the FO and the CRO, 11 Feb. 1965. para. 32: 'These courses of training provide us 
with a valuable opportunity to influence potentially key military leaders in the new Commonwealth 
countries in Africa. ' 
117 DEFE 4/146. COS (62) 47th Meeting, Item 4. 'Authorities for Counter-Battery and Retaliatory 
Action against the Yemen'. 19 July 1962. 
118 Ibid., COS (62) 48th Meeting, Item 3, 'Information Services in Aden'. 24 July 1962. COS (62) 
50th Meeting, Item 3. 'Defence Facilities in Aden'. 31 July 1962, COS (62) 52nd Meeting. Item 1. 
Retention of Sovereign Base Areas in Aden'. 7 Aug. 1962. CAB 128/36. CC (62) 52nd Meeting. 
Item 1. 'Aden'. 11 Aug. 1962: DEFE 4/147, COS (62) 53rd Meeting. Item 5. 'Retention of Defence 
Facilities in Aden'. 21 Aug. 1962, COS (62) 57th Meeting. 'Retention of Defence Facilities in Aden'. 
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Britain was ill-prepared for the 27 September 1962 Yemen revolution, as well as its 
implications. 119 
Earlier British hopes of establishing legally entrenched principles for the 
retention of `sovereign base areas' in Aden before the colony joined in a federation 
were diminished by fears of antagonising Adeni public opinion in the potentially 
volatile circumstances created by the Yemen Coup. 120 While the Yemen revolution was 
expected to remain a primarily internal affair, at least for the first month or so, serious 
consideration had to be given to the prospects for overt British military action to 
defend Aden's frontiers, as well as counter-subversion measures. 121 `It is conceivable 
that political developments in the Arabian Peninsula may make it difficult for us to rely 
on continuing use of our defence facilities in Aden after 1967. '122 This again raised 
questions over Britain's handling of constitutional advance in Kenya with regard to 
strategic requirements. If security of tenure could not be expected in Aden all that long 
after withdrawal from Kenya, and while there still remained a faint hope of staying on 
in East Africa, upgrading facilities in the former could well end up being a case of 
throwing `good money after bad'. Why risk increasing turbulence in the Middle East 
when a friendly Kenya could still be amenable to a British military presence? 
20 Sept. 1962, COS (62) 58th Meeting, Item 4. 'Retention of Defence Facilities in Aden'. 25 Sept. 
1962. 
119 Balfour-Paul, The end of empire in the Middle East. p. 78; Fitzsimons, Empire bj., Treaty. p. 216; 
Lapping, End of'Empire. p. 287. 
120 DEFE 4/147, COS (62) 60th Meeting, Item 8, 'Retention of Defence Facilities in Aden'. 2 Oct. 
1962. 
DEFE 4/148, COS (62) 62nd Meeting, Confidential Annex ('UK Eyes Only'). Item 5, 'Situation in 
the Yemen'. 9 Oct. 1962. COS (62) 64th Meeting. Item 1. `Retention of Defence Facilities in Aden'. 
Item 2. `Information Services in Aden'. 16 Oct. 1962. COS (62) 66th Meeting. Item 4. 'Measures 
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Britain was equally, if not more, afraid of the possible implications of the 
Yemen situation for Kuwait. In the event of operations being conducted to deter or 
expel Iraq from Kuwait, 1,300 troops would have to be flown quickly to Aden. This 
made it imperative that accommodation intended for the redeployment from Kenya, 
although cheaper and reduced in standard, should be completed as soon as possible. "' 
As might have been expected, given the general climate of financial stringency, and 
especially in the light of concerns over the Yemen and Aden, any further expenditure 
had to be justified. Because Britain had managed successfully to postpone until 
independence any substantive defence negotiations with Kenya government ministers, 
it still remained uncertain whether attitudes to the British base would soften under the 
afterglow of having achieved full sovereignty. After all, by the time Britain had 
withdrawn from formal administration of the colony, then surely any question of 
imperialist aims or domination would become anachronistic? 
In late 1962, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary in the Colonial Office, Nigel 
Fisher, certainly felt that the dire prospects for Kenya's economy of withdrawing 
British troops could be used as a lever in negotiations. 124 Some Treasury officials even 
questioned the levels of political sensitivity that Britain ascribed to prospective defence 
negotiations: `I should think it unwise for Kenya Ministers to be given any idea that we 
are open to suggestions from them as to the number of troops we should keep 
there. '125 It followed that it appeared to be equally unwise to commit funds to Aden 
123 T 225/2210,118/Arabia/140 (WA2(a)). R. W. Barrow (WO) to P. H. F. Dodd (Treasury). 12 Oct. 
1962.11/018/02. J. A. Millson (MOD) to Dodd. 30 Oct. 1962. For Britain's increasing concern over 
Kuwait's security from Iraq as Kenya drew closer to independence. see: CAB 148/15. DOP (631) 1st 
Meeting. Item 3. 'Middle East Command forces'. 13 Nov. 1963. and DO (6 3) 5. 'Middle East 
Command Forces'. note by the Chairman of the DOP (0) C, 8 Nov. 1963N. 
DEFE 13/297. Fisher to Thornevcroft. 27 Nov. 1962. 
', Ibid.. John Boyd Carpenter (Chief Secretary. Treasury-) to Fisher. 28 Dec. 1962. 
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when it could still prove to be the case that British troops might well remain in Kenya. 
Naturally, the Treasury was more than prepared to consider such ideas. 126 
Britain had delayed holding detailed defence negotiations with Kenya ministers 
until the last moment in the hope of forestalling a rash and unfavourable decision. 
However, in a sense, by doing so Britain was hoist by its own petard. The delay in 
holding the negotiations would always lead to a correspondingly late agreement, 
making it impossible to foresee whether or not an independent Kenya would be 
amenable to the retention of British troops after all. While there were still some 
officials in Whitehall who felt that unfavourable pronouncements on Britain's military 
bases in Kenya by KANU ministers amounted to little more than political posturing, 
driven by the requirement to be seen to be more nationalistic than their rivals, the 
consequences of ignoring such statements could well have proven to be far more 
damaging to Britain's defence interests. The likelihood that even if British troops 
remained in Kenya after independence there would be `severe restrictions' placed on 
their use left Britain with little option other than to adhere to the spirit of Macmillan's 
1961 directive. 127 Why risk losing all by aiming too high? 
This decision was vindicated in November 1962, when Kenyatta, then President 
of KANU, congratulated the Permanent Representative of the Saudi-Arabian 
Delegation to the UN on his recent demand for the removal of British military bases in 
Kenya and Aden. It thereby finally became a practical certainty that it would be 
politically impossible to retain large numbers of British troops for more than a very 
1 26 T 225/2211. Treasury minute- 'Kenya Forces After Independence: Mr Nigel Fishers Letter of 28th 
November [sic]'. 19 Dec. 1962. 
DEFE 13/297. Thorneycroft to Fisher. 11 Jan. 1963, 'British Troops in Kenya* unattributed brief 
for Profumo, n. d. (c. Feb. 
-March 1963). PREM 11/4328, minute by Thorneycroft for Macmillan. 7 
March 1963. 
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limited period, no matter who, ultimately, was to rule Kenya. 128 Britain thus had to 
proceed with the fateful plan for upgrading Aden, as well as ensuring that Kenya's 
military would be able to fulfil at least its internal security role. 129 It should be stressed, 
though, that this did not spell the end of Britain's strategic interests in Kenya, nor the 
achievement of its minimum defence aims, which would be facilitated by some far from 
novel means. 
`Stage 4': arming the Kenyatta state, and maintaining British `influence', 1963-5 
By January 1963, the likelihood of the withdrawal of British troops from Kenya, and 
probable restrictions on their use after independence, forced British ministers to 
concede that Kenya's military had to be built up vigorously. `Unless, therefore, we are 
prepared to risk a Congo-type situation in Kenya from mid-1964 onwards we must act 
quickly to expand 70 Brigade. ' 130 Britain would have to continue to plan for the 
phased withdrawal of its forces, making any proposed arrangements to expand and, 
more importantly, to train Kenya's forces thereafter, all the more vital. As 
Thorneycroft explained to Nigel Fisher at the Colonial Office: 
We certainly could not take the risk of cancelling or stretching out these [withdrawal] 
plans against the possibility that Kenya Ministers might at some future date welcome 
military help. [... ] That is not to say that we should refrain from negotiating 
... 
for the 
retention for as long as may be of air staging, overflying, training and communications 
facilities and so on and for assistance, including seconded personnel, in the training of 
Kenya Defence Forces. With regard to the latter, in view of the especial importance of 
1 CO 822/2892, un-numbered telegram, Kenya (Public Relations Department) to Webber. 14 Nov. 
1962, hand-written minute by Hull (CO), n. d. (c. 15 Nov. 1962): 'It is clear 
... 
if the position was at 
all doubtful before. that the recent Kenya proposals that we might retain some military facilities in 
exchange for building up the Kenya Army- amount at best to a dollar pro quo [sic]. ' 
129 DEFE 4/150. COS (62) 76th Meeting. Item 1. `The Implications of the Yemeni Revolt'. 4 Dec. 
1962, COS (62) 77th Meeting, Item 1, 'Television Service in Aden'. 6 Dec. 1962. COS (62) 79th 
Meeting. Item 'N. 'Western Aden Protectorate Security Report'. 11 Dec. 1962. COS (62) 82nd 
Meeting. Item 2. 'The Situation in the Yemen'. 20 Dec. 1962. DEFE 13/297. Thornevcroft to Fisher. 
II Jan. 1963. T 225/2211.118/Arabia/20 (WA2(A)). Batho (WO) to Dodd (T). 29 Jan. 1196 3. 
'kcnva/Aden'. Treasury minute by Dodd. )1 Jan. 196'. 
"o DEFE 13/297. Thornevcroft to Fisher, 11 Jan. 196 3. 
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EASTLEIGH [sic], the Air Ministry are working out proposals for the training of a 
small Kenyan air force as an inducement to Kenya to grant us these facilities. l' 1 
Despite the imposition by the Treasury of a temporary standstill on 
construction projects in Aden, Thorneycroft's caution had been justified by London's 
reluctance to second guess KANU's ultimate outlook on the stationing of British 
troops in Kenya. 1 33 2 In the run up to the June 1963 elections, both KANU, in its 
manifesto, and KADU, orally, had made statements to the following effect: `In 
accordance with the principles of non-alignment we shall not permit the existence of 
foreign military bases on our soil. ' 1'3 Following the June 1963 election, Britain 
therefore wasted little time in trying to keep KANU `on side'. The Sandys-Mboya 
communique of 20 June 1963 dispelled any notion that Britain would retain a 
permanent military base in Kenya, with troop withdrawals planned to be completed by 
December 1964.134 In a stroke Sandys had unravelled years of painstaking military 
planning and expenditure. `Thus finally perished the doomed post-Suez project of 
basing Britain's Middle East reserves on Kenyan soil. ' 1'5 Despite Kyle's dismissive 
remark, it should be stressed that Britain already had contingency plans for withdrawal 
from Kenya and, as we have seen, was well prepared to accept a very modest strategic 
settlement. Britain's public acceptance of KANU's demands for closure of the Kahawa 
base suggests that it seemed expedient to remove one of the main African `extremist' 
objections to the independence settlement: the diminution of sovereignty represented 
1 31 Ibid. See also: CAB 134/2278, OC (0) (63) 27. 'Expansion of Kenva Military Forces', note by the 
Colonial Office, 26 July 1963. 
132 T 225/2211. Sir R. H. Scott (MoD) to R. W. B. Clarke (T), 19 April 1963, 'Service Building in the 
Middle East and Far East: Sir R Scott's letter of 19th April'. Treasury minute by Peck for Sir R. 
Hams and Clarke. 24 April 1963: `I agree with Mr Peck that wie should be throwing away a valuable 
instrument of leverage vis-a-vis (sich the Service Department's if «e were now to accede to Sir Robert 
Scott's request [to lift the ban on works in Aden] ". appended minute by Hams. 26 April 196". 
133 Ibid.. Sir Hilton Povnton (CO) to Clarke. 21 May 1963. 
134 Kyle. Politics of Indepc'ndenec. p. 18' 
. 
135 Ibid. 
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by a British military base in Kenya. Far better than to risk undermining Kenyatta's 
legitimacy as nationalist leader by providing his rivals with quite literally concrete 
political capital. KANU ministers might therefore also be amenable to Britain's 
requests for staging and overflying rights, especially now that it was incumbent on the 
latter to expand Kenya's military. 136 
As it turned out, this astute act of political legerdemain paid off, and did not 
prove to be the end, nor even the swansong of Britain's military involvement in Kenya. 
Britain was determined to ensure that any promise of financial and logistic support in 
expanding Kenya's armed forces would be attached to a reciprocal promise of the 
military `concessions' mentioned above. Even during the September/October 1963 
`Independence Conference', Britain therefore agreed to its commitment to Kenya 
taking the form of `proposals in principle only'. '37 Of course, the delay implied by all 
this would, in the event of agreement, add to the longevity of the duration of British 
military training teams in Kenya, thus continuing access to military `facilities'. ' 8 
The impetus added to the defence negotiations by Britain's involvement in 
suppressing the January 1964 Kenya Rifles mutiny ensured that it did not take long for 
this hope to be realised. 139 On 12 March 1964, following a recent visit to East Africa, 
Sandys informed the Cabinet that the Kenya government was `anxious to strengthen 
their armed forces and to improve their arrangements for maintaining internal 
security'. 140 He had reached `broad agreement' that Britain would help to train the 
136 DEFE 13/297, 'Military Implications of a Phased Withdrawal of British Forces from Kenya during 
1964'. brief by Mountbatten for Thornevcroft. 28 Aug. 1963. 
137 CAB 1'14/2277, CC (0) (63) l 3th Meeting. Item 1,30 July 1963: CAB 13 4/2278. OC (0) (6') 27. 
'Expansion of Kenya Militan" Forces-. note by the Colonial Office. 26 July 196". 
"' DEFE 13/297. 'Militant' Implications of a phased Withdrawal of British Forces from Kenya During 
1964'. minute by Mountbatten for Thorne)-croft. 28 Aug. 1963. 
131) PREM 11/4889. telegram 246, de Freitas to Sandes. 29 Jan. 1964. 
'i"' CAB 128/38 (II). CM (64) 18th Meeting. Item 3. 'East Africa'. 12 March 1964. See also. CAB 
148/1. DO (64) 13th Meeting. Item 1. 'East Africa. 11 March 1964. DO ((4) 15th Meeting. Item 2. 
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Kenya army and air force, and would transfer `certain items of equipment and 
accommodation to the Kenya forces'. In exchange, the Kenya government would grant 
overflying and staging rights to British military aircraft, and naval facilities at 
Mombasa. `They had also agreed that British units might visit Kenya at intervals for 
military training and exercises. ' 141 
The icing on the cake, however, had come in a telegram from the then British 
High Commissioner, Sir Geoffrey de Freitas, dated 10 March 1964, in which he 
outlined the contents of a recent letter from Kenyatta: `I shall be grateful if the British 
Government will agree to retain in Kenya after 12th December 1964 sufficient British 
Army and Royal Air Force personnel to carry [out] these duties in Kenya which are 
beyond the present capability of Kenya Armed Forces. ' 142 Following the January 
mutiny, it had already been agreed that, under the guise of maintaining internal 
stability, British troops could operate `back and forth on the mainland 
... 
as the military 
situation requires'. 14' Barring the difficulty of tying the defence negotiations to the land 
settlement question, the matter of some £45-7 million of financial aid `over the next 
few years', and Kenyan concerns over the all too convenient delays in forming the 
Kenya Navy, Britain had gained practically all that it wanted. 144 While Kenya would 
`East Africa: Kenya Discussions'. 18 March, 1964: and CAB 148/2, DO (64) 19. `East Africa 
- 
Defence Arrangements', memo. by Sands. 9 March 1964. 
141 CAB 128/38 (II), CM (64) 18th Meeting, Item 3. 'East Africa', 12 March 1964. 
142 CAB 148/2, telegram 511. de Freitas to Sandes. 10 March 1964. 
143 CAB 148/4, DO (0) (64) 4. `British Defence Obligations in the Commonwealth'. memo. by the 
CRO, 10 Feb. 1964, fo. 146. para. 38. 
"4 For details of the defence negotiations see, for example: PREM 11/4889, 'East Africa 
- 
Kenya 
Discussions', brief by Burke Trend 17 March 1964. 'Memorandum of Intention and Understanding 
Regarding Certain Financial and Defence Matters of Mutual Interest to the British and Kenn a 
Governments (As approved by British Ministers)'. n. d. (c. April 1964). See also: CAB l')4/2279. OC 
(0) (64) 4th Meeting, `East Africa: Defence and Financial Negotiations'. 21 Feb. 1964. OC (0) (64) 
2. 'East Africa: Defence and Financial Negotiations. memo. by the CRO. 20 Feb. 1964. CAB 148/1. 
DO (64) 10th Meeting. Item 3. 'East Africa'. 26 Feb. 1964. DO (64) 16, 'East Africa 
- 
Defence 
Arrangements'. memo. by Sandes. 24 Feb. 1964. CAB 148/4. DO (0) (64) 6th Meeting. 'Kenya - 
Defence and Financial Discussions'. 1I March 1964. DO (0) (64) 8th Meeting. 'Kenya - Defence and 
Financial Discussions, 7 April 1964. CAB 148/2. DO (0) (64) 13. 'Ken a: Defence and Financial 
Discussions'. memo. by the CRO. 1? March 1964. DO (64) 19. 'East Africa - Defence 
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never attain the kind of defensive `pole position" that had been ascribed alternately to, 
say, Aden, Cyprus, Egypt, Libya, Malaya, or Singapore, it would remain an important 
`fall back' option and would help to maintain a significant degree of British influence in 
a sensitive region of the world. As the CRO East Africa Political Department put it in 
July 1965, with regard to the need to minimise communist penetration in Kenya: `We 
enjoy military facilities which have proved useful already and some of which cannot yet 
be replaced from elsewhere. ' las Under the terms of the 1964 Anglo-Kenyan Defence 
Agreement, British troops in Kenya would, if required, assist in `dealing with internal 
disturbances', while Britain also agreed to `cancel the eight interest free loans (totalling 
£6.05 million) made to the Kenya Government during the period September 1954 to 
March 1960'! Quid pro quo or status quo? 
In the previous chapter it has been shown that even the new British Labour 
government supported its Conservative predecessor's initiatives when it came to 
assisting in the maintenance of independent Kenya's internal security and, more 
important, was equally committed to keeping Kenyatta or a `moderate' successor in 
power. Labour also had to follow in the footsteps of the previous administration in 
attempting to apply economies to defence expenditure, while at the same time 
remaining equally reluctant to reduce Britain's world-wide commitments, at least until 
the financial crises of 1966-7.146 This was especially the case because the new party of 
Arrangements', memo. by Sandys, 9 March 1964, DO (64) 21, `East Africa: Kenya Discussions'. note 
by the Chairman of the Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee. 16 March 1964; CAB 
148/5. DO (0) (64) 20, 'The Defence and Financial Discussions with Kenya in Nairobi. March 1964'. 
Report by the Leader of the British Delegation', 3 April 1964: CAB 148/7. DO (0) (64) 61. 
'Formation of the Kenya Navy, joint memo. by the CRO and the MoD. 27 July 1964. DO (0) (64) 61, 
`Copy of letter from the Prime Minister of Kenya to the Commonwealth Secretary dated 14th July - 
FORMATION OF THE KENYA NAVY (. cicl'. 27 July 1964. and Page. KiR. pp. 264-8. PREM 
11/4889. 'Formation of the Kenya NaNý `. brief by Burke Trend for Douglas-Home. 29 July 1964. 
''` CAB 134/2544. RJ 5545/235. 'The Implications of Sino-Soviet Penetration in Black Africa (SV 
(65) 1- 19 Jan. 196 '. paper by the CRO. Juli 1965. fo. 126. 
116 Carver, Tightrope Walking. pp. 70-5: Dan Keohane. Labour Party Defence Policy 
. 
since 1945 
(Leicester. London: Leicester University Press. 199$). p. 21: Ovendale (ed. ). British Defence Pa/icy 
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government had inherited an £800 million balance of payments deficit- as well as the 
ongoing deployment of some 390-400,000 military personnel overseas, around 54.000 
of whom were engaged against the `Indonesian Confrontation' in Southeast Asia. 147 
The newly-elected Labour government was aided initially in this task by the 
decision taken earlier in the year by the Douglas-Home government to establish in May 
1964 a defence and oversea policy `Long Term Study Group' (LTSG), in an effort to 
rationalise defence commitments with expenditure; in itself a logical extension of 
Macmillan's initiatives of 1960-1 and the amalgamation of the defence and oversea 
policy committees in October 1963.148 With the help of the new Defence Secretary, 
Denis Healey, Prime Minister Harold Wilson soon demonstrated that he was in fact an 
`east of Suez man', with savings in defence expenditure found by scuttling US 
proposals for a multi-lateral nuclear deterrent (MLF) in favour of the less expensive 
British alternative, the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF), and the eventual cancellation of 
several very costly military aviation development projects, in favour of buying US 
aircraft `off the shelf. 149 
While all this was eventually to prove to be futile, given Britain's ultimate 
withdrawal of a large part of its military forces from east of Suez, ironically, it seems 
that Britain's defence and internal security links with Kenya survived long after the 
since 1945, p. 8, Pickering, Britain 's Withdrawal fi"oin East of Suez, pp. 135-49,150-76; Clive 
Ponting, Breach of Promise: Labour in Power 1964-1970 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1989), pp. 
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in Opposition, 1964-70', p. 184, Nicholas Woodward 'Labour's economic performance. 1964-70'. 
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evacuation from Aden. 150 The LTSG had been set up with a view to 'breaking the 
pattern of seeking "automatically to justify the status quo"". However, there was 
disagreement between the Board of Trade and the Treasury, and the Foreign Office 
over how in future to protect Britain's overseas interests: the former favoured 
commercial and diplomatic means, while the latter could not conceive of abandoning a 
British military presence. With Foreign Office officials Michael Palliser and Sir John 
Nicholls, the Deputy Under-Secretary, dominating the proceedings and writing the 
LTSG report, it is not surprising that the latter view prevailed. The report recognised 
that hitherto Britain had maintained global commitments and "`an influence 
disproportionate to" its economic strength'. Yet, as Dockrill observes, the question 
arose whether Britain, by contracting some of its overseas interests in order to reduce 
the costs of maintaining them, would find the consequent reduction in `power and 
influence' so great `as to endanger her economic and political independence' 
. 
15' There 
was also the matter of whether withdrawal from east of Suez would in fact produce 
any savings, not to mention what the US attitude would be. Significantly, the report 
was completed just days before Labour's election victory, and the condensed version 
(for Cabinet perusal) concluded that `there will never be an ideal moment for decisions 
1' Space precludes further consideration of the `east of Suez decision'. For debate and details, see. for 
example: Sir Ewen Broadbent, The ý1lilitarv and Government: from Macmillan to Heseltine (London: 
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to be taken, but unless they are taken in the very near future, the carrying out of policy 
will be seriously prejudiced '. 1s2 
Of course, one of the main assumptions underlying the LTSG study. that 
Britain could not expect to retain its military bases in Aden and Singapore for another 
ten years, had to be shelved because of immediate financial difficulties. The Wilson 
government had accepted that in the long term withdrawal would take place, and that 
it should be an ordered affair. In the short term, however, Britain would remain east of 
Suez, and savings were made in the fields of nuclear deterrence and military aviation 
projects. There was `considerable support' within Wilson's immediate coterie `for the 
view that our first priority should be the maintenance' of the east of Suez role. 153 With 
the reduced commitment in Kenya negotiated by the Conservative government, it 
follows that it was unnecessary to make any drastic changes there. This was especially 
the case given that, in the long term, besides the commitment to Europe through 
NATO, and the nuclear deterrent, Britain's interests in the Middle East were seen as 
paramount. 154 Kenya could still prove to be very useful if things `went wrong' in Aden 
and/or the Gulf, and the LTSG was certainly aware of the importance to Britain of 
retaining military facilities there. "' In 1965, although Britain was allowed passage 
through the Suez Canal, the southern air route via Libya, Sudan, and Kenya was closed 
by the recently changed Sudan government. `But our use of the 
... 
route may well be 
restored to a substantial degree and it must be our aim to keep the maximum options 
''` CAB 1 x0/213. MISC 17/2, 'British Interests and Commitments Overseas'. 18 Nov. 1964, cited in 
ibid.. p. 7. 
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open. '156 Without the Defence Agreement with Kenya, even this unlikely outcome 
would have been practically impossible. 
Conclusion 
In many respects it could be argued that any consideration of Kenya in terms of 
Britain's `east of Suez role' after December 1963 is largely academic, if not irrelevant. 
Yet, the former colony's effective invisibility from previous studies of British defence 
policy presents an ironic departure from current interpretations of the transfer of 
power. In a sense, Britain's staggered military withdrawal from Kenya served as a 
model for the ultimate abandonment of east of Suez. Of course, Britain did not 
maintain military facilities, even on a small scale, in all of the territories where it 
formerly held political influence. Libya is one good example. However, Britain's 
strategic bottom line in Kenya, whereby minimal `defence rights' were retained, in 
exchange for financial, internal security, and military assistance, whether overt or 
secret, has proved to be far more successful than the pre-1968 Foreign Office model, if 
it can be called that, and belies earlier failures to take seriously Kenya's place in British 
defence policy. Equally, Britain's achievement in keeping Kenya pro-Western will not 
have been lost on its principal ally. Mombasa Harbour, which in the late 1970s was 
dredged by the US to enable the berthing of aircraft carriers from the Sixth Fleet, at the 
cost of some $50 million, has proven to be a far safer haven than Aden. Even if 
Kenya's significance to British defence strategy did indeed diminish from the early 
1970s onwards, that significance during the twenty years after the Second World War. 
no matter how periodic, has surely warranted more detailed consideration than 
1 56 CAB 129/120. C (65) 49. The Middle East'. memo. by M. Stewart (Foreign Secretary). 24 March 
1965. 
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previous scholarship would suggest. Moreover, one suspects that, available 
documentation allowing, detailed analysis of Anglo-Kenyan defence and foreign 
relations, and British assistance in maintaining Kenya's internal security over the ten 
years or so from 1965, would produce more than a few surprises. 
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Conclusions 
British Defence and Colonial Internal Security Policy in East Africa, 1945-65 
This thesis has examined a hitherto largely neglected aspect of British decolonisation in 
Kenya. By considering Kenya's vacillating place in Britain's overseas defence strategy 
and related internal security issues in the context of the first twenty years of the Cold 
War, it has demonstrated the large degree of continuity in British policy. Clearly, given 
this broad perspective, defence and security issues beyond the confines of the Mau 
Mau Emergency were far more significant to Britain than has hitherto been 
acknowledged. 
As the Second World War drew to an end, and Cold War preparations began, 
British officials in East Africa began to assess their readiness to cope with the possible 
threat to internal security posed by the imminent mass demobilisation of African 
soldiers and an expected upsurge in anti-colonial nationalism. The East African 
governors found their intelligence systems to be woefully inadequate. They also had 
considerable restrictions placed upon their ability to fulfil the manpower requirements 
deemed necessary to maintain control in the event of a State of Emergency, as a result 
of financial and manpower limits imposed in London. As the Cold War took hold, the 
situation was exacerbated by uncertainty in London over the precise nature of future 
defence policy in the Middle East, and the broad question of colonial defence and 
security throughout the British Empire. The prognosis for internal security in Kenya 
was not helped, either, by the considerable levels of political and socio-economic 
hardship, thus disaffection, among the colony's majority African population. 
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Nevertheless, the Kenya government took serious steps in planning and 
preparing for the possibility of a serious breakdown in `public security'. The Kenya 
Police did all in its power to `nip" a potential security crisis `in the bud'. Yet, if 
anything, the major problem for Kenya's security planners during the early stages of 
the Cold War was the multitude of potential threats that they had to assess. Ironically, 
in the absence of meaningful or sufficient political and socio-economic improvements, 
government repression, even at the level of a handful of pre-emptive arrests, served 
only to increase the likelihood of the insurgency that they were designed to prevent. 
Between 1945 and 1952, Kenya might not in fact have been in the throes of an armed 
insurrection, but the declaration of the State of Emergency and the concomitant 
increase in repressive measures soon brought this about. 
As government repression led to the onset of the Emergency it was designed to 
forestall, so the level and sophistication of that repression had to be increased. Clearly, 
despite the piecemeal political reforms and selectively targeted socio-economic 
developments introduced during the 1952-6 period, British counter-insurgency was not 
designed to pave the way for the transfer of power to anti-colonial nationalists. British 
prerogatives were, primarily, to regain control. By the end of 1956, it appeared that 
this had largely been achieved. This was perhaps a fortunate coincidence for a Britain 
which had so very recently fallen foul not only of the stubborn Egyptian nationalist, 
Colonel Nasser, but of diplomatic and economic pressures applied from that most 
unlikely of quarters, Washington. 
Britain's decision to `permanently' station elements of the UK Strategic 
Reserve in Kenya, taken shortly after the Mau Mau and Suez conflicts- confirms that 
the reforms introduced during the previous four years were designed to ensure British 
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control of the colony. The Lyttelton Constitution and Swynnerton Plan in no way 
constituted a precursor to the planned transfer of power to an African majority 
government. Indeed, British defence chiefs and officials concerned themselves mainly 
with the day-to-day mundanities associated with moving troops to Kenya, while their 
colleagues in the Colonial Office did their utmost to silence the increasingly vocal and, 
it must have seemed, irrational African nationalists. Britain's strategic project in Kenya 
did not seem doomed from the start to those involved at the time. Besides, with Mau 
Mau apparently defeated, the imposition of the Lennox-Boyd Constitution surely 
demonstrated that political development in Kenya was proceeding in an orderly, if not 
break-neck fashion. While the nationalists adhered to the ethereal Colonial Office 
timetable for further constitutional advance, little regard had to be paid to African 
political sensibilities. 
Yet, just as the numerous problems associated with stationing British troops in 
Kenya seemed to have been ironed out, British defence strategists were compelled 
once more to take account of African political considerations. With the Africans' 
boycott of Legislative Council of January 1959 serving to undermine the veneer of 
political stability in Kenya, so too was the legitimacy of Britain's nominal 
developmental strategy brought into question. Only then did Britain begin to 
contemplate seriously its strategic options in Kenya with regard to the Africans' refusal 
to legitimise the process further with their participation. As Britain's political 
legitimacy in Kenya was brought increasingly into question, the grounds for retaining 
its military bases there became all the more difficult to justify. Yet, three years of 
painstaking military planning and implementation would not be cast aside lightly. 
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Every effort was therefore made by Britain to be seen to make concessions to 
legitimate African nationalist aspirations, and thereby hoped that Kenya would remain 
stable enough for Britain to be able to `guide' future political developments at its 
leisure. This seemed the best means of safeguarding existing economic interests and 
prolonging the post-Suez regional defence strategy. However, ever-increasing socio- 
economic hardship among Africans provided fertile ground for the nationalists, if they 
were radical enough, and those who did not care for politics, especially among the 
Kikuyu, reverted to their traditional secretive practices. Rising crime and militancy on 
a par with levels seen before the Mau Mau Emergency and scarce resources ensured 
that the fiction of `normality' in Kenyan society could only be perpetuated while the 
African nationalists continued to legitimise Britain's political dalliance. Once African 
participation was withdrawn,. Britain was compelled to meet the nationalists halfway if 
it were to avoid a repeat of Mau Mau and the dangerous prospect of an irreversible 
loss of control. 
With the principle of the constitutional conference established in January 1960, 
Britain still had more work to do in order to bring the KANU nationalists on board. 
Again, it was perhaps fortunate, if not totally unexpected in all quarters, that 
Kenyatta's release provided the appropriate calming influence. The political climate in 
Kenya was thereby moderated to a considerable extent, and many colonial officials' 
nerves were correspondingly settled by his rehabilitation. Thus, with the circumstances 
apparently ripe for the withdrawal of formal administration, Britain did all in its power 
to bolster Kenyatta's position in readiness for independence. By arming the Kenyatta 
state Britain ensured that future threats to Kenya's stability could be 
dealt with by 
largely `political' means. 
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As the last chapter in this thesis makes clear, one of the key motives 
underpinning Britain's political and internal security policies in Kenya from early 1957 
to beyond independence was its defence interests. Hitherto, it could be argued that 
British defence policy in Kenya, especially with regard to the `east of Suez role' after 
December 1963, does not warrant detailed academic attention. Yet, as this thesis has 
shown, the former colony remained, if not in the forefront, then certainly not absent 
from British defence planner's thinking. Kenya may not have remained a large military 
installation, at least not for Britain, but the staggered military withdrawal, it could be 
argued, was at least representative of an orderly and mutually beneficial model. Britain 
no longer needed a base. 
This is confirmed by the very fact that Britain did not maintain military 
facilities, even on a small scale, in all of the territories where it formerly held political 
control. However, it should be stressed that Britain did retain albeit minimal `defence 
rights' in Kenya, in exchange for financial, internal security, and military assistance, 
designed to maintain the country's stability. The defence and security aspects of that 
particular decolonisation were therefore a resounding success, at least from the Cold 
War perspective. 
While Kenya's strategic significance to Britain did indeed diminish from the 
early 1970s onwards, the former colony remained largely pro-Western, if not 
benevolently neutral, throughout the Cold War. Although Kenya has been sullied by 
massive levels of political corruption, and far too many of its citizens still suffer from 
`land hunger' and remain in abject poverty, in comparative African terms the country 
represents a rare post-independence success story. 
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